Property Dualism

Question 1

What is property dualism?

Answer 1

The brain has non-physical properties alongside its ordinary physical properties.
Non-physical properties are mental phenomena such as sensations, thoughts, desires etc.

Question 2

What is the philosophical zombies argument for property dualism?

Answer 2

Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature (produced by the brain)
It follows that any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness
But we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one in which there is no conscious experience (philosophical zombies who act the same way we do but experience no qualia).
Therefore, physicalism is false

Question 3

Is a zombie world actually conceivable?

Answer 3

Having a mind is integral to being able to perform things like speaking and reacting to perceptual stimuli.
We cannot imagine someone who isn’t experiencing consciousness because it would be nonsensical to prick someone with a pin and tell yourself that they are not experiencing pain.

Question 4

Is what is conceivable always possible? (counter the philosophical zombies argument)

Answer 4

We can imagine a world exactly identical to ours but water has a different chemical composition. No matter how similarly it acts to water, it is not actually water. This means that it is not possible in any world for water to not be H2O.
It is not metaphysically possible to have a zombie world because in order for them to be identical to us they would need to have consciousness

Question 5

What is the knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism?

Answer 5

Mary lives in a black and white room but she knows everything about colour
One day she leaves the black and white room and she learns something new - the sensation of colour
Therefore, there is more to know about colour than the physical account of it
Therefore, physicalism is false

Question 6

Does Mary gain any new propositional knowledge? (counter Mary argument)

Answer 6

Mary knows every propositional fact about colour. When Mary leaves the room she does learn something new but it is not new propositional knowledge. Mary is learning acquaintance knowledge, she should already know how it should feel to experience the qualia of colour but she is only being acquainted with it now.

Question 7

Does knowledge of qualia count as physical knowledge? (counter Mary argument)

Answer 7

If Mary did know all physical facts about colour vision then she would have been able to work out what colours look like.

Question 8

Is there more than one way of knowing the same physical fact? (counter Mary argument)

Answer 8

Mary does not gain new knowledge because she should already knows how to describe colour. She’s just arriving at the same fact in a different way - from a third person point of view to a first person perspective.

Question 9

Does qualia actually exist? (counter Mary argument)

Answer 9

Qualia could just be a form of folk psychology, meaning in the future we will abandon talk about mental states and only refer to brain processes

Question 10

What is the problem of other minds?

Answer 10

The only evidence I have for others having minds is their behaviour. But as shown with the philosophical zombie argument, they may exhibit behaviour but this does not mean they are actually experiencing the mental state.
For example; someone can behave like they are experiencing pain by screaming but we cannot know that they are actually experiencing pain because mental states are private experiences.

Question 11

What is the argument from analogy? (response to the problem of other minds)

Answer 11

I can perceive others behaviour, which are similar to mine. From this I can infer that they have minds because they react similarly to the way I do when experiencing a mental state

Question 12

Criticise the argument from analogy.

Answer 12

Arguments from analogy are weak. You cannot say that every swan is white just because you have only seen white swans. Therefore, we cannot infer that others have minds by just looking at our own cases.

Question 13

What are Wittgenstein’s private language argument? (response to the problem of other minds)

Answer 13

Other people have minds because the terms that describe our mental states are acquired in the same way as any other term in our language, by being shown how terms are used.
The only reason we are able to use such terms properly is because there is a public world in which correct and incorrect usage is determined.

Question 14

What is the argument to the best explanation? (response to the problem of other minds)

Answer 14

The supposition of other minds existing is the best hypothesis. To say that someone actually is in pain when they exhibit the signs of pain is an easier explanation than saying they are not. - Occham’s Razor

Question 15

What is analytical behaviourism?

Answer 15

There is nothing beyond the behaviour of others. Minds cannot be detected because all we observe are behaviours.
Analytical behaviourism is the analysis of the meanings of the language of the mind shows that brain states are just behaviour - through analytic reduction.

Question 16

Why argue for analytical behaviourism?

Answer 16

It argues for something we can directly perceive - passes Ayer’s verification principle

Question 17

What is hard behaviourism?

Answer 17

If we are to talk meaningfully about human beings’ minds we need to be able to empirically show them. Therefore, we need to replace the language of mental states with the physical descriptions of movements.
We can explain pain physically by saying ‘she has stepped on a nail and is swearing loudly whilst hopping on one foot, trying to remove the nail.’
Mental phenomena are not private.

Question 18

Criticise hard behaviourism

Answer 18

Some mental states do not lead to specific actions. If I am feeling thirsty I could; say ‘I’m thirsty’, stay quiet, go to a cafe, do nothing, go to a pub etc.

Question 19

What is Ryle’s counter to substance dualism?

Answer 19

We are making a category mistake (like the foreigner at the cricket match) by thinking the mind is a different type of substance because it is not a substance at all. Mind is a way of talking about the capacities of humans to perform a range of actions, by understanding how our talk about the mind can be made sense of in terms of human behaviour, we will have no need for Cartesian dualism.

Question 20

What is Ryle’s soft behaviourism?

Answer 20

We have dispositions towards things - we are prone to act in certain ways.
Mental states are dispositions to behave in certain ways.
E.g. offering someone a pint; could say yes because they are thirsty, could say no because they are driving etc.

Question 21

What is the issue of introspection for behaviourism?

Answer 21

Denies that we have qualia when we clearly do. I only have to look inwards to see that there is more to my mind than outward behaviour.

Question 22

What is the issue of the asymmetry between self knowledge and the knowledge of others for behaviourism?

Answer 22

I can know I’m in pain without having to look at my behaviour, even though I can only know someone else is in pain by observing their behaviour. It would be absurd to only know I’m in pain through behaviour.

Question 23

Why is defence of interaction an issue for behaviourism?

Answer 23

By denying that beliefs, desires and sensations causally act with my behaviour it goes against common sense. We drink tea because we want tea and the sensation of pain causes me to scream, we do not scream merely to alter our behaviour.

Question 24

Why is circularity an issue for behaviourism?

Answer 24

If mental states are just actions then there is nothing to explain them, if the desire and sensation are translated into behaviour then they cannot explain behaviour without circularity, we would be explaining behaviour with behaviour.

Question 25

Explain how the conceivability of mental states without associated behaviour is an issue for behaviourism? (super spartans) and respond

Answer 25

We can conceive of cases where someone may be in a particular mental state but without any behaviour.
E.g. Super spartans experience pain but do not express it outwardly through behaviour. If behaviourism is correct then the spartans do not experience pain.

Ryle responds that they remain disposed to display the behaviour, if they were not trained they would exhibit behaviour.

Question 26

What is identity theory?

Answer 26

The mind is the brain and every mental process/state happens within the brain and is part of it. Beliefs, desires and sensations are just brain states.
Talk of the mind is NOT the same as talk about the brain because when I say I am experiencing a certain sensation, it is not the same as talking about neurons.
What is being claimed is that the mind and the brain happen to be the same empirically, both terms refer to the same object. (ontological reduction)

Question 27

Why argue for identity theory?

Answer 27

It points to physical processes that support human development.
Following evolutionary theory, its a better explanation than dualism because we cannot make sense of immaterial substance in today’s science.

Question 28

Explain the issue of talk about the brain not being the same as talk about the mind for identity theory.

Answer 28

It is implausible since the words we use to talk about mental states do not mean the same as our vocabulary of physical states.
When I say I have a headache, to say my c-fibres are firing something gets lost in translation because they aren’t necessarily the same.

Question 29

Explain the difference between meaning and reference in identity theory.

Answer 29

Meaning = is how it is identified/presented to the mind
Reference = the actual thing in the world to which the term refers
E.g. Morning star and evening star MEAN different things but they REFER to Venus
Therefore, brain and mind vocabulary have different meanings but they refer to the same thing

Question 30

Explain the spatial location problem for type identity theory.

Answer 30

To say that my brain states and mental states exist physically means they have spacial location. But it’s nonsensical to say that my belief rabbits have ears is two centimetres to the right of my desire for spag bol.

Question 31

How can type identity theorists overcome the spatial location problem?

Answer 31

It sounds odd because ordinary language lags behind neuroscientific advances.
Eventually it will sound normal to say that a belief is two nanometers long and located in the cerebellum

Question 32

How is the evidence of introspection an issue for type identity theory?

Answer 32

Introspection can reveal sensations, thoughts, emotions etc. not a domain of electrochemical impulses in an organ in my head.
Brain processes are observable but the sensation of mental states are private.

Question 33

Explain functionalism.

Answer 33

Many physical objects are defined less by what they are made of and more by their function - e.g. Can openers.
Therefore, functionalism explains mental phenomena according to their functional role.
e.g. the functional role of pain would be to avoid danger - any state that follows that function IS pain.
Mental states are dependent on physical states - mental states SUPERVENE physical.

Question 34

Why argue for functionalism?

Answer 34

Functionalists recognise the role that mental states have in causing behaviour and accords better with our common understanding of the mind (in comparison to behaviourism)

Question 35

Why is inverted qualia an issue for functionalism?

Answer 35

Someone elses red could be the same as my blue.
Because they would both have the same functional equivalent - both of our ‘reds’ could still envoke the feeling of anger - we would have no way of knowing the difference

Question 36

Why is the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia an issue for funtionalism? (Chinese room)

Answer 36

Anything functionally equivalent to a mind would classify as a mind - e.g. Turing test
An English speaker is locked in a room with an instruction book in english on how to respond and baskets of chinese characters. A chinese speaker outside the room sends in messages and the english speaker responds by following the rule book, passing the Turing test.

Question 37

Why is the Mary argument an issue for functionalism?

Answer 37

If mary knows all functional facts about what happens when humans experience colours, but learnt something new when she experienced colour, then there must be something more than function.

Question 38

What is eliminative materialism?

Answer 38

Mental states as we currently understand them are wrong. At the moment we are following folk psychology for mental states and in the future we will be able to eliminate folk psychology of mental states in favour for new scientific discoveries.
Has happened in science in the past - e.g. the plague being ‘bad air’ but is actually bacteria carried by rats

Question 39

Why is the intuitive certainty of mental states an issue for eliminativism?

Answer 39

I am aware of the existence of my desires, thoughts and feelings and therefore any theory that denies the existence of these has to be false.

Question 40

Explain why folk-psychology having good predictive/explanatory power is an issue for eliminativism.

Answer 40

Folk-psychology is a good starting point for scientific theories, we can predict and explain a good deal of things, neuroscience hasn’t given us a good enough theory yet so we can defend folk-psychology as the only viable option.
We would not be at the scientific stage that we are at today if we didn’t have folk-psychology.

Question 41

Explain how eliminativism is self-refuting

Answer 41

Eliminativists believe that there are no such things as beliefs, but if there are no beliefs then there is no point in believing eliminativism. Since it denies beliefs it must be false because it itself is a belief, so it would be wrong according to its own theory.