Should one save the greater number from harm? Flashcards
What is consequentialism? Is it different from utilitarianism?
Consequentialism is the belief that one ought to do the most good one possibly can. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism that maintains (i) consequentialism (above) and (ii) that happiness is the only thing that’s good
Describe some problems with consequentialism. Are there responses to these?
- it seems overly demanding - maximising the good of your actions may require you to donate your organs (e.g. eyes) to help the lives of many others. or else the donation of all your possessions to help the starving.
RESPONSE: (i) being good isn’t easy, (ii) consequentialism provides a moral ideal rather than an account of what we’re obligated to do (supererogation) - consequentialism could mandate the killing of innocent people (e.g. killing the terrorists child or killing one person to give their organs to 5 dying people) - this seems intuitively immoral (how can this be a moral ideal!)
RESPONSE: rule consequentialism: ‘an act is right if and only if it results from the internalisation of a set of rules that would maximize good if the overwhelming majority of agents internalised this set of rules’ - Difficult to apply to real life decisions. RESPONSE: rule consequentialism
- Impossible to predict full consequences. RESPONSE: (i) try, (ii) only applies to predictable consequences.
What is act consequentialism?
the view that you ought to do as much good as you possibly can. Actions are good/ bad depending on their consequences.
what is rule consequentialism?
an act is right if and only if it results from the internalisation of a set of rules that would maximise good if the overwhelming majority of agents internalised this set of rules
Outline the rescue case. How do consequentialists respond? Is this intuitive?
you can either save the lives of a small group or a bigger group. Specific example: you are on the only rescue boat around and you can either save a group of 5 or an individual person. consequentialism says save the greater number - this seems intuitive.
Why does Taurek argue that you are not morally required to save the greater number? How does he think we should respond to the rescue case?
1) you cannot aggregate harms - two people suffer individually - separateness of persons. therefore it is a mistake to assume harms to two persons are twice as bad as a harm to one person, the badness of a situation depends on how bad it is for a single individual (a thing must be worse for someone).
2) equal concern and respect to every individual - every individual should be given an equal chance of survival otherwise you commit ‘numbers-ism’ and discriminate against people in smaller groups.
3) (sub-note) you are not morally obliged to be impartial to strangers just as you are not morally obliged to treat yourself as equal to others.
Response to rescue case: you should flip a coin to decide whether to save the 5 of the 1
What is Lewis’s toothache example? How does this apply to Taurek’s rejection of aggregation?
- if I have a toothache of intensity x and you next to me have a toothache also of intensity x - there is 2x pain in the room BUT no ONE person suffers 2x
- there is no such thing as a sum of different peoples suffering because no one suffers it.
- suffering must happen to someone
- Taurek uses this line of thought to argue that you cannot aggregate harm when making moral decisions
what is Taurek’s headache example?
- 50 people with mild headaches does not equal one person with a headache 50x the pain of the others.
- you cannot aggregate harm, harm must be done/happen to someone.
What criticism’s could be levelled against Taurek’s argument that you don’t have to save the greater number, but should instead flip a coin? are there any responses he could offer/ has offered?
- it is counter-intuitive to argue that the death of one individual is no worse than the death of 5.
RESPONSE: but it is in line with our intuitions about killing 1 to save 5 (e.g. transplant case). the pursuit of the good might be trumped by a right of each person to be treated with equal concern and respect (not Taurek’s arg nec) - every person had an equal chance of ending up in the big group prior to the rescue situation - flipping the coin is an unnecessary double lottery.
- flipping a coin is inconsistent with giving each person equal concern and respect/ chance for survival because ignore the difference between 1v1 and 1v5 - therefore ignores the other 4 people
RESPONSE: weighted coin/ dice - every individual is given an equal chance.
Why does Anscombe argue that you are not obligated to save the greater number from harm? What example does she use?
the example (Philippa Foot’s case): you can either save 1 person who needs a drug or 5 people who need just one fifth of the drug each. Anscombe argues that you are not required to split the drug in 5 because:
(i) to do wrong, you must wrong SOMEONE (i.e. someone must be able to complain against your action)
(ii) if you save 1 rather than 5 nobody is wronged
(iii) therefore you have not done anything wrong
What is the main problem with Anscombe’s argument? what is Anscombe’s response to this?
if you save the 1, the other 5 ARE wronged - they are not saved, therefore the doctor has done something morally wrong.
Anscombe argues that if the 5 were amongst a larger group of 9 (i.e. the drug could save a random 5 of 9) and the doctor saved the one - the claim any of the 9 would make is ‘you ought to have save me instead of the 1’ - but this is no more valid than the claim of the 1 against use on the 5. the only legitimate claim made by anyone is that the drug should not be wasted.
RESPONSE: if Anscombe claims that ‘all can reproach me if i gave it to none’ why then can the 9 (or the 5) not reproach her for not giving it to them (as a group even if it meant that the specific indiv would still have died) - aren’t they wronged by not being saved, when being saved was (i) possible and (b) a greater good (than the saving of the one). Surely this is identitcal even to the claim made by the 10 against the doctor if the drug is unused and wasted.
What is Taurek’s pairwise comparison approach to harm
- the badness of an option is as great as the harm to the single person who is harmed most
- extension of not aggregating harm and that something must be worse for someone
- example: if you could save person A from loosing a life and B from loosing an arm, you should save A. If you could save the arms of 5 people or the life of one, you should save the life.
How would Taurek respond to the argument that it is worse for 5 people to die than 1 therefore you should save the 5? How else could you respond?
- you cannot aggregate harm - a situation must be worse FOR someone - therefore the claim doesn’t hold
- even if it is worse for 5 to die instead of 1 - the pursuit of the good requires that you treat people as moral equals - this deontological ethic trumps the consequentialist ethic (like in the intuitive response to the transplant case).