Quiz 5 Flashcards
Plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, is a widow whose husband was killed in an accident while working for Defendant, a construction company. Defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Idaho. Plaintiff brought a diversity action against Defendant in federal district court in Missouri alleging negligence and seeking $100,000 in damages. Defendant filed a third-party claim against Distributor, seeking $100,000 in damages and alleging that if Defendant is liable to Plaintiff, Distributor is liable to Defendant for having leased the equipment that allegedly caused the accident. Distributor is incorporated in Missouri. Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to assert a tort claim against Distributor and to seek $100,000 in damages from that party.
Defendant and Distributor each move to dismiss the claims against them based on subject-matter jurisdiction objections. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim; Distributor moves to dismiss Defendant’s third-party claim; and Distributor also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s tort claim. How should the court resolve the motions?
(A)
Grant all motions.
(B)
Grant Distributor’s motion against Defendant and Plaintiff.
(C)
Grant Distributor’s motion against Plaintiff.
(D)
Grant Defendant’s motion.
(C) is the correct answer because Plaintiff’s claim against Distributor is not within the court’s diversity jurisdiction; supplemental jurisdiction cannot be exercised over it; and the facts do not suggest that any other jurisdictional basis is available. When faced with a multi-party and multi-claim action, it helps to diagram the action:
Plaintiff (Missouri) v. Defendant (Idaho) v. Distributor (Missouri)
Here, Plaintiff is seeking to amend her complaint to sue Distributor, who has been joined in the action as a third-party defendant, under FRCP 14. However, in order to bring a claim against a third-party defendant, the court must be able to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. One form of subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The federal diversity statute permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff and the defendant are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff (Missouri) and Distributor (Missouri) are citizens of the same state, and so diversity jurisdiction is not present.
The second form of subject-matter jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction, though this too is unavailable in this situation. Here, Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000, and so diversity jurisdiction is present. When the anchor claim is grounded in diversity jurisdiction, federal law withholds supplemental jurisdiction over any claim “…by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure…” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Defendant’s third-party claim against Distributor requires that Distributor be joined under FRCP Rule 14 which governs third-party practice in federal court. Thus, Distributor is a person made a party under FRCP 14, and Plaintiff is prohibited from joining a claim under § 1367(b); supplemental jurisdiction may not be exercised on Plaintiff’s claim against Distributor. The statute codifies the practice that existed before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), which did not permit ancillary jurisdiction when its exercise would violate the rule of complete diversity as articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
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Plaintiff, a citizen of Missouri, is a widow whose husband was killed in an accident while working for Defendant, a construction company. Defendant is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Idaho. Plaintiff brought a diversity action against Defendant in federal district court in Missouri alleging negligence and seeking $100,000 in damages. Defendant filed a third-party claim against Distributor, seeking $100,000 in damages and alleging that if Defendant is liable to Plaintiff, Distributor is liable to Defendant for having leased the equipment that allegedly caused the accident. Distributor is incorporated in Missouri. Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to assert a tort claim against Distributor and to seek $100,000 in damages from that party.
Defendant and Distributor each move to dismiss the claims against them based on subject-matter jurisdiction objections. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim; Distributor moves to dismiss Defendant’s third-party claim; and Distributor also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s tort claim. How should the court resolve the motions?
(A)
Grant all motions.
(B)
Grant Distributor’s motion against Defendant and Plaintiff.
(C)
Grant Distributor’s motion against Plaintiff.
(D)
Grant Defendant’s motion.
(C) is the correct answer because Plaintiff’s claim against Distributor is not within the court’s diversity jurisdiction; supplemental jurisdiction cannot be exercised over it; and the facts do not suggest that any other jurisdictional basis is available. When faced with a multi-party and multi-claim action, it helps to diagram the action:
Plaintiff (Missouri) v. Defendant (Idaho) v. Distributor (Missouri)
Here, Plaintiff is seeking to amend her complaint to sue Distributor, who has been joined in the action as a third-party defendant, under FRCP 14. However, in order to bring a claim against a third-party defendant, the court must be able to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. One form of subject-matter jurisdiction is diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The federal diversity statute permits the exercise of diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff and the defendant are “citizens of different States” and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000 exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Plaintiff (Missouri) and Distributor (Missouri) are citizens of the same state, and so diversity jurisdiction is not present.
The second form of subject-matter jurisdiction is supplemental jurisdiction, though this too is unavailable in this situation. Here, Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of different states and the amount-in-controversy exceeds $75,000, and so diversity jurisdiction is present. When the anchor claim is grounded in diversity jurisdiction, federal law withholds supplemental jurisdiction over any claim “…by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure…” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). Defendant’s third-party claim against Distributor requires that Distributor be joined under FRCP Rule 14 which governs third-party practice in federal court. Thus, Distributor is a person made a party under FRCP 14, and Plaintiff is prohibited from joining a claim under § 1367(b); supplemental jurisdiction may not be exercised on Plaintiff’s claim against Distributor. The statute codifies the practice that existed before enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), which did not permit ancillary jurisdiction when its exercise would violate the rule of complete diversity as articulated in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806).
Plaintiff is an insurance company incorporated in Delaware. Defendant, its insured, owns an interstate bus company that is incorporated and headquartered in California. A Driver who works for Defendant crashed into a car on an interstate highway. More than a dozen individuals, both drivers and passengers, were seriously injured and three people eventually die from their injuries. Defendant was insured for claims up to $1 million for accidents that occur in the course of Driver’s employment. Driver had no personal insurance at the time of the accident. Ten of the injured parties sued Defendant and Driver, and their claims, consolidated in a federal district court in California, seek more than $10 million. Plaintiff filed a statutory interpleader action in federal court in Delaware.
Under what circumstances must the court dismiss the interpleader action?
(A)
The district court must dismiss if complete diversity does not exist between Plaintiff and all the claimants.
(B)
The district court must dismiss if the individual claims, aggregated together, do not exceed $75,000 in value.
(C)
The district court must dismiss if Plaintiff fails to deposit the stake into court or refuses to pay a bond.
(D)
The district court must dismiss if the claims to be resolved are not identical.
(C) is the correct answer because it recognizes the special requirements imposed on a stakeholder in a statutory interpleader action. Interpleader is a procedure that allows a party—called the stakeholder—to join in one lawsuit all claimants to whom he is or might be liable. Federal law recognizes two different kinds of interpleader actions: “Rule 22” interpleader and “statutory” interpleader (28 U.S.C. § 1335). Although the procedures serve the same purpose—to enable a party to avoid the risk of multiple and conflicting liability “when several claimants assert rights to a single stake,” Airborne Freight Corp. v. U.S., 195 F.3d 238, 240 (5th Cir. 1999)—statutory and rule interpleader differ in their procedural requirements. Statutory interpleader requires that the plaintiff deposit the stake “into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given bond payable to the clerk of the court in such amount and with surety as the court or judge may deem proper.” 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1)(B); see U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Asbestospray, Inc., 182 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A proper deposit or bond is a jurisdictional prerequisite… The stakeholder …must deposit the largest amount for which it may be liable in view of the subject matter of the controversy.”). Rule interpleader does not have an explicit deposit or bond requirement. Since the question asks about statutory interpleader, (C) is the correct answer.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, filed an action in federal district court in New Orleans. His complaint contained a federal civil rights claim alleging that he had been the victim of unlawful sexual harassment and a breach of contract claim against his employer, also a citizen of Louisiana. The breach of contract claim alleged that Defendant had failed to pay Plaintiff overtime as required by his employment contract. Plaintiff also asserted a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his manager, a citizen of Louisiana, alleging that it was her intentional acts of sexual harassment that caused him to suffer severe emotional distress. In addition to filing an answer, Defendant employer asserted a breach of contract claim against Plaintiff and an indemnity claim against the manager. In its breach of contract claim, Defendant alleged that Plaintiff had not honored his contractual commitment to attend a variety of off-site conferences.
Is Defendant’s claim against the manager joinable?
(A)
No, because the claim does not arise under federal law.
(B)
Yes, because its right of joinder is unlimited.
(C)
No, because the parties are citizens of the same state.
(D)
Yes, because this claim arises out of the transaction that gave rise to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant.
The correct answer is D. Defendant has filed a cross-claim against the manager. The rule governing the joinder of cross-claims in federal court is FRCP 13(g). Like the rule regarding joinability of third-party claims, and unlike the rules governing the joinability of counterclaims, the rule governing joinability of cross-claims is limited. Rule 13(g) only permits the joinability of cross-claims that arise out of the transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims or to a counterclaim. Defendant’s cross-claim against the manager for indemnity in connection with any liability it may incur as a result of Plaintiff’s claim against it clearly arises out of the occurrences that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim against Defendant.
Plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Atlanta, Georgia, brought suit in federal district court in Atlanta against a publisher, Books, Inc., alleging copyright infringement under the federal copyright statute, for which she sought $100,000 in damages. Books, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York City. Plaintiff also filed a claim against Books, Inc. alleging that it had breached its agreement with her to publish her book upon receipt of a manuscript. She sought $60,000 in damages in connection with that claim. In that same suit, Plaintiff also filed a $105,000 tort claim against the president of Books, Inc., a citizen of New York, alleging that he had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by sending emails to dozens of other publishers denouncing her as a horrible writer and a fraud and explaining that those were the reasons for his company’s refusal to publish her book. In this same action, Books, Inc. filed a claim against President seeking indemnity for any liability it might accrue in connection with Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against it. In response, President filed a breach of contract claim against Books, Inc. alleging that Books, Inc. had improperly withheld two weeks of salary from him totaling $65,000.
Is President’s breach of contract claim against Books, Inc. joinable?
(A)
Yes, because there is no limit to joinability of this type of claim.
(B)
No, because it is unrelated to the events that gave rise to Books, Inc.’s claim against Jackson.
(C)
Yes, because Books, Inc. was named in the complaint.
(D)
No, because the parties are not diverse.
The correct answer is A. Although this is a claim between co-defendants, it is not a cross-claim, but a counterclaim to Books, Inc.’s cross-claim against President. Consequently, the correct Rule governing joinability is Rule 13(a) and (b) and not Rule 13(g). There is no limit on joinability of counterclaims and so this claim is joinable. Whether or not the court has subject matter jurisdiction is another matter, but that is not being tested in this question. Rule 13 is only a rule of pleading and does not purport to override or eliminate the jurisdictional and venue requirements under the U.S. Code. Thus, the question asks only whether the claim is joinable, not whether the court will ultimately be able to adjudicate the claim based on subject matter jurisdiction.
Since it is not a cross-claim, but rather it is a counterclaim to Books, Inc.’s cross-claim, there is no need to meet the Rule 13(g) requirement of transactional relatedness and so answer B is incorrect.
Plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Atlanta, Georgia, brought suit in federal district court in Atlanta against a publisher, Books, Inc., alleging copyright infringement under the federal copyright statute, for which she sought $100,000 in damages. Books, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York City. Plaintiff also filed a claim against Books, Inc. alleging that it had breached its agreement with her to publish her book upon receipt of a manuscript. She sought $60,000 in damages in connection with that claim. In that same suit, Plaintiff also filed a $105,000 tort claim against the president of Books, Inc., a citizen of New York, alleging that he had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by sending emails to dozens of other publishers denouncing her as a horrible writer and a fraud and explaining that those were the reasons for his company’s refusal to publish her book. In this same action, Books, Inc. filed a claim against President seeking indemnity for any liability it might accrue in connection with Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against it. In response, President filed a breach of contract claim against Books, Inc. alleging that Books, Inc. had improperly withheld two weeks of salary from him totaling $65,000. Finally, President asserted a tort claim against his neighbor, claiming that her negligent maintenance of her home significantly depreciated the value of his property, for which he sought an injunction and $45,000 in damages.
Is President a properly joined defendant in this case?
(A)
No, because he is not a citizen of Georgia.
(B)
Yes, because he is a citizen of a different state than Plaintiff.
(C)
Yes, because this claim is transactionally related to Plaintiff’s claim against Books, Inc. and the two claims share a common question of fact.
(D)
Yes, because the claim is for $105,000.
The correct answer is C. Since Plaintiff filed claims against two defendants, this raises the issue of joinder of parties-defendant. Under Rule 20(a) multiple defendants can be joined if the claim against them arises out of the same transaction and there is at least one question of either law or fact common to the claim against all joined defendants. Both of these requirements are met here as both claims arise out of the decision not to publish Plaintiff’s book and involve the common question of why the book was not published, among others.
A citizen of Indiana brings an action against her employer, an Indiana corporation, in federal district court. Claim I alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex in violation of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. The second claim consists of a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the same series of acts of sexual harassment that formed the basis of her federal sex discrimination claim. The plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages in connection with each claim.
Does the court have subject matter jurisdiction over the entire lawsuit?
(A)
No, not over the second claim because it is a non-diverse state law claim.
(B)
Yes, because the two claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact and there is no reason to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim.
(C)
No, because the defendant is a citizen of the forum state.
(D)
Yes, because federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal law claims.
The correct answer is B. A federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over every claim in the lawsuit. The federal claim clearly falls within the court’s §1331 jurisdiction. The second claim, however, is a non-diverse state law claim since both parties are citizens of Indiana. Thus, it does not fall within the court’s original jurisdiction under either §1331 or §1332. This, then, raises the question of whether the claim falls within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction as provided by 28 U.S.C. §1367.
This is a “pendent claim jurisdiction” first articulated by the Supreme Court in UMW v. Gibbs. It consists of a federal question claim and a non-diverse state claim brought by one plaintiff against one defendant. Congress codified this doctrine in §1367(a), which gives federal courts the discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under these circumstances as long as the two claims form part of the same “case” under Article III of the Constitution, i.e., they arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts. If they do not, then the state claim must be dismissed and the federal court retains jurisdiction over the federal claim only. If they do form part of the same “case,” then the court has the discretion to exercise jurisdiction over the (non-diverse state law) claim that did not fall within its original jurisdiction. And §1367(c)(1)-(4) lists the factors that the court should consider in deciding whether or not to decline to exercise this supplemental jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim.
In this question, both claims arise out of the same series of alleged acts of harassment and so the common nucleus test is satisfied. And none of the factors listed in §1367(c) such as predominance of state issues or novelty of state law issues or dismissal of the federal claim is present to justify dismissal of the state law claim. Therefore, the fact that there is no independent subject matter jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim is not fatal and so answer A is incorrect.
A purchaser of a television brought an action against the manufacturer in federal district court in Massachusetts containing a claim that the manufacturer participated in a conspiracy to engage in unlawful price-fixing in violation of the federal antitrust laws. The plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts and the defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Massachusetts. In his complaint, the plaintiff also asserted a breach of contract claim, alleging that the television was defective and that the manufacturer refused to honor the warranty contained in the purchase agreement. In connection with this second claim, the plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the entire lawsuit?
(A)
No, because both parties are citizens of Massachusetts.
(B)
Yes, because the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim and §1331 jurisdiction over the federal claim.
(C)
No, because the claims do not arise out of a common nucleus of operative fact.
(D)
Yes, because the value of the state claim exceeds $75,000.
The correct answer is C. The federal claim falls within the court’s §1331 jurisdiction. The non-diverse state claim (both parties are citizens of Massachusetts) is subject to supplemental jurisdiction under §1367 only if the two claims form part of the same case, meaning they arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts and if none of the factors listed in §1367(c)(1)-(4) justify declining to exercise such supplemental jurisdiction. Here, the facts giving rise to the price-fixing conspiracy are different from and unrelated to the facts giving rise to the breach of contract claim; the two claims do not form part of the same case. Therefore, there can be no supplemental jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claim.
Plaintiff is injured in a crash between his car and another car and a truck on a narrow country road in Concord, New Hampshire. Plaintiff is a citizen of New Hampshire. Driver, the driver of the other car, is a citizen of Maine, and the owner of the truck, Trucks, Inc., is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Connecticut. Plaintiff filed an action in the federal court for the District of New Hampshire seeking damages of $250,000 against each of the two named defendants, Driver and Trucks, Inc. In the same suit, Driver filed a claim against Trucks, Inc. seeking $75,000 in damages for the damage to her car. Trucks, Inc. filed a tort claim against Plaintiff seeking $70,000 in damages for the damages to its truck. Trucks, Inc. also filed a claim against Trucker, a citizen of Connecticut who was driving its truck at the time of the accident, seeking indemnity from any loss it might suffer in connection with Plaintiff’s claim against it.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Driver’s claim against Trucks, Inc.?
(A)
Yes, because Driver and Trucks, Inc. are citizens of different states.
(B)
No, because Driver is seeking $70,000.
(C)
Yes, because this claim arose out of the car crash.
(D)
No, because original jurisdiction was based solely on diversity.
The correct answer is C. Driver and Trucks, Inc. are diverse, but since the amount in controversy is only $75,000, it does not exceed $75,000 and therefore does not meet the amount in controversy requirement of §1332. Since this is a state law claim, the court does not have original jurisdiction over this cross-claim. Since original jurisdiction over the civil action is founded solely on §1332, whether or not the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Driver’s claim involves the application of §1367(b). This section prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-based cases, but only over claims by “plaintiffs.” Although Driver is a cross-plaintiff, this does not meet the §1367(b) requirement of being a plaintiff. She is a defendant and cross-plaintiff and so the limitation of §1367(b) is inapplicable here. So we must go to §1367(a) and ask if this claim forms part of the same “case” as claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. And it does, since this claim arises out of the accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. So the common nucleus of operative fact standard of §1367(a) is met.
Plaintiff is injured in a crash between his car and another car and a truck on a narrow country road in Concord, New Hampshire. Plaintiff is a citizen of New Hampshire. Driver, the driver of the other car, is a citizen of Maine, and the owner of the truck, Trucks, Inc., is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Connecticut. Plaintiff filed an action in the federal court for the District of New Hampshire seeking damages of $250,000 against each of the two named defendants, Driver and Trucks, Inc. In the same suit, Driver filed a claim against Trucks, Inc. seeking $75,000 in damages for the damage to her car. Trucks, Inc. filed a tort claim against Plaintiff seeking $70,000 in damages for the damages to its truck. Trucks, Inc. also filed a claim against Trucker, a citizen of Connecticut who was driving its truck at the time of the accident, seeking indemnity from any loss it might suffer in connection with Plaintiff’s claim against it.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Trucks, Inc.’s claim against Plaintiff?
(A)
Yes, because Trucks, Inc. and Plaintiff are citizens of different states.
(B)
No, because Trucks, Inc. is seeking $70,000.
(C)
Yes, because this claim arose out of the car crash.
(D)
No, because original jurisdiction was based solely on diversity.
The correct answer is C. This is a state law counterclaim between diverse parties but as to which the amount in controversy requirement has not been met. So there is no original jurisdiction over this claim. But since original jurisdiction over the civil action is founded solely on §1332, whether or not the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Trucks, Inc.’s counterclaim involves the application of §1367(b). This section prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity-based cases, but only over claims by “plaintiffs.” Although Trucks, Inc. is a counter-plaintiff, this does not meet the §1367(b) requirement of being a plaintiff. Trucks, Inc. is a defendant and counter-plaintiff and so the limitation of §1367(b) is inapplicable here. So we must go to §1367(a) and ask if this claim forms part of the same “case” as claims over which the court has original jurisdiction. And it does, since this claim arises out of the accident that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. So the common nucleus of operative fact standard of §1367(a) is met.
Plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Atlanta, Georgia, brought suit in federal district court in Atlanta against a publisher, Books, Inc., alleging copyright infringement under the federal copyright statute, for which she sought $100,000 in damages. Books, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York City. Plaintiff also filed a claim against Books, Inc. alleging that it had breached its agreement with her to publish her book upon receipt of a manuscript. She sought $60,000 in damages in connection with that claim. In that same suit, Plaintiff also filed a $105,000 tort claim against the president of Books, Inc., a citizen of New York, alleging that he had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by sending emails to dozens of other publishers denouncing her as a horrible writer and a fraud and explaining that those were the reasons for his company’s refusal to publish her book. In this same action, Books, Inc. filed a claim against President seeking indemnity for any liability it might accrue in connection with Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against it.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Books, Inc.’s claim against President?
(A)
Yes, under §1367(a)
(B)
Yes, under §1367(b)
(C)
No, because of §1367(b)
(D)
No, because President is not diverse from Books, Inc.
The correct answer is A. Books, Inc. and President are both citizens of New York and so they are not diverse. And this is a state law claim for indemnity. So there is no original jurisdiction over this claim. We must examine whether the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. Under §1367(a), the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this indemnity claim if it is part of the same constitutional “case” as any claim that falls within the court’s original jurisdiction. The indemnity claim, by definition, arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact that gave rise to the copyright infringement claim. Thus, the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim under §1367(a).
Plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Atlanta, Georgia, brought suit in federal district court in Atlanta against a publisher, Books, Inc., alleging copyright infringement under the federal copyright statute, for which she sought $100,000 in damages. Books, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York City. Plaintiff also filed a claim against Books, Inc. alleging that it had breached its agreement with her to publish her book upon receipt of a manuscript. She sought $60,000 in damages in connection with that claim. In that same suit, Plaintiff also filed a $105,000 tort claim against the president of Books, Inc., a citizen of New York, alleging that he had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by sending emails to dozens of other publishers denouncing her as a horrible writer and a fraud and explaining that those were the reasons for his company’s refusal to publish her book. In this same action, Books, Inc. filed a claim against President seeking indemnity for any liability it might accrue in connection with Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against it. In response, President filed a breach of contract claim against Books, Inc. alleging that Books, Inc. had improperly withheld two weeks of salary from him totaling $65,000.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over President’s breach of contract claim against Books, Inc.?
(A)
No, because President and Books, Inc. are citizens of New York.
(B)
Yes, because Books, Inc. is a citizen of Delaware.
(C)
No, because it is unrelated to the copyright claim.
(D)
No, because the breach did not occur in Georgia.
The correct answer is C. The adverse parties to this claim are both citizens of New York and so there is no original jurisdiction since the claim does not arise out of federal law. Since there is a federal question claim in the case, we turn to §1367(a) to determine whether or not the court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim. The requirement here is that this claim be part of the same “case” as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction. This claim for withheld salary does not arise from the nucleus of fact associated with plaintiff’s copyright claim, the claim which forms the court’s original jurisdiction. Consequently, the court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Plaintiff, a lifelong resident of Atlanta, Georgia, brought suit in federal district court in Atlanta against a publisher, Books, Inc., alleging copyright infringement under the federal copyright statute, for which she sought $100,000 in damages. Books, Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in New York City. Plaintiff also filed a claim against Books, Inc. alleging that it had breached its agreement with her to publish her book upon receipt of a manuscript. She sought $60,000 in damages in connection with that claim. In that same suit, Plaintiff also filed a $105,000 tort claim against the president of Books, Inc., a citizen of New York, alleging that he had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by sending emails to dozens of other publishers denouncing her as a horrible writer and a fraud and explaining that those were the reasons for his company’s refusal to publish her book. In this same action, Books, Inc. filed a claim against President seeking indemnity for any liability it might accrue in connection with Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim against it. In response, President filed a breach of contract claim against Books, Inc. alleging that Books, Inc. had improperly withheld two weeks of salary from him totaling $65,000. Finally, President asserted a tort claim against his neighbor, claiming that her negligent maintenance of her home significantly depreciated the value of his property, for which he sought an injunction and $45,000 in damages.
Can the court exercise subject matter jurisdiction over President’s claim against neighbor?
(A)
No, because the claim is for $45,000.
(B)
No, because President is seeking an injunction.
(C)
No, because neither President nor neighbor are citizens of Georgia.
(D)
No, because this claim seeks relief from neighbor’s maintenance of her property.
The correct answer is D. The parties are both citizens of New York and this is a state law claim so there is no original jurisdiction over this claim. There is a federal question claim (plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim) forming original jurisdiction in the case so the question is whether this claim falls within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction under §1367(a), which turns on whether this claim forms part of the same “case” as claims within the court’s original jurisdiction. Because this claim alleges that the neighbor negligently maintained her property, it does not arise out of the nucleus of operative fact giving rise to the copyright claim. So the court cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, filed an action in federal district court in New Orleans. His complaint contained a federal civil rights claim alleging that he had been the victim of unlawful sexual harassment and a breach of contract claim against his employer, also a citizen of Louisiana. The breach of contract claim alleged that Defendant had failed to pay Plaintiff overtime as required by his employment contract.
Are all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant joinable?
(A)
No, because they do not arise out of the same transactions or occurrences.
(B)
Yes, because his right of joinder is unlimited.
(C)
No, because the parties are not diverse.
(D)
Yes, because the court has subject matter jurisdiction over both claims.
The correct answer is B. Here we have a plaintiff asserting two claims against one defendant. The relevant standard is contained in FRCP 18. Under Rule 18, a party can join as many claims as he or she has against that adverse party, regardless of whether the claims are related or unrelated. Keep in mind that the court would still need subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy, but that is not the question at issue. Rule 18 deals only with pleading. A claim properly joined as a matter of pleading need not be proceeded with together with the other claim if fairness or convenience justifies separate treatment. Also, Rule 18 does not purport to deal with questions of jurisdiction or venue which may arise with respect to claims properly joined as a matter of pleading.
Plaintiff, a citizen of Louisiana, filed an action in federal district court in New Orleans. His complaint contained a federal civil rights claim alleging that he had been the victim of unlawful sexual harassment and a breach of contract claim against his employer, also a citizen of Louisiana. The breach of contract claim alleged that Defendant had failed to pay Plaintiff overtime as required by his employment contract. Plaintiff also asserted a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his manager, a citizen of Louisiana, alleging that it was her intentional acts of sexual harassment that caused him to suffer severe emotional distress.
Is Plaintiff’s claim against the manager joinable?
(A)
Yes, because his right of joinder is unlimited.
(B)
No, because manager and Plaintiff are citizens of the same state.
(C)
Yes, because his claim against the manager arises out of the same occurrences that gave rise to his claim against his employer and both claims contain a common question of fact.
(D)
No, because the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
The correct answer is C. Plaintiff is seeking to bring claims against more than one defendant in this suit, which automatically makes this a joinder of parties problem, not a joinder of issues problem. The rule governing joinder of parties in federal court is FRCP 20. Under Rule 20(a)(2), a plaintiff can assert claims against more than one defendant as long as both of two requirements are met. First, these claims must arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Second, the claims against both of the defendants must contain at least one common question of law or fact. Here, the claims against both Defendant and the manager arise out of the latter’s alleged acts of harassment. So the first requirement of Rule 20 is met. Second, both of these claims require resolution of, among other things, the factual question of what the manager did to Plaintiff. Consequently, both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2) have been met.
