Searle Ch1

Question 1

10 marker structure

Answer 1

• define BN
• talk about how 4 mental processes (intentionality,subjectivity, consciousness and mental causation) are to the brain was bile secretion is to the liver
• the mind is explicable according to a familiar biological framework - no need for dualism

Main:

• mind body problem has two strands: 1. How a physical substance can cause mental states
  2. How something mental can have a causal effect on the physical world

Dealing with 1.:

• connections between mind and brain are undeniable (phantom limb example)
• but how can non extended and private mental state experiences be triggered by something purely physical?
• more “sophisticated understanding of causation”; reject Humean approach which leads misunderstanding that consciousness is a distinct state of affairs from the brain
• surface feature is both “caused by The behaviour of micro elements, and at the same time is realised in the system that is made up of micro elements”
• liquidity of water
• new version of cause allows Hume to shows how the brain causes consciousness with asserting a distinct mental feature that is over and above the brain
• the fact that mental and physical states seem so different is not problematic for Searle because of his water example

Dealing with 2.:

• macro features are the result of underlying micro-features of the brain
• it follows that both feature have the same causal power; “two causally real levels of description”
• hammer analogy: solidity AND the particles in the hammer move the nail
• consciousness and mental states are similar: intention to move my head is a macro state caused by micro-level neurons

Conc:

• mind is an objective fact of biology
• gaps in our understanding are a problem for science not Philo
• demystification should not surprise us and has historically happens (élan vital)

Question 2

15 marker P1:

Answer 2

• marries naive mentalism and naive physicalism (mental phenomena really exist + the world is nothing but particles); this is in accordance with our view that everything is physical + our folk psychology is correct in saying that mental states are ontologically real and have causal powers
• by asserting that the mental has causal powers, S évadés consequences of PD such as epiphenomenalism
• the mind is a macro state of the brain that is not reducible to it (wetness= molecular arrangement but no individual molecule is wet)
• the mind’s subjectivity is an objective fact of science; gaps in our understanding regarding consciousness are problems for science, not philosophy; and we should not be surprised at the demystification of our understanding of life (élan vital example)

Question 3

15 marker P2:

Answer 3

• S rejects Humean causation, but his model of causation seems to assert that micro/macro features are separate, when they seem identical
• S wants to label macro and micro as two phenomena, when in fact they seem like one phenomena viewed from different perspectives (even if there is a hierarchical structure)
• liquidity isn’t a macro feature, it just is the micro-features
• Maslin: Searle posits two levels of description - neurons on the one hand and the brain on the other
• maslin argues that one level of description cannot cause another, since descriptions are non-linguistic events. Descriptions can be logically related to each other in language (I am an only child = I have no siblings) and these relations can only be observed by reasoning, and so are not causal in nature - since cause and effect are observable only through experience
• so there is no causal relation between the macro and the micro ; neurons and the brain can’t be the cause of one another because they are non-linguistic events
• S would seem to be saying that one phenomenon is the cause of itself

Question 4

15 marker P3:

Answer 4

• S’ view on causation fits with the scientific method, which in effect portrays causation as explanation: heat is moving molecules so heat = molecules
• in this way, an explanation becomes “an identity”
• S seems to suggest this himself - he says thirst is localised in the hypothalamus; he seems to elevate the notion of thirst to that of a logical substance - it becomes a precise substance like the hypothalamus
• this suggests that the mental processes merely are physical - the mind is the brain: MBIT
• other problems with MBIT come up: if S says the brain is central to the mind, then MBIT chauvinism issues come up - non brain creatures can’t have minds
• if S says any biological process will do, then biology itself because irrelevant - the process is what matters; BN then collapses into functionalism

Question 5

15 marker P4:

Answer 5

• S denies he is a PD because BN avoids charges of ephiphenomenalism: hammer analogy; both micro and macro have causal powers
• but this statement only holds if one accepts S’ view of causation/that BN is not MBIT
• the irreducibility of the mental would suggest that is is a distinct and emergent property altogether; we are back to PD
• but S says his reference to “irreducibility” has “no deep metaphysical consequences” (it doesn’t make him a dualist) reduction involves moving from appearances to reality, but since the mind “is” the apparences then further reduction is impossible. For S, this is a “trivial” consequence of the way we use reduction.
• BUT Chalmers objects that it is significant that only the mind has an irreducible 1st person ontology; this suggests that we need to take it as a basic and fundamental aspect of the universe.