Psychatric Harm Flashcards
Legal Principle: A claim can be made if the victim fears for the own safety.
Dulieu V White (1901)
The claimant was working in a bar, when, as a result of an accident in the street outside, a coach and horses crashed into the bar. She suffered fear for her own safety. Her claim was allowed as it was foreseeable that, in the event of an accident, someone could suffer real and immediate fear of personal danger. This was probably the first successful claim for mental injuries.
Legal Principle: Extended the principle of Dulieu V White to fear for a family member.
Hambrook V Stokes (1925)
A mother was walking with her child along a pavement when a runaway lorry passed her. She heard a crash ahead of her and also that the lorry was involved in an accident involving children. She suffered severe shock as she feared for the safety of her children. Her claim was allowed and, as a result, a claim could be made by those suffering shock due to fearing the safety of a family member.
Legal Principle: Extended the mental injury must be caused by injury to a family member.
Bourhill V Young (1943)
A pregnant fishwife heard an accident involving a motorbike as she was getting off a tram. She went to look at the scene and, when she saw the blood on the road, she suffered such a shock that she miscarried. Her claim against the estate of the dead motorcyclist who had caused the accident failed, as she was not related to him and she was not within the range of people who could be foreseen as suffering shock. There was no proximity of relationship between her and the motorcyclist.
Legal Principle:
McLoughlin V O’Brain (1982)
Mrs McLoughlin’s husband and children were involved in a car accident due to the negligence of a lorry driver. She was at home and was informed of the accident. She went to the hospital where her family were being treated. She suffered shock when she saw them and learned of the death of one of her children.
Legal Principle: last part of case in booklet:)
Page V Smith
The claimant had suffered from ME before the accident. He was in recovery when he was involved in a minor care accident due to the defendant’s negligence. He was not physically injured but the accident triggered his ME which became chronic and permanent. As a result he was unable to return to his job as a teacher. The House of Lords decided that provided some kind of personal injury was foreseeable, it did not matter whether the injury was physical or psychiatric and so the distinction was made between primary and secondary victims.
Legal principle:
Alcock V Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1992)
Due to the negligence of the police, too many football supporters were allowed into an arena of the Hillsborough ground, leading to too many suffering crush injuries. Ninety-six fans died and hundreds were injured. The police eventually admitted negligence and settled claims made by those present. The case involved a representative group of families who suffered mental injuries as a result of learning that family members had been involved in the tragedy.
Legal Principle: Rescuer claims are allowed if they are primary victims.
Chadwick V British Rail (1967)
The claimant helped victims of the Lewisham train crash which occurred close to his home. Because of his small size he was encouraged to crawl into the wreckage to give injections and comfort trapped passengers. As a result of his experience, he suffered mental injuries. His claim against the negligent railway authority was successful, as the court considered he was a primary victim, at risk to himself, and it did not want to discourage members of the public from rescuing, if required.
Legal principle: If a rescuer is not a physical risk they are a secondary victim and will need to satisfy the Alcock criteria
White V Chief constable of South Yorkshire
Police officers who took part in the rescue operation at Hillsborough claimed post traumatic stress disorder as a result of their experiences. Their claims were denied as they did not put themselves at risk. A further reason was that the judge considered that public policy prevented them from recovering compensation when the relatives of the victims could not recover.
Legal principle: Bystanders are secondary victims and need to satisfy the Alcock criteria.
McFarlane V E E Caledonia (1994)
The claimant was on board a supply ship when the Piper Alpha oil rig exploded in the North Sea. He witnesses the explosion and the rescue of the survivors and suffered psychiatric injury as a result of what he saw. He did not help in the rescue. McFarlane failed in his claim because he was classed as a bystander rather than a rescuer, and he did not satisfy the Alcock criteria.
Legal Principle: property owners may claim for psychiatric injury if they witness their property destroyed.
Attia V British Gas (1987)
A woman engaged the defendants to install central heating. When she returned home from work, she saw smoke coming from the property but, by the time the fire brigade arrived, her house was burned down and was completely destroyed. The fire was caused by the defendants negligence. The claimant suffered severe shock from seeing her house and possessions destroyed. Her claim was allowed as she was within the area of impact and within the reasonable foresight of the defendants.
Legal Principle: Shock needs to be suffered as a result of a sudden event, 14 days was too long.
Sion V Hampstead Health Authority (1994)
The claimants son was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident. He was taken to the hospital, went into a coma and dies 14 days later. The claimant remained at his son bedside throughput and claimed psychiatric injury as a result of witnessing her son’s deterioration. He claimed against the hospital, alleging that their negligent treatment of his son caused him to suffer psychiatric injury. The court decided that, as there was no sudden horrifying event but a gradual decline in the son’s condition, there was no claim.
Legal Principle: reaction to events happening over 36 hours can be considered as horrifying event.
North Glamorgan NHS Trust V Walters (2002)
Doctors negligently failed to diagnose the claimants 10 month old son’s liver failure. He was taken by ambulance to another hospital for a liver transplant, followed by the claimant in her car. On arrival she was told that her son had suffered severe brain damage following a seizure. The next day she to his life support system to be turned off and he died. She suffered pathological grief reaction, as a result of what she had witnesses and experienced over 36 hours.
Galli-Atkinson V Seghal (2003)
The claimants 16 year old daughter was killed in a crash. She arrived at the scene after her daughter had been removed. Hysterical, she was taken to the mortuary and saw her daughter’s body, which was badly disfigured, and suffered severe shock. The court appeal decided that, in this case, the immediate aftermath was an uninterrupted series of events from the time of the accident to when the victim left the mortuary.
