Final Exam Flashcards
Epistemically justified
If a belief is good within a relevant category of evaluation
Martin’s connection between justification and argument?
for a belief that p to be justified, one must be able to justify that belief/give a good argument for its truth
Examples challenging Martins’ connection between justification and need for arguments
3 year old could have a belief but is unable to justify it, like they saw a deer in the backyard; even if can’t say what it is based on, it’s still justified
1 plus 1 = 2 (we dont’ have a good argument for it, but seems to be true)
General reliability of cognitive faculties
What is the regress/Pyrrhonian problematic?
Caused by Martin’s connection between justification and argument
Seems that P’s being argumentativtively based on Q can confer justification on P only if Q is justified, but this means that fully accounting of rate justification of P will require that we then proceed to give an account of the justification of Q - leads to either infinite chain, circular chain, or chain with a starting point
What are the three options for the regress problem
Infinite chain
Circular chain
Chain w/ starting point
Infinitism implications and objections
Need infinite string of arguments involving different propositions, also would need argument just for infinite number of propositions; maybe impossible
Coherentism implications and objections
Beliefs justified in virtue of being part of a coherent system of beliefs (circular chain insufficient on account of question begging)
Foundationalism implications and objections
Some beliefs are properly basic; they are not justified in virtue of being based on other justified beliefs, but for some other reason; other claims justified in virtue of being conclusion of an inferential chain terminating in proper basic beliefs; do not need inferential support to be justified; criticized for being too dogmatic
Basic belief
A belief that is accepted without being based on other beliefs that one holds, for example “I am seeing a tree”; contrasts with derived beliefs
Properly basic belief
rationally justified and appropriate for a person to accept that belief in a basic way
If she religious beliefs are properly basic, then…
the question of whether religious beliefs are justified will not come down to whether there are good arguments for religious belief
Evidentialism:
justified religious belief must be based on evidence that is,, in principle, publicly available and dialectically effective
Reformed epistimology
religious beliefs could be properly basic, justified without argumentative support
What are two types of non-evidentialism
Reformed epistemology and pragmatism
Examples of religious experience
answered or unanswered prayers
apparent miracles
perceptual experiences (appearance that is relevantly analoguous to sense perception)
experiences of insight (in worship, epiphany, meditaiton)
What does James say on the noetic quality of mystical experience
The insightful character of mystical experiences; unlike mere visual perception, mystical experience purports to bring some sort of cognitive improvement or deeper understanding (deeper significance is appreciate)
Catch with James’ noetic quality of mystical experience
For mystical insight to have philosophical experience, it must be integrated into a theory informed by more standard philosophical reasoning
Contrast between noetic and purely perceptual mystical experiences
Noetic gives you new insights/ways of understanding
Affective rationalism:
Proper affective responses/emotionally engaged experiences can play a crucial role in facilitating rational insight into the plausibility of some position; these insightful experiences could increase rational probability; but still emphasizes rational assessment x
What is the argument with affective rationalism
- appropriate affective response arguably crucial to facilitating isngihtt into moral and value claims
- Traditional theism relies on claims that a good God is responsible of world, so our assessment of theism will depend on worthiness judgments (could a world like ours be worthy of creation by a good god?)
- Cannot assess these claims dispassionately
Example of when affective rationalism comes into handy
Unable to assess power of responsibility theodicy without assessing how valuable mutal responsibility is, and if it is valuable to the level that would warrant God doing that even though it could cause pain
What might Martin-style critiques of experience-based grounds for religious belief imply and then the rejoined?
- Suggest that primary way religious experience might help ground religious belief is by providing material for an inference to the best explanation; but in reality religious experience might give someone a new and meaningful way of shaping the world that shapes the apparent plausibility of religious outlooks
Alston’s perceptual model of experience-based religious belief
There is an apparent perceptual experience of God, and this experience is the justifying ground for belief in the existence of the perceived reality; most beliefs formed by sense perception are justified non-inferentiallly
Alston’s thesis
If God exists, then many religious experiences could be genuinely counted as cases of perceiving god
Alstons’ analogy:
going from a mystical experience to the conclusion that God exists isn’t any different from going from sense perception to conclusion that something exists
Defeaters
just because properly basic beliefs start off juried doesn’t mean they cannot lose this justification
Two examples of defeaters and explanations
Rebutting defeater (evidence that p is false)
Undercutting defeater (undercuts basis for believing p - untrustworthy source)
How does Alston say we can establish ultima facie justification
Need to show prima faciejsutificaiotn can survive undercutting defeaters
What is a potential undercutting defeater for those beliefs based on religious “perception?”
Martins’ Negative principle of credulity: the seeming absence of God is as powerful “perceptual” justification as the putative appearance of God
Does Platinga prioritize sense perceptual beliefs among non=inferentially justified beliefs we might have?
No - perception shouldn’t be the paradigm for religious belief
Why does Plating dislike classical foundationalist conception of proper basicality (2)
- It would require many paradigmatically reasonable beliefs to be dismissed as unjustified (belief in the reality of a long past, belief that other people are conscious)
- Self-undermining
What does classical foundationalism admit as properly basic
- self-evident (a priori, math/logical truths)
- incorrigible (my toe is in pain)
- evident to the sense
What is Platinga’s view of a warranted belief?
A belief that comes from truth-oriented properly functioning faculties; if theism is true and God exists, then belief sin God are probably the result of truth-aimed proper cognitive faulcites.
Great Pumpking Objection
Structurally similar to proper functionalist account could be used to justify this; also why is Great Pumpkin not basic belief?
What is Plantinga’s alternative to classical foundationalism as whether holding a belief is warranted?
Proper functionalist account of warrant: Belief B on the part of a subject as warrant if and only if that belief is a result of the subject’s faculties functioning properly in an appropriate environment according to got a design plan that successfully aims at truth acquisition
Implications of proper functionalist account?
If this is true and God exists, then makes sense to think God would design us so that theistic belief was natural
Response to Great Pumpkins Objection from reformed epistemologists:
no reason to expect that the correct philosophical account of rationality/warrant will provide us ways to distinguish between silly and respectable views (if it did, it might lead to classical foundationalism with skeptical results); might have to look at world and base it off of that (in a world w/ very reliable dreams, our belief that we’re awake is not as justified as in a world w/out very reliable dreams)
Pragmatism
religious belief might be rationally based on practical reasons that do not ear on truth or probability of religious belief, but instead on question of whether it would be in some way good or advantageous to have the belief in question
Practical/pragmatic reasons
reasons that support the conclusion “it would be good to believe p” but that do not support the conclusion “p”
What are three types of pragmatic arguments for religious belief?
Prudential
Moral
Existential
Prudential pragmatic arguments
Faith is instrumental for a good we have (Pascal for happiness)
Moral pragmatic arguments
Our confidence in objective reality of moral life rationally requires faith (Kant)
Existential pragmatic arguments
Faith not just instrumental to some goal, but is in some sense consitituve of the kind of person or way of life that is most excellent, noble, or beautiful
Utility of Pascal’s wager?
Expected utility of Wager exceeds expected utility of not wagering as long as the probability of “god exists” is some positive finite number
what does Pascal suggest if you can’t cause the belief?
Take actions that might lead to that
Possible objections to Pascal’s wager
Other gods/jealous gods objection
Calculating
Problems with “infinite utilities”
Jealous Gods objection
By wagering for one God, maybe you wager against another; maybe some Gods less rewarding than others
Calculating objection
Maybe God will punish you for doing utilitarian calculation
Problem with infinite utilities
Uncertainty regarding which actions really count as wagering on God
in what way does Kirkegaard appeal to faith?
Not as something we have, but rather as most desirable way to be human
Objective truth
Right conception of reality; obtained by believing true propositions
subjective truth
Right relation to reality; obtained by living in a humanly excellent way
What is necessary for passion, in Kirkegaard’s opinion?
Thinking uncertainty
Does Kierkegaard think we can have both objective and subjective truth?
No - pursuing objective knowledge limits subjective truth
Example of pursuing objective truth limiting subjective truth
We intellectually domesticate God and render him comprehensible, maybe makes God less worth of our devotion; distorts the truth by trying to accommodate it to our finite minds
Why is there a tradeoff between objective truth and subjective truth?
Objective inquiry holds back as it attempts to approximate the truth, subjective truth demands passionate commitment now
What does K see as relationship between objectivity and passion?
Objectivity limits passion
What is subjectivity, according to K?
The engagement of our passion, being that which makes us a human subject, not merely a knowing mind who understands and who can be disinterested and disengaged from the world
What, according to K, makes God such a fitting object of faith?
That it is so elusive to our mind and can only be seized out of passion
What is the major objection to pragmatism
Involuntarily challenge
Involuntarily challenge
Is it possiblee to believe in the faith of great uncertainty/suppose unrealistic voluntarist conception of belief?
2 Responses to the Involuntarist challenge to pragmatism
- Maybe can still lean into certain way of seeing reality; perhaps faith need not involve belief but “acceptance,” maybe non-believing commitment is enough
- Maybe faith can be voluntary in certain situations
- Maybe can voluntarily put yourself in certain situations where it is more likely you form the belief
Clifford’s stance on believing without sufficient evidence
Always wrong, in every situation; anytime you do so, creates insesitivity to evidence
James’ stance on believing without sufficient evidence
In some cases it is okay, when the truth cannot be determined by purely intellectual means; differences between religious belief and assessing mundane beliefs since religious beliefs lack a non=controversial rational framework to settle the degree of evidential support
Criticism of Clifford’s stance on believing w/out evidence
Regress problem - non-skeptical epistemology will need to recognize a great many beliefs that we confidently accept
What is something in support of James’ stance on believing w/out sufficient evidence?
Some cases, the benefit of believing w/ questions evidential support outweighs the costs - don’t want to miss out on God, belief in free will in connection to moral actions, religious belief and its connection to social beneficial behavior
Religious epistemology
Do those with different religious views have the same or similar knowledge? How do the truth claims made by different religious traditions relate to each other
Exclusivism
Religions are making different truth claims; there’s one right answer when there’s important disagreement; only those who accept that right answer can reap the benefits of that answer, namely salvation
Example of exclusivism
Buddhist salvation vs. Jesus as salvation
Incluvisivism
Religions are making different truth claims, and terse’s one right answer when there’s important disagreement, but others who disagree cn still live in accord with that truth and reap the benefits of that answer
Example of inclusivism
Dalai Lama; still thinks Buddhism is the best way, but can work toward salvation in other religions; still might reap some benefits
Religious pluralism
The truth claims made my different religions are compatible; either different traditions are making meaningfully different claims and many can be correct, or different traditions are actually making the same truth claims even if it sounds like different claims
Example of religious pluralism
John Hick and the elephant
Foru positions on religious diversity
Exclusivism
Inclusivism
Pluralism
Nonrealism
Nonrealism
Religious claims are actually about living a meaningful life rather than about the truth
Examples of nonrealism
religious claims can be truth claims, but religious meaning claims are preferable and religious truth claims are best avoided, because religious sources of authority are epistemically untrustworthy
Hick’s concerns about inclusivism
Inclusivism doesn’t make much sense - why maintain a specific tradition’s authority if its benefits are accessible to those who have no contact with that tradition? Wont’ lead you to have stable commitment to a view
Hick’s main claim about religious pluralism
Different religions represent different ways of relating to the Real or Ultimate and orientation oneself to it
2 concerns with Hick’s view about religious pluralism
- Hick fails to distinguish between personal god and impersonal divine order (Christmas God vs. karma)
- Hick assumes separation between everyday experience and ultimate reality, but could double that all traditions have such strong a separation
What is an objection to Hick’s rejection of inclusivism
Analogy: just because someone can be a good person w/out knowing about the correct moral theory, doesn’t mean we should stop promoting it
What is another objection to Hick’s endorsement of pluralism?
People’s religious claims only make sense/have forced when viewed in specific contexts; pluralism is dangerous because it doesn’t let you make sense of things w/out their contexts
What is Gould’s NOMA view
Lack of conflict between science and religion arises from lack of overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise
Three reasons Gould uses to support NOMA
- Descriptive: Science talks about constitution of universe, religion nabout ethical values
- Eunemical: Room for and need for science and religion in making sense of world and our place in it
- Practical: dialogue between science and religion facilitiated/made less adversarial by recognition of NOMA
What is objection to the descriptive support for NOMA?
Sometimes the religious make quasi-scientific claims (creationism)
In softer sciences (psychology, economics) hard to say there is nothing value-based, so they do seem to overlap
What is objection to eunemical support for NOMA?
Philosophy can fill the holes left by science; no need for religion
What is ovreall objection to Gould for NOMA?
Might be relying on a dubious fact-value dichotomy, when in reality maybe certain values are underpinned by certain facts, or vice versa; hard to separate
What is Polkinghorne’s view?
Philosophical gaps left by science might be filled by religion, science needs supplementation with metaphysics, completely licit to use religious claims to fill the gaps here
Two arguments for Intelligent Design
- Concrete case argument
- Computational Argument
Concrete case argument for ID
Complex structures card to explain in terms of evolution by natural selection; difficult to make sense of intermediate steps between lack of eye altogether and presence of an eye; subparts that don’t confer any evolutionary advantage, ned to be able to explain intermediate phase
Kitcher’s response to concrete case argument for ID
oriented toward some function, then slight changes that slightly augment vision; varying degrees of photosensitive organs terminating in a fully developed eye (not a half an eye)
Computational argument for ID
Unlikely life could arise via natural selection in time frame in which it’s supposed to have occurred (1/30,000 chance you get the combo of genes for a certain result)
Kitcher’s response to computational argument for ID
Particular use of probability dubious here; also various physical-biological features can constrain the probabilities in ways we are not aware of
What is Kitcher’s fundamental claim about ID’s failure
poor theory since it is not sufficiency developed to make predictions about when and how an intelligence would intervene; doesn’t let you make testable predictions
In absence of Vic knowing a reason independent of his own visual impression about the dresses, what should he conclude_
Given the apparent symmetry of the situation, eh should conciliate/give equal weight to both sides of the dispute
Conciliationism
In contexts of full disclosure, disagreement with qualified thinkers typically constitutes a reason to reduce confidence in one’s own views to a nontrivial extend, even if one has rightly responded to one’s first-order evidence
What is the problem with trusting your perspective more in the dress situation?
Arbitrarily privileging of yourself, must have some factor that breaks the symmetry between you and your perspective
What is critical requirement for symmetry breakers?
They must be internally discernible/thigns you can tell inside
Agent impartiality constraint (controversial)
agent impartiality constraint
agent-neutral reason that comes from a third person perspective, rather than being a reason that applies only in virtue of who one is or what perspective one happens to occupy
Disagreement over Anselm’s ontological argument, where neither student has dispute-independent reasons for thinking they are more likely to be correct; what do strong conciliationists argue?
Equal weight verdict should apply; if unreasonable for Vic to accord greater trust to his visual faculties, isn’t It unreasonable for Belinda to put more trust in her argument-assessing faculties?
What are the reasons for rejecting that equal weight verdict should apply for Anselm’s ontological argument?
Vic’s example had acknowledged rational parity; but in the second case, disagreement persists because one party is making a rational mistake, there is not rational parity (there’s an internally discernible rational difference)
More about rational parity and cogency
- Arguably, someone who is thinking ratinally and clearly can tell that their thinking is cogent; it does not violate internal reason constraint
- Arguably, continued confidence need not violate an agent impariatiliy constraint
Why does continued confidence not violate an agent impartiality constraint?
Cogency of the reasoning for p can be stated in third=person terms and should have force for any person; gives more weight to your own view but not because your own views strike you as more convincing, but oconfidence in cogency of own thinking, that any suitably rational party could appreciate
Strong conciliationist’s final conclusion on Anselm example
Even if you’re reasoning better than the other side, confidence is only justified when one has agent-neutral, dispute-neutral reasons to prefer one’s side
What will the strong conciliationist reply to for the Anselm example to the arguably statements?
One more constraint on symmetry breakers: must also satisfy reasons impartiality constraint
Reasons impartiality constraint
must have indepdencepnt reason (more philosophers agree with me, I have better grades) that are dispute-independent; it’s question-begging to trust your own reasoning because you see it as better
What is a critique of strong conciliationism? (2)
- Could lead to radical skepticism, a radical skeptic could supposedly question all supposedly dispute-neutral reasons
- Self-undermining
Four possible connections between God and morality
- God supplies the grounds for morality
- Belief in God plays a role in making moral commitment reasonable and feasible
- Morality serves as evidence for God
- God supplies the grounds for confidence in moral judgments
Divine command theory/theological voluntarism:
Moral norms ultimately depend on God’s will; varying levels of strength on whether determines good/bad and right/wrong
Difference between good and bad
A tree falling on a house might not be morally right or wrong, but it is bad; stealing a suitcase containing drugs might be morally wrong, but good
Where does the norm to obey God come from?
Maybe it’s a norm existing independent of his authority
What does “No computer game until you’ve cleaned your room” show
That maybe there’s nothing morally wrong with the action, but after it is commanded, going against it might be wrong; parents create moral obligations through their commands
3 Motivations for theological voluntarism:
- Consonant with strong views of divine sovereignty (otherwise would imply something that constrains God’s judgement/he is dependent on)
- Gives moral truths a kind of robust metaphysical grounding, one that does justice to the sense that moral truths are objective but also not disconnected from actual care and concern, since made by loving personal being
- Explains how moral questions could have determinate/objective answers despite apparent arbitrariness of commonsense morality
Two possible objections to theological voluntarism
- Trivializes God being good if that means that God approves of himself
- Arbitrariness objection and the Euthryphro dilemma
Two possible response to the trivializes God being good object to theological voluntarism
- Maybe divine goodness is analogous to but not the same as creaturely goodness, to not trivial to say God is good if divine goodness is not to be analyzed in terms of divine approval
- Voluntarism for the wrong/wrong, but not good/bad; so god can still be good in virtue of a goodness not only decided by himself, so still meaningful
Socrates thing
“X is holy” and “X is god-loved” stand in different explanatory relationship to “gods loving x”, so even if refer to same things, then not the same properties
How does the socrates thing relate to divine command theory
Is an action right because God commanded it, or vice versa? Vice versa would give up on divine command theory
Why is arbitrarines/Euthryop an objection to theological volunatarism?
Presents two options:
1. God wills something because it is good - morality exists independently of God
2. Something is good because god wills it - god could do abhorrent things, arbitrary morality in this case
What is a way to escape the arbitrariness/Euthrop objection?
Robert Adams’ view that right actions are those commanded by a loving God
Or just go with platonism/realism
What is platonism/realism?
`Truths about morality independent of human minds
Question about Gyekye: is morality Is human-centered and grounded in something promoting social harmony, then what about social harmony for future generations or distant tribes? What explains these truths?`
Maybe truths of logic or truths of morality that are necessary and exist abstractly
Why is it risky for a theist to endorse anti-realism?
If goodness is a critical property of God, would want to think morality doesn’t depend on what humans do
What is a plausible alternative for theists to divine command theory?
Platonism/realism (then you avoid the arbitrary objection)
What is the point of Russell’s piece?
Commitment to moral truths even in the face of a morally empty world; it is maybe extra noble since will not be rewarded
Why would belief in God make moral commitments feasible (2)
- Belief in free will and moral resolve
- Absurdity of moral obligation in a Russellian world
- Adams on moral despair
Belief in free will and moral resolve
Libertian free will arguably more plausible given theism
Mavrodes’ objection to Russell’s piece:
seems absurd that our set of norms about how we behave is allied w/out self-interest; therefore need alignment with virtue and some higher power that aligns it (evidential argument for God), since our self=interest and our moral obligations obviously do not perfectly overlap
Adams on moral despair
Makes sense to believe in a god that makes it easier to commit to doing the right thing
God supplies grounds for confidence in moral jugments
If you doin’t think there’s a god, then maybe should not have confidence;
What is Sharon Street’s argument for that w do not have a reason to be confident in moral intuitions?
- Moral intuitions that we have a result of evolution by natural selection, that are adaptive, no reason to think that having reliable moral intuitions is adaptive; what evolution favors is not constrained by moral rightness
Why is there no reason to think that having reliable moral intuitions is adaptive?
Changing moral facts would have no effect on evolutionary pressures
What dilemma does Street’s Darwinian dilemma lead to?
It means you can be a moral realist or a non-skeptic, but not both
Why does theism supply a reason for thinking that our moral intuitions are truth-tracking?
If there’s a god then maybe dynamics in evolution helped us develop so that we would have access to the moral norms
