Reactor Protective System Flashcards

1
Q

Discuss the function of Reactor Protection System.

A
  • Ensure TS Safety Limits are not exceeded by tripping the Reactor whenever any of the Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS; RPS Trip setpoints) are exceeded. Required by 10CFR50 APP-A
  • Protects Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limits during Normal and AOO’s
  • DNBR for cladding protection
    o Thermal Power, Pressure, Tcold
  • Peak Linear Heat Rate for Fuel Protection (KW/FT – Peak Fuel Centerline Temp)
  • Limits RCS <2750 psia during AOOs
  • RPS has redundancy such that a single failure will NOT cause nor prevent a Reactor Trip
  • Protects plant equipment (RCPs)
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2
Q

What Reactor Trips ensure that SAFDLs are not exceeded?

A
  • TM/LP & Low Power Density in conjunction with T/S’s
  • Variable High Power & PDIL’s
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3
Q

Discuss the RCS Pressure Safety Limit.

A
  • RCS Pressure must NOT exceed 2750 psia – RCS integrity protection
     Mode 1, 2: Be in Mode 3 with pressure 2750 within 1 hour
     Mode 3, 4, 5: be <2750 psia within 5 min
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4
Q

Discuss how DNBR protection is achieved.

A

Combination of Power, Tc, and Ppzr shall NOT exceed limits of curve – DNBR protection
* RCS Cold Leg Temp
* Thermal Power
* RCS Flow
* ASI

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5
Q

What are the RPS Color designators.

A

RPS Color Designators
A Channel - Red
B Channel - Yellow
C Channel - Green
D Channel - Blue

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6
Q

Discuss Q Power.

A
  • The value of Q power is the auctioneered high value of either LRNI power or ∆ T power
  • The calculated value of Q power is then sent to each RPS channel
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7
Q

Why does Q power look at two signals?

A
  • NI Power is inaccurately low during C/D events since colder water tends to shield the Ex-core detectors
  • Delta T power is too slow to protect against a CEA ejection accident, and not accurate at low power.
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8
Q

What are the Inputs in the Q Power calculation?

A

∆T power & Linear Range NI’s

1) ∆ T power:

  • Calculated ∆ T power is derived from:

a) Average Hot Leg Temp; and

b) Maximum Cold Leg Temp.

RPS ∆ T = Thot avg - Tcold max

  • Thot has a range of 515°F – 665°F. This is important when considering failures!! Since ∆T is derived from (Average Thot - Maximum Tc), a failed high Th would cause the calculated ∆T to increase, most likely shifting the auctioneered high value of Qpwr to be generated from ∆T power.
  • Tcold range 465 – 615°F. This is important when considering failures!! Since ∆T is derived from (Average Thot - Maximum Tc), a failed high Tc would cause the calculated ∆T to decrease, most likely shifting the auctioneered high value of Qpwr to be generated from the LRNI’s.

2) Linear Range NI Power:
* 4 Linear Range Nuclear Instrument channels, each consisting of an upper and a lower detector feed each channel of Q power

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9
Q

What is the Basis for the Variable High Power Trip?

A

The Variable High Power Level trip provides reactor core protection against positive reactivity excursions that are too rapid for a High Pressurizer Pressure or TM/LP trip to protect against.

The following events require Variable Power Level - High trip protection:
* Uncontrolled CEA withdrawal event
* Excess load
* [Unit 2, Excess feedwater heat removal event]
* CEA ejection event
* Main steam line break (MSLB) (backup protection)

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10
Q

What are the Setpoints for the Variable High Power Trip?

A

Setpoint:
Variable (calculated by CPC-2) within Max 107 % and Min 15% power
(CWP on Pretrip ~ 2% less than trip setpoint)
9.61% Trip above last reset
7.61% Pre-Trip (trip setpoint - 2%)
5.61% Manual Reset lights (trip setpoint – 4 %)

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11
Q

What are the Blocks or Interlocks associated with the Variable High Power Trip?

A

Setpoint ranges from 15% minimum to 107% maximum
Setpoint automatically follows power down, but must be manually adjusted as power is increased by pressing the Hi Power Reset Pushbuttons on the RTGB or on the RPS Cabinets
VHP Trip Reset Button lights up when power is within 4% of setpoint - indicates setpoint needs to be reset

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12
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the Variable High Power Trip?

A

Pretrip when power is within 2% of the setpoint
2/4 Pretrips generate a CEA Withdrawal Prohibit signal.

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13
Q

What is the Basis for the High Startup Rate Trip?

A

The High Rate of Power Change trip is NOT credited in the accident analysis as providing primary protection for any limiting case AOO or Postulated Accident (PA).

Equipment protection trip to protect core, used only at low power levels to protect the reactor against an uncontrolled CEA withdrawal or boron dilution incident when the reactor is critical but at low power.

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14
Q

What are the Setpoint for the High Startup Rate Trip?

A

Setpoints:
Trip < 2.49 dpm
Pretrip ~ 1.3 dpm
Provides CWP (CEA Withdrawal Prohibit)

Auto blocked if:
< 10-4% power decreasing
> 15% power increasing

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15
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the High Startup Rate Trip?

A

Pretrip lights enabled at 1.3 DPM (between enabled ranges of >10 –4 % and <15%)
2/4 Pretrips generate a CEA Withdrawal Prohibit

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16
Q

What is the Basis for the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip?

A

The TM/LP trip prevents exceeding the DNBR SL during AOOs and aids the ESFAS during certain accidents. The following events require TM/LP protection:
* Excess load (inadvertent opening of a steam generator ADV)
* RCS depressurization (inadvertent safety or PORVs opening)
* Steam generator tube rupture
* LOCA accident

TM/LP is also utilized to trip on asymmetric steam generator pressure conditions (ASGT).

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17
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip?

A

Trip setpoint is variable and compares pressure setpoint (derived by the Core Protection Calculator) vs. actual PZR pressure. The calculated pressure setpoint is compared to actual RCS pressure. If RCS pressure is less than the setpoint, a RX trip signal would be generated.
Minimum setpoint: {1887 psia} [1900 psia]

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18
Q

What are the Blocks or Interlocks associated with the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip?

A

The Zero Power Mode Bypass key block bypasses this trip when {≤ 1%} [≤ 0.5%] WR power

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19
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip?

A

Pre-trip 50 psi higher than setpoint.
2/4 Pretrips generate a CEA Withdrawal Prohibit

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20
Q

What are the inputs to the Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip Setpoint?

A

1) Max Cold Leg temperature
2) QPwr
3) ASI - modifies signal through shape annealing.
4) Assymetric S/G trip – If present will drive pressure trip setpoint to ≥ 2500 psia.
Asymmetric SG Transient (ASGT) – Part of TM/LP (DNBR)
Basis: Protects against secondary system malfunctions that create asymmetric Tc tempsresulting in significant radial peaking.
Most limiting event is the Loss of Load caused by the slow closure of one MSIV
* (PSG A – PSG B) > 135 psid [120 psid] sets TM/LP input to 2500 psia = TM/LP trip (on affected channel) since normal RCS pressure is 2250 psia.

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21
Q

What failures could cause a Thermal Margin/Low Pressure Trip to be generated?

A

A TM/LP trip will be generated if:
1) S/G pressure inst fails (High or low) – (ASGT)
2) Failed upper or lower NI detectors (High or low) – would impact penalties for ASI
3) Failed upper or lower NI detectors (High failures only) – would raise calculated value of Qpwr.
4) Failed Thot high – Would raise calculated value of Qpwr due to ∆T power increasing.
Failed Tcold high – Would raise calculated value of TM/LP setpoint

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22
Q

What is the Basis for the Local Power Density Trip?

A

The Local Power Density - High trip ensures that excessive axial peaking, such as that due to axial xenon oscillations, will not cause fuel damage. It ensures that neither a DNBR less than the SL nor a peak linear heat rate that corresponds to the temperature for fuel centerline melting will occur. This trip is the primary protection against fuel centerline melting.

Input:
Core Protection Calculator-2 contact. CPC-2 calculates both ASI (Y) and ASI limits (Yn & Yp).
Setpoint:
Trip: Variable, ITS Figure 3.3.1-3 (this is two pages)
Pre-Trip: Variable
(CWP on Pretrip)

Bypassed <15% power via Lin 1 bistable

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23
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Local Power Density Trip?

A

Setpoint is Variable with power (As determined by Core Protection Calculator #2)
Basically this trip is based on actual ASI as determined by Q-power vs. ASI setpoint as determined by LRNI’s. To calculate the trip setpoint, CPC-2 looks at Q-power that is sent to core protection calculator -2 and it develops a limit curve that ASI must be within. If ASI is not within these limits, a Rx trip is generated.
CPC-2 looks at actual ASI versus an ASI Limit curve which is developed by CPC-2 with inputs from Qpower.

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24
Q

What are Blocks or Interlocks associated with the Local Power Density Trip?

A

Enabled > 15% by the Linear PR Safety LRNI #1 Bistable
Auto Bypass disabled at <15%

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25
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the Local Power Density Trip?

A

Variable setpoint.
2/4 Pretrips will cause a CEA Withdrawal Prohibit

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26
Q

What failures could generate a Local Power Density Trip?

A

Failed upper or lower detector – Would drive either HIGH OR LOW (ASI)
Failed T-hot HIGH (to 665°F) - ASI limits

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27
Q

What is the Basis for the RCS Low Flow Trip?

A

The low reactor coolant flow trip is provided to prevent violation of the DNB SAFDL during the Loss of Coolant Flow and Loss of AC Power AOOs

Assists ESFAS in accident analysis for seized/sheared rotor shaft [U2 only – certain MSLB events] and thus limit fuel pin damage due to DNB along with peak RCS pressure.

Input S/G D/P (RCS side)
Setpoint: {>95%} [>95.4%] of 375,000gpm
Manual Key Bypass {< 1%} [.5] via ZPMB, Auto removal on power rising

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28
Q

What is the Setpoint for the RCS Low Flow Trip?

A

Trip is set at {95%} [95.4%] of RCS design flow (375,000 gpm)
DP across each SG is summed to provide RCS flow indication

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29
Q

What are Blocks or Interlocks Associated with the RCS Low Flow Trip?

A

Zero Power Mode Bypass key block bypasses trip when {≤ 1%} [≤ 0.5%] WR power
Bypass is auto removed when power rises above permissive.

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30
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the RCS Low Flow Trip?

A

Pre-trip at {96%} [97%] flow

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31
Q

What is the Basis for the High Pressurizer Pressure Trip?

A

The Pressurizer Pressure - High trip, in conjunction with pressurizer safety valves and main steam safety valves (MSSVs), provides protection against overpressure conditions in the RCS during the following events:
* Loss of condenser vacuum with a concurrent loss of offsite power
* Loss of condenser vacuum with a concurrent loss of one 6.9 kV bus
* Loss of External Load/Turbine trip
* CEA withdrawal
* Loss of feedwater flow

Input: NR Pressurizer Pressure
Setpoint: {2400} [2370] psia
Sends a signal to open PORVs

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32
Q

What is the Setpoint for the High Pressurizer Pressure Trip?

A

Trip is set at 2/4 NR Pressurizer Pressure instruments sense {≥ 2400 psia} [≥ 2370 psia]

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33
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the High Pressurizer Pressure Trip?

A

Pretrip set @ {2350 psia} [2327 psia]

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34
Q

What is the Basis for the Low Steam Generator Level Trip?

A

The Steam Generator Level - Low trip ensures that low DNBR, high local power density, and the RCS pressure SLs are maintained during normal operation and AOOs, and, in conjunction with the ESFAS, the consequences of the Feedwater System pipe break accident will be acceptable.

Input:
Low select of either S/G A or B Narrow Range Levels
Setpoint: 35% NR Level

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35
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Low Steam Generator Level Trip?

A

Trip is set at ≤ 35% level on Narrow Range level on the auctioneered low A or B S/G
Each RPS channel looks at both SG’s and uses the lowest level (auctioneered low)
An individual RPS Channel Trip will occur if:
* Any single ‘A’ train S/G level instrument senses level ≤ 35%; or
* Any single ‘B’ train S/G level instrument senses level ≤ 35%
An actual RX Trip would occur if:
* Any 2 RPS Channels have a S/G level instrument that senses level ≤ 35%
Setpoint ensures enough inventory in SG’s at time of trip for 10 min margin before AFW is required

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36
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the Low Steam Generator Level Trip?

A

Pre-trip at 40%

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37
Q

How many level transmitters feed the Low Steam Generator Level Trip?

A

4 level transmitters per S/G.

38
Q

What is the Basis for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip?

A

The Steam Generator Pressure - Low trip provides protection against an excessive rate of heat extraction from the steam generators, which would result in a rapid uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS. This trip is needed to shut down the reactor and assist the ESFAS in the event of an MSLB.

Input:
Lowest pressure in either Steam Generator A or B
Setpoint: {600} [626] psia
Manual Key Bypass: {<700} [720] psia. Auto disabled on rising power

39
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip?

A

Trip is set at {≤600 psia} [≤626 psia]
Each RPS channel looks at both SG’s and uses the lowest pressure (auctioneered low)
An individual RPS Channel Trip will occur if:
* Any single ‘A’ train S/G pressure instrument senses pressure {≤600 psia} [≤626 psia]; or
* Any single ‘B’ train S/G pressure instrument senses pressure {≤600 psia} [≤626 psia]
An actual RX Trip would occur if:
* Any 2 RPS Channels have a S/G pressure channel senses pressure {≤600 psia} [≤626 psia]

40
Q

What are Blocks or Interlocks associated with the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip?

A

A key operated bypass switch is provided on the aux logic assembly on each of the 4 RPS channels. Allows CEA testing while shutdown.
Interlock allows the key switch to bypass the trip only If pressure is S/G pressure is {< 700 psia} [<720 psia] and 15VDC is present.
The trip is auto re-instated should S/G pressure rises {< 700 psia} [>720 psia]. It will not re-bypass the trip if S/G pressure subsequently lowers less than setpoint again.

41
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip?

A

Pretrip setpoint: {700 psia} [665 psia]

42
Q

How many pressure transmitters feed the Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip?

A

4 pressure transmitters per S/G.

43
Q

What is the Basis for the Loss of Load Trip?

A

The Loss of Load (turbine Hydraulic Fluid Pressure – Low control oil pressure) trip is anticipatory for the loss of heat removal capabilities of the secondary system following a turbine trip. The Loss of Load trip prevents lifting the pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, and MSSVs in the event of a turbine generator trip. Thus, the trip minimizes the pressure and temperature transients on the reactor by initiating a trip well before reaching the Pressurizer Pressure - High trip and pressurizer safety valve setpoints.

Input: Turbine Emergency Trip Header pressure
Setpoint: ~1000 psig Emergency Trip Header Pressure
(Nominal Trip Setting, >800psig)
Enabled when >15% Linear Safety Channel NI power via Lin 1 Bistable
Bypassed <15% power
No Pretrip

44
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Loss of Load Trip?

A

Trip setpoint is Low DEH Oil Pressure on the Emergency Trip Header of < 1000 psig.

45
Q

What are the Blocks or Interlocks associated with the Loss of Load Trip?

A
  • Enabled > 15% by the Linear PR Safety LIN 1 Bistable
  • Auto Bypass disabled at <15%
46
Q

What is the Basis for the High Containment Pressure Trip?

A

The Containment Pressure - High trip prevents exceeding the containment design pressure during certain loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) or feedwater line break accidents. It ensures a reactor trip prior to, or concurrent with, a LOCA, thus assisting the ESFAS in the event of a LOCA or MSLB.

Input: Containment Pressure
Setpoint:
Trip: {3.3} [3.0] psig
Pre-Trip: 2.5 psig

47
Q

What it the Setpoint for the High Containment Pressure Trip?

A

{3.3 psig} [3.0 psig]

48
Q

What is the Pre-Trip Setpoint for the High Containment Pressure Trip?

A

Pre-trip 2.5 psig

49
Q

Discuss the Containment Pressure transmitters.

A

Containment Pressure transmitter output is reverse acting – zero output is indicative of a high containment pressure
Transmitters are outside of CTMT. 4 solenoid isolation valves fail open (loss of DC).

50
Q

What is the Basis for the Unit 2 Loss of CCW to RCPs Trip?

A

Equipment Protection Only potential for pressure boundary loss by seal failure, or, seized shaft due to loss of seal cooling and bearing cooling.

Input: CCW return flow from RCPs
Setpoint: [1220 gpm for > 10mins: TRM >636 gpm]

The difference between the TRM value and the measured value is due to the way the flow is measured.
Total CCW return flow is measured which includes CCW from RCPs and CEDM coolers.
No Pretrip but does have the timing alarm

51
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Unit 2 Loss of CCW to RCPs Trip?

A

Trip is set at ≤1220 gpm CCW Return Header flow after a 10 min time delay

52
Q

Where is flow sensed for the Unit 2 Loss of CCW to RCPs Trip?

A

Flow is sensed on the N Header return from CNMT (RCPS and CEDM fans)

53
Q

What is the Basis for the Manual Reactor Trip?

A

A Manual RX Trip is a valid RPS actuation

54
Q

What is the Setpoint for the Manual Reactor Trip?

A

Two Sets of Trip Pushbuttons are located on RTGB 101 and 104 (4 buttons total on each unit)
Each PB trips 2 TCB’s
Both Buttons in a set must be depressed to get a Reactor Trip

55
Q

Discuss the Reactor Trip Breakers.

A

Reactor Trip Breakers
* Can be closed from Control Room near NI cabinets
* Contain U/V and Shunt trip relays which work together to ensure the trip breakers open
* U/V relays de-energize to actuate
* Shunt trip relays energize to actuate.
* Each relay gets a signal from each of the six RPS logic matrixes on a 2/4 trip signal

56
Q

Discuss how RPS trips the Reactor.

A

Simplified understanding of how RPS trips the RX
* 4 RPS Channels monitor specific instrumentation related to RX safety (Channels A, B, C, D)
* Each RPS Channel generates an output to their associated 6 logic matrix combinations (AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, CD)
* If any of the 6 logic matrixes determines that 2/4 instruments exceeded their trip setpoints, it will de-energize the 4 logic matrix relays associated with that matrix. (For example, the AB logic relays are AB1, AB2, AB3 & AB4)
* These logic matrix relays will then de-energize their associated K1, K2, K3 and K4 relays. (For example: AB1→K1), (AB2→K2), (AB3→K3), (AB4→K4)
* Each K relay de-energizing causes it’s associated TCB’s to open by de-energizing the breakers U/V relay and energizing the Shunt Trip relay.

57
Q

Discuss Trip Condition Status.

A

Unit 1 Trip Condition Status:
* K relay lights OFF (if auto trip in)
* UV relay lights OFF
* Shunt relay lights ON
* TCBs OPEN GREEN light ON
* Bus UV Red Lights ON Rx trip bus.
* ALL Phase Current lights white lights ON

U2 Trip Condition Status
* 4 K relay lights OFF (if auto trip in)
* 8 TCBs GREEN OPEN Lights ON
* 12 Phase current White lights ON

58
Q

Discuss Trip Inhibit Key Bypass (Single Channel Bypass).

A

Key operated bypass switches in each RPS cabinet allow the operator to change the state of contacts in logic matrix. The key is captured in bypass. While the selected trip unit is in BYPASS, actuation of the bistable will NOT input into Rx Trip logic. Once a channel is bypassed, actuation logic for that parameter is changed to 2 out of 3. It does NOT block Pre-Trips, or CEA Withdrawal Prohibits.

Requires power for the channel to be bypassed. If power is lost to any of the cabinets, any channel in bypass w/ the key switch would then be tripped

59
Q

Discuss Zero Power Mode Operational Bypass Switch (multi channel).

A
  • Allows CEAs to be tested when RCS is depressurized and RCPs are off.
  • Four key operated switches (1/Channel)
  • Bypasses the following:

ΔT power signal to CPC-2 (bypassed if there are failed temperature instruments)

RCS Low Flow Trip

TM/LP Trip [& CWP]

  • Can be taken to bypass when power is {<1%} [<0.5%] as sensed by WR Safety Logarithmic NI’s. Will go back into bypass if power lowers < Setpoint again.
60
Q

Discuss Manual Low Steam Generator Pressure Trip Operational Key Bypass (multi channel).

A
  • Key operated bypass switch is provided on the aux logic assembly on each of the 4 RPS channels.
  • Allows CEA testing while shutdown.
  • Interlocked to allow the key switch to bypass the trip only If pressure is S/G pressure is < 700 psia [<720 psia] and 15VDC is present.
  • The trip is auto re-instated should S/G pressure rises > 700 psia [>720 psia].
  • It will not re-bypass the trip if S/G pressure subsequently lowers < setpoint again.
61
Q

Discuss CEA Withdrawal Prohibit (CWP).

A

Prevents withdrawal of all CEA’s in ANY mode.
CWP is caused by 2/4 Pre-Trips on VHP, SUR, LPD, TM/LP - All the Qpwr trips and SUR

On Unit 1:
a) The SUR and TM/LP CWP logic is automatically bypassed when power is < 10-4% power.

On Unit 2:
a) The high startup rate SUR input signals to the CWP logic are automatically bypassed when power is less than 10-4%.
b) The TM/LP input signals to the CWP logic are bypassed via the ZPMB switch when power < 0.5%.

62
Q

Discuss Diverse Scram Actuation (ATWS).

A
  • 2/4 channels of Hi PZR Pressure; Setpoint: 2437 psia
  • Trips CEDM supply contactors to de-energize both CEDM units
  • Most limiting ATWS is Loss of Feedwater / Rx fails to trip
63
Q

Discuss Turbine Trip on RX Trip

A

Signal is generated by U/V Relays located on:
a) RX Trip Swgr on Unit 1
b) On the CEDMCS Cabinets on Unit 2.

64
Q

Discuss Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI).

A

PTTI is Caused by either of the following:
1) LIN Trouble Bistable actuation from Linear PR Safety channel
2) ∆T Power Calculator Test Switch out of OPERATE

Results in:
1) VHP, TM/LP, LPD trips being generated (can be bypassed with keys)
2) Q power signal to PRC & RPI is interrupted = no PDIL inputs “PTTI’s don’t PDIL”

65
Q

Discuss the Power Ratio Calculator.

A

Located in the rear of RPS channel D

Functions:
1. Converts the Maximum value of the 4 channels of Qpower input into ASI DNB limits and is fed into the RED & GREEN pens. The Red pen is the positive ASI limit. The GREEN pen is the negative ASI limit.
2. Converts the average of the Lin PR Control Channels (9 & 10) inputs into the ASI DNB actual value and is fed into the BLUE pen. It represents actual ASI.
3. Provides Q power input to RPI signal for PDIL & PPDIL lines
4. {Performs alarm setpoint calculation for HI and HI-HI NI power deviation on Unit 1 only}

Inputs:
Toggle Switches located inside PRC can be used to remove Channel of RRS from calculation
When a PTTI signal is generated in any RPS channel, the Power Ratio Calculator ASI recorder on RTGB 204 and annunciator PWR Ration Calculator Deviation will be inoperable.

66
Q

Discuss Bistable Trip Units.

A
  • Comparators analyze setpoints vs. signal inputs for trip and pre-trip values
  • 5 Relays: 2 Alarm (trip & pre-trip), 3 trip relays that operate contacts in Logic Matrices
  • Deenergizes trip relay when inputs exceed setpoint and reenergizes when input normalizes
  • Loss of power (Instrument Buses) de-energizes (trips) all BTU/ATU on that channel
  • Trip and Pre-Trip Lights on the module must be Manually Reset by depressing button
67
Q

Discuss how to place BTUs in “Trip”.

A

RPS: Pull out the Trip Unit Bistable
ESFAS: Pull out BOTH Upper & Lower Isolation Modules (Except MSIS - Pull only 1 isolation module)
AFAS: Contact I&C to install jumpers

68
Q

Discuss Half Trip.

A
  • If only 1 TCB failed to Open
  • Power will remain to ~ half CEAs they will remain withdrawn
  • Power will be Lost to ~ half CEAs and they will insert.
  • If one TCB trips open or is removed from service for maintenance: Manually open the other TCB in that pair to prevent a half trip condition. Also required per ADM-11.16
69
Q

Discuss Turbine Trip from the RPS.

A

How does the turbine know the RX is tripped?

Reactor trip detected by 4 UV relays located: {on Reactor Trip Switchgear for U1} [CEDM power buses for U2]

UV condition on these 4 relays (4/4 logic) causes the Turbine to trip

70
Q

Discuss RPS Power Supplies.

A

RPS Cabinets (A-D) - Powered individually from each of the 120 VAC Instrument Buses
Logic Matrices - Two 28 VDC Power Supplies per Matrix powered from 2 different Inst. Buses
Trip Paths (K Relays) - 120 V Instrument AC Buses MA / MB / MC / MD (1 per relay)
UV and Shunt Relays - 125 VDC Buses A & B (A-TCB 1, 3, 5, 7; B-TCB-2, 4, 6, 8)
Test Power Supply - 120 VAC Instrument Bus MA
Trip Status Panel - Powered from the 120 VAC Instrument Bus MD (RPS Mimic)

71
Q

Discuss Logic Matrix Trip Testing.

A

Precautions;
* To terminate Logic Matrix testing before completion:
a) Place Channel Trip Select Switch to OFF
b) [Matrix Fuse to OFF]
c) Slowly release Matrix Relay hold pushbutton
d) Rotate Matrix Relay Trip Select Switch to OFF
* Testing requires TCB-9 to be closed to ensure plant will not trip

[Fuse Test - Unit 2 Only]
* Fuse Integrity of fuses in the Logic Ladder Matrix is tested. If Matrix Relay Lights De-Energize, this indicates a Fuse in the Applicable Logic Ladder Interbay Circuitry has Failed Open.

72
Q

Discuss the Channel Trip Select Switch.

A

A 12-position switch that applies tripping power, (from the test power supply) to two trip relays at a time, one in each selected trip unit. Rotation of the Channel Trip Select Switch tests only those trip unit relays that operate contacts in the logic matrix under test. This would normally deenergize all 4 Logic Matrix Relays and cause a Plant Trip but a Hold Current is applied.

73
Q

Discuss the Matrix Relay Trip Select Switch.

A

A 4-Position switch that interrupts the electrical circuit between the test power supply and the matrix relay it is selected to. It allows testing of only one matrix relay at a time; it determines, by virtue of its position, which one of the four relays is tested by interrupting hold voltage to the selected relay.

74
Q

Discuss the Matrix Relay Hold Pushbutton.

A

A 2-Position Button which makes up two circuits that apply test voltage, as you push in the pushbutton, it first completes the path for the matrix relay. When fully depressed, test voltage is also aligned to the channel trip circuitry.

75
Q

Discuss RPS Failure Scenarios.

A

Failure of a shunt or U/V relay_____One RTCB opens____No RX trip
Failure of one MG set______________No RTCBs open_____No RX trip
Failure of a single K relay__________Two RTCBs open____No RX trip
Failure of a Single DC Power supply in a ladder network Four RTCBs open No RX trip

Loss of Power to one RPS channel (One instrument bus) Four RTCBs open No RX trip

Loss of Power to 2 RPS channels (Two instrument buses) Eight RTCBs open RX trip (PORV’s may open. See PORV operation in PPLCS notes)
Loss of an A or B DC Bus Eight RTCBs open RX trip
(PORV’s may open. See PORV operation in PPLCS notes)

76
Q

Describe the RPS response to a T-hot instrument failure.

A

HIGH (665°F) (RTD Open)
VHP, TM/LP, & LPD channel trips
(Large DT = High Power condition as seen by RPS trips)

LOW (515°F) (RTD Shorted)
NO CHANNEL TRIP
(Small DT, NI power selected for Q pwr)

77
Q

Describe the RPS response to a T-cold instrument failure.

A

HIGH (615°F) (RTD Open)
TM/LP channel trip
(Max Tc is selected increases trip setpoint to trip channel)

LOW (465°F) (RTD Shorted)
NO CHANNEL TRIP
(Max Tc is selected)

78
Q

Describe the RPS response to a Linear Range Safety NI failure.

A

HIGH (fails to 200%)
Upper Detector or Lower Detector

VHP, TM/LP, LPD channel trips
Loss of Load channel trip if EH trip header <1000psig
Enables Loss of Load trip (sees power as >15%)
Affected channel ASI indication would:
Upper detector fails high: ASI would show more negative
Lower detector fails high: ASI would show more positive

Unit 1 ONLY:
* HI & HI-HI deviation lights on failed channel
* L20 Reactor Power Range Subchannel Deviation alarm

LOW
Upper Detector or Lower Detector

TM/LP & LPD channel trips
Affected channel ASI indication would:
Upper detector fails low: ASI would show more positive
Lower detector fails low: ASI would show more negative

Unit 1 ONLY:
* HI & HI-HI deviation lights on failed channel
* L20 Reactor Power Range Subchannel Deviation alarm

79
Q

Describe the RPS response to a Log Safety NI instrument failure.

A

HIGH

SUR channel trips and will clear unless power >15% then trip is blocked. (Lin 1 block)
Removes:
* Hi SUR block for < 10-4% power
* Zero Power Mode Bypass (TM/LP and Low RCS flow trips are enabled)
* Unit 1 ONLY High Counts if in SU Range and selected.

LOW

NO CHANNEL TRIP, NO Alarms
Applies channel High SUR < 10-4% power block
Permissive to allow manually enabling the ZPMB.
Unit 1 ONLY Loss of Counts if in SU Range and selected.

80
Q

Describe the RPS response to a S/G Pressure instrument failure.

A

HIGH
TM/LP channel trip (ASGT)

LOW
TM/LP channel trip (ASGT)
Low S/G Pressure trip

81
Q

Describe the RPS response to an RCS Flow D/P instrument failure.

A

HIGH
NO CHANNEL TRIP

LOW
Low RCS flow channel trip

82
Q

Describe the RPS response to a RCP Pressure Pressure instrument failure.

A

(reverse acting transmitter 20-4ma = 0-50psig [0-15psig])

HIGH input signal
NO CHANNEL TRIP
High Input

LOW input signal
RCB High Press channel trip

83
Q

Describe the RPS response to a Pressurizer Pressure instrument failure.

A

HIGH
Pressurizer High Pressure channel trip,
PORV open logic now 1/3

LOW
TM/LP channel trip

84
Q

Discuss the Unit 2 RPS response to a CCW flow instrument failure.

A

HIGH
NO CHANNEL TRIP

LOW
Low CCW flow Channel trip after 10 minute time delay.

85
Q

Discuss the RPS response to Pulling a Trip Module.

A

Trips monitored parameter unless in Inhibit Channel Bypass.

86
Q

Describe the RPS response to the Loss of 1 of 4 120VAC Instrument Busses.

A

NO REACTOR TRIP
Only 4 TCBs Open
2 K relays de-energize
* Loss of either MA or MB opens TCBs: 1, 2, 5, & 6
* Loss of either MC or MD opens TCBs: 3, 4, 7, & 8

87
Q

Describe the RPS response to the Loss of the A or B 125VDC Safety Bus.

A

REACTOR TRIPS
* 2/4 channels lose power and drop out 1 logic matrix
* A Second logic matrix drops out due to power loss.
* All 4 K relays along with 8 UV relays de-energize, 4 shunt relays energize to open and trip reactor.
* Directly TCBs 1, 5 , 3 & 7 on loss of “A” DC bus
* Directly TCBs 2, 6, 4, & 8 on loss of “B” DC bus to trip reactor.
* PORVs receive OPEN signal

88
Q

RPS (NSSS) Channel Inputs

A

Linear Power Range Safety NI (0 - 200%)
Wide Range Log NI (2x10-8 - 200%)
SUR (-1 to +7 dpm) via Wide Range Log NI
Pressurizer Pressure (1500 - 2500 psia)
Reactor Coolant Flow (0 - 100%)
T-hot (515 - 665F)
T-cold (465 - 615F)
2 S/G Pressures (0 – 1200 psia)
2 S/G Water Levels (N/R 0 – 100% )
Containment Bldg. Pressure (0 - 50 psig [0 – 15 psig])
Axial Flux Shape Index (via Linear Power Range Safety Nis and calculated by Core Protection Calculators (CPCs))
[U2 ONLY CCW Flow (0 - 2000gpm)]

89
Q

What is the Basis for the Asymmetric Steam Generator Trip?

A

The Steam Generator Pressure Difference provides protection for those AOOs associated with secondary system malfunctions that result in asymmetric primary coolant temperatures. The most limiting event is closure of a single main steam isolation valve.
Inputs:
CPC (Core Protection Calculator)
Pressurizer N/R Pressure
Setpoint is variable: T.S. Figures 3.3.1-1 & 3.3.1-2 are inputs
<{1887} psia [1900] Pmin setpoint, (CWP on Pre Trip)
ASGT {135} [120] psid ΔS/G pressure:
Drives Pmin setpoint to 2500 psia
Can be Key Bypassed: via ZPMB @ {1%} [.5] power

90
Q

What conditions will invoke the Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI)?

A

Delta T Power Calculator Test Switch NOT in OPERATE.
A “Lin Trouble” bistable actuation from the Linear Power Range Safety Channel. The “Lin Trouble” actuates if one or more of the following occur:

Power supply failure
Circuit card removal
Power Range Safety Channel Test Switch not in OPERATE with Test Enable Switch in ENABLE.
“AVERAGE CONTROL” switch NOT in (U & L)/2

91
Q

What does Power Trip Test Interlock (PTTI) trip?

A

PTTI Trips the following:
VHP
LPD
TM/LP (ASGT)

PTTI Also Blocks:
Q-Power from that channel to:
PRC
Rod Position Indication System

(Note: Loss of Power and Pulling Circuit Cards Can Also Cause a PTTI via Lin Trouble circuit)