Rylands v Fletcher Flashcards
What does Rylands v Fletcher concern?
C may have an action in the tort of Rylands v Fletcher. It concerns the escape of a dangerous thing (e.g. leak of oil)
Can the defendant avoid liability if they took precautions to prevent the escape?
It is a strict liability tort, so the defendant could still be liable even if they tried to prevent the escape or did not know about it.
What does C need to have to make a claim in Rylands v Fletcher?
C has a proprietary interest in the land affected because (e.g. C owns the house that was damaged) as in HUNTER v CANARY WHARF
What is the defendant?
D is the occupier (or accumulator) of the land that the dangerous thing accumulated on because (e.g. D owns the house where the oil accumulated) as in Read v Lyons.
How did Blackburn J define the tort in Rylands v Fletcher, and how was it further developed?
The tort of Rylands v Fletcher was defined by Blackburn J: “anyone who brings into his land and keeps there something likely to do mischief if it escapes, is answerable for all damage which is a natural consequence of its escape”. The 2004 case of TRANSCO PLC v STOCKPORT MBC has developed the tort further.
What must C show regarding accumulation in a Rylands v Fletcher case?
C must show the thing that must be brought and accumulated on D’s land, as in GILES v WALKER.
What must C prove about what escapes in a Rylands v Fletcher case?
The thing that accumulates must be the thing that escapes, as in STANNARD v GORE.
Does the thing need to be dangerous in a Rylands v Fletcher case?
Although the thing does not need to be inherently dangerous, as in Rylands v Fletcher, the thing must be likely to do mischief (damage) if it escapes, as in Hales v Jennings.
What must be reasonably foreseeable in order to establish the damage in the rule from CAMBRIDGE WATER v EC LEATHER?
Damage must be caused, and the damage must be reasonably foreseeable, as in CAMBRIDGE WATER v EC LEATHER.
What are the requirements for something to “escape” under READ v LYONS and HALE v JENNINGS?
The thing must escape from the defendant’s land over which they have control, as in READ v LYONS, or escape from circumstances over which they have control, as in HALE v JENNINGS
What defines a non-natural use of land under TRANSCO v STOCKPORT and CAMBRIDGE WATER v EC LEATHER?
There must be a non-natural use of land, which means it is (a) ‘extraordinary and unusual considering time and place’, rather than a ‘truly domestic use’, as in TRANSCO v STOCKPORT. It must be (b) potentially dangerous, as in CAMBRIDGE WATER v EC LEATHER. It is likely to involve (c) things stored in large quantities, as in MASON v LEVY.
When does the defence of ACT OF GOD apply in tort of law?
The defence of ACT OF GOD arises where the thing escaped due to unforeseeable extreme weather conditions, set out in NICHOLS v MARSLAND
What is the defence of COMMON BENEFIT in the tort law?
The defence of COMMON BENEFIT where the dangerous thing has been accumulated by the defendant for either the common benefit of both the defendant and claimant, or just the benefit of the claimant, as in DUNNE v NORTH WEST GAS.
What constitutes the defence of ACT OF A STRANGER in tort law?
The defence of ACT OF A STRANGER arises where the thing escaped because of the actions of someone over which the defendant had no control, as in PERRY v KENDRICKS
How does STATUTORY AUTHORITY serves as a defence in tort law?
The defence of STATUTORY AUTHORITY arises where the thing was brought onto the land and accumulated under the authority of a law/statue, set out in CHARING CROSS ELECTRICITY v HYDRAULIC POWER.
