Constitutional Law Flashcards
A federal statute imposes an excise tax of $100 on each new computer sold in the
United States. It also appropriates the entire proceeds of that tax to a special fund,
which is required to be used to purchase licenses for computer software that will be
made available for use, free of charge, to any resident of the United States.
Is this statute constitutional?
(A) No, because the federal government may not impose any direct taxes on citizens
of the United States.
(B) No, because this statute takes without just compensation the property of persons
who hold patents or copyrights on computer software.
(C) Yes, because it is a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to tax and
spend for the general welfare.
(D) Yes, because the patent power authorizes Congress to impose reasonable charges
on the sale of technology and to spend the proceeds of those charges to advance
the use of technology in the United States.
(C) Yes, because it is a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to tax and
spend for the general welfare.
Congress wishes to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing on the basis of the affectional preference or sexual orientation of the
potential purchaser or renter. Congress wishes this statute to apply to all public and
private vendors and lessors of residential property in this country, with a few narrowly
drawn exceptions.
The most credible argument for congressional authority to enact such a statute would
be based upon the
(A) general welfare clause of Article I, Section 8, because the conduct the statute
prohibits could reasonably be deemed to be harmful to the national interest.
(B) commerce clause of Article I, Section 8, because, in inseverable aggregates, the
sale or rental of almost all housing in this country could reasonably be deemed
to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
(C) enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, because that amendment
clearly prohibits discrimination against the class of persons protected by this
statute.
(D) enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because that amendment
prohibits all public and private actors from engaging in irrational discrimination.
(B) commerce clause of Article I, Section 8, because, in inseverable aggregates, the
sale or rental of almost all housing in this country could reasonably be deemed
to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
After several well-publicized deaths caused by fires in products made from highly
flammable fabrics, the state of Orange enacted a statute prohibiting “the manufacture
or assembly of any product in this state which contains any fabric that has not been
tested and approved for flame retardancy by the Zetest Testing Company.” The Zetest
Testing Company is a privately owned and operated business located in Orange.
For many years, Fabric Mill, located in the state of Orange, has had its fabric tested for
flame retardancy by the Alpha Testing Company, located in the state of Green. Alpha
Testing Company is a reliable organization that uses a process for testing and
approving fabrics for flame retardancy identical in all respects to that used by the
Zetest Testing Company.
Because Fabric Mill wishes to continue to have its fabric tested solely by Alpha Testing
Company, Fabric Mill files an action in Orange state court challenging the
constitutionality of the Orange statute as applied to its circumstances.
In this suit, the court should hold the statute to be
(A) unconstitutional, because it denies to Fabric Mill the equal protection of the laws.
(B) unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
(C) constitutional, because it is reasonably related to the protection of the reputation
of the fabric industry located in the state of Orange.
(D) constitutional, because it is a legitimate means of protecting the safety of the
public.
(B) unconstitutional, because it imposes an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce.
A state legislature conducted an investigation into a series of fatal accidents in the
state involving commercial trucks with trailer exteriors made of polished aluminum.
The investigation revealed that the sun’s glare off of these trucks blinded the drivers
of other vehicles. The state’s legislature then enacted a law prohibiting commercial
trucks with polished aluminum trailer exteriors from traveling on the state’s highways.
Litigation over the state law resulted in a final decision by the United States Supreme
Court that the law impermissibly burdened interstate commerce and, therefore, was
unconstitutional. Congress later enacted a statute permitting any state to enact a law
regulating the degree of light reflectiveness of the exteriors of commercial trucks
using the state’s highways.
Is this federal statute constitutional?
(A) No, because the U.S. Supreme Court has already determined that state laws of
this type impermissibly burden interstate commerce.
(B) No, because Article III vests the judicial power in the federal courts, the essence of
judicial power is the ability to render a final judgment, and this statute overrules a
final judgment of the federal Supreme Court.
(C) Yes, because Article I, Section 8 grants Congress authority to enact statutes
authorizing states to impose burdens on interstate commerce that would
otherwise be prohibited.
(D) Yes, because Article I, Section 8 grants Congress authority to enact statutes for the
general welfare, and Congress could reasonably believe that state laws regulating
the light reflectiveness of the exteriors of trucks promote the general welfare.
(C) Yes, because Article I, Section 8 grants Congress authority to enact statutes
authorizing states to impose burdens on interstate commerce that would
otherwise be prohibited.
Doctor, a resident of the city of Greenville in the state of Green, is a physician licensed
to practice in both Green and the neighboring state of Red. Doctor finds that the most
convenient place to treat her patients who need hospital care is in the publicly owned
and operated Redville Municipal Hospital of the city of Redville in the state of Red,
which is located just across the state line from Greenville. For many years Doctor had
successfully treated her patients in that hospital. Early this year she was notified that
she could no longer treat patients in the Redville hospital because she was not a
resident of Red, and a newly adopted rule of Redville Municipal Hospital, which was
adopted in conformance with all required procedures, stated that every physician who
practices in that hospital must be a resident of Red.
Which of the following constitutional provisions would be most helpful to Doctor in an
action to challenge her exclusion from the Redville hospital solely on the basis of this
hospital rule?
(A) The bill of attainder clause.
(B) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.
(C) The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(D) The ex post facto clause.
(B) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.
National statistics revealed a dramatic increase in the number of elementary and
secondary school students bringing controlled substances to school for sale. In
response, Congress enacted a statute requiring each state legislature to enact a state
law making it a crime for any person to sell, within 1,000 feet of any elementary or
secondary school, any controlled substance that had previously been transported in
interstate commerce.
Is the federal statute constitutional?
(A) No, because Congress has no authority to require a state legislature to enact any
specified legislation.
(B) No, because the sale of a controlled substance in close proximity to a school does
not have a sufficiently close nexus to interstate commerce to justify its regulation
by Congress.
(C) Yes, because it contains a jurisdictional provision that will ensure, on a case-bycase
basis, that any particular controlled substance subject to the terms of this
statute will, in fact, affect interstate commerce.
(D) Yes, because Congress possesses broad authority under both the general welfare
clause and the commerce clause to regulate any activities affecting education that
also have, in inseverable aggregates, a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
(A) No, because Congress has no authority to require a state legislature to enact any
specified legislation.
Congress passed a statute directing the United States Forest Service, a federal agency,
to issue regulations to control campfires on federal public lands and to establish a
schedule of penalties for those who violate the new regulations. The statute provided
that the Forest Service regulations should “reduce, to the maximum extent feasible,
all potential hazards that arise from campfires on Forest Service lands.” The Forest
Service issued the regulations and the schedule of penalties directed by Congress. The
regulations include a rule that provides for the doubling of the fine for any negligent
or prohibited use of fire if the user is intoxicated by alcohol or drugs.
Which of the following is the best argument for sustaining the constitutionality of the
Forest Service’s rule providing for the fines?
(A) The executive branch of government, of which the Forest Service is part, has
inherent rule-making authority over public lands.
(B) The rule is issued pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress’s power to delegate
rule-making authority to federal agencies.
(C) The rule is justified by a compelling governmental interest in safeguarding forest
resources.
(D) The rule relates directly to law enforcement, which is an executive rather than
legislative function, and hence it does not need specific congressional
authorization.
(B) The rule is issued pursuant to a valid exercise of Congress’s power to delegate
rule-making authority to federal agencies.
The Federal Automobile Safety Act establishes certain safety and performance
standards for all automobiles manufactured in the United States. The Act creates a
five-member “Automobile Commission” to investigate automobile safety, to make
recommendations to Congress for new laws, to make further rules establishing safety
and performance standards, and to prosecute violations of the act. The chairman is
appointed by the President, two members are selected by the President pro tempore
of the Senate, and two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Minicar, Inc.,
a minor United States car manufacturer, seeks to enjoin enforcement of the
Commission’s rules.
The best argument that Minicar can make is that
(A) Minicar is denied due process of law because it is not represented on the
Commission.
(B) the commerce power does not extend to the manufacture of automobiles not
used in interstate commerce.
(C) the Commission lacks authority to enforce its standards because not all of its
members were appointed by the President.
(D) legislative power may not be delegated by Congress to an agency in the absence
of clear guidelines.
(C) the Commission lacks authority to enforce its standards because not all of its
members were appointed by the President.
The vaccination of children against childhood contagious diseases (such as measles,
diphtheria and whooping cough) has traditionally been a function of private doctors
and local and state health departments. Because vaccination rates have declined in
recent years, especially in urban areas, the President proposes to appoint a
Presidential Advisory Commission on Vaccination which would be charged with
conducting a national publicity campaign to encourage vaccination as a public health
measure. No federal statute authorizes or prohibits this action by the President. The
activities of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Vaccination would be financed
entirely from funds appropriated by Congress to the Office of the President for “such
other purposes as the President may think appropriate.”
May the President constitutionally create such a commission for this purpose?
(A) Yes, because the President has plenary authority to provide for the health, safety,
and welfare of the people of the United States.
(B) Yes, because this action is within the scope of executive authority vested in the
President by the Constitution, and no federal statute prohibits it.
(C) No, because the protection of children against common diseases by vaccination is
a traditional state function and, therefore, is reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.
(D) No, because Congress has not specifically authorized the creation and support of
such a new federal agency.
(B) Yes, because this action is within the scope of executive authority vested in the
President by the Constitution, and no federal statute prohibits it.
A federal statute sets up a program of dental education. The statute provides that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services “shall, on a current basis, spend all of the
money appropriated for this purpose” and “shall distribute the appropriated funds” by
a specified formula to state health departments that agree to participate in the
program. In the current year Congress has appropriated $100 million for expenditure
on this program. In order to ensure a budget surplus in the current fiscal year, the
President issued an executive order directing the various cabinet secretaries to cut
expenditures in this year by 10 percent in all categories. He also orders certain
programs to be cut more drastically because he believes that “they are not as
important to the general welfare as other programs.” The President identifies the
dental education program as such a program and orders it to be cut by 50 percent.
Assume that no other federal statutes are relevant.
To satisfy constitutional requirements, how much money must the Secretary of Health
and Human Services distribute for the dental education program this year?
(A) $100 million, because the President may not unilaterally suspend the effect of a
valid federal statute imposing a duty to spend appropriated monies.
(B) $50 million, because the President could reasonably determine that this program
is not as important to the general welfare as other programs.
(C) $90 million, because any more drastic cut for the program would be a denial of
equal protection to beneficiaries of this program as compared to beneficiaries of
other programs.
(D) $50 million, because as chief executive the President has the constitutional
authority to control the actions of all of his subordinates by executive order.
(A) $100 million, because the President may not unilaterally suspend the effect of a
valid federal statute imposing a duty to spend appropriated monies.
The National AIDS Prevention and Control Act is a new, comprehensive federal statute
that was enacted to deal with the public health crisis caused by the AIDS virus.
Congress and the President were concerned that inconsistent lower court rulings with
respect to the constitutionality, interpretation, and application of the statute might
adversely affect or delay its enforcement and, thereby, jeopardize the public health.
As a result, they included a provision in the statute providing that all legal challenges
concerning those matters may be initiated only by filing suit directly in the United
States Supreme Court
The provision authorizing direct review of the constitutionality, interpretation, or
application of this statute only in the United States Supreme Court is
(A) constitutional, because it is authorized by the Article I power of Congress to enact
all laws that are “necessary and proper” to implement the general welfare.
(B) constitutional, because Article III provides that the jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court is subject to such exceptions and such regulations as Congress
shall make.
(C) unconstitutional, because it is inconsistent with the specification in Article III of
the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
(D) unconstitutional, because it denies persons who wish to challenge this statute the
equal protection of the laws by requiring them to file suit in a court different from
that in which persons who wish to challenge other statutes may file suit.
(C) unconstitutional, because it is inconsistent with the specification in Article III of
the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
A federal statute required the National Bureau of Standards to establish minimum
quality standards for all beer sold in the United States. The statute also provided that
public proceedings must precede adoption of the standards, and that once they were
adopted, the standards would be subject to judicial review. No standards have yet
been adopted. Several officials of the National Bureau of Standards have indicated
their personal preference for beer produced by a special brewing process commonly
referred to as pasteurization. However, these officials have not indicated whether
they intend to include a requirement for pasteurization in the minimum beer quality
standards to be adopted by the Bureau.
A brewery that produces an unpasteurized beer believes that its brewing process is as
safe as pasteurization. The brewery is concerned that, after the appropriate
proceedings, the Bureau may adopt quality standards that will prohibit the sale of any
unpasteurized beer. As a result, the brewery sued in federal district court to enjoin the
Bureau from adopting any standards that would prohibit the sale of unpasteurized
beer in this country.
How should the district court dispose of the suit?
(A) Determine whether the Bureau could reasonably believe that pasteurization is the
safest process by which to brew beer, and if the Bureau could reasonably believe
that, refuse to issue the injunction against the Bureau.
(B) Determine whether the process used by the brewery is as safe as pasteurization
and, if it is, issue the injunction against the Bureau.
(C) Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit at this time and stay the action until the
Bureau has actually issued beer quality standards.
(D) Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit, because it does not involve a
justiciable case or controversy.
(D) Refuse to adjudicate the merits of the suit, because it does not involve a
justiciable case or controversy.
A private university is owned and operated by a religious organization. The university
is accredited by the department of education of the state in which it is located. This
accreditation certifies that the university meets prescribed educational standards.
Because it is accredited, the university qualifies for state funding for certain of its
operating expenses. Under this funding program, 25 percent of the university’s total
operating budget comes from state funds. A professor at the university was a parttime
columnist for the local newspaper. In one of her published columns, the
professor argued that “religion has become a negative force in society.” The university
subsequently discharged the professor, giving as its sole reason for the dismissal her
authorship and publication of this column. The professor sued the university, claiming
only that her discharge violated her constitutional right to freedom of speech. The
university moved to dismiss the professor’s lawsuit on the ground that the U.S.
Constitution does not provide the professor with a cause of action in this case.
Should the court grant the university’s motion to dismiss?
(A) No, because the accreditation and partial funding of the university by the state are
sufficient to justify the conclusion that the state was an active participant in the
discharge of the professor.
(B) No, because the U.S. Constitution provides a cause of action against any stateaccredited
institution that restricts freedom of speech as a condition of
employment.
(C) Yes, because the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the
university to employ only individuals who share and communicate its views.
(D) Yes, because the action of the university in discharging the professor is not
attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(D) Yes, because the action of the university in discharging the professor is not
attributable to the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Barnes was hired as an assistant professor of mathematics at Reardon State College
and is now in his third consecutive one-year contract. Under state law, he cannot
acquire tenure until after five consecutive annual contracts. In his third year, Barnes
was notified that he was not being re-hired for the following year. Applicable state law
and college rules did not require either a statement of reasons or a hearing, and in
fact neither was offered to Barnes.
Which of the following, if established, sets forth the strongest constitutional argument
Barnes could make to compel the college to furnish him a statement of reasons for the
failure to rehire him and an opportunity for a hearing?
(A) He leased a home in reliance on an oral promise of reemployment by the college
president.
(B) There is no evidence that tenured teachers are any more qualified than he is.
(C) He was the only teacher at the college whose contract was not renewed that year.
(D) In the expectation of remaining at the college, he had just moved his elderly
parents to the town in which the college is located.
(A) He leased a home in reliance on an oral promise of reemployment by the college
president.
A city zoning ordinance requires anyone who proposes to operate a group home to
obtain a special use permit from the city zoning board. The zoning ordinance defines a
group home as a residence in which four or more unrelated adults reside. An
individual applied for a special use permit to operate a group home for convicts during
their transition from serving prison sentences to their release on parole. Although the
proposed group home met all of the requirements for the special use permit, the
zoning board denied the individual’s application because of the nature of the
proposed use. The individual sued the zoning board seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief on constitutional grounds.
Which of the following best states the appropriate burden of persuasion in this
action?
(A) Because housing is a fundamental right, the zoning board must demonstrate that
denial of the permit is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
(B) Because the zoning board’s action is in the nature of an economic or social
welfare regulation, the individual seeking the permit must demonstrate that the
denial of the permit is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
(C) Because the zoning board’s action invidiously discriminates against a suspect class,
the zoning board must demonstrate that denial of the permit is necessary to serve
a compelling state interest.
(D) Because the zoning board’s action has the effect of discriminating against a quasisuspect
class in regard to a basic subsistence right, the zoning board must
demonstrate that the denial of the permit is substantially related to an important
state interest.
(B) Because the zoning board’s action is in the nature of an economic or social
welfare regulation, the individual seeking the permit must demonstrate that the
denial of the permit is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
The United States government demonstrated that terrorist attacks involving
commercial airliners were perpetrated exclusively by individuals of one particular
race. In response, Congress enacted a statute imposing stringent new airport and
airline security measures only on individuals of that race seeking to board airplanes in
the United States.
Which of the following provides the best ground for challenging the constitutionality
of this statute?
(A) The commerce clause of Article I, Section 8.
(B) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
(C) The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV.
(D) The privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(B) The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A city passed an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a license in order to care for
children under the age of 12 for pay. To receive such a license, the ordinance required
the individuals to complete 10 hours of instruction in child care, undergo a
background check, and pay a $100 fee. The ordinance affected women
disproportionately to men, because female babysitters far outnumbered male
babysitters in the city. City officials who promoted the measure said that the
certification process would ensure that babysitters were adequately regulated for the
health and safety of the city’s children.
Is the ordinance constitutional?
(A) Yes, because it is rationally related to a legitimate government objective.
(B) Yes, because any burden it imposes is clearly outweighed by an important
government objective.
(C) No, because it has a disparate impact on women without a showing that the
ordinance is necessary to advance a compelling government interest.
(D) No, because it infringes on the freedom of contract without a compelling
government interest.
(A) Yes, because it is rationally related to a legitimate government objective.
To encourage the growth of its population, the state of Axbridge established a
program that awarded $1,000 to the parents of each child born within the state,
provided that at the time of the child’s birth the mother and father of the newborn
were citizens of the United States.
The Lills are aliens who are permanent residents of the United States and have resided
in Axbridge for three years. When their first child was born two months ago, they
applied for and were denied the $1,000 award by Axbridge officials on the sole ground
that they are not citizens of the United States. The Lills filed suit in federal court
contending that their exclusion from the award program was unconstitutional.
Assume no federal statute addresses this question.
In this case, the court should hold that the exclusion of aliens from the Axbridge award
program is
(A) constitutional, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states plenary
authority over the spending of state funds.
(B) constitutional, because Axbridge has a legitimate interest in encouraging the
growth of its population, and a rational legislature could believe that families in
which both parents are United States citizens are more likely to stay in Axbridge
and contribute to its future prosperity than those in which one or both of the
parents are aliens.
(C) unconstitutional, because strict scrutiny governs judicial review of such state
classifications based on alienage, and Axbridge cannot demonstrate that this
classification is necessary to advance a compelling state interest.
(D) unconstitutional, because state classifications based on alienage are impermissible
unless explicitly authorized by an act of Congress.
(C) unconstitutional, because strict scrutiny governs judicial review of such state
classifications based on alienage, and Axbridge cannot demonstrate that this
classification is necessary to advance a compelling state interest.
Water District is an independent municipal water-supply district incorporated under
the applicable laws of the state of Green. The district was created solely to supply
water to an entirely new community in a recently developed area of Green. That new
community is racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse, and the community
has never engaged in any discrimination against members of minority groups.
The five-member, elected governing board of the newly created Water District
contains two persons who are members of racial minority groups. At its first meeting,
the governing board of Water District adopted a rule unqualifiedly setting aside 25%
of all positions on the staff of the District and 25% of all contracts to be awarded by
the District to members of racial minority groups. The purpose of the rule was “to
help redress the historical discrimination against these groups in this country and to
help them achieve economic parity with other groups in our society.” Assume that no
federal statute applies.
A suit by appropriate parties challenges the constitutionality of these set-asides.
In this suit, the most appropriate ruling on the basis of applicable United States
Supreme Court precedent would be that the set-asides are
(A) unconstitutional, because they would deny other potential employees or potential
contractors the equal protection of the laws.
(B) unconstitutional, because they would impermissibly impair the right to contract of
other potential employees or potential contractors.
(C) constitutional, because this is a reasonable means of addressing historic
discrimination against these racial minority groups.
(D) constitutional, because they would assure members of racial minority groups the
equal protection of the laws.
(A) unconstitutional, because they would deny other potential employees or potential
contractors the equal protection of the laws.
In order to combat terrorism, Congress enacted a statute authorizing the President to
construct surveillance facilities on privately owned property if the President
determined that the construction of such facilities was “necessary to safeguard the
security of the United States.” The statute provided no compensation for the owner of
the land on which such facilities were constructed and provided that the surveillance
facilities were to be owned and operated by the United States government. Pursuant
to this statute, the President has determined that the construction of a surveillance
facility on a very small, unused portion of an owner’s large tract of land is necessary to
safeguard the security of the United States. The construction and operation of the
facility will not affect any of the uses that the owner is currently making of the entire
tract of land. The owner has filed suit to challenge the constitutionality of the
construction of a surveillance facility on the parcel of land at issue without
compensation.
How should the court rule?
(A) It would not interfere with any use the owner is currently making of the entire
tract of land and, therefore, would not entitle the owner to any compensation.
(B) It would be a taking of the owner’s property for which the owner must be
compensated.
(C) It would single out the owner for adverse treatment in violation of the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
(D) It would be valid without any compensation, because it has been determined to
be necessary to protect a compelling government interest in national security.
(B) It would be a taking of the owner’s property for which the owner must be
compensated.
A generally applicable state statute requires an autopsy by the county coroner in all cases of death that are not obviously of natural causes. The purpose of this law is to ensure the discovery and prosecution of all illegal activity resulting in death. In the 50 years since its enactment, the statute has been consistently enforced. A husband and wife are practicing members of a religious group which believes that it is essential for a deceased person’s body to be buried promptly and without any invasive procedures, including an autopsy. The couple sincerely believes in the religious group’s tenets, including the group’s views regarding autopsies. The couple’s son died of mysterious causes and an autopsy was scheduled in accordance with the state statute. The couple filed an action in state court challenging the constitutionality of the state statute, and seeking an injunction prohibiting the county coroner from performing an autopsy on their son’s body. In this action, the couple’s only claim is that the application of this statute in the circumstances of their son’s death would violate their right to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Assume that no federal statutes are applicable.
As applied to the couple’s case, is the state’s autopsy statute constitutional?
(A) Yes, because it is a generally applicable statute and is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
(B) Yes, because a dead individual is not a person protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(C) No, because it is not necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest.
(D) No, because it is not substantially related to an important state interest.
(A) Yes, because it is a generally applicable statute and is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
Several public high school students asked the superintendent of the public school district whether the minister of a local church could deliver an interdenominational prayer at their graduation ceremony in the school auditorium. None of the students or their guests at graduation would be required to pray while the minister delivered the prayer.
Would the minister’s delivery of such a prayer at the public high school graduation be constitutional?
(A) Yes, because none of the students or their guests would be required to pray at the graduation ceremony.
(B) Yes, because the idea for the prayer originated with the students and not with school officials.
(C) No, because it would be an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
(D) No, because it would deny attendees who are not members of the minister’s denomination the right to freely exercise their religion.
(C) No, because it would be an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
Members of a religious group calling itself the Friends of Lucifer believe in Lucifer as their Supreme Being. The members of this group meet once a year on top of Mt. Snow, located in a U.S. National Park, to hold an overnight encampment and a midnight dance around a large campfire. They believe this overnight encampment and all of its rituals are required by Lucifer to be held on the top of Mt. Snow. U.S. National Park Service rules that have been consistently enforced prohibit all overnight camping and all campfires on Mt. Snow because of the very great dangers overnight camping and campfires would pose in that particular location. As a result, the park Superintendent denied a request by the Friends of Lucifer for a permit to conduct these activities on top of Mt. Snow. The park Superintendent, who was known to be violently opposed to cults and other unconventional groups had, in the past, issued permits to conventional religious groups to conduct sunrise services in other areas of that U.S. National Park. The Friends of Lucifer brought suit in Federal Court against the U.S. National Park Service and the Superintendent of the park to compel issuance of the requested permit.
As a matter of constitutional law, the most appropriate result in this suit would be a decision that denial of the permit was
(A) valid, because religiously motivated conduct may be subjected to nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that advance important public interests.
(B) invalid, because the free exercise clause of the First Amendment prohibits the Park Service from knowingly interfering with religious conduct.
(C) valid, because the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits the holding of religious ceremonies on federal land.
(D) invalid, because these facts demonstrate that the action of the Park Service purposefully and invidiously discriminated against the Friends of Lucifer.
(A) valid, because religiously motivated conduct may be subjected to nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that advance important public interests.
A group of students at a state university’s law school wished to debate the future of affirmative action in that state and at that law school. For this debate they requested the use of a meeting room in the law school that is available on a first-come, first-served basis for extracurricular student use. Speakers presenting all sides of the issue were scheduled to participate. The law school administration refused to allow the use of any of its meeting rooms for this purpose solely because it believed that “such a debate, even if balanced, would have a negative effect on the morale of the law school community and might cause friction among the students that would disrupt the institution’s educational mission.”
Is the refusal of the law school administration to allow the use of its meeting room for this purpose constitutional?
(A) No, because the law school administration cannot demonstrate that its action was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
(B) No, because the law school administration cannot demonstrate that its action was necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest.
(C) Yes, because the law school administration’s only concern was the adverse effect of such a discussion of affirmative action on the immediate audience and the mission of the institution.
(D) Yes, because the law students do not have a right to use a state-owned law school facility for a meeting that is not organized and sponsored by the law school itself.
(B) No, because the law school administration cannot demonstrate that its action was necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest.
A state legislature received complaints from accident victims who, in the days immediately following their accidents, had received unwelcome and occasionally misleading telephone calls on behalf of medical care providers. The callers warned of the risks of not obtaining prompt medical evaluation to detect injuries resulting from accidents and offered free examinations to determine whether the victims had suffered any injuries. In response to these complaints, the legislature enacted a law prohibiting medical care providers from soliciting any accident victim by telephone within 30 days of his or her accident.
Which of the following is the most useful argument for the state to use in defending the constitutionality of the law?
(A) Because the law regulates only commercial speech, the state need only demonstrate that the restriction is rationally related to achieving the state’s legitimate interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the medical profession.
(B) The law is a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.
(C) The state has substantial interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the practice of medical care providers, and the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s objectives.
(D) Because the commercial speech that is the subject of this law includes some speech that is misleading, the First Amendment does not limit the power of the state to regulate that speech.
(C) The state has substantial interests in protecting the privacy of accident victims and in regulating the practice of medical care providers, and the law is narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s objectives.
A federal statute appropriated $7 million for a nationwide essay contest on “How the United States Can Best Stop Drug Abuse.” The statute indicates that its purpose is to generate new, practical ideas for eliminating drug abuse in the United States.
Contest rules set forth in the statute provide that winning essays are to be selected on the basis of the “originality, aptness, and feasibility of their ideas.” The statute expressly authorizes a first prize of $1 million, 50 second prizes of $100,000 each, and 100 third prizes of $10,000 each. It also states that judges for the contest are to be appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, and that all residents of the United States who are not employees of the federal government are eligible to enter and win the contest. A provision of the statute authorizes any taxpayer of the United States to challenge its constitutionality.
In a suit by a federal taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of the statute, the court should
(A) refuse to decide its merits, because the suit involves policy questions that are inherently political and, therefore, non-justiciable.
(B) hold the statute unconstitutional, because it does not provide sufficient guidelines for awarding the prize money appropriated by Congress and, therefore, unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the contest judges.
(C) hold the statute unconstitutional, because its relationship to legitimate purposes of the spending power of Congress is too tenuous and conjectural to satisfy the necessary and proper clause of Article I.
(D) hold the statute constitutional, because it is reasonably related to the general welfare, it states concrete objectives, and it provides adequate criteria for conducting the essay contest and awarding the prize money.
(D) hold the statute constitutional, because it is reasonably related to the general welfare, it states concrete objectives, and it provides adequate criteria for conducting the essay contest and awarding the prize money.
