Property Dualism (Mind) Flashcards
Supervenience def
Properties of Type A supervene upon properties of Type B.
In any case two things exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties
- e.g. Paining. Type A properties (Face) supervene on/from Type B properties (physical dots of paint)
- Can’t change the aesthetic properties of the paining without changing the physical properties
Property Dualism’s claims
- There is only one substance (physical)
- Mental properties depend upon the brain
- Brains have one type of substance (Physical) but with two distinct sets of properties
There are some mental properties that are neither reducible nor supervenient upon physical properties.
Chalmers’ explanatory problem
P1. Physical accounts explain at most structure and function (the ‘easy’ problem)
P2. Explaining structure and function is not sufficient to explain consciousness. (i.e. it doesn’t explain the ‘hard’ problem)
C. Therefore, no physical account can explain consciousness
Knowledge/Mary Argument for PD
P1. Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision.
P2. But she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself.
C1. Therefore there is more to know about colour vision than what is given in a complete physical account of it.
C2. So physicalism is false.
Ability knowledge response to Knowledge/ Mary argument (PD)
- K knowledge argues that she doesn’t gain propositional knowledge, which they still say Mary doesn’t
- Rather Mary gains Ability knowledge, as she is now able to ‘identify a ripe tomato by sight’
- This new knowledge doesn’t mean she hasn’t gained any new knowledge about colour vision, and knew all factual knowledge before leaving the room.
Defence: Against ability knowledge reponse of K argument (PD)
Still gains knowledge
Despite knowing all the facts (propositional knowledge), she still gains ability knowledge, which is learning something new as P2 says.
Philosophical zombies argument for PD (Against physicalism)
- Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical.
- Therefore, if there was an identical world it must also contain consciousness.
- However, a zombie world (physically the same but without consciousness) is metaphysically possible as it makes logical sense.
- What’s conceivable is metaphysically possible.
- Therefore a zombie world is metaphorically possible, meaning physicalism is false
Physicalism is shown to be false here as a world ,that is completely physically identical, is able to exist without consciousness while physicalism says consciousness is 100% physical.
Response to zombie argument: Zombie world is not conceivable
Chalmers says there is no evident logical contradiction in a zombie world.
However, the criticism is that it may only seen possible due to our lack of understanding of how the brain works.
If we knew the neuro-scientific explanation of how phenomenal consciousness arises from the complex functioning brain, we may find that it is not possible.
The fact that we have no good idea of how the brain produces consciousness isn’t evidence that it doesn’t.
Epiphenominalism
Just Property Dualism:
- The view that only Physical can cause Mental states or physical states.
- Mental states cannot cause mental or physical states/ actions
- Mental states just ‘hang above’ physical states, they aren’t able to do anything because they don’t have physical substance, so can’t interact with the physical.
M1 M2 M3 M4
|
P1 -> P2 -> P3 -> P4
Objection to Epiphenomenalism (PD): Mental causing physical
We can see examples of the mental states causing physical states/actions.
eg when we have the mental state of being tired, it results in the physical state of going for a nap for 20 mins
Epiphenomenalism says that this is impossible as mental states shouldn’t be able to interact with physical things, due to them not having physical substance.
Therefore the problem of interaction starts to creep in again and PD fails.
