Property In Class Questions Flashcards
A landlord leased an apartment to a tenant by written lease for two years ending on
the last day of a recent month. The lease provided for $700 monthly rental. The
tenant occupied the apartment and paid the rent for the first 15 months of the lease
term, until he moved to a new job in another city. Without consulting the landlord,
the tenant moved a friend into the apartment and signed an informal writing
transferring to the friend his “lease rights” for the remaining nine months of the lease.
The friend made the next four monthly $700 rental payments to the landlord. For the
final five months of the lease term, no rent was paid by anyone, and the friend moved
out with three months left of the lease term. The landlord was on an extended trip
abroad, and did not learn of the default and the vacancy until last week. The landlord
sued the tenant and the friend, jointly and severally, for $3,500 for the last five
months’ rent.
What is the likely outcome of the lawsuit?
(A) Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is
liable on privity of contract and the friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.
(B) The friend is liable for $3,500 on privity of estate and the tenant is not liable,
because the landlord’s failure to object to the friend’s payment of rent relieved
the tenant of liability.
(C) The friend is liable for $1,400 on privity of estate, which lasted only until he
vacated, and the tenant is liable for $2,100 on privity of contract and estate for
the period after the friend vacated.
(D) The tenant is liable for $3,500 on privity of contract and the friend is not liable,
because a sublessee does not have personal liability to the original landlord.
(A) Both the tenant and the friend are liable for the full $3,500, because the tenant is
liable on privity of contract and the friend is liable on privity of estate as assignee.
With a writing, a landlord leased his home to a tenant for a term of three years,
ending December 31 of last year, at the rent of $1,000 per month. The lease provided
that the tenant could sublet and assign. The tenant lived in the house for one year and
paid the rent promptly. After one year, the tenant leased the house to a friend for one
year at a rent of $1,000 per month. The friend took possession of the house and lived
there for six months but, because of her unemployment, paid no rent. After six
months, on June 30 the friend abandoned the house, which remained vacant for the
balance of that year. The tenant again took possession of the house at the beginning
of the third and final year of the term but paid the landlord no rent. At the end of the
lease term, the landlord brought an appropriate action against both the tenant and
the friend to recover $24,000, the unpaid rent.
How much will the landlord recover?
(A) $12,000 against the tenant, and against the tenant and the friend jointly and
severally for $12,000.
(B) $18,000 against the tenant, and against the friend individually for $6,000.
(C) $18,000 against the tenant, and against the tenant and the friend jointly and
severally for $6,000.
(D) $24,000 individually from the tenant, and no judgment against the friend
(D) $24,000 individually from the tenant, and no judgment against the friend
A man owned 80 acres of land, fronting on a town road. Two years ago, the man sold
to a buyer the back 40 acres. The 40 acres sold to the buyer did not adjoin any public
road. The man’s deed to the buyer expressly granted a right-of-way over a specified
strip of the man’s retained 40 acres, so the buyer could reach the town road. The deed
was promptly and properly recorded. Last year, the buyer conveyed the back 40 acres
to his son. They had discussed the right-of-way over man’s land to the road, but the
buyer’s deed to his son made no mention of it. The son began to use the right-of-way
as the buyer had, but the man sued to enjoin such use by the son.
For whom will the court decide?
(A) The son, because he has an easement by implication.
(B) The son, because the easement appurtenant passed to him as a result of the
buyer’s deed to him.
(C) The man, because the buyer’s easement in gross was not transferable.
(D) The man, because the buyer’s deed failed expressly to transfer the right-of-way to
the son.
(B) The son, because the easement appurtenant passed to him as a result of the
buyer’s deed to him.
A man contacted his lawyer regarding his right to use a path that was on his neighbor’s
vacant land. Fifteen years ago, after a part of the path located on his land and
connecting his cabin to the public highway washed out, the man cleared a small part
of his neighbor’s land and rerouted a section of the path through the neighbor’s land.
Twelve years ago, the neighbor leased her land to some hunters. For the next 12
years, the hunters and the man who had rerouted the path used the path for access to
the highway. A month ago, the neighbor discovered that part of the path was on her
land. The neighbor told the man that she had not given him permission to cross her
land and that she would be closing the rerouted path after 90 days. The man’s land
and the neighbor’s land have never been in common ownership.
The period of time necessary to acquire rights by prescription in the jurisdiction is 10
years. The period of time necessary to acquire title by adverse possession in the
jurisdiction is 10 years.
What should the lawyer tell the man concerning his right to use the rerouted path on
the neighbor’s land?
(A) The man has fee title by adverse possession of the land included in the path.
(B) The man has an easement by necessity to use the path.
(C) The man has an easement by prescription to use the path.
(D) The man has no right to use the path.
(C) The man has an easement by prescription to use the path.
Frank owned two adjacent parcels, Blackacre and Whiteacre. Blackacre fronts on a
poor unpaved public road, while Whiteacre fronts on Route 20, a paved major
highway. Fifteen years ago, Frank conveyed to his son, Sam, Blackacre “together with
a right-of-way 25 feet wide over the east side of Whiteacre to Route 20.” At that time,
Blackacre was improved with a ten-unit motel.
Ten years ago, Frank died. His will devised Whiteacre “to my son, Sam, for life,
remainder to my daughter, Doris.” Five years ago, Sam executed an instrument in the
proper form of a deed, purporting to convey Blackacre and Whiteacre to Joe in fee
simple. Joe then enlarged the motel to 12 units. Six months ago, Sam died and Doris
took possession of Whiteacre. She brought an appropriate action to enjoin Joe from
using the right-of-way.
In this action, who should prevail?
(A) Joe, because he has an easement by necessity.
(B) Joe, because he has the easement granted by Frank to Sam.
(C) Doris, because merger extinguished the easement.
(D) Doris, because Joe has overburdened the easement.
(B) Joe, because he has the easement granted by Frank to Sam.
A businesswoman owned two adjoining tracts of land, one that was improved with a
commercial rental building and another that was vacant and abutted a river. Twenty years ago,
the businesswoman conveyed the vacant tract to a grantee by a warranty deed that the
businesswoman signed but the grantee did not. The deed contained a covenant by the grantee
as owner of the vacant tract that neither he nor his heirs or assigns would “erect any building”
on the vacant tract, in order to preserve the view of the river from the commercial building on
the improved tract. The grantee intended to use the vacant tract as a nature preserve. The
grantee promptly and properly recorded the deed. Last year, the businesswoman conveyed
the improved tract to a businessman. A month later, the grantee died, devising all of his
property, including the vacant land, to his cousin. Six weeks ago, the cousin began construction
of a building on the vacant tract. The businessman objected and sued to enjoin construction of
the building.
Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The cousin, because an equitable servitude does not survive the death of the promisor.
(B) The cousin, because the grantee did not sign the deed.
(C) The businessman, because the cousin is bound by the covenant made by the grantee.
(D) The businessman, because the commercial building was constructed before the cousin
began his construction project.
(C) The businessman, because the cousin is bound by the covenant made by the grantee.
Twenty-five years ago, a man who owned a 45-acre tract of land conveyed 40 of the 45 acres
to a developer by warranty deed. The man retained the rear five-acre portion of the land and
continues to live there in a large farmhouse. The deed to the 40-acre tract was promptly and
properly recorded. It contained the following language: “It is a term and condition of this deed,
which shall be a covenant running with the land and binding on all owners, their heirs and
assigns, that no use shall be made of the 40-acre tract of land except for residential purposes.”
Subsequently, the developer fully developed the 40-acre tract into a residential subdivision
consisting of 40 lots with a single-family residence on each lot. Although there have been
multiple transfers of ownership of each of the 40 lots within the subdivision, none of them
included a reference to the quoted provision in the deed from the man to the developer, nor
did any deed to a subdivision lot create any new covenants restricting use. Last year, a major
new medical center was constructed adjacent to the subdivision. A doctor who owns a house
in the subdivision wishes to relocate her medical offices to her house. For the first time, the
doctor learned of the restrictive covenant in the deed from the man to the developer. The
applicable zoning ordinance permits the doctor’s intended use. The man, as owner of the fiveacre
tract, however, objects to the doctor’s proposed use of her property. There are no
governing statutes other than the zoning code. The common law Rule Against Perpetuities is
unmodified in the jurisdiction.
Can the doctor convert her house in the subdivision into a medical office?
(A) Yes, because the original restrictive covenant violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(B) Yes, because the zoning ordinance allows the doctor’s proposed use and preempts the
restrictive covenant.
(C) No, because the owners of lots in the subdivision own property benefitted by the original
residential covenant and have the sole right to enforce it.
(D) No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and
has a right to enforce it.
(D) No, because the man owns property benefitted by the original restrictive covenant and
has a right to enforce it.
A fee-simple landowner lawfully subdivided his land into 10 large lots. The recorded
subdivision plan imposed no restrictions on any of the 10 lots. Within two months after
recording the plan, the landowner conveyed Lot 1 to a buyer, by a deed that contained no
restriction on the lot’s use. There was then a lull in sales. Two years later, the real estate
market in the state had generally improved and, during the next six months, the landowner
sold and conveyed eight of the remaining nine lots. In each of the eight deeds of conveyance,
the landowner included the following language: “It is a term and condition of this conveyance,
which shall be a covenant running with the land for the benefit of each of the 10 lots [with an
appropriate reference to the recorded subdivision plan], that for 15 years from the date of
recording of the plan, no use shall be made of the premises herein conveyed except for singlefamily
residential purposes.” The buyer of Lot 1 had actual knowledge of what the landowner
had done. The landowner included the quoted language in part because the zoning ordinance
of the municipality had been amended a year earlier to permit professional offices in any
residential zone. Shortly after the landowner’s most recent sale, when he owned only one
unsold lot, the buyer of Lot 1 constructed a one-story house on Lot 1 and then conveyed Lot 1
to a doctor. The deed to the doctor contained no reference to any restriction on the use of Lot
1. The doctor applied for an appropriate certificate of occupancy to enable her to use a part of
the house on Lot 1 as a medical office. The landowner, on behalf of himself as the owner of the
unsold lot, and on behalf of the other lot owners, sued to enjoin the doctor from carrying out
her plans and to impose the quoted restriction on Lot 1.
Who is likely to prevail?
(A) The landowner, because the doctor, as a successor in interest to the first buyer, is
estopped to deny that Lot 1 remains subject to the zoning ordinance as it existed when
Lot 1 was first conveyed by the landowner to the first buyer.
(B) The doctor, because zoning ordinances override private restrictive covenants as a matter
of public policy.
(C) The doctor, because Lot 1 was conveyed without the inclusion of the restrictive covenant
in the deed to the first buyer and the subsequent deed to the doctor.
(D) The landowner, because with the first buyer’s knowledge of the facts, Lot 1 became
incorporated into a common scheme.
(C) The doctor, because Lot 1 was conveyed without the inclusion of the restrictive covenant
in the deed to the first buyer and the subsequent deed to the doctor.
Simmons and Boyd entered into a written contract for the sale and purchase of Wideacre. The
contract provided that “Simmons agrees to convey a good and marketable title to Boyd sixty
days from the date of this contract.” The purchase price was stated as $60,000. At the time set
for closing Simmons tendered a deed in the form agreed to in the contract. Boyd’s examination
of the record prior to the date of closing had disclosed, however, that the owner of record was
not Simmons, but Olson. Further investigation by Boyd revealed that, notwithstanding the
state of the record, Simmons had been in what Boyd conceded as adverse possession for
fifteen years. The period of time to acquire title by adverse possession in the jurisdiction is ten
years. Boyd refuses to pay the purchase price or to take possession “because of the inability of
Simmons to transfer a marketable title.”
In an appropriate action by Simmons against Boyd for specific performance, Simmons will
(A) not prevail, because Boyd cannot be required to buy a lawsuit even if the probability is
great that Boyd would prevail against Olson.
(B) not prevail, because Simmons’ failure to disclose his lack of record title constitutes fraud.
(C) prevail, because he has obtained a “good and marketable title” by adverse possession.
(D) prevail, because Simmons’ action for specific performance is an action in rem even though
Olson is not a party.
(A) not prevail, because Boyd cannot be required to buy a lawsuit even if the probability is
great that Boyd would prevail against Olson.
By a valid written contract, a seller agreed to sell land to a buyer. The contract stated, “The
parties agree that closing will occur on next May 1 at 10 a.m.” There was no other reference to
closing. The contract was silent as to quality of title. On April 27, the seller notified the buyer
that she had discovered that the land was subject to a longstanding easement in favor of a
corporation for a towpath for a canal, should the corporation ever want to build a canal. The
buyer thought it so unlikely that a canal would be built that the closing should occur
notwithstanding this outstanding easement. Therefore, the buyer notified the seller on April
28 that he would expect to close on May 1. When the seller refused to close, the buyer sued
for specific performance.
Will the buyer prevail?
(A) No, because the easement renders the seller’s title unmarketable.
(B) No, because rights of third parties are unresolved.
(C) Yes, because the decision to terminate the contract for title not being marketable belongs
only to the buyer.
(D) Yes, because the seller did not give notice of the easement a reasonable time before the
closing date.
(C) Yes, because the decision to terminate the contract for title not being marketable belongs
only to the buyer.
A seller entered into a written contract to sell a tract of land to an investor. The contract made
no mention of the quality of title to be conveyed. Thereafter, the seller and the investor
completed the sale, and the seller delivered a warranty deed to the investor. Soon thereafter,
the value of the land increased dramatically. The investor entered into a written contract to
sell the land to a buyer. The contract between the investor and the buyer expressly provided
that the investor would convey a marketable title. The buyer’s attorney discovered that the
title to the land was not marketable, and had not been marketable when the original seller
conveyed to the investor. The buyer refused to complete the sale. The investor sued the
original seller on multiple counts. One count was for breach of the contract between the seller
and the investor for damages resulting from the seller’s failure to convey to the investor
marketable title, resulting in the loss of the sale of the land to the subsequent buyer.
Who is likely to prevail on this count?
(A) The investor, because the law implies in the contract a covenant that the title would be
marketable.
(B) The investor, because the original seller is liable for all reasonably foreseeable damages.
(C) The original seller, because she did not expressly agree to convey marketable title.
(D) The original seller, because her contract obligations as to title merged into the deed.
(D) The original seller, because her contract obligations as to title merged into the deed.
A landowner executed an instrument in the proper form of a deed, purporting to convey his
land to a friend. The landowner handed the instrument to the friend, saying, “This is yours, but
please do not record it until after I am dead. Otherwise, it will cause me no end of trouble with
my relatives.” Two days later, the landowner asked the friend to return the deed to him
because he had decided that he should devise the land to the friend by will rather than by
deed. The friend said that he would destroy the deed and a day or so later falsely told the
landowner that the deed had been destroyed. Six months ago, the landowner, who had never
executed a will, died intestate, survived by a daughter as his sole heir at law. The day after the
landowner’s death, the friend recorded the deed from him. As soon as the daughter
discovered this recording and the friend’s claim to the land, she brought an appropriate action
against the friend to quiet title to the land.
For whom should the court hold?
(A) The daughter, because the death of the landowner deprived the subsequent recordation
of any effect.
(B) The daughter, because the friend was dishonest in reporting that he had destroyed the
deed.
(C) The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
(D) The friend, because the deed was recorded by him.
(C) The friend, because the deed was delivered to him.
While hospitalized, Marsh requested her attorney to draw a deed conveying her home to her
son, Simon. While Marsh remained in the hospital, the deed was drawn, properly executed,
and promptly and properly recorded. On being informed of the existence of the deed, Simon
told his mother, “I want no part of the property; take the deed right back.” Marsh recovered
and left the hospital, but shortly thereafter, before any other relevant event, Simon died
intestate. Marsh brought an appropriate action against Simon’s heirs to determine title.
If Marsh wins, it will be because
(A) Simon’s declaration was a constructive reconveyance of the land.
(B) there was no effective acceptance of delivery of the deed.
(C) the presumption of delivery arising from the recording is not valid unless the grantee has
knowledge at the time of the recording.
(D) the court will impose a constructive trust to carry out the intent of the deceased son.
(B) there was no effective acceptance of delivery of the deed.
The owner of Greenacre, conveyed Greenacre by quitclaim deed as a gift to a woman, who did
not then record her deed. Later, the owner conveyed Greenacre by warranty deed to a
neighbor, who paid valuable consideration, knew nothing of the woman’s claim, and promptly
and properly recorded. Next, the woman recorded her deed. Then the neighbor conveyed
Greenacre by quitclaim deed to her son as a gift. When the possible conflict with the woman
was discovered, the son recorded his deed.
Greenacre at all relevant times has been vacant unoccupied land.
The recording act of the jurisdiction provides: “No unrecorded conveyance or mortgage of real
property shall be good against subsequent purchasers for value without notice, who shall first
record.” No other statute is applicable.
The son has sued the woman to establish who owns Greenacre.
The court will hold for
(A) The son, because the woman was a donee.
(B) The son, because the neighbor’s purchase cut off the woman’s rights.
(C) The woman, because she recorded before the son.
(D) The woman, because the son was a subsequent donee.
(B) The son, because the neighbor’s purchase cut off the woman’s rights.
An uncle was the record title holder of a vacant tract of land. He often told friends that he
would leave the land to his nephew in his will. The nephew knew of these conversations. Prior
to the uncle’s death, the nephew conveyed the land by warranty deed to a woman for
$10,000. She did not conduct a title search of the land before she accepted the deed from the
nephew. She promptly and properly recorded her deed. Last month, the uncle died, leaving
the land to the nephew in his duly probated will. Both the nephew and the woman now claim
ownership of the land. The nephew has offered to return the $10,000 to the woman.
Who has title to the land?
(A) The nephew, because at the time of the deed to the woman, the uncle was the owner of
record.
(B) The nephew, because the woman did not conduct a title search.
(C) The woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
(D) The woman, because she recorded her deed prior to the uncle’s death.
(C) The woman, because of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.
