Defining Knoweldge Flashcards
Circular reasoning
Find a definition of knoweldge
Make a list of instances of knoweldge
Identify instances of knowledge
Knowing the defining features of knowledge
Possesing the definition of knowledge
Identifying instances of knowledge requires knowing what the criteria for knowledge are
Knowing what the criteria for knowledge are requires beingable to identify instances of knowledge
Problem can be defined as: Extension and Intension
Example planets
Intension: Relativiley large natural body that revolves in an orbit around a star and that is not radiating engery from internal nuclear fusions reactions
Extensions: Earth, Venus. Jupiter, Neptune
How can one know the Extension without knowing the intension
How to break out of the circle?
P1: You are able to identify instances of knowledge only if (→) you already know what the criteria for knowledge are
P2: You can know what the criteria for knowledge are only if (→) you are already able to identify instances of knowledge
2 options and both are quesiton begging in realtion to eachoter
Option 1: Give up the first principle
Option 2: Give up the second principle
Begging the question
Informal fallacy in argumentation (petitio principii)
Occurs when the premise of an argument already assumes the
Truth of the conclusion (dependency), or the premise and the
Conclusion are the same proposition (equivalence).
Methodism
Give up the second principle
It is possible to know what the criteria for knowledge are, without already being able to identify instances of knowledge
Subsequently, use the criteria for knowledge to figure out which instances are indeed instances of knowledge
This option is called methodism
Descartes’ philosophy instantiates methodism
Particularism
Give up the first principle
It is possible to identify instances of knowledge, without already knowing what the criteria for knowledge are
Subsequently, use the identified instances of knowledge to figure
Out the criteria for knowledge
This option is called particularism
Most contemporary epistemologists
Skepticism
Give up the both principles
There is no independent way to establish either principle, and if neither of the principles can be established independently, they cannot be answered at all
Consequently, there is no solution to the problem of the criterion
However, this response begs the question as well:
* It assumes that there are no independent way to establish principle 1 or 2
* This assumption needs to be substantiated!
The pros and cons of methodism
We can know what the criteria for knowledge are without already being able to identify concrete instances of knowledge (= abstract philosophical reflection suffices)
- Advantage: The problem of skepticism is taken seriously
Knowing what the criteria for knowledge does not mean: knowing that anything satisfies these criteria
> It does not assume the falsity of skepticism but it leaves an open question whether there is anything that meets the criteria
- Disadvantage: Achieving knowledge about the criteria for knowledge in this way seems to be very difficult/mysterious.
The pros and cons of particularism
We are able to identify instances of knowledge, without already knowing what the criteria for knowledge are
Advantage: Less extravagant than methodism
We only suppose that we can correctly identify particular instances of
knowledge, not its defining features!
- Disadvantage: The skeptical hypothesis is not taken
seriously
The (im)plausibility of methodism
If the criteria for knowledge are pretty obvious:
o Coming to know them through reflection is pretty realistic
o Methodism is a pretty plausible position
f the criteria for knowledge are very complicated:
o Coming to know them through reflection is very unrealistic
o Methodism is a very implausible position
The criteria for knowledge are indeed very complicated
Thus, methodism seems very implausible
The classical account of knowledge
Knowledge = justified true belief (JTB)
Gettier cases
counter examples to the JTB
The basic ingredients of Gettier cases
Fallibility:
The justification provided in each case is fallible.
Although it offers good support for the truth of the belief in
question, that support is far from perfect.
Luck
here is a significant degree of luck in how the belief
manages to combine being true with being justified in Gettier
cases. Odd circumstances are invoked
Do we really need justification?
Some epistemologists have argued that we should look for a criterion
that can replace justification (instead of K=JTF + X, we need K=?TF)
Belief and justification can obtain in all sorts of bizarre and
strange situations
Goldman (1967) “The causal theory of knowledge“
Basic idea: S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is caused by the fact that p
S knows that p iff S’s belief that p is causally connected in an appropriate way with the fact that p
Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions to the Gettier
problem! (Barn)