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Security alliances > Security Dilemma > Flashcards

Security Dilemma Flashcards

1
Q

Which problem does the security dilemma represent?

A

One can never be fully clear of the capabilities and intentions of the enemy

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2
Q

From which theory does the security dilemma originate?

A

Realism

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3
Q

3 ways of accumulating power

A
  1. Armament
  2. Territorial aggrandisement
  3. Alliance formation
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4
Q

Three “supergames” of international security

A
  1. Armament games
  2. Adversary Games
  3. Alliance games
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5
Q

Example of Armament games

A

The cold war

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6
Q

Example of Adversary game

A

China vs the US

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7
Q

Example of alliance game

A

NATO vs Warsaw

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8
Q

What are the two phases in an alliance game?

A
  1. Primary phase: alliance formation

2. Secondary phase: after alliances are formed

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9
Q

What are the two options that states have in an alliance game?

A
  1. Form an alliance

2. Abstain

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10
Q

What are the costs created by alliances?

A

reduced freedom of action, entrapment in the commitment to defend the interest of others

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11
Q

What are two reasons for the formation of alliances?

A
  1. States are not satisfied with moderate security

2. Fearing that others will form alliances. Therefore, once an alliance is formed, another will also form

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12
Q

What is the best scenario in an alliance game?

A

Forming an alliance while the others do not

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13
Q

What can the alliance game model predict, and what can it not predict?

A

It will predict the formation of alliances, but cannot predict which states will form them

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14
Q

How is the formation of alliances decided

A

through bargaining and competition through offering attractive shares

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15
Q

What are the two types of interests in the creation of alliances?

A
  1. General: reality of an anarchic system and the geographic position of the state

ex defend a close neighbor to preserve the balance of power

  1. Particular: specific areas of agreement or disagreement
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16
Q

Is it internal politics or ideology that will have the largest impact on who we ally with?

A

internal politics. states will rather choose an ally due to geographical location or natural resources rather than a shared ideology.

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17
Q

In a multipolar world, what will be the incentive of a state as seen in the prisoner’s dilemma?

A

to ally with some other states. This is why realist authors such as Busan and Walt say that a bipolar world is more stable than a multipolar.

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18
Q

what is a proto-partner?

A

A possible future ally

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19
Q

What are the traditional labels of alliances?

A
  1. Cooperate= strong alliance

2. Defect=Weak alliance

20
Q

What are the consequences depending on the combination of C/D in the prisoner’s dilemma?

A
  1. Bad
    - entrapment
    abandonment
  2. Good
    - Reduction in the risk of being entrapped by an ally
21
Q

What does Jervis say about alliances in a multipolar world?

A

In a multipolar world, alliances are never absolutely firm.

22
Q

An example of entrapment

A

US in NATO. NATO allies are often entrapped by the decisions of the US not to invade countries. The benefits of being in an alliance with the US must therefore outweigh the consequences

23
Q

How is the status quo important in the security dilemma?

A

States cannot always be sure if an adversary increases military capabilities with expansionist intentions, or with the aim of protecting the status quo.

24
Q

What is the insecurity spiral of the security dilemma?

A

One will always believe that the other is increasing their power tools and one must therefore always increase one’s own.

25
Q

What can a conciliatory policy do in terms of alliances?

A

find a common point on how they will work inside the alliance to avoid internal tensions

26
Q

In an alliance security dilemma where C is an alliance that supports and strengthens commitment while D is an adversary that stands firm, what are the “goods” and “bads” of the two?

A

Alliance C
Goods
- Reassure ally and reduce the risk of abandonment
- Enhance reputation for loyalty

Bads

  • Increase the risk of entrapment
  • Reduce the bargaining power over an ally
  • Foreclose any realignment option
  • Solidify adversary’s alliance

Adversary D

Goods

  • Deter, or prevail over, adversary
  • enhance the reputation for resolve

Bads
-Provoke adversary; increase tension; insecurity spiral

27
Q

What must actors evaluate in an alliance game?

A

trade-offs, benefits, costs and risks

28
Q

What are the 4 determinants of a choice to ally?

A
  1. Dependence of the partners
  2. Strategic interest: keep the ally’s power resources out of reach of the opponents hands
  3. Asymmetries: indirect dependence affects the relative fears of abandonment
  4. The degree to which allies share interests in the conflict with the adversary. If they are different they might risk entrapments or being abandoned
29
Q

In a restrain allies dilemma, what is the best outcome?

A

Secretly protect one’s ally while the other restrains their own.

30
Q

What is a weakness of the alliance security dilemma and why?

A

A bipolar system as you either have to cooperate with your ally or become isolated

31
Q

What is an example of contradictory policies within NATO?

A

Some European states were afraid to be abandoned by the US after WWII. At the same time, they became entrapped by them during the cold war.

32
Q

What does the Stag Hunt by Jervis represent?

A

It represents that inside an alliance, members will be better off if all make the same decisions as one actor can do no better than what he expects the other to do. The equilibria is, therefore, C,C, and D, D

33
Q

What is the main difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and the Stag Hunt

A

In a prisoners dilemma the only equilibria is D,D as it would make sense to defect if the other cooperates. Therefore, a player would never choose to cooperate as he does not know what the other will choose.

In a Stag Hunt, both C,C and D,D will be the equilibria as both actors will choose the same as what he believes the other will choose.

34
Q

What increases the possibilities of cooperation?

A

Anything that increases incentives to cooperate, such as mutual gains, or something that decreases the costs that an actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not.

Anything that decreases the incentive to defect and increase the mutual cost of not cooperating.

35
Q

What is the ultimate cost of CD?

A

The loss of sovereignty

36
Q

Why will the security dilemma remain even when states gain and increase their power?

A

Security provides a base form which it can exploit others

37
Q

Why is cooperation more attractive?

A

Due to the costs of defecting

38
Q

When can we say that the offensive has an advantage?

A

They will have the advantage of the first strike, and if they will be stronger at attacking than defending themselves from an attack

39
Q

When can we say that the defense has an advantage?

A

If it is easier to protect and hold one’s own territory than to move forward and take lan.

40
Q

How will a great offensive advantage impact the defense?

A

If the offense has a large advantage, a strong defense will be to expensive

41
Q

How will a great defensive advantage impact the offense?

A

It will deter a state from attacking as the costs will be to big

42
Q

What is the situation if the offense has the advantage and the defensive posture cannot be distinguished from a defensive one?

A

Doubly dangerous

43
Q

What is the situation if the offense has the advantage and the defensive posture is distinguishable from a defensive one?

A

There will be no security dilemma, but aggression is still possible. The offense has an advantage, and status quo states might respond in a different way than the aggressor.

44
Q

What is the situation when the defense has an advantage and the defensive posture cannot be distinguished from a defensive one?

A

There is a security dilemma as both will increase their defensive powers as they are uncertain wether the other will use their power for offensive measures, or just for obtaining a defensive advantage

45
Q

What is the situation when the defense has an advantage and the defensive posture is distinguishable from a defensive one?

A

It will be doubly stable as the other won’t attack as we already know that the defence has an advantage.

Security alliances (7 decks)

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