Contractualism and Numbers Flashcards
What is contractualism
Morality consists in those forms of cooperative behaviour that it is mutually advantageous for self-interested agents to engage in. The aim is to treat every individual as an equal and individual moral agent (unlike utilitarianism) where it interprets this moral status as based on their capacity for rational autonomous agency.
Scanlon: ‘morality is a matter if rules that it would be reasonable for all to agree to for the regulation of one another’s behaviour’
- an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any system of rules which NO ONE could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
- moral rules must be justifiable to every person not necessarily actually accepted.
- justification must be specific to the particular interests, claims and grievances of the individual in question
How does the complaint model work?
The complaint model means moral rules can be justified to all. It does this by minimising the complaint of the person with the largest complaint therefore making the moral rule justifiable to them (it’s the most well off they could reasonably have been). [Maximin] Justifiability is relative to cost/benefits of individuals involved - if a moral rule costs one individual, such cost/complaint may be justified by the (greater) benefit to another (e.g. World Cup Case).
Why would one accept Scanlon’s contractualism
- The individualist restriction - it does not aggregate harms or appeal tot he claims of groups only to the claims of individuals (e.g. no utilitarian sacrifice of one for the greater good - World Cup Case) - this is intuitively appealing
- Actions will always be justifiable
Describe the World Cup Case.
Jones has an accident in which he is trapped by a television transmitter. In order to save him you must turn off the TV during the World Cup Final for 15 minutes angering the millions of people watching. Should you wait till the match is over, leaving Jones to suffer for another hour or save him now?
What is Scanlon’s response to the World Cup case? Why?
Save Jones now!
- If Jones had to suffer - the fact that total happiness would be maximised if Jones suffers is not an adequate justification to Jones that he should suffer (although a utilitarian may disagree) - he (the biggest complainer) breaks the ‘contract of morality’
- if however Jones was saved, the biggest complaint would come from a World Cup supporter who had to miss 15mins of the game - Scanlon argues that saving Jones would be a sufficient justification to this complainer.
- this model of justification works because the cost to the World Cup supporter is far smaller than the benefit to jones.
What is the Utilitarian response to the World Cup Case?
Leave Jones in pain for the hour - the aggregate pain/ suffering of the many World Cup watchers outweighs Jones’ pain or suffering
How should/ does Scanlon respond to saving either 1 or 5 people? Why?
should:
- like Taurek and Anscombe, Scanlon relies on pairwise comparisons of harm, in the 1 v 5 case, the person with the greatest complaint is tied between any two dying individuals therefore it seems morally arbitrary/ irrelevant which group is saved.
- Parfit: only if everyone has a 50% chance of being saved is the worst person as well off as possible because dying with a chance of survival is better than dying with no chance of survival (because it is regarded as a benefit to have a chance to live)
but Scanlon argues that contractualism still requires the saving of the 5 because:
- Kamm balancing argument against taurek: the coin flip accounts for 1 of the 1 and 1 of the 5 - it thus is no different to choosing between 1 and 1. The additional 4 people seem to hold no moral weight - this is fails to treat them as moral equals - the additional people should weigh on the moral scale
- Scanlon’s tie-breaker argument (builds on Kamm): [1 v 2 Rock example] P3 in the three-rock case breaks the tie between P1 and P2.
Otsuka’s rejection of Scanlon’s argument for saving the many over the few
- Scanlon complains that Taurek ignores the third person in the rock case but if this were the case, even if the coin decided they pick P2 they would ignore P3 completely - but would pick her up also
Response: but surely they aren’t considered in the moral decision, only because saving P2 - Otsuka argues that Scanlon IS combining claims (aggregating harms) of P2 and P3 even though he claims to reject aggregation.
- weighted lottery doesn’t aggregate harms
What is the neutralisation argument for saving the greater number in the 3-rock case? What are it’s potential problems?
P1 and P2’s claims neutralise one another - you should save P3 and as P2 is close by so save P2 as well.
Problem: Why save P2 in addition to P3 if P2’s claim has been neutralised? What about the 2 Rock case? The neutralisation argument suggests that no one should be saved in the 2-rock case.
What is the Leximin argument for saving the greater number in the 3-rock case? What are it’s potential problems?
Make the worst off as well off as possible, then make the second worst off as well off as possible etc. PICK D2
D1 (save P1):
worst off: Death
2nd worst: Death
3rd worst: survival
D2 (save P2&3):
worst off: Death
2nd worst: survival
3rd worst: survival
Problems:
- Parfit: it is better to die with a 50% chance of survival than die with no chance of survival therefore D1 should be selected in Leximin or at least flip a coin
- Leximin implausibly implies that one should save one from death rather than several million from parapaligia
How could the veil of ignorance be used to argue for saving the greater number from harm? How does it differ from Scanlon’s view?
It’s in each person’s rational self interest to adopt a principle of saving the greater number - makes sense behind the veil of ignorance - this can also be considered a hypothetical contract therefore contractualism. Note Rawls’s contract is more Kantian than Scanlon’s, as he seeks principles everyone would agree to, rather than principles no-one could reasonably reject. Contractualism, by contrast, invokes no veil of ignorance. I know my own circumstances. It is not self-interest combined with ignorance of self that makes me take account of everyone’s interests, but rather my concern to justify myself to everyone else
What constitutes reasonable rejection of a moral rule?
In order to reasonably reject a principle, I must have some objection to it. This objection may begin with some direct harm I suffer as a result of the principle. So far, if the harm involved is pain or suffering, contractualism mirrors utilitarianism. However, the fact that a principle impacts negatively on me is not sufficient. To know whether I can reasonably reject the principle, I must also ask how it impacts on others. If a principle imposes a certain burden (b1) on me, but every alternative imposes a greater burden (b2) on someone else, then b1 does not give me a reason to reject the principle. If I am reasonable, then I withdraw my objection when I see that your reason is more pressing
