Property Dualism

Question 1

Substances v properties

Answer 1

Substances: things that can exist independently of anything else as a matter of logic (atoms)

Properties: things that logically depend on something else for their existence (shape)

Question 2

Property dualism definition

Answer 2

The brain has non-physical, mental properties which emerge from physical properties. The mental properties are irreducible to matter because they are emergent; they cannot be explained by physical sciences.

Question 3

Strengths of PD

Answer 3

Avoids criticisms of SD: the SD position struggles to explain the relation of the brain to the mind, whilst PD has a clear theory

Avoids criticisms of interactionism: SD doesn’t sufficiently explain how substances intermingle; PD says there is only one property and one substance - direct explanation of the relation between the two

Takes consciousness seriously: MBIT/functionalism/eliminativism might seem to either deny or not take consciousness seriously; PD takes it into account

Question 4

Arguments in support of PD: Chalmers

Answer 4

Charmers zombies:

1. Physicalism claims that consciousness is of a physical nature
2. therefore a world identical physically must also contain consciousness
3. But we can conceive of a world in which there is physicalism but no consciousness (zombies)
4. Therefore physicalism is false.

Question 5

Reply to Chalmers: Dennett

Answer 5

Dennett:
Zombies are not conceivable because consciousness is linked to our capacity to act; it is not entirely conceivable To imagine someone acting entirely without a conscience
– removing conscience is like removing “health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact […] Health isn’t that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness“

Question 6

Reply to Chalmers: conceivability does not entail possibility

Answer 6

• We can falsely conceive of zombies just like we can falsely conceive of water not being H20
• when we look closer, we can tell that no liquid that isn’t H20 is water
• zombies logically contradictory but not genuine metaphysical possibilities

Question 7

Reply to Chalmers: verificationism

Answer 7

Since the zombie hypothesis can’t be tested by empirical test, it is devoid of meaning. If words get meaning from referring to experiences, then the zombie hypothesis is meaningless.

Question 8

Arguments for PD: Jackson

Answer 8

• mental states like qualia are irreducible
• Mary example
  Knowledge argument:
  1. Mary possesses all the science about the physical processes concerning colour vision
  2. But she appears to learn something new when she sees colour
  3.Therefore the physicalist account of what colour vision is isn’t complete
  4. So physicalism is false

Question 9

Replies to Jackson: no new propositional knowledge

Answer 9

• the argument Relies on a distinction between propositional and acquaintance knowledge
• Propositional knowledge = facts (Mary knows ABOUT colour vision)
• acquaintance knowledge = knowledge gained from experience
• objection is that Jackson says the same sort of knowledge is gained by Mary when she is in/out the room
• in fact she gains acquaintance knowledge not propositional