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IC > Exam 1 > Flashcards

Exam 1 Flashcards

1
Q

A falsifiable theory ____.

A

can empirically be proven false

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2
Q

What is not a characteristic of a good theory?

A

Complexity

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3
Q

___ refers to the international order in which no international authority exists to protect states or enforce international law.

A

Anarchy

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4
Q

The ___ refers to the situation in which a state’s attempt to increase its own power ultimately threatens its own security, because other states in fear of their own survival, respond by increasing their own power.

A

The Security Dilemma

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5
Q

___ is considered the father of Neorealist Theory.

A

Kenneth Waltz

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6
Q

One of the main consequences of the security dilemma, according to Waltz, is that states are more interested in maximizing ___, as opposed to maximizing ___.

A

Security; Power

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7
Q

Waltz argues that the world would be more peaceful if ___ nations had nuclear weapons.

A

More

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8
Q

According to Snyder, ___ systems are less conflict prone because major powers have less fear of abandonment or entrapment

A

Bipolar

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9
Q

Blainey argues that wars are more likely to begin when states ___ about their relative power (i.e. which side is strongest).

A

Disagree

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10
Q

Blainey argues that the relative power between two nations is clearest ____.

A

During peace

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11
Q

Schelling differentiates between two notions of the term “force”; the power to take something that an adversary has and the power to ___.

A

Hurt

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12
Q

According to Fearon in “Rationalist Explanations for War” war occurs because it is always the best possible outcome for states. True or false?

A

False

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13
Q

Fearon argues that wars occur due to private information about ___ and incentives to misrepresent this information.

A

Resolve

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14
Q

___ is defined as the act of using threats of force to prevent someone from doing something you believe they would otherwise do without your threat.

A

Deterrence

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15
Q

In order for deterrence to succeed, a defender’s threat needs to be ___ and ___.

A

Capable; Credible

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16
Q

The “Chicken Game” shows that extended deterrent threats will always be successful. True or False?

A

False

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17
Q

___ deterrence is the situation in which a Defender is attempting to keep a Challenger from attacking a third party (or protege).

A

Extended

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18
Q

As a strategy advocated by Schelling, “burning bridges” refers to the act of severing all ties (economic, diplomatic, etc.) with the Soviet Union. True or False?

A

False

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19
Q

Theory

A

A simplification of reality, meaning we focus on what we think are the most important factors causing (leading to) some particular outcome.

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20
Q

What are the three criteria of an effective theory?

A

(1) Predictive Accuracy
(2) Logical Consistency
(3) Falsifiability

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21
Q

What is Predictive Accuracy?

A

How well the theory can predict the future; how well the theory holds up in the future.

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22
Q

What is Logical Consistency?

A

The premises have to follow logically from the assumptions and no two assumptions (or more) can contradict.

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23
Q

What is Falsifiability?

A

A theory has to be able to be proven false; there has to be an occurrence to happen that is inconsistent with the theory.

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24
Q

What is Morgenthau’s main theory?

A

All nations want to gain power. However, there are some states that are content with the power they have (status quo) and don’t want to increase power and instead want to hold onto the power they have.

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25
Q

Why is Morgenthau’s theory unfalsifiable?

A

Regardless of what a country does, it is consistent with one or two logically inconsistent premises.

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26
Q

What is rationality?

A

Making sound decisions and looking at the cost/benefit analysis of a decision.

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27
Q

What is a rational actor?

A

Someone who, when faced with two or more options which give rise to outcomes, chooses the option that leads to the most preferred possible outcome.

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28
Q

What are the two requirements for being rational?

A

(1) The preferences over outcomes are connected and able to be ordered by preferences.
(2) The preferences over outcomes are transitive, meaning outcomes could apply to more than one decision and they are consistent.

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29
Q

Thucydides

A

The Athenians were trying to convince the Melians to allow themselves to be conquered. The Melians were a colony of Sparta. Realism focuses on power, not morality.

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30
Q

Assumptions of Realism

A

(1) International system is characterized by anarchy
(2) States are most important actors
(3) States are rational and unitary actors
(4) All states seek to maximize power

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31
Q

Realist Methods of Balancing Power (Morgenthau)

A

(1) Building up military and increasing your own strength

(2) Forming alliances with a more powerful nation

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32
Q

Assumptions of Waltz’s Neorealist Theory

A

(1) States are the most important actors
(2) States are rational and unitary actors
(3) Not every state wants to maximize power, but instead wants to maximize security
(4) International system characterized by structural anarchy

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33
Q

Unipolar System

A

Having only one great power

34
Q

Bipolar

A

Having two or more great powers

35
Q

Waltz’s Neorealist Hypotheses

A

(1) Peace is best assured under a balance of power
(2) Nuclear weapons promote peace
(3) Qualitative arms races are bad
(4) Bipolar systems are more stable

36
Q

Qualitative Arms Races

A

Change in the quality of weapons. Waltz says changing the quality of weapons gives a nation an advantage, making the targeted nation unable to retaliate; imbalance of power

37
Q

Primary Security Dilemma (Waltz)

A

The prisoner’s dilemma. There is no one to enforce that each prisoner follows the agreement. They always want to do what is best for themselves, including not sticking with the agreement.

38
Q

According to Waltz, why is forming an alliance costly?

A

(1) A physical cost; NATO makes nations give up some of their GDP on defense.
(2) Lose or sacrifice some autonomy (cannot do what you want because you might upset your allies)

39
Q

Secondary Security Dilemma

A

How much do I commit to my ally? Too much commitment leads to the fear of abandonment and less security. Too little commitment leads to emboldenment and less security.

40
Q

Moral Hazard of Economics

A

Perverse incentives to engage in risky behavior because of a strongly committed ally.

41
Q

Chain Ganging

A

If one country in an alliance goes into war, the ally is involved in the war involuntarily.

42
Q

Why does war occur according to Realists?

A

Wars occur when power is unbalanced.

43
Q

Why does war occur according to Orthodox Theorists?

A

Wars occur when both nations disagree over their bargaining power and assume they both have a chance to win. When power is balanced, war occurs.

44
Q

Blainey’s Power Transition Theory Assumptions

A

(1) States are the most important actors
(2) States are rational and unitary actors
(3) The international system is organized hierarchically.
(4) States are differentiated by their satisfaction with the status quo.
(5) States seek to maximize net gains.
(6) Socioeconomic sources of power are critical

45
Q

Hegemonic Order from Most to Least Powerful (Blainey)

A

(1) Dominant Powers
(2) Major Powers
(3) Middle Powers
(4) Minor Powers

46
Q

According to Blainey, when is war most likely to occur?

A

(1) Rough equality of power

(2) One side of dissatisfied with the status quo.

47
Q

What is the source of the long peace between the Soviets and the United States during the Cold War?

A

Historians were only looking at military power where the United States and Soviets were roughly equal. However, they were very different in economic power, causing the peace.

48
Q

According to the Thucydides Trap, what may and may not cause war between the United States and China?

A

War may not come to a head between the United States and China because of military power (China is behind) but could happen because of economic power.

49
Q

What is diplomacy?

A

Finding a mutually acceptable agreement between two sides.

50
Q

(Schelling) Power to Take

A

With enough military power, relative to the opponent’s power, a nation doesn’t need to bargain; it can take whatever it wants.

51
Q

(Schelling) Power to Hurt

A

Suffering used as a purpose to make people do what you want them to do (prevent unacceptable behavior)

52
Q

According to Fearon, when will states compromise?

A

When the value of the compromise makes them at least as good off as they would expect to be through fighting.

53
Q

P

A

Probability country A wins

54
Q

1-P

A

Probability country B wins

55
Q

1

A

Utility for Victory

56
Q

0

A

Utility for Losing

57
Q

C

A

Costs of war

58
Q

P-C

A

A’s expected utility for war

59
Q

(1-P)-C

A

B’s expected utility for war

60
Q

Why is anarchy not a permissive cause for war according to Fearon?

A

The costs of war should be enough to prevent states from fighting.

61
Q

Why is Positive Expected Utility not a permissive cause for war, according to Fearon?

A

The expected utility for war is never greater than what states could get in a negotiated settlement. There is never a positive expected utility for war because there is always an option for a state to get more of what they want.

62
Q

What is the puzzle Fearon is trying to put together?

A

(1) When will states compromise?
(2) Why do wars occur despite the costs?
(3) Why does war occur despite the presence of a negotiated settlement that both sides prefer to fighting.

63
Q

What are Fearon’s three rationalist explanations for war?

A

(1) Issue Indivisibility
(2) Private Information about Resolve and Incentives to Misrepresent
(3) Commitment Problems

64
Q

Why is issue indivisibility an explanation for war (Fearon)?

A

Actors hold such extreme preferences that they become unwilling to accept less than all of it; there is no room for compromise.

65
Q

Why is private information about resolve and the incentive to misrepresent an explanation for war (Fearon)?

A

State’s don’t know their opponents’ reservation point. A state would prefer a negotiated settlement to war but also wants the most it can get closer to the opponent’s reservation point.

66
Q

Why are commitment problems an explanation for war (Fearon)?

A

The inability to commit to the agreement in the future; war can occur even though nations are knowledgable of each others’ reservation point. War occurs because future negotiations could lie outside of the original bargaining range.

67
Q

What is deterrence? (Schelling)

A

A situation in which one state (deterrer or defender) threatens retaliation against another state if the challenger carries out some action that is unacceptable to the defender.

68
Q

When does deterrence “succeed”? (Schelling)

A

When you don’t have to carry out the threat; the challenger backs down and doesn’t carry out the unacceptable action. We can’t assume, however, the challenger backed down just because of the threat we made.

69
Q

When does deterrence fail? (Schelling)

A

When the challenger does the unacceptable act despite the threat made to it.

70
Q

What are the two requirements for deterrent success? (Schelling)

A

(1) Be capable of carrying out the threat

(2) Send a credible threat

71
Q

What is the main distinction between direct deterrence and extended deterrence? (Schelling)

A

Who the defender is threatening to defend

72
Q

What is the main distinction between general and immediate deterrence? (Schelling)

A

The immediacy of the threat

73
Q

What is the first problem of credibility in nuclear warfare of the Cold War (Schelling)?

A

Both sides were threatening to use nuclear weapons.

74
Q

What is the second problem of credibility in nuclear warfare of the Cold War (Schelling)?

A

Extended deterrence threats.

75
Q

What happens if the challenger doesn’t attack and the defender doesn’t defend? (Schelling)

A

A compromise is made.

76
Q

What happens when the challenger doesn’t attack and the defender defends? (Schelling)

A

The defender wins

77
Q

What happens when the challenger attacks and the defender doesn’t defend? (Schelling)

A

The challenger wins

78
Q

What happens when the challenger attacks and the defender defends? (Schelling)

A

Nuclear Warfare (the worst outcome)

79
Q

What are the four ways to make an incredible threat credible (Schelling)?

A

(1) Feign Irrationality (do something you wouldn’t normally do)
(2) Team Up with an Impulsive Ally
(3) Delegate Authority to a Lower-Level Commander
(4) Burning Bridges

80
Q

What is a state’s face? (Schelling)

A

A state’s reputation for resolve (image other states have of it) based on previous behavior.

81
Q

What is Temporal Interdependence of Commitments (Schelling)?

A

How a nation acts in one time will influence how an opponent believes it will act in the future?

82
Q

What is Spatial Interdependence of Commitments?

A

How a nation acts in a region or country will influence how an opponent believes it will act in another region or country.

IC (3 decks)

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