Proximate Cause Flashcards
*Ryan
Warning! Not accepted rule anymore. Defendant’s train set fire to defendant’s woodshed and it spread to plaintiff’s house and then other houses. Court said RR is not liable to the plaintiff for the first house or for any house A-Z because the sparks landed on the defendant’s shed and a person is only liable for proximate results of his own acts, not remote damages. It was foreseeable the one building would be destroyed when sparks landed on it but not that the fire would spread bc that depends on other things, like the wind and atmosphere, which is intervening cause (for foreseeability, need an “ordinary and natural result” and the fire spreading was only “possible and not infrequent”).
Court said any other result would have problematic policy implications because creating unlimited liability would be the destruction of all civilized society (Schwab notes that the court is hinting that the RR can’t buy insurance for the homeowner, but today it can, so this is kind of a silly argument).
*Berry
Chestnut tree blew down as plaintiff speeding on motorcar went by beneath it. Technically the plaintiff would not have been under the tree but for his contributory negligence, but that is a “sophistical” argument. The fact that his speed took him to that spot right as the tree feel was mere chance and foresight couldn’t have predicted it – coincidental cause. There isn’t REALLY but-for cause since the speeding was essentially unrelated to the accident otherwise (harm is not within risk – statute about speeding not intended for this) (no liability).
Price compared to Hines
Price: negligence of RR was didn’t drop woman at her station, so she spent the night at a hotel she was escorted to by RR’s conductor and there was a kerosene lamp that exploded and set fire to the netting over her bed. Court said RR not liable because the injury was too remote [it wasn’t really a consequence of letting off at wrong stop because this could have happened anywhere and regardless of negligence]. Different result in Hines where the RR went a mile past a young girl’s stop, which forced her to walk back through an area frequented by bad people, leading to her rape. The court held the RR liable.
Dillon
Dependent cause. Boy fell from bridge and was killed by defendant’s electric wires on the way down. Court held defendant liable for wires, but said either $0 if he would have died anyway or only the limited earning capacity if he would have been maimed by the fall.
Horton
Breaking chain of causation. A kid picked up an explosive and traded it to another kid who had his hand blown off. The defendant company/foreman who dropped it originally not liable bc the kid was taking the explosive home to play with, and his dad was a miner, so presumably his parents knew an explosive when they saw it and his mom should have done something when she picked up his toy to put it away. His mom broke the chain of causation, and parents liable instead.
*Brower
After train track crossing accident, thieves stole barrels, cider, and blanket off wagon. Court said that the RR could be held liable even with intervening cause because its negligence caused the accident, and since the driver left due to his emotional state, it was foreseeable that things would be stolen, (especially since RR had its own guards to protect from that sort of thing, so it clearly knew the risks of thievery in the wilds of NJ).
Dissent makes a very strong argument that you shouldn’t imply that crime is to be presumed. Schwab thinks a person is an even better intervening cause than wind like in Ryan, but tries to resolve all the cases by pointing to the dissent’s 2 examples with a fruit stand/street urchins and a murder. Perhaps you shouldn’t assume a murder where an adult is acting, but you can’t control the bad behavior of kids, which goes to foreseeability.
*Wagner
Herbert thrown out of train at a bridge because train didn’t close door; plaintiff went out on bridge to look for cousin and fell off. Danger invites rescue. Rescue is foreseeable; it is “natural and probable.” Even if the wrongdoer claims he couldn’t foresee the rescue, he is accountable as if he had, and there is no reason to limit recover to spontaneous and immediate rescues. Any rescue so long as “it be not wanton” (foolhardy).
*Polemis
Slip, spark, boom, liability! Negligence of ship employees in dropping board caused a spark that caused a fire when it ignited petrol vapour in the hold. Foreseeability is irrelevant – only whether the damage is a direct result of the negligence matters.
Junior counsel made an attempt to argue that there is an important difference between the foreseeability of the extent and type of damage [court and Schwab thought this was ridiculous; it probably would open floodgates of litigation].
*Wagon Mound
Foreseeability! Defendants carelessly discharged oil from ship while docked at Sydney Harbor and oil carried to plaintiff’s wharf, which caught on fire when burning metal from welding caught a floating rag on fire. Defendant could not reasonably have been expected know that oil is capable of being set on fire when spread on water, although there was a foreseeable “muck” damage of oil getting on wharf. Under Polemis could be liable for fire if that was direct (could say debris intervening) but here the court only could say that muck might have been foreseeable, so that’s all defendant could be liable for, not the fire.
Kinsman Transit
We agree more with Polemis. A thaw on Buffalo River released ice that hit ship (negligently tied) which hit other ship, which hit drawbridge and made a dam that floating ice accumulated on, causing flooding. The crew tending the drawbridge should have raised it. The court held both defendants (1st ship and city) liable for the plaintiff’s damages due to flooding. Court said we do not limit liability to foreseeability, which renders conduct negligent, but defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him and will be responsible for full injury regardless of whether foreseeable (eggshell skull theory). RULE in US for direct cause v. foreseeability: NOT limited to consequences that are foreseeable; the consequences just need to be “direct” and the damage can be “other and greater than expected” as long as it is “related to same general sort that was risked.” [Remember, still use foreseeability for duty/breach, just not once get to cause!]
*Palsgraf
Defendant’s employees attempted to help passenger board moving train, and he dropped package containing fireworks, which exploded and injured plaintiff standing at other end of platform when scales fell on her. Cardozo: even if the conduct of the guard was wrong to the holder of the package, it certainly was not wrong to plaintiff who was standing so far away. She was not within the orbit of danger as disclosed to the eye of ordinary vigilance and therefore was not in the orbit of the duty. Andrews: hints. Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C alone. A wrongdoer is liable for all proximate results and it does not matter if they were unusual, unexpected, unforeseen, and unforeseeable. Offers 8 hints for whether defendant should be liable: o But for? o Natural and continuous? o Substantial factor? o Too many intervening? o Attenuated? o Likely to produce result? o Foreseeability? o Remoteness (time and space)?
Gonzales
The court rejected the but-for test for the RST’s substantial factor test bc but for would have overemphasized how a child’s inability to swim caused his death and ignored how horseplay on a raft and parent’s negligent supervision was a substantial factor in the accident.
*Nugent
Plaintiff was hurt after standing on road to warn cars of unexpected danger bc oil trucker had run him off road and other driver, Nugent, tried to avoid collision with oil tanker on road and skidded into plaintiff. Court said there needs to be flexibility for each special type of case and here, the extra risks created by the oil tanker driver’s negligence were not “all over” when the accident happened. This is the case with the crazy jury instruction.
*Mitchell
Horse fright case that led to a miscarriage. Court said a plaintiff can’t recover for fright, so it also can’t recover for injuries caused by fright. Otherwise, flood of litigation and cases easily feigned.
But, the usual rule is if there is even the slightest physical impact, courts can use that as a foundation for the claim for emotional distress. Thus, if the horse had licked her, she could have recovered.
*Dillon
Negligent driver hit Erin, sister was in zone of danger, mother was not, so lower court didn’t let mother recover for her emotional distress of watching her child get killed. RULE: foreseeability is always the “prime” factor. Other facts (which help show foreseeability): 1) near accident? 2) observance of accident or just learning about it? 3) close relationship of plaintiff and victim?
After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation (a hospital incorrectly diagnosed syphilis, which caused a marriage to break down), courts began to ask if defendant assumed a “direct duty” to plaintiff (so not foreseeability).
