Quiz 1 Flashcards
- Defendant, the manufacturer of automobile tires, entered into a long-term sales contract with Plaintiff, a company that distributes used cars.
Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the quality of Defendant’s tires and files a diversity action in federal court against Defendant and Defendant’s Director. The complaint alleges three claims: breach of warranty, strict liability, and breach of contract. The court grants Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the contract claim against both opposing parties in favor of Plaintiff, but orders trial on the two remaining claims. Defendant and Director seek to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment, and Plaintiff gives its consent to the motion, hoping that by quickly resolving the issue of liability, the parties can reach a settlement on the amount of damages and avoid a trial.
Does the appeals court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?
(A)
Yes, the appeals court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the grant of partial summary judgment is a final judgment.
(B)
Yes, the appeals court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the grant of partial summary judgment, although an interlocutory order, may be immediately appealed in the discretion of the court.
(C)
No, the appeals court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the grant of partial summary judgment is an interlocutory order.
(D)
No, the appeals court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the parties did not file their consent to the appeal within ten days of the court’s entry of its order.
C is the correct answer because it correctly recognizes that partial summary judgments are not final and do not fall within an exception to the federal requirement of finality. Courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeal from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1291. The question then is whether a grant of partial summary judgment is a final judgment or an interlocutory order. FRCP 54(b) addresses the finality of claims in actions that present more than one claim: “[T]he court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” FRCP 54(b). Otherwise, there is no final judgment. Id. An order granting partial summary judgment is not final, and thus it is not appealable under §1291. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 466 (2d Cir. 2007). Since the district court issued no express determination that its partial summary judgment order presented “no just reason for delay,” the defendants may not appeal it until all the claims are resolved. Thus, the appeals court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Finally, a defect in appellate jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent of the parties.
A Pennsylvania plaintiff brought a tort action against a New York defendant in New York state court. The New York court dismissed the complaint because the claim had expired under New York’s relatively short statute of limitations. Plaintiff then refiled the same claim in a Pennsylvania state court because Pennsylvania has a much longer statute of limitations. Defendant moved to dismiss the Pennsylvania action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Should the court grant the motion?
(A)
Yes, because the parties are the same in both suits.
(B)
Yes, because the cause of action is the same in both suits.
(C)
No, because a dismissal for failing to file within the governing limitations period is not an adjudication on the merits distinguishing the claim.
(D)
No, because the plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania
(C) is correct. Although the states do not take a uniform position on this issue, a majority take the position that the expiration of the statute of limitations operates only to bar the remedy, i.e., to preclude the plaintiff from reasserting that claim in that jurisdiction. But as they do not find that the limitations period operates to extinguish the substantive cause of action, the dismissal is not deemed to preclude the filing of that same cause of action in a different jurisdiction with a longer (and unexpired) limitations period. (A minority of states adopt the view that the expiration of the statute of limitations does extinguish the substantive right and, therefore, a claim dismissed on that ground enjoys claim-preclusive effect in other jurisdictions.)
- An Alabama plaintiff brought a tort action against a Florida defendant in Alabama state court. The Alabama court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama. Plaintiff then brought precisely the same lawsuit against the same defendant in state court in Florida. Defendant moved to dismiss that action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
How should the court rule on the motion?
(A)
The court should grant the motion to dismiss, because both lawsuits consist of the identical cause of action.
(B)
The court should grant the motion to dismiss, because the parties are the same in both lawsuits.
(C)
The court should deny the motion to dismiss, because defendant is a citizen of Florida.
(D)
The court should deny the motion to dismiss, because the first dismissal did not constitute an adjudication on the merits.
(D) is correct. In order to invoke claim preclusion, the proponent of that doctrine must satisfy three requirements: (1) that the two suits in question involve the same parties (or their privies); (2) that the two suits contained the same cause of action; and (3) there was a valid judgment on the merits in the first decided case. Since the first case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, there was no adjudication on the merits and so the final requirement for claim preclusion (res judicata) was not met.
- Plaintiff Electronics Inc., a Georgia citizen, brought a breach of contract action in federal court in Atlanta against its customer, Defendant, a citizen of Florida, for failure to pay for the television that Defendant purchased from its store in Atlanta. In the answer, Defendant admitted that she had not paid for the television, but alleged that she had returned the television after she discovered its defective quality. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant-customer because it found that the defect breached Plaintiff’s warranty of merchantability and so Defendant’s refusal to pay was excused by Plaintiff’s material breach of the sales contract. Some months later, the same customer filed a tort claim seeking damages in the amount of $70,000 against Electronics, Inc. In this complaint, the customer alleged that when she turned on the television for the first time, it emitted sparks, which injured her and her property. Electronics Inc. moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds of claim preclusion. Should the court grant the motion?
(A)
Yes, under the doctrine of defense preclusion.
(B)
No, because the customer was a defendant in the first suit and the plaintiff in the second suit.
(C)
Yes, because the claim is for $70,000.
(D)
No, because the parties are citizens of different states.
(A) is the correct answer. Defendant-customer asserted an affirmative defense to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and then used that same theory offensively as the basis for a claim in the second lawsuit. An essential element of claim preclusion is that a plaintiff cannot “split” one single, indivisible cause of action into two parts. Claim preclusion precludes re-litigation of any part of a cause of action that was the subject of a final adjudication on the merits, regardless of whether that particular portion of the claim was adjudicated in the first case. This means that claim preclusion precludes from re-litigation claims that were fully adjudicated in the previous case, but also claims that should have been adjudicated in the previous case. This same theory applies to what is called defense preclusion. Defense preclusion occurs where, as here, a defendant asserts a theory as an affirmative defense in one case and then reasserts it against that same opposing party in a second case as the plaintiff seeking affirmative relief. In effect, the courts will not allow a defendant to split up the same issue into an affirmative defense in one case and a complaint seeking affirmative relief in the second case.
- Plaintiff purchased a used car from Defendant. At the time of the sale, Plaintiff did not know that the car had defective brakes. While driving the car, Plaintiff crashed into a taxi that was exceeding the speed limit.
Plaintiff sues Defendant in federal district court in Pennsylvania for personal injury, damage to property, and misrepresentation, and wins on all counts.
Plaintiff then sues Taxi Driver in a separate action in federal district court in New York for personal injury and property damage. Taxi Driver raises the affirmative defense of claim preclusion, citing the judgment of the Pennsylvania federal court, and moves for summary judgment on that basis.
Which statement provides the best explanation of how the New York court should resolve the motion?
(A)
The federal court should grant the motion, because Plaintiff was required to sue all parties involved in the accident in the Pennsylvania action.
(B)
The federal court should grant the motion, under the transactional test for claim preclusion.
(C)
The court should deny the motion, because Taxi Driver was not a party to the Pennsylvania action.
(D)
The court should deny the motion, because judgment of the Pennsylvania court is not final until all appeals are concluded.
(C) is correct because it accurately states and applies the rule of mutuality for when a nonparty can invoke claim preclusion as an affirmative defense. A stranger to a lawsuit cannot claim the benefits of or be subject to the burdens of a prior judgment in a lawsuit in which it did not participate (subject to exceptions explained below). Claim preclusion is a judicially created doctrine that bars the re-litigation of a claim raised in a prior suit. The basic rule of claim preclusion is that a valid and final judgment between the same parties (or those who are treated as the same parties) is conclusive and bars a second action by the plaintiff on the same claim. This rule, set out in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 17 (1982), is followed by the federal courts and by all of the state court systems in the United States. Thus, a judgment will not have claim-preclusive effect unless the parties in the second lawsuit are identical to the parties to the first lawsuit. Taxi Driver was not a party to the first lawsuit and cannot show that he is in a legal relationship with a party in the first lawsuit that would convince the court to treat him as a party. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008) (“nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of pre-existing ‘substantive legal relationship[s] between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment”) (citation omitted). The Court has held that preclusion by “virtual representation” violates due process other than in six narrow and exceptional circumstances that are not present on the facts in this problem. Those exceptions are: (1) when a person agrees to be bound; (2) when a person is in a “pre-existing” and qualifying substantive legal relationship, e.g., bailee and bailor, successive property owners, and assignee and assignor; (3) when a person is adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was named a party in the prior suit, such as a fiduciary or guardian; (4) when a person’s interests were litigated through a “proxy”; (5) when a “special statutory scheme” explicitly forecloses “successive litigation by non-litigants”; and (6) if the nonparty “assume[d] control” over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-895 (2008). Under these circumstances, Taxi Driver is a stranger to the lawsuit decided by the Pennsylvania court and cannot assert an affirmative defense of claim preclusion based on that judgment.
- Dennis was arrested at an anti-war rally. While the police officer was arresting Dennis, an altercation between the two broke out. Dennis claims that the police officer used excessive force in making the arrest. As a result of the arrest and altercation, Dennis incurred damages totaling $7,500 for medical expenses. Dennis filed suit against the police officer for violation of his federal constitutional rights in state court. The police officer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
How should the court rule?
(A)
The court should grant the police officer’s motion to dismiss, as federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal civil rights violations.
(B)
The court should grant the police officer’s motion to dismiss, as federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over federal questions based on constitutional rights.
(C)
The court should deny the police officer’s motion to dismiss, as state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most federal questions, including this one.
(D)
The court should deny the police officer’s motion to dismiss, but only if Dennis includes the state law claims for assault and battery.
C is correct. Generally, the state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases. In a few situations, federal statutes make federal jurisdiction exclusive over certain types of claims. In most situations, including a civil rights claim such as this one, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction so the plaintiff can choose to file the case either in state court or federal court. Therefore, the state court has jurisdiction and the motion should be denied.
- Defendant was acquitted of a charge of bank robbery that had been filed against him in criminal court by the federal government. Shortly after his acquittal, Defendant was served with a civil complaint in which the government sought to recover possession of the money that allegedly had been stolen by Defendant.
Should the trial court in the civil case grant Defendant’s motion to preclude re-litigation of the issue of whether or not he stole the money from the bank?
(A)
No, because the parties to the two cases are not identical.
(B)
Yes, because this issue was already litigated in the previously concluded criminal case.
(C)
No, because the standard of proof is higher in criminal than in civil proceedings.
(D)
Yes, because the standard of proof is lower in civil than in criminal proceedings.
(C) is the correct answer. This problem raises the question of the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). This doctrine is invoked to preclude the re-litigation of an issue that has already been fully decided in a prior case involving a different cause of action than is involved in the subsequent proceeding. The consequence of invoking issue preclusion is merely to preclude re-litigation of that issue. This is different than the consequence of invoking claim preclusion because when that doctrine is invoked, it results in the dismissal of the entire cause of action. The specific issue in this problem is whether the fact that the standard of proof governing the resolution of the same issue in the two proceedings is different means that the issue in the two cases is not the “same.” In the criminal proceeding, the government had to establish that Defendant had stolen the money by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, whereas it need only meet the lesser “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the subsequent civil action. Since this change in the standard of proof means that it is possible that the same evidence would result in a finding against Defendant in the second action, issue preclusion does not apply in this situation. Keep in mind that “double jeopardy,” which prohibits a criminal defendant from being prosecuted twice for the same crime, does not apply in this scenario because the subsequent case is a civil action, rather than a second criminal action for the same offense.
Defendant was convicted of a charge of bank robbery that had been filed against him in criminal court by the federal government. Shortly after his conviction, Defendant was served with a civil complaint in which the government sought to recover possession of the money it alleged had been stolen by Defendant.
Should the trial court in the civil case grant the government’s motion to preclude re-litigation of the issue of whether or not Defendant stole the money from the bank?
(A)
No, because the parties to the two cases are not identical.
(B)
Yes, because the standard of proof is higher in criminal than in civil proceedings.
(C)
No, because the standard of proof is lower in civil than in criminal proceedings.
(D)
Yes, because the issue is the same in both cases.
(B) is the correct answer. This problem raises the question of the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). This doctrine is invoked to preclude the re-litigation of an issue that has already been decided in a prior case involving a different cause of action than is involved in the subsequent proceeding. The consequence of invoking issue preclusion is merely to preclude re-litigation of that issue. This is different than the consequence of invoking claim preclusion because when that doctrine is invoked, it results in the dismissal of the entire cause of action. The specific issue in this problem is whether the fact that the standard of proof governing the resolution of the same issue in the two proceedings is different means that the issue in the two cases is not the “same.” In the criminal proceeding, the government had to establish that Defendant had stolen the money by a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, whereas it need only meet the lesser “preponderance of the evidence” standard in the subsequent civil action. Since the government obtained a conviction in the criminal case, Defendant would be precluded from re-litigating the issue of stealing the money in the subsequent civil action since the government had sustained the more rigorous standard of proof in the criminal case.
