Quiz 2

Question 1

According to Blainey, why does war occur when power is balanced?

Answer 1

When power is balanced, it’s hard to measure which nation is more powerful, causing both sides of the war to think they are going to win; incentive to fight

Question 2

How do Realists believe war occurs?

Answer 2

When power is unbalanced.

Question 3

How do Orthodox Theorists believe war occurs?

Answer 3

When both nations disagree over their bargaining power, they assume they both of them have a chance to win.

Question 4

What are the assumptions of Blainey’s Power Transition Theory?

Answer 4

(1) States are the most important actors
(2) States are rational and unitary actors
(3) International system is organized hierarchically (dominant powers/hegemony, major powers, middle powers, minor powers)
(4) States are differentiated by their satisfaction with the status quo.
(5) States seek to maximize net gains
(6) Sources of power are critical (military vs. economic)

Question 5

According to Blainey, when is war most likely to occur?

Answer 5

(1) When power is roughly equal

(2) When one side is dissatisfied with the status quo.

Question 6

What is the explanation for the long peace after World War II and during the Cold War, according to Power Transition Theorists?

Answer 6

The distribution of power after 1945. Historians were only looking at military power where the US and Soviets were roughly equal. The U.S. had way more economic power than the Soviets.

Question 7

According to the Thucydides Trap, why can we assume war may or may not come to fruition between China and the United States?

Answer 7

China’s military is far behind the United States. However, a conflict between the economy of China and the United States could emerge.

Question 8

According to Schelling, what is the Power to Take?

Answer 8

With enough military power (relative to how much power the opponent has), a nation doesn’t need to bargain; it can just take what it wants.

Question 9

According to Schelling, what is the Power to Hurt?

Answer 9

Suffering can be used as a purpose to make people afraid to take something from you; purposefully destroying lives to make other people do what you want them to do and make them want to avoid retaliation.

Question 10

What is defense? (Schelling)

Answer 10

Being able to repel someone if they attack

Question 11

What is deterrence? (Schelling)

Answer 11

Making someone afraid to attack you in the first place because of the threat of retaliation

Question 12

According to Fearon, when will states compromise?

Answer 12

States will always be willing to compromise if the value of the compromise makes them at least as good off as they would expect to be through fighting.

Question 13

What does P stand for in finding the expected utility from war (Fearon)?

Answer 13

The probability country A wins.

Question 14

What does (1-P) stand for in finding the expected utility from war (Fearon)?

Answer 14

The probability country B wins

Question 15

What is the utility for victory (Fearon)?

Answer 15

1

Question 16

What is the utility for losing (Fearon)?

Answer 16

0

Question 17

What is the equation for finding country A’s expected utility for war (Fearon)?

Answer 17

P-C (probability A wins - the costs)

Question 18

What is the equation for finding country B’s expected utility for war (Fearon)?

Answer 18

(1-P)-C (probability B wins - the costs)

Question 19

According to Fearon, why is anarchy not a permissive cause for war?

Answer 19

The costs of war should be enough to stop the states from fighting.

Question 20

According to Fearon, why is positive expected utility not a permissive cause for war?

Answer 20

The expected utility for war is never greater than what states could get in a negotiated settlement.

Question 21

What is the puzzle Fearon is trying to figure out?

Answer 21

(1) When will states compromise?
(2) Why do wars occur even though they are costly?
(3) Why do wars occur despite the presence of a negotiated settlement that both sides prefer to fighting

Question 22

What are the three rationalist explanations Fearon gives for war?

Answer 22

(1) Issue Indivisibility
(2) Private Information About Power or Resolve and Incentives to Misrepresent
(3) Commitment Problems

Question 23

According to Fearon, why is Issue Indivisibility a valid cause for war?

Answer 23

Actors hold extreme preferences and sometimes become unwilling to accept less than all of it. There is no room for compromise. For example, Pro-Choice vs. Pro-Life

Question 24

According to Fearon, why is Private Information About Power or Resolve and Incentive to Misrepresent a valid cause for war?

Answer 24

States don’t know each other’s reservation points are located and they have the incentive to lie to each other. Country A wants a negotiated settlement to war but also wants to get an outcome that is closest to B’s reservation point, for example.

Question 25

According to Fearon, why are Commitment Problems a valid cause for war?

Answer 25

The inability to commit to the agreement made in the future. War can occur even though nations are knowledgable of each others’ reservation point. War occurs because future negotiations could lie outside of the original bargaining range

Question 26

According to Fearon, when does war end?

Answer 26

When the acceptable negotiated settlement is revealed (finding the bargaining range and influencing where the range is located).

Question 27

What is deterrence? (Schelling)

Answer 27

A situation in which one state (deterrer or defender) threatens retaliation against another state (challenger/attacker) carries out some action that is unacceptable to the defender

Question 28

When does deterrence “succeed” (Schelling)?

Answer 28

When you don’t have to carry out the threat because the challenger backs down; however we cannot assume the challenger backed down just because of the threat we made.

Question 29

When does deterrence fail (Schelling)?

Answer 29

When the challenger does the unacceptable act anyway, despite the threat made to them.

Question 30

What is required for deterrent success (Schelling)?

Answer 30

(1) Being capable to carry out the threat

2) Send a credible threat (opponent believes your resolve; that you are willing to carry out the threat

Question 31

What is the distinction between direct deterrence and extended deterrence? (Schelling)

Answer 31

Who the defender is threatening to defend.

Question 32

What is the distinction between general and immediate deterrence? (Schelling)

Answer 32

The immediacy of the threat

Question 33

(Schelling) What was the first problem of credibility?

Answer 33

Both sides (Soviets and United States) were threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Question 34

(Schelling) What was the second problem of credibility?

Answer 34

Extended deterrence threats

Question 35

(Schelling; Chicken Game): What happens if the challenger doesn’t attack and the defender doesn’t defend?

Answer 35

A compromise is made.

Question 36

(Schelling; Chicken Game): What happens if the challenger doesn’t attack and the defender defends?

Answer 36

The defender (country B) wins

Question 37

(Schelling; Chicken Game): What happens if the challenger attacks at the defender doesn’t defend?

Answer 37

The challenger (country A) wins.

Question 38

(Schelling; Chicken Game): What happens if the challenger attacks and the defender defends?

Answer 38

Nuclear War (the worst outcome)

Question 39

How can you make an incredible threat sound credible (Schelling, Danivolic)?

Answer 39

(1) Feign Irrationality
(2) Team Up With An Impulsive Ally
(3) Delegate Authority to a Lower-Level Commander
(4) Burning Bridges