Quality Of Education (Chaudhury , Muralidharan) Flashcards

1
Q

What is the key thing to understand about quality of eduction

A

Just because people are enrolling, it doesn’t mean they are learning.

E.g in India 76% of grade 4 children cannot read do simple division.

So quality of education matters, not just enrolment

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2
Q

Is a lack of inputs e.g textbooks, desks etc a problem

A

No. Kremer and Holla found more inputs by themselves do not make a difference

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3
Q

Is the teaching the problem? Find 2 evidences for yes in Chaudhury et al

A

Yes -
High absenteeism, Found teachers miss 1/5 days in 2002/03 in Bangladesh etc.

Teachers spend less than half the time they are supposed to be teaching actually doing so

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4
Q

How can we solve this?

A

Performance pay for teachers - so incentivised to put in more effort, improve their quality of teaching for their students to get better grades.

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5
Q

Issues with performance based pay (3)

A

Risk of crowdout of intrinsic motivation

Multi-task problem

Elite bias - neglect weak kids, or make sure they drop out (since bad results reflect badly on teacher)

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6
Q

First issue of performance based pay: risk of crowdout of intrinsic motivation

A

No longer do it because they want their students to do well, but for other incentives since it becomes a transaction.

E.g wont do it for £1 because feels like its a waste of time, compared to doing it for free since they have intrinsic motivation so feels better doing for free! So have to pay high or not at all

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7
Q

Multi-task problem - teaching to the test

A

Neglect other tasks to focus on the task the incentive is based on.

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8
Q

Teacher performance pay experiment - Muralidharan - how was intrinsic motivation crowdout, and elite bias eliminated, and multi-task problem (teaching to the test?)

A

Provide bonus payments based on AVERAGE improvement of test scores.

This eliminated the elite bias, they were incentivised to focus on all students not just the top ones, since drop outs who didn’t take test were assigned low scores.

Eliminated intrinsic motivation crowdout by being framed in terms of recognition for outstanding teaching opposed to accountability

Avoided teaching to test by test design requiring deeper understanding

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9
Q

Findings

A

No teaching to test - test scores still improved for non-incentive subjects (so teachers increased more effort for all subjects)

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10
Q

Also looked at

performance pay in group bonuses
Block grants to school (money for inputs)
Contract teachers (assistants, lower staff-student ratio)
Feedback

What did they find

A

Pure incentives (individual and group bonuses are most effective)

Then contract teachers

Then pure inputs are least effective (block grants and feedback(

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11
Q

So individual teacher and group (school) bonuses on performance based pay were the most effective.

Which one more

A

Individual teacher PP more effective (as shown in original experiment) because group bonuses get diluted (split between school teachers overall

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