functionalism Flashcards
what does functionalism claim about mental states
- all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised
- function –> the operation of a system of inputs and outputs
- multiple realisability –> mental states can be expressed in a variety of systems varying in both composition and organisation
what is the difference between a functional definition of something and a compositional definition
functional —> tells us what something does like eyes, clocks, poisons
compositional —> tells us what something is made up of like diamonds, water, sunflower
how does functionalism avoid the problem of other minds which dualism faced
requirements to constitute mindedness…
- dualism = an internal experience of mind
- functionalism = an external organisation of a complex system
- if a system is sufficiently complex, it has a mind no matter what it is made of
how does functionalism solve the interaction problems for dualism
- functionalism doesn’t define minds in terms of their compositions so interaction is not a problem
how does functionalism solve the issue of multiple realisability for behaviourism and MBIT
- minds are multiply realisable by definition in functionalism, since they are understood in terms of function rather than composition
how does functionalism avoid the issue of circularity faced by behaviourism
- functionalism doesn’t seek to analytically reduce the language of mental states to the language of behaviours, so it allows for reference to internal mental states, not expressed as inputs or outputs
what are the 4 objections to functionalism
qualia - Jackson
inverted qualia - Ned Block
absent qualia - Ned Block
intentionality - John Searle
what are qualia and how does it pose an issue to functionalism and physicalism
- introspectively accessible phenomenal features of mental states that correspond to “what it is like” to experience any given mental state
- they are non-representational, ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately accessible to the mind
- physicalism and functionalism ignore the inner quality of our consciousness and our subjective experience of the world
- they are good at explaining third person consciousness, what is publicly available in terms of neurological and physiological behaviour
- but cannot explain our own individual experience of the world
outline the knowledge argument applied to functionalism formally and how might a functionalist respond
P1) Mary knows all the functional and physical facts about human colour vision before her release
P2) Mary does not know all the facts about human colour vision before her release, as she does not know about the phenomenal facts, qualia
C1) Therefore, there are non-functional and non-physical facts about human colour vision
P3) Non-functional and non-physical facts are about phenomenal properties (qualia)
C2) Therefore, there are non-functional and non-physical facts and functionalism is an insufficient account of the mind
Mary gains ability knowledge
Mary gains acquaintance knowledge
Mary gains new knowledge of an old fact
outline the inverted qualia scenario for Ned Block
- imagine two human beings who are bought up in the same community to speak the same language
- both look at a tomato and say it is red
- however, one has inverted qualia, when they see the tomato their quale is of green, despite the fact they say red
- they are functionally identical so the inputs they receive are the same and the outputs but this does not account for their qualia being different
outline Ned Blocks inverted qualia objection formally
P1) It is conceivable that two functionally identical systems could have inverted qualia
P2) If something is conceivable it is metaphysically possible
C1) Therefore the inversion scenario is metaphysically possible
P3) If so, then phenomenal properties aren’t functional properties
C2) Therefore, phenomenal properties aren’t functional properties and functionalism is an insufficient account of the mind
how could a functionalist respond to the inverted qualia objection
each person is functionally different so not functionally identical
this would mean that the two individuals in the inverted qualitative scenario are not functionally identical so the argument will fail
outline the absent qualia scenario –> China
- imagine the entire population of China was connected via two way radios to each other
- according to functionalism this would constitute a mind
- it is unclear how it could be said to have consciousness or phenomenal states
- there is nothing that “it is like” to be the Chinese mind and yet it can function in such a way that machine state functionalism claims should constitute a mind
outline the absent qualia objection formally
P1) If it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mental such that one has qualia and the other does not then functionalism is false
P2) Consideration of the Chinese Mind thought experiment shows that it is possible for two functional duplicates to differ mental such that one, the human, has qualia, while the other, the population of China as a system doesn’t
C) Therefore functionalism is false
see booklet for hive-mind consciousness
what is intentionality
the power of mental states to be about, to be directed towards or to represent things, properties or states of affairs
outline the Chinese room thought experiment
- there are two people, one is a native Chinese speaker and the other doesn’t know how to speak it
- the non-native person is in a box, with dictionaries and the the native Chinese speaker doesn’t know what is in the box
- the native Chinese speaker writes a message and deposits it in a letterbox, the non-native speaker then uses the dictionaries to decode the message and write their own one back
- the message written is then put back through the letterbox and read by the native Chinese speaker
- it is a perfect response
what is the implication of the Chinese room thought experiment for functionalism
- the situations shows we can have a functional system that appears to understand Chinese however it does not
- the person making the translations in the box doesn’t understand Chinese, so the system lacks intentionality
- AI lacks intentionality (understanding of meaning)
- functions aren’t sufficient for understanding meaning, for intentionality, and therefore having a mind
- so functionalism is an insufficient account of the mind
