Second Midterm Flashcards
Two steps of modern cosmological arguments
- Argue for existence of necessary/self-existent being
- Identification stage
First and last step of Reichenbach’s cosmological argument
- A contingent being exists
- A necessary being exists
Is cosmological argument full or partial
Full
Problem w/ premise cosmological “What explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent being
“Being” - if modify to “thing” (law/principle), weaker conclusion necessary thing exists which might not be a being
Commentary on “A contingent being exists”
Granted there are beings, denying premise 1 would affirm the conclusion
Commentary on “The cause of its existence is something other than the contingent being itself”
Rules out self-causing beings, seems secure, would have to explanatorily precede itself
Alternatives to “contingent beings alone cannot cause the existence of another contingent being”
chains terminating in contingent being (that is brute)
Chains that are circular (not plausible)
Chains that are infinite
Hume/Edwards Priniciple
Sufficiently explaining each/every part of something sufficiently explains existence of the whole
Arguments against Hume/Edwards Principle
- Reducing infinite causation to circular causation (sees illegitimate to explain collection of eggs w/ collection or chickens); whole infinite series still requires explanation
- Cannonball’s causeless flight
Two versions of cannonball’s causeless flight
- Cannonball at rest at t0, t1l; trajectory every time in between. Can explain each stage of trajectory even if cannonball not shot
- Canon ball does not exist at t0, but exists at every moment after; existence of cannon ball popping into existence sufficiently explained
One possible way to justify premise “This contingent being has a cause of its existence”
PSR
Principle of Sufficient Reason
For everything that exists, there is a sufficient reason for its existence; denies brute facts; universe is intelligible/things have explanations
Problem with PSR
Modal collapse
Modal collapse argument
If the PSR is true, then there are no contingent facts (necessitarianism)
How could we save Premise 2 from modal collapse
weaker intelligibility principle that doesn’t have contrastive explanation for everything but still sufficient to explain what we witness
More on Buridan’s ass
With a more demanding PSR, donkey could not go anywhere
But still ruling out many other possibilities, so intelligibility still preserved
Why is Buridan’s ass advantageous to cosmological argument 1
Found explanatory principle that doesn’t require fully contastive explanation
Brute Facrt view
Explanation for existence of universe of contingent beings terminates in a brute fact; or there is infinite chain of contingent beings, and that chains’ existence is brute fact
Why might theist want to rule out necessarianism?
Maybe free will, theological determinism; maybe limiting if God forced to create universe
What is response to partial intelligibility/brute fact view
Maybe not rational in maintaining trust in cognitive facilities and in rejecting skepticism
What is a reason to doubt a skeptical universe and say common sense view more antecedent probability
If thought there was a necessary ordering toward valuehat
What is the common sense view
The universe you take yourself to inhabit (vs. skeptical universe)
Examples of skeptical universes
5 minute old universe
Laws of physics normal, then shift radically
Boltzmann Brains - particles accidentally come together, really just popped into existence
Sprase consciousness
Why would brute fact lead to skeptical universes
If skeptical universes all possible, then no reason there’s ovne over the other; common sense universe being simpler would not carry weight
Why is skeptical view so powerful
Skeptical view predicts evidence just as well as common sense view; and pre-evidential probability is just as high, so no basis to deny skeptical view
One way to argue for identification stage/definition
Perections don’t just happen; good qualities must be there from the beginning, so first cause must be personal
Since first cause is necessary, reason to deny it has arbitrary features; supports attributes resembling omnipotence and omniscience (no arbitrary limits on those things) and simplicity (no composition of parts that didn’t have to exist together)
Maximalism
Every possible universe exists
Pros/cons of maximalism
Pro: theoretically simple/non-arbitary/explanatorily powerful
Con: leads to radical skepticism
Axiarchism
fundamental ordering toward good
Three steps of Kalam cosmological existence
- Whatever beings to exist has a cause of its existence
- The universe began to exist
- Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence
A posteriori defintion
Begins w/ premises about things that exist
Typical conclusion of teleological arguments
Some very powerful designer accounts for natural world; still needs identification stage
Basic teleological argument
- Fine-tuning is more likely under design than not
- Fine-tuning data tell us that life was extremely unlikely to occur just by chance
- Evidential significance of life boosted
Illustration of teleological argument
Randomly generated pixels; strength of evidence dependent on how likely it could obtain by accident
Example of observer selection effect
20 sharp shooters its, likely that thy planned it; but only universe you could have observed since alive
3 objections to fine-tuning argument
- Why think a designer would care about life
- Observer selection effect
- Non-intentional orientation
- many universes/cycles/regions (we’re in a hospitable region, most of other places not fine-tuned)
- Projections of specialness
- Have no way of assuming how unlikely probabilities are
Most plausible response to teleological argument q
Multiple universes
Hume’s “who designed God?” utility and implications
Response to teleological argument: complex configuration of reality in God’s mind calls out for explanation just as much as physical configuration of matter , so appealing to designer not explanatorily powerful; just pushes surprise back
Hume’s response to the necessary being theist
Maybe material reality is necessarily ordered toward value w/out direction of an intelligence being
How does Hume respond to Brute Fact theist/response
Material order exhibiting valuable properties by chance is no more or less likely than change existence of a divine being; maybe divine being is more simple, but questionable whether that is simpler since maybe God must be as complex as the universe
Two forms of argument of evil
Logical argument: given existence of God, existence of evil lis a conceptual impossibility
Evidential argument: evil if can’t be logically proven God/evil are incompatible, nature of evil we observe is highly improbable given God’s existence
Platinga’s proposed premise:
Everyone suffers from transworld depravity, so God created world w/ evil because it was price to create a world with significant freedom and moral good
Logical problem - Plaintga
- God is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good
- Such a being would eliminate every evil it can properly eliminate
- If God is such, then he can properly eliminate every evil state of affairs
- Evil exists
Why does free will defense say “If God is such, then he can properly eliminate very evil state of affairs”
There could be a good state of affairs that cannot obtain unless some evil state of affairs E also obtains outweighs E (moral heroism in face of adversity)
Properly eliminate defintion
Eliminate without either eliminating an outweighing good or bringing about a greater evil
Multiverse Theodicy
A good God would have reason to create many universes that add to the good of the whole collection; as long as existence of our universe is better than its non-existent
Platinga’s aim
To find a proposition that would, when combined with 1, 3, and 4, still show the consistency of the set
What are two assumptions of Platinga’s about problem of evil?
- Incompatibalism (if God knows what would be done, would not work)
- Monlinism
How could Platinga make his problem easier?
Keeping incompatibility but dropping Molinism for open theism
What key conclusion follows from incompatibalism?
God cannot actualize just any possible world
What is Planting’s key claim about which worlds can be created/incompatibalism?
Possible that all possible worlds where there are meaninfinglly free creatures who never sin are non-actualizable; all creatures suffer from transworld depravity
If I suffer from transworld depravity, then…
all the possible worlds where I do something right contain some possibility where if actualized I would go wrong; for a given being, that being will (freely) do something bad in every possible world in which that being exists.
To what conclusion does transworld depravity lead?
Everyone suffers from transworld depravity, so God created a world w/ evil since this was price to pay to create world w/ significant freedom and oral good; possibly true proposition that in combination with 1, 2, and would imply 4
Free-will theodicies
Attempt to explain how evil could exist in world created by Godby viewing moral evils as side effect of morally consequential creaturely freedom; evils permitted by God but don’t align with preferences
Defeat theodicies
God permits evils for the sake of some goods that depend on these (or similar) evils for their realization
What is something special about defeat theodicies
Make evils an organic part of a whole that is good
Difference between free will theodicies and defeat theodicies
- In free will God doesn’t allow bad things for sake of achieving some good, but rather for preserving freedom will
- free will theodicy has option of saying God could defeat evils, but doesn’t allow evils for that purpose
Example of full/partial defeat with defeat theodicies
Making good friend from war is perhaps partial defeat
What is categorization of responsibility theodicy
Strong version of free will ltheodicy
Responsibility theodicy
God permits evils so creatures can have difference-making responsibility for another’s flourishing; through praiseworthy moral choices, make positive difference sin one another’s lives
Does God give creatures freedom in responsibility theodicy?
Yes
Could evil be regrettable from God’s perspective in responsibility theodicy?
Yes
First objection to responsibility theodicy/It’s a wonderful life?
Why can’t God determine Sondra to choose the good action?
Response to why can’t God determine Sondra to choose the good action?
She wouldn’t be free and have responsibility for making positive difference
What type of view on free will does responsibility assume
indeterminism
Second objection to responsibility theodicy/It’s a wonderful life?
Once it is clear Sondra makes a bad choice, why wouldn’t God intervene to stop really bad consequences?
Response to why Once it is clear Sondra makes a bad choice, why wouldn’t God intervene to stop really bad consequences?
- Maybe God is an open theist
- Maybe God self-binds so responsibility is preserved, maybe he knows she will want to correct it after
- If God intervenes, have implications for relevantly similar examples; cmaybe God stepping in in one branch could affect counterfactual of another branch; if God always steps in to prevent evils, then in similar situations people less preserved
What type of risk does God take with responsibility theodicy?
For it to be the case that Bailey would be responsible for town to be blessed, then must also be the case that things would go badly if made wrong decision; so that genuine responsibility exists
What is key about the branch structure for responsibility theodicy
Must have significant gap between consequences of good actions and bad actions
Third objection to responsibility theodicy/it’s a wonderful life?
Even if God cannot make Sondra choose good action w/out undermining her responsibility, why not make choice overwhelmingly probable?
Response to Even if God cannot make Sondra choose good action w/out undermining her responsibility, why not make choice overwhelmingly probable?
The harder it is for Sondra to choose good action, more responsible/praiseworhty she is for having chosen it
Agent-casual libertarianism (Akan)
For there to be free agents, agents must exercise a causal role not reducible top events that happen in agent’s body/brain
Deities in akan theodicy
Spirits are proximate explanation for evil, but pushes question back
How does Akan explain spirit-caused evil and human-caused evil?
Appeal to free will
Slight difference between responsibility theodicy and Akan view?
Akan emphasizes rational agents must be able to make choices that lead either way, in order to preserve their nationality
Way to challenge Rowe’s second premise?
greater good that is initial reason for permitting suffering suffering need not outweigh suffering; must just be that expected value of permitting s1 be positive
- perhaps evil really bad but highly unlikely
- God intervening afterwards affect scope of creaturely responsibility across all relevantly similar situations (and sometimes he does intervene in ways not evident)
Horrendous evils
Evils which give one reason to doubt whether one’s life is a great good to one on the whole
Defeat/balancing off distinction
A god/loving God would want to incorporate evil into a greater defeating good and make meaning out of it, defeating it w/in life of victim
Is Adams’ theodicy a defeat theodicy?
Not really
Pros/cons of afterlife with Adams
Pro: Maybe evil is defeated for person in afterlife
Con: if there can exist a great realm with freedom and no suffering, why didn’t God make world that way
What does contractarian alternative say about sufficiency of global defeat?
You would prefer world with evils over world of pleasures because average well-being still higher?
Responsible to question of why natural evils exist? Why can’t have world where rocks turn to jello?
- Maybe restricts the scope of our responsibility, so little at stake makes it less significant/nontrivial responsibility
- For creatures to engage in morally significant actions, must be acting in world where not clear if God exists or not, so that it’s not just incentive of being rewarded by God but actually acting out of pure moral concern
One worry about Adam’s views
- If accept Adams and also say goods should be better than evils they defeat, then suffering evil makes someone overall better off…little perverse
Very basic responses to animal suffering (4)
Responsibility theodicy (purpose of animal caring for young, contributing to hive)
Defeat theodicy: develop in afterlife in ways allow them to appreciate goods dependent on suffering
Multiverse theory
Maybe what makes animals amazing is way they developed out of difficulty
One reason for thinking consciousness and theodicy line must coincide
Any sort of conscious animal would have a theodicy
Causal closure principle
Any physical event has sufficient physical cause; everything can break explained by physics
Why is it hard to explain consciousness on assumption of causal closure of the physical?
Difficult to know where to pin down the line, since given causal closure, consciousness does not make any difference to evolutionary success when physical properties held fixed
Hard to explain why some animals have consciousness, others don’t, and where to pin down the line, since consciousness hard to explain just by physical features
Concerns with using whole line thing for animal suffering/Neocartesian (2)
- This is deceptive, since one kind of worm is conscious while another is not
- animal factories
Where are the two lines for animal suffering with naturalism?
Probably pretty close
How can theist explain consciousness?
Because it is good that there be such creatures, even if they have no evolutionary advantage
Noseeum inference that skeptical theism attacks: (2)
- There are inscrutable evils (can’t find a God-justified reason for permitting them)
- So there probably are no God-justified reasons for permitting them
Skeptical theist’s central claim
Our severe cognitive limits w/ respect to apprehension of possible God-justified reasons , so inscrutability not good grounds for believing there are unjustified evils
Possible argument from evil without noseeum inferences
Overall mix of observed good and evil more probable given naturalism than it is given theism - holistic rather than focused on single evil,
Possible response to argument from evil without noseeum inferences
Maybe there’s other air or rules of the game we don’t know about, so we should not give weigh to problem of evil
Conceptual version of hiddenness argument
- Perfectly loving God would seek personal relationship with all nonresistors
- relationship available only if they have evidence sufficient for belief in God’s existence
- Thus, perfectly loving god would provide that evidence (doesn’t logically follow)
- Such evidence not been made available to all nonresistors
- so perfectly loving God does not exist
Possible problem with preimise hiddenness “Evidence for belief in God’s existence has not ben made avail not all nonresistors”
Timeframe - maybe after death
Way to revise divine hiddenness to combat timeframe
Specify that a perfectly loving God would seek personal relationship with all nonresistors during their earthly life
What is a weakness of revised premise that a relationship available to nonresistors only if they have evidence sufficient for belief in God’s existence during their earthly life?
Maybe can have personal relationship without belief (messages from imprisoned sister)
Way to respond to that maybe could have personal relationship without belief
God would want you to have the best relationship, one which requires belief, so can benefit from comfort, etc. like mother/child
Worry about double revised premise 1 (necessarily, a perfectly loving God would seek the kind of personal relationship that requires belief with all nonresistors during their earthly life)
Maybe many other things God would want for us that are not parallel to a mother (persist in religion and faith even despite lack of evidence)
What exactly is Hume’s argument about miracles?
Not that they are impossible, but that shouldn’t believe it on basis of testimony
Hume: upon receiving testimony in favor of miracle, can only think miracle probably occurred if:
the probability of the testimony and the miracle is higher than the probability of the testimony and then the miracle not being true
Steps of Hume’s miracle argument (3)
- Can only think miracle occurred if Pr(T and M) > Pr(T and not-M)
- Necessarily, Pr(T and M) less than/equal to Pr(T and not-M)
- Moreover, Pr(T and M) «_space;Pr(T and not-M)
Why should we think that Necessarily, Pr(T and M) less than/equal to Pr(T and not-M)
Because empirical evidence against M is maximally strong
Why is our empirical evidence against a miracle maximally strong?
Law of natures is as epistemically secure as any matter can be since it has in lure experience been obtained without exception
Reasons for supporting Pr(T and M) «_space;Pr(T and not-M)
- T w/out M is not surprising (people often lie)
- Mmiraclel reports support contrary religious views, so many must be false
Main worries with Hume’s argument
- Argument implies that for any two miracles with equal testimonial support, they are equally improbable (Elvis vs. Jesus)
- Argument establishes that we cannot beven believe a miracle that we have personally witnessed
