Scepticism

Question 1

scepticism in general

Answer 1

Expressing doubt towards claims about knowledge, existence, or
more generally the testimony of others

Question 2

Academic scepticism

Answer 2

Denies the possibility of all knowledge

Question 3

Pyrrhonian scepticism

Answer 3

Advocates suspension of judgement due to the inadequacy of evidence

Question 4

Local scepticism

Answer 4

We cannot have certain types of knowledge

Question 5

Global (or radical) scepticism

Answer 5

We cannot have any knowledge at all!

Question 6

John stuart mill Argument from Analogy

Answer 6

I behave in way
I can observer other people behave in a way
People have minds like me

Question 7

Radical scepticism

Answer 7

Do we have any knowledge at all?

Mainly a methodological function:
if your theory can not addres the sceptical challenge then its not a very good theory

Question 8

The closure principle

Answer 8

The closure principle: If S knows that p, and knows that p entails q, then S knows that q

Question 9

RAM and scepticism summary

Answer 9

by denying the closure principle and affirming the sensitivity condition Nozick and Dretske can:
* Agree with the sceptic that knowledge of the denials of sceptical scenarios are impossible
o For them: this is follows from the sensitivity condition on knowledge
* Disagree with the sceptic that this implies that we cannot know much at all

Question 10

Problems for the RAM account

Answer 10

Denial of epistemic closure: Most would be reluctant to give it up!

Denial of infallibilism: Many might be happy to give it up!

Committed to externalism: Truth tracking theories are concerned with the world, not our reasons for believing

Question 11

Moorean response to scepticism

Answer 11

sceptical version of the argument: (modus ponens)
o If S doesn’t know that not-ss, then S doesn’t know that p
o S doesn’t know that not-ss
o Therefore, S doesn’t know that p

Moore’s response: (modus tollens)
o If S doesn’t know that not-ss, then S doesn’t know that p
o S knows that p
o Therefore, S knows that not-ss

Most sceptics find the argument unconvincing (if not question-begging…) and argue that criterion 2 is not met

A Moorean, however, might bolster his argument by invoking the safety condition:
In all near-by possible worlds, if S believes that p, then p is true
Or: p couldn’t have easily been false

Question 12

The contextualist response to scepticism

Answer 12

Some words are context-sensitive
o Obvious examples: Here, now, etc.
o Less obvious examples: Empty, flat, etc.

Higher standards for ‘knows’ in the epistemology seminar than in the bar
o Low standards: Be able to rule out ‘mundane’ possibilities
o High standards: Be able to also rule out far-fetched possibilities (e.g.
the sceptical scenarios)

S knows that p iff S’s evidence eliminates every relevant alternative to p

Lewis argues that the context is switched midway in the
sceptic’s argument
o The first context concerns ordinary knowledge, in which you may properly ignore the error-possibilities generated by sceptical scenarios
o The second context concerns knowledge as an absolute term, in which no error-possibilities may be properly ignored
o Thus, while Dretske and Nozick get the diagnosis right (relevant alternatives), they misclassify what they see
o It is not a phenomenon of logic, but of pragmatics