property dualism Flashcards
what does property dualism claim
there exists one substance, the physical, which has two properties, physical and mental, some mental properties do not supervene on physical properties
explain David Chalmers easy problem of consciousness and how it is solved
- psychological concept of mind = where we look at what the mind does and we explain behaviour (psychology), folk psychology
- easy problem = things we can solve or science is capable of solving, for example how we discriminate between objects, how perception works
- solved by = conducting empirical investigations of the brain, body and environment
explain David Chalmers hard problem of consciousness and how it is solved
- phenomenal concept of mind = this is the subjective experience of the mind, science has little to say here because it is not designed to investigate subjectively
- hard problem = what science cannot currently solve and perhaps never will be able to such as what consciousness is and how it arises
- why it cannot be solved by physicalism = by its nature, consciousness is subjective not objective, it is not something observable to others, only to the individual experiencing it, therefore there cannot be an empirical investigation of it
outline Chalmers explanatory argument formally
P1) Physicalist accounts explain at most structure and function (the easy problem)
P2) Explaining structure and function is not sufficient to explain consciousness (the hard problem)
C1) Therefore, no physicalist account can explain consciousness
what is a philosophical zombie
a being that is physically and functionally identical to a human being, so it has all the same physical properties, but lacks consciousness/qualia/qualitative mental states/phenomenal properties
what does the conceivability of a philosophical zombie imply about the nature of mental states
If phenomenal mental states and physical properties were identical, then it would not be metaphysically possible for something with those physical properties to exist without phenomenal mental states. Since zombies are conceivable, so are metaphysically possible, phenomenal mental states cannot be identical with any physical state. Therefore physicalism is false.
outline the zombie/conceivability argument
P1) If phenomenal properties were reducible to physical properties of the human body, then it would be metaphysically impossible for those physical properties to exist without phenomenal properties
P2) Philosophical zombies - physically/functionally identical beings that lack phenomenal properties - are conceivable
P3) What is conceivable is metaphysically possible
P4) Philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible
P5) If philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible then phenomenal properties are possibly distinct from physical properties (Leibniz’s Law reference)
C1) Phenomenal properties are distinct from physical properties and physicalism is insufficient
physicalists argue that philosophical zombies are not conceivable - why might this be and what is the implication for the zombie argument if they are true
- the only reason why we think a zombie is conceivable is that we lack some relevant info –> science has not explained it all yet
- if physicalism is true then physical properties determine functional properties –> a physical duplicate is also a functional duplicate
- if they were fully identical to us, then they would have consciousness - because this is ultimately just something physical for physicalists
- if they weren’t conscious then they wouldn’t be identical to us
outline the formal objection to philosophical zombies, that they are not conceivable
P1) A philosophical zombie is a physical duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness only the zombie lacks this
P2) A physical duplicate is a functional duplicate
C1) Therefore, a philosophical zombie is a physical and functional duplicate of a person but without phenomenal consciousness
P3) Phenomenal properties are physical properties realising particular functional roles
C2) Therefore a physical and functional duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness will have phenomenal consciousness
P4) A physical and functional duplicate of a person with consciousness cannot both have and lack phenomenal consciousness
C3) Therefore since a physical and functional duplicate of a person with phenomenal consciousness would have consciousness, philosophical zombies are inconceivable
what is logical possibility
any statement that is not self contradictory
what is physical possibility
something that is possible given the laws of physics in the universe
- physically possible for humans to walk on the moon
- not physically possible for humans to fly unaided
what is metaphysical possibility
something that is possible given the real nature/identity of a thing, something that is metaphysically impossible goes against the real nature/identity of a thing
- metaphysically possible for water to be H20 but not CO2
How might something be conceivable but not metaphysically possible
- conceivability is determined via an a priori reflection on the concepts involved
- metaphysical possibility is dependent on the actual nature of things involved
- sometimes this nature is discovered a posteriori and these discoveries can show that what is conceivable is not metaphysically possible
—> it is conceivable that water is not H20 but since water actually is H2O, it is metaphysically impossible for it to not be water - Masked Man Fallacy against Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism
what is the implication for the philosophical zombie argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
- even if PZombies are conceivable, it does not follow that they are also metaphysically possible
- may be the case that mental properties (both phenomenal qualities like qualia and psychological properties like intentionality) are identical to or reducible to physical properties
- zombie/conceivability argument doesn’t demonstrate that physicalism is false, it assumes that phenomenal properties are not physical but we do not know if this is the case
- there is good reason to think that the mind may be supervenient on the physical
how might metaphysical possibility tell us nothing about the actual world and how does this objection undermine conceivability arguments
- claiming that something is metaphysically possible really only says that one thing may be another
–> prior to discovering the nature of water, it was metaphysically possible for it to be a range of things, not just H20 as we did not know the composition of water - the only way to use metaphysical possibility is to say something substantive is to demonstrate what is metaphysically possible (by ruling out what a thing could be)
- the zombie argument does not do this, it would be more effective if it ruled out the possibility of mind being physical but it does not want to achieve this as a dualist theory not physicalist
- undermines conceivability arguments as just because PZombies could exist in some possible world, it wouldn’t necessarily apply to this world, property dualism must do more than just show that PZombies are conceivable, they need to show that they could actually exist, but they fail to do so so the argument is unconvincing
what are qualia
- the what it is like to experience any given experience
- they are introspectively accessible ineffable, non-intention, non-representational and intrinsic properties of experiential mental states
outline the Mary’s Room thought experiment
Mary is a scientist locked in a room without colour, she has all the physical and functional information that there is in relation to what happens when we see objects with colour, but she has never actually seen or experienced it
Upon her release, she sees colour for the first time and gains new knowledge about what it is like to see colour, she gains propositional knowledge of the qualia of colour
Propositional knowledge is knowing that, factual knowledge, knowing that something is the case or not, it is a truth apt statement, I know that London is in England
outline the knowledge argument formally
- outline Mary’s Room –> she knows physical and functional facts, and when released learns about seeing and experiencing colour (phenomenal facts, qualia of colour)
- Therefore, not all facts are physical and functional facts, there are phenomenal facts too
- Phenomenal facts are about non-physical phenomenal properties
- Therefore, since physicalism claims there are only physical and functional facts, and Mary gains knowledge of phenomenal facts, physicalism is false
explain the objection to the knowledge argument that Mary gains ability knowledge
- ability knowledge –> knowing how
- she gains the ability to see colour and experience qualia, she will now be able to imagine and recognise colour
- implication of this objection is that the thought experiment fails to show that there are facts in addition to physical and functional ones, so physicalism is not shown to be false
- Mary does know all the facts about colour vision and then upon leaving the room gains a new ability
how might a property dualist respond to the objection that Mary gains ability knowledge rather than propositional to the knowledge argument (Mary’s room)
Jackson accepts that Mary gains ability knowledge but insists that this does not contradict her also gaining propositional knowledge, she can gain both. So the objection fails to demonstrate that Mary does not gain propositional knowledge so the argument stands
explain the objection to the knowledge argument, that Mary gains acquaintance knowledge, the implications of this and how a property dualist could respond
- acquaintance knowledge –> knowing of, knowledge of something through direct experience/awareness
- Mary doesn’t gain new propositional knowledge, rather she gains acquaintance, gains direct awareness of colour and experiences of qualia
- implication is that the thought experiment fails to show that there are facts in addition to physical and functional ones, so P2 is false and physicalism is not shown to be false
- Mary does know all the facts about colour vision and upon leaving the room gains a new direct awareness of colour
- Response could be to accept Mary gains acquaintance knowledge but also propositional, so objection fails
explain the objection to the knowledge argument (Mary’s Room) that Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact
- example of a triangle, learning it has 3 sides, then learning sine and cosine rule, none of these new aspects of knowledge changed the fact you know what a triangle is
- so Mary gained a new concept of colour, but all along she knew what colour was
- didn’t learn a new fact, but a new perspective, new knowledge of the phenomenal concept
- does not learn a new fact, but just adds another concept to a fact she already knew
explain the objection that Mary cannot gain new knowledge because qualia do not exist
- eliminativist –> qualia is a part of fold psychology and Mary cannot gain knowledge as FP is mistaken
- the qualia of red is not a new mental state but rather a way of seeing various physical phenomena
- a behaviourist may say that Mary may well learn a new way of talking about colour but she will not have discovered any new properties or facts about colour
what does epiphenomenalist dualism claim
- dualism is true, either substance or property
- mental events are caused by physical events as a by-product
- mental events lack causal power, they cannot cause physical events nor other mental events, they are merely epiphenomena
difference between interactionist and epiphenomenalist dualism
interactionists –> mental states have causal power to change physical states and other mental states
epi –> mental states lack causal power, they cannot cause changes to physical states and other mental states
epi –> physical world is a causally closed system, all physical events have physical causes
interactionists –> do not see it as a causally closed system, some physical events have non-physical causes
what is introspective self knowledge
- knowledge of our own minds that we have, such as of mental states
- acquired directly and so is non-inferential
- requires that beliefs are caused by mental states that they are about, but this would require mental states to have causal power
- epiphenomenalism –> mental states do not have causal power, so introspective self knowledge should not be possible
- since I have introspective self knowledge, mental states must have causal power
- if this is true, then epiphenomenalism is true
outline the formal objection to epiphenomenalism posed by introspective self knowledge and how an epiphenomenalist dualist could respond
P1) If epiphenomenalism is true then mental states have no causal effects
P2) If mental states have no causal effects, then self-knowledge of mental states is impossible
P3) Self knowledge of mental states is possible
C1) Therefore, epiphenomenalism is true
It may be the case that phenomenal properties (qualia) have no causal power, but other mental states such as psychological properties (intentionality) do. Further, it could be the case that the knowledge of our own mental states is the result of physical processes (though this may run into an interaction problem)
what is phenomenology and how does it pose a challenge to epiphenomenalism
- phenomenology is the philosophic and scientific study of subjectivity and consciousness, of the objects of direct experience
- when we study our direct experience, we find that it seems like our mental states really do have causal power
- for example when I want to raise my arm to ask a question, then my arm goes up, my mental state appears to cause changes in physical states
- epiphenomenalism is therefore counter-intuitive and false given the conclusions of phenomenology at least
- mental states can cause behaviour and be themselves caused by behaviour (physical states)
- they can also causally impact other mental states, since epiphenomenalism does not adequately account for this, it is likely to be false
how does Chalmers respond to the challenge posed by the phenomenology of mental life
- Chalmers does not claim that all mental states are epiphenomenal, only that phenomenal properties (qualia) are
- psychological properties (intentionality) aren’t epiphenomenal
- he would argue that these mental states do have causal power, but subjective experience of experience does not
- however, we may still argue that this is counterintuitive –> the experience of pain or being in love for example are non-causal epiphenomena
outline the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution for epiphenomenalism
P1) Organisms with mental states have evolved from creatures that lack mental states and this is a result of natural selection
P2) For natural selection to select a feature, it must be causally potent (its presence/absence bestows different causal powers on the organism that has it)
C1) Therefore, mental states have causal powers
P3) According to epiphenomenalist dualism, mental states have no causal powers, this contradicts C1
C2) Therefore, epiphenomenalist dualism is false
