Shareholders Flashcards

1
Q

Shareholder Standing:

A

π must have equity interest in corporation, more than a share of stock.
(1) Nature of the Holding: SH of record or beneficial owner?
(2) Timing: P must have been SH - (a) at time of the wrongdoing; (b) at time suit was filed; and (c) throughout litigation
(3) Countervailing Interests: No interests adverse to the corporations success; No short selling.

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2
Q

Tooley v. Donaldson: Deciding Between a Direct and Derivative Suit

A

Test:
(1) Who suffered the alleged harm, the corporation or the suing SHs individually?
(2) Who would recieve the benefit of any recovery or other remedy, the corporation or the SHs individually?

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3
Q

Incumbent Director Candidate:

A

Already on board and election expenses paid whether they win or lose.

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4
Q

Insurgent Director Candidate:

A

Outside candidate and corporation does not reimburse insurgent’s election expenses unless they are elected and SH approves.

Entrenches incumbent management and discourages SH activism.

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5
Q

Contested Election Situations:

A

(1) Hostile Takeover;
(2) Activist Investor

Contested Vote: Corporation pays for incumbent if they win or lose.

Expenses must be reasonable and proper.

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6
Q

Pre-Suit Demand Requirement

A

(A) Must be Made to Board; OR
(B) Allege with particularity why demand should be excused.
- Demand Futility Test
- Only applicable to derivative suits, NOT direct suit.

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7
Q

United Food and Commercial Workers Union v. Zuckerberg: NEW Rule for Demand Futility

A

Test:
(1) Did the director receive a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand?
(2) Does the director face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand?
(3) Does the director lack independence from someone who receive a material personal benefit from the alleged misconduct that is the subject of the litigation demand or who would face a substantial likelihood of liability on any of the claims that are the subject of the litigation demand?

Note:
- Ask for EACH director on demand board.
- Focus on whether directors would have been able to make a good decision.

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8
Q

Shareholder Voting Rights:

A

Elect directors; Approve fundamental transactions; and Initiate Action.

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9
Q

Special Litigation Committees

A

Committee of independent directors formed by board to investigate and make recommendations about whether to pursue litigation in a derivative action.

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10
Q

Einhorn v. Culea: Indepence Test

A

Test: Whether a member of a committee has a relationship with an individual ∆ or the corporation that would reasonably be expected to affect the member’s judgment with respect to the litigation at issue.

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11
Q

Factors to Determine Independence of Director:

A

(1) Status as a ∆ and potential liability
(2) Participation in alleged wrongdoing or financial benefits from challenged transaction.
(3) Dealings with an individual ∆
(4) Personal, family, or social relations with individual ∆’s
(5) Economic relationships with the corporation
(6) Number of members; AND
(7) Roles of corporate counsel and independent counsel.

Note: Considered as totality of the circumstances

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12
Q

What is Structural Bias?

A

When current directors sued are the ones who chose the new, non-defendant directors.

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13
Q

In re Oracle Corp: Independent Directors?

A

Question of independence turns on whether a director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interest of the corporation in mind.

Test focuses on impartiality and objectivity.

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14
Q

Auer v. Dressel: Shareholder Power to Initiate Action

A

(H):
Resolution: Shareholders cannot make board change executive officers. Infringes board powers to run corporation.

Amend Bylaws: Shareholders have right to amend bylaws.

Removal Power: Shareholders have inherent power to removed board members; Must give notice, reason why, and opportunity to rebut accusation.

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15
Q

Campbell v. Loew’s (DE Ch. 1957): Battle for Control between Two Majority SH’s

A

(H): SHs have inherent right between annual meetings to fill newly created vacancies; SHs have inherent power to remove directors for cause.

Process of Removal:
(1) There must be notice of the charges;
(2) For cause (good reason)
- Harassment was “for cause” for removal (deliberate instruction)
(3) Opportunity to be heard (able to present defense)

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16
Q

CA Inc. v. AFSCME

A

Corporations pay for re-election but NOT for election expenses of new directors.

Shareholders can make rules about procedures that the company does.

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17
Q

How do shareholders vote?

A

Only at Meetings: Annual or Special

Annual: Required to elect directors; Public Companies must vote on “Say on Pay”; Have to have every year, shareholder can bring attention after 15 months; Have to have notice of meeting at least 10 days in advance, no more than 60 days.

Special Meeting: Notice has to have time, place, and purpose; Called by either board or person authorized in articles/bylaws.

No Meeting: Written Consent (DE Statute: Only need majority outstanding votes to take action by written consent).

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18
Q

How/When is Vote Valid?

A

Quorum: Most require MAJORITY of shares entitled to vote (Number of shares, not number of SHs).

In Person or Proxy: May give proxy holder discretion to vote as they please or direct vote.

Voting Requirements: Simple Majority ( Everyone who shoed up, more people voted yes than no); or Absolute Majority (More than half of TOTAL number of shares, no matter who present).

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19
Q

How do you determine WHICH SH’s vote?

A

Record Date: Day that corporation picks for date of entitlement to vote.

Record Date can be manipulated.

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20
Q

Shareholder Voting (How Many Votes?)

A

Default Rule: One Share, One Vote.

Permissible: Different Classes of Stock (Supervoting Stock and Non-Voting Stock)

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21
Q

Electing Directors: Voting

A

Straight Voting: Vote all shares for each individual director spots.

Cumulative Voting: Vote all shares for one director.

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22
Q

Voting Trusts

A

Arrangement shareholders make (usually in close corporations) about how things are going to happen.

Taking legal title and transferring to voting trust.

Trust Agreement: Document controlling how shares are voted.

Trustee: Votes on behalf of trust (beneficiary).

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23
Q

Voting Pool Arrangements:

A

Agreement of some sort that you are all going to vote the same way.

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24
Q

Plurality Voting v. Majority Voting

A

Majority Voting: Each elected director must obtain a majority.

Plurality: Top vote getters for open directorship win those seats (DEFAULT Rule)

Note: Can stagger voting; Avoid shareholder taking control of board at one single voting.

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25
Q

Blasius Industries (DE 1988): Interference with Shareholder Voting

A

(R) Directors breach their fiduciary duty when they take an action to interfere with shareholder voting, even if it is in a good faith pursuit of corporation’s best interest.

  • Even if acting with subjective good faith, the board could not act for principle shareholders; interfering with effectiveness of vote.
  • Unintended breach of duty of loyalty
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26
Q

Poison Pill:

A

Thing company does when someone gets too many shares and the board decided to offer all other shareholders, except big one, more shares at a cheap price.

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27
Q

Advisory Shareholder Resolution:

A

Statement of the general goals of the corporation that shareholders vote on.

Not something board directly follows; chance for shareholders to get issue in front of fellow shareholders.

28
Q

Securities Exchange Act: Rule on Information

A

If you are going to sell securities to the public, you have to give them information.

29
Q

Proxy Soliciation:

A

Form/card being sent, requesting for the person to vote for you via form.

Furnishing of proxy or some form of solicitation to get a proxy to vote for them.

30
Q

Proxy Statement:

A

Wishes to vote for a certain informed decision.

Does not have to require certain vote; Can allow proxy to exercise discretion.

31
Q

SEC Proxy Rule

A

If I ask you to be a proxy, I have to send you the information.

32
Q

SEC Rule 14a-8: Requirement and Exception to Proxy Materials

A

Procedural and substantive requirements that shareholder proponents must meet to have their proposals included in the company’s proxy statement.

Requires corporations to include shareholder proposals in proxy materials distributed in advance of shareholder meetings.

Exception: Certain proposals are not proper subjects for shareholder action and do not need to be included.

33
Q

Long-Island Lighting v. Barbash (2CCOA 1985): Ad taken out that is claimed to influence shareholder voting

A

(I) Whether the challenged communication, seen in the totality of the circumstances, is reasonably calculated to include the shareholders’ votes?
- Does not need to target shareholders directly.

(H) Public ad is proxy solicitation; Reasonably calculated to influence shareholder votes, even though it might not have been targeted directly at shareholders.

34
Q

Exceptions where Proxy Rules DO NOT Apply:

A
  • Those who do not seek proxy authority and who do not furnish shareholders with a form of proxy.
  • Shareholders can solicit other shareholders to vote in a particular way without filing notice with the SEC if it is oral OR if it is by a shareholder who owns less than $5 million of the company’s shares.
  • Shareholder can announce how they intend to vote and explain why (and those announcements can be published, broadcast, or disseminated to the media)
35
Q

SEC Rules on Proxy Solicitation (Defined):

A

(1) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or include in a form of proxy;
(2) Any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy; or
(3) the furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, without holding or revocation of a proxy.

36
Q

Who can the corporations books and records?

A

Shareholders of record and beneficial shareholders.

Shareholders of Record: Names appear on the corporation’s stock ledger.
Beneficial Shareholders: Stock is held by another, such as a securities firm.

37
Q

Under DE Law, WHAT can be inspected?

A

With showing of proper purpose:
Stock ledger and shareholder list: Burden on corporation to show improper purpose.
“Other Books and Records: burden on Shareholder to show proper purpose.

38
Q

Under MBCA Law, What can be inpsected?

A

Ready inspect of articles of incorporation, bylaws, minutes of sharheolder meetings, names of directors and officers, and like documents. (FILED WITH THE STATE).

Inspect with a showing of proper purpose: Board meeting minutes, accounting records, and shareholder lists.

39
Q

Pillsbury v. Honeywell (MN 1971): Pillsbury not happy with board decision in potential involvement with manufacturing of ammunition for Vietnam war.

A

(I) Does Pillsbury’s sole purpose in buying shares for political reasons sufficient for demand inspection?

(H) No! Not proper purpose. No economic interest regarding Pillbury’s Stock.

(R) Shareholder can only inspect corporation records if shareholder has BONA FIDE INVESTMENT INTEREST IN DOING SO.

40
Q

Saito v. McKesson-HBOC: Merged and SH wanted to look at books of company they merged with for accounting irregularities, along with prior information before merger and before SH’s stock interest.

A

Scope of what SH is allowed to look at in records: records that are NECESSARY AND ESSENTIAL.

Can inspect records prior to SH stock purchase (Could be continued wrong).

Cannot look at subsidaries records, absent showing of fraud.

41
Q

When can SH (in parent co.) get access to books/records of subsidiary? (DGCL Amended)

A

Corporation has actual POSSESSION and CONTROL of subsidiary’s records; or
Corporation could obtain such records through exercise of control over subsidiary, provided that doing so would not (1) breach agreement between parent and subsidiary; and (2) be able to lawfully deny such access demanded by parent.

42
Q

AmerisourceBergen v. Lebanon County Employee Retirement Fund (DE 2020): Pharmaceutical company being sued and stock price went down; ∆ demanded inspection of books/records.

A

(I) Is investigating mismanagement or wrongdoing a proper purpose or does SH has to show that it is actionable?

(H) Proper purpose; do not have to show purpose is actionable; Do not have to show SH intends to use information requested.

(R) Investigation of corporate wrongdoing is a credible basis or purpose purpose.

43
Q

Examples of Proper Purpose for Inspection Demand

A
  • Determination of the value of one’s equity holdings
  • Evaluating an offer ot purchase shares
  • Inquiring inot the independence of directors, investigation of a director’s suitability for office
  • Testing the propriety of the company’s public disclosures, investigation of corporate waste
  • Investigation of possible mismanagement or self dealing.
44
Q

Encumbered Shares:

A

If you are a SH, but do not necessarily care/want company to do well.

Shorting Shares.

Court gives information rights to long shares, not short shares.

45
Q

Proxy Card:

A

Form of a proxy; voting ballot sent to shareholders.

46
Q

Form of Proxy:

A

Instructions that specify how SHs want their shares to be voted.

47
Q

What π must show in Proxy Fraud Litigation:

A

False or Misleading statement;
Of Material Fact;
Upon Which Shareholder Voters Relied;
Causing them to suffer losses.

48
Q

Duty of Candor:

A

Requires directors to disclose all material information, fully and faily, to shareholders when seeking shareholder action.

49
Q

Proxy Fraud Litigation: Potential Remedies

A

Rescissory Damages, Injunctive Relief, Compensatory Damages, and Disgorgement of Fiduciary Profit.

Allow attorney fees to be computed on basis of class action results.

50
Q

Management Proxy Solicitations:

A

Before soliciting shareholder proxies, management must prepare a proxy statement and a form of proxy.

51
Q

Controlling Shareholder: De Jure

A

More than 50% of voting power

52
Q

Controlling Shareholder: De Facto

A

“Effective Contro”: Less than 50% voting stock BUT has “ability to control” the corporation.

  • Majority of board lacks independence from SH.
  • π bears burden to prove.
53
Q

Factors in Considering De Facto Control:

THINK TESLA CASE!

A

% stock ownership (large enough block to be dominant force in contested election?)
Relationship with directors, management, and advisors?
Influence on or deference from directors?
Influence within company?
Important to business and operations?
Contractual Power?

Note: REASONABLY CONCEIVABLE STANDARD.

54
Q

Affiliate Transaction Standard of Review when π (minority SH) shows self-dealing

A

Courts use INTRINSIC FAIRNESS STANDARD (NOT BJR): Must prove that the conduct was intrinsically fair to the minority SHs.

Self-Dealing = benefit the parent receives that the subsidiary does not “to the EXCLUSION OF and DETRIMENT TO the minority shareholders of subsidiary.”

55
Q

Cash-Out Mergers

A

Merge subsidiary with itself or new company; Minority SHs are squeezed out of corporation; they cease ot be SHs in return for a cash payment.

Minority SHs challenge the adequacy of the merger consideration in an appraisal.

56
Q

Entire Fairness Test from Weinberger (Cash-Out Merger Litigation)

A

(1) Fair Dealing: When the transaction was timed; How it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to directors; How director and SH approvals were obtained.

(2) Fair Price: Economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, other elements affecting intrinsic or inherent value of stock.

57
Q

Weinberger Takeaway:

A

Result in this case could have been entirely different if there was an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with parent company at arms length.

58
Q

Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp (DE 2014): BJR will be applied in controller buyouts IF AND ONLY IF:

A

i. The controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority shareholders;
ii. The Special Committee is independent;
iii. The Special Committee is empower to freely select its own advisors and to say no definitively;
iv. The Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price;
v. The vote of the minority is informed; and
vi. There is no coercion of the minority.

59
Q

Freeze-Out Transactions:

A

elimination by corporation of minority SHs.

60
Q

Majority Rule for Freeze-Out Transactions:

A

allows controlling SHs to structure transaction taht force minority SHs to accept cash for their shares.

61
Q

Ways that Majority SHs can Freeze-Out Minority SHs:

A

Cash-Out Merger: Merge subsidiary into another company and pay SHs for their shares (minority still has appraisal rights, if they think $$ is unfair).

Tender offer followed by Merger: Offer everyone money for their shares then do Cash-Out Merger.

Sale to Outside Buyer: Parent corporation arranges for subsidiary to merge with outside buyer (happens when parent does not have 100% ownership of subsidiary).

62
Q

Close Corporation Typical Characterizations:

A

(1) Small number of SHs;
(2) No ready market for corporation’s shares; and
(3) Substantial majority of SHs participate in management, direction and operations of corporation.

63
Q

Test for Determining whether closely held corporation breach fiduciary duties when Freezing Out:

A

NOT THE ONLY TEST! (This one is from MA):
(1) Must show a legitimate business objective: if challenged by minority SH, controlling group must show legitimate business objective for its action.
(2) Is there a less harmful option? π minority SH can still win if they show that controlling group could have accomplished business objective in a manner that harmed them less.

64
Q

Close Corporation SH Duties:

A

Utmost good faith and loyalty (like partnerships).

65
Q

ESOP?:

A

Employee Stock Ownership Plan (Retirement Plan Equivalent)

66
Q

Nixon v. Blackwell (DE 1993): ESOP

A

(I) Whether board in close corporation breached its fiduciary duties by failing to provide liquidity rights to non-employee minority SHs?

(H) Corporate directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to treat ALL SHs EQUALLY.
- This was an intentional BJ that owner/founder made when he died; giving rights of profits to family, without right to sell shares for money.

67
Q
A