Property Cases

Question 1

Article 415

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. ^Judge PANIS 1987

whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to the government

Answer 1

FACTS:

1. Plaintiffs-spouses Fernando A. Magcale and Teodula Baluyut Magcale secured a loan from the defendant Prudential Bank by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over their house and lot(where there is a pending sales patent)
2. Plaintiffs secured an additional loan from defendant by executing another Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties
3. For failure of plaintiffs to pay, the (2) deeds of Real Estate Mortgage were sold at public auction.
4. Respondent Court declared the deeds of Real Estate Mortgage as null and void

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 415 of the Civil Code, the inclusion of “building” separate and distinct from the land means that a building is by itself an immovable property.

A building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage.

Hence, The mortgage executed on the building which was erected on the land belonging to the government is a valid mortgage.

However, the second mortgage in so far it was executed after the issuance of the sales patent is null and void as it falls under the prohibitions in the Public Land Act.

Question 2

Article 1544

Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery 1918

Who owns the land in this case

Answer 2

Compañia Agricola Filipina - A; Machinery Company - B; Plaintiff - C

1. A bought a rice-cleaning machinery company from B and executed a chattel mortgage upon the machineries which included the building to secure payment of the purchase price. Unable to pay, pursuant to the chattel mortgage agreement, the property was sold to B. The deed of sale was registered.
2. Weeks later, A executed a deed of sale of the land to B but was not registered.
3. At the time when the chattel mortgage was executed, A executed another mortgage to C upon the building to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to C under a contract for the construction of the building. Upon default, C sought the execution of judgment upon the building. Despite protests from B, The building was sold in public auction to C, as highest bidder and certificate of sale was duly registered.
4. C filed an action to recover the building from B.

Who owns the land and building?

RULING:

B owns the land and Building.

Under Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil Code :

In case of double sale, ownership shall be transferred accordingly:

• If personal property, to the one who first took possesion in good faith
• If real property, to the one who first registered in good faith
• In the absence thereof, to the one who first took possession in good faith,
• In the absence thereof, to the one who presents the oldest title, in good faith

Since C had full knowledge of B’s claim of ownership when he executed the indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriff’s sale, he cannot be said to have been an innocent purchaser for value.

Hence, considering that B bought the machineries which included the Building from A and that he is the one who first took possession of both the land and building, he is deemed to be owner of the same under Article 1544.

^Note:

^{Instances where a Buyer is in Bad Faith​: ​One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.}

Question 3

Article 415

YAP V. ^JUDGE TANADA, 163 SCRA 464 (1988)

w/n the the pump is considered an immovable, thus the requisite advertisement/notice of sale under the Rules of Court applies to subject pump

Answer 3

1. Respondent Goulds Pumps filed a complaint against Petitioner Julian S. Yap for money claims representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump.
2. Respodent Judge Tañada issued an Order granting Goulds’ Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
3. On appeal, Yap seeks to annul the writ of execution as it was granted without the requisite notice prescribed for the sale of immovables

RULING:

No. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything “attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking or deterioration.

The pump could be separated without being broken. It could be easily removed by the loosening of bolts.

Question 4

Article 415

NAVARRO vs. PINEDA, 1963

w/n the deed of real estate and chattel mortgages appended to the complaint is valid, despite the fact that the housewas made the subject of the chattel mortgage

Answer 4

FACTS:

1. Defendants Rufino G. Pineda and his mother Juana Gonzales, secured a loan from Plaintiff Conrado P. Navarro by executing DEED OF REAL ESTATE and CHATTEL MORTGAGES”, upon a land owned by Gonzales and upon a Pineda’s house erected on a lot belonging to Atty. Vicente Castro.
2. Upon Default, plaintiff filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage

RULING:

Yes, a house may be treated as personal property by the contracting parties under the principle of estopel

In the deed of chattel mortgage, it was stated that “my personal properties”, a residential house and a truck shall be conveyed by way of chattel mortgage.

Question 5

LUNA V. ^JUDGE ENCARNACION 1952

w/m extra-judicial sale of a “chattel”, having been conducted under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is invalid because the mortgage in question is not a real estate mortgage

Answer 5

FACTS:

1. to secure the payment of a promissory note, Petitioner Jose A. Luna executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Respodent Trinidad Reyes upon a certain house of mixed materials
2. Unable to pay, the house was sold at public auction.
3. After the period for the redemption of the property had expired, the surrender of the possession of the property,
4. Luna filed a petition on the ground that said extra-judicial sale having been conducted under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is invalid because the mortgage in question is not a real estate mortgage

RULING:

No. The sale is still valid.

The Chattel Mortgage Law allows an extrajudicial sale in the same manner as Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,

Question 6

Article 415

MERALCO VS BOAA (Board of Assesment Appeals) 1982

w/n oil storage tanks can be imposed real property tax

Answer 6

FACTS:

This case is about the imposition of the realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed by Manila Electric Company on a lot in which it leased to Caltex . They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco’s power plants.

RULING:

Yes. Oil tanks may be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility because it is installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for oil.

Question 7

Davao Sawmill. vs. Castillo 1935

w/n the machineries mounted on foundations of cement placed by petitioner-tenant is immovable, thus shall belong to the owner of the land by virtue of said lease contract

Answer 7

1. Petitioner Davao Saw Mill Co., erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. However, the land belonged to another person. The contract of lease provides: That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by second party shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the first party.
2. Some machineries were mounted on foundations of cement.

RULING:

No. Machinery which is movable by nature only becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the property, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

Question 8

Article 415

Ago vs. Court of Appeals 1962

w/n the machineries installed by Golden Pacific Sawmill became real estate properties, thus making the sheriff’s sale void

Answer 8

1. Petitioner Pastor D. Ago bought sawmill machineries. To secure payment, he executed chattel mortgage on the same.
2. Defaulted in his payment, respondent Grace Park Engineering, instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings.
3. respondent Sheriff levied upon and ordered the sale of the sawmill machineries
4. However, Petitioner sold the machineries and equipments Golden Pacific Sawmill which installed the same on their sawmill building

RULING:

Yes. The installment of the sawmill machineries in the building of the Gold Pacific Sawmill, for use in the sawing of logs, the same became a necessary and permanent part of the building, converting the said machineries and equipments into real estate within the meaning of Article 415(5)

Considering that the machineries and equipments appear to have been sold without the necessary advertisement of sale as required in Sec. 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the sale made by the sheriff must be declared null and void.

Question 9

Board of Assessment Appeals vs. Meralco 1964

whether Meralco’s steel towers constitute real properties, so that they can be subject to a real property tax.

Answer 9

FACTS:

1. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it.
2. petitioner City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property tax

RULING:

No. The Steel Towers are not real properties as they are not considered immovable property under 415 of the Civil Code.

First, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.

Second, they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking or detoriation.

Third, they are not machineries and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in which the steel towers are constructed.

Question 10

MAKATI LEASING v. WEAREVER 1983

whether a machinery which is immovable by nature can be treated as personal property if no 3rd parties are prejudiced.

Answer 10

1. To secure the collection of the receivables assigned, respondent Wearever Textile Mills executed a Chattel Mortgage over a machinery described as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
2. Upon default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgage to it.
3. However, the Sheriff failed to gain entry into respondent’s premises and was not able to effect the seizure of the machinery.
4. Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with Replevin
5. The sheriff d removed the main drive motor of the subject machinery.
6. On Appeal, the CA ordered the return of the drive motor ruling that the machinery cannot be the subject of replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property as the only way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the sheriff could do to enfore the writ was to take the main drive motor of said machinery.

RULING:

Yes. Like a house, a machinery may be treated as personal property in a chattel mortgage provided that the parties agree and no third party will be prejudiced.

This is because one who has agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.

Even assuming that respondent had been required “to sign a printed form of chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at the time of signing.”, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering said contract voidable.

Question 11

Serg’s Products, vs. PCI Leasing 2000

subject machines used in their factory were proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin, because they were treated as personal property in the lease agreement

Answer 11

Yes. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.

After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real property is treated as personal, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise.

the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines are to be considered as personal property.

Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin.

^{NOTE: However, it must be remembered that third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. There is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.}

Question 12

Tumalad vs. Vicencio 1971

w/n the chattel mortgage was null and void because only personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage.

Answer 12

1. Petitioner Tumalad executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Respondent Vicencio over their house of strong materials, which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc.
2. Upon Default, the house extra-judicially forclosed and was sold at public auction to respodent as highest bidder.

RULING:

No. A house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby,

This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.

Question 13

Lopez v. Orosa & Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98

lien is also extended to the land which the construction was made

Answer 13

1. Petitioner Lopez he agreed to supply the lumber necessary for the construction of the proposed theatre, that payment therefor would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Pursuant to said verbal agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre on May 17, 1946, up to December 4 of the same year. But of the total cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only P20,848.50, thus leaving a balance of P41,771.35.
2. We may state at this juncture that the Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land with an area of 679.17 square meters formerly owned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., and was acquired by the corporation on September 25, 1946, for P6,000.
3. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of the remaining unpaid obligation, the latter and Belarmino Rustia, the president of the corporation, promised to obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the properties of the Plaza Theatre.,
4. Unknown to him, however, as early as November, 1946, the corporation already got a loan for P30,000 from the Philippine National Bank with the Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage on the land and building in favor of said company as counter-security.
5. Persistent demand from Lopez for the payment of the amount due him caused Vicente Orosa, Jr. to execute on March 17, 1947, an alleged “deed of assignment” of his 420 shares of stock of the Plaza Theater, Inc., at P100 per share or with a total value of P42,000 in favor of the creditor,
6. owned by the corporation be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness; or that the 420 shares of the capital stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., assigned by Vicente Orosa, Jr., to said plaintiff be sold at public auction for the same purpose;

Defendants Vicente Orosa, Jr. and Plaza Theatre, Inc., filed separate answers, the first denying that the materials were delivered to him as a promoter and later treasurer of the corporation, because he had purchased and received the same on his personal account; that the land on which the movie house was constructed was not charged with a lien to secure the payment of the aforementioned unpaid obligation; and that the 420 shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc., was not assigned to plaintiff as collaterals but as direct security for the payment of his indebtedness. As special defense, this defendant contended that as the 420 shares of stock assigned and conveyed by the assignor and accepted by Lopez as direct security for the payment of the amount of P41,771.35 were personal properties, plaintiff was barred from recovering any deficiency if the proceeds of the sale thereof at public auction would not be sufficient to cover and satisfy the obligation. It was thus prayed that he be declared exempted from the payment of any deficiency in case the proceeds from the sale of said personal properties would not be enough to cover the amount sought to be collected.

7.

Question 14

FELS ENERGY INC. vs PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, G.R. No. 168557, Feb. 16, 2007

Question 15

VILLANUEVA v. CASTANEDA, JR., 154 SCRA 142 (1987)

Question 16

MANECLANG v. IAC, 144 SCRA 533 (1986)

Question 17

LAUREL vs. GARCIA, 187 SCRA 797

Question 18

CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE CO. v. BERCILLES, 66 SCRA 431

Question 19

VILLARICO v. COURT OF APPEALS, 309 SCRA 193

Question 20

DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. MERALCO, 153 SCRA 686 (1987)

Question 21

LAO CHIT VS. SECURITY BANK 1959

Answer 21

FACTS:

• In 1953, Lao Chit filed a case against Security Bank and the lessor Consolidated Investments demanding payment of rentals for the use of subject fixtures and improvement by the Bank.
• It turns out Dikit entered into a lease contract with the lessor, which stipulated that the improvements shall belong to the lessor upon expiration of the lease contract. Then after, Lao chit was contracted to construct said improvements but was not paid.
• CFI ruled in favor of plaintiff

ISSUE: w/n the improvements belong to Lao Chit.

RULING:

No. It cannot be denied that the improvements introduced by Lao Chit became property of the lessor by virtue of the lease contract. Although Lao Chit was not a party to said contract, this stipulation is binding upon him pursuant to his right to enter the building and make the improvements. insofar as the construction is concerned, Lao Chit was a mere agent or representative of Dikit and, as such was privy to the contract of lease.

The provision: “The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith, shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or planted, upon paying the compensation” does not apply in this case for the following reasons:

First, this provisions refers to one who builds upon a land which he believes to be his property.

Second, this provision is limited to “buildings” constructed on another’s land not to partitions and improvements made in a building.

The improvements in question became property of the owner of the building, not only by operation of law, as accessions to said building, but, also, by specific stipulation in the contract of lease between Dikit and the lessor.

Question 22

F

Answer 22

FACTS:

• On 1972, Francisco DEPRA’s mother, Beatriz Depra,filed an action for Unlawful Detainer against DUMLAO before the MTC
• It turns out that sometime in 1972, when DUMLAO constructed his house, the kitchen had encroached DEPRA’s property
• MTC ruled in favor of Dumlao on the ground that he is a builder in good faith
• DEPRA filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against DUMLAO before the CFI
• CFI ruled in favor of DEPRA

ISSUE: w/n DEPRA still owns the land

RULING:

The case should be remanded.

ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in good faith, shall have the rightto appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building. On the other hand, the owner of the land has the option either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building.

It is the owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

Question 23

BRIONES VS. MACABAGDAL

Answer 23

BRIONES VS. MACABAGDAL 2010

FACTS:

• Respondent-spouses filed an action to recover ownership and possession of land against Petitioners with the RTC of Makati City.
• It turns out Respondent-spouses purchased Lot 2R from Vergon Realty. On the other hand, petitioners are the owners of Lot 2S which is adjacent to Lot 2R.
• Sometime in 1984, petitioners constructed a house on Lot No. 2-R which they thought was Lot No. 2-S.
• Respondent-spouses immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the house and vacate the property.
• Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondent-spouses

w/n respondent spouses can recover ownership of the land

RULING:

The case should be remanded.

Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have built the house in good faith.

When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, Article 448 of the Civil Code governs.

Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful expenses they may have made on the subject property under Articles 546 and 548.

In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, this case must be remanded to the RTC to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448, in relation to Articles 546 and 548, of the Civil Code.

^{Note: Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.}

^{ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.}

^{Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.}

^{ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.}

Answer 24

SARMIENTO VS. AGANA, 1984

FACTS:

• In 1975, SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against the ERNESTO and his wife
• It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter’s mother had told him the couple could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on Lot D (LAND)
• ERNESTO did construct a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00 assuming that the wife’s mother was the owner of the LAND.
• It turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr. who sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO.
• SARMIENTO did not exercise any of the two options under Art 448, and ERNESTO was then allowed by the CFI to deposit the sum of P25,000.00 as the purchase price for the LAND.
• Thenafter, SARMIENTO instituted certiorari proceedings.

w/n the owner of land can refuse the options in Art 448

RULING:

No. If the builder is in good faith, Article 448 governs.

The owner, of the land has the option under Article 448, either to pay for the building or to sell his land. But he cannot refuse both and compel the owner of the building to remove the building.

Answer 25

TECHNOGAS PHILS. V. CA 1997

• In 1970, a land was purchased by plaintiff from Pariz Industries, together with all the buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon
• defendant later filed a complaint against plaintiff in connection with the encroachment by plaintiff’s buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did not prosper; that defendant dug a canal along plaintiff’s wall, a portion of which collapsed and led to the filing by plaintiff of the supplemental complaint
• The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff while the CA ruled in favor of defendant.

ISSUE:

1. w/n plaintiff is a builder in bad faith because it is presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property
2. w/n the Art 448 applies to the buyer of the bulding

RULING:

1. No. The Sc rejected such theory because unless one is versed in the science of surveying, “no one can determine the precise extent or location of his property by merely examining his paper title.

Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith.

2. Yes. The same benefit can be invoked by petitioner who is not the builder but possesses them as buyer for the following reasons:

First, plaintiff was not aware of the encroachment at the time it acquired the property.

Second, plaintiff is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller(builder) in regard to all rights of ownership over the immovable sold, including the right to compel the private respondent to exercise either of the two options provided under Article 448

Answer 26

DEL OCAMPO VS. ABESIA 1988

• An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu.
• Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners
• The house of defendants occupied the portion of the Lot of the plaintiffs.
• CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff ordering the demolition of the house on the ground that The rights of a builder in good faith under Article 448 does not apply to a case where one co-owner has built, planted or sown on the land owned in common.

w/n article 448 does not apply to co-owners

RULING:

Yes. As a general rule art 448 cannot apply to co-ownership as the builder did not build in the land of “another”. the rules of co-ownership applies.

However, when, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition, and builder is in good faith then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply.

Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has been established.

Answer 27

CRUZ vs. SECRETARY OF DENR 2000

FACTS:

• Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 8371 aka Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) on the ground that:
  
  • the provisions amounted to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as they granted ownership over these same to indigenous peoples.
  • that public lands, bodies of water, mineral resources found within ancestral domains were private but community property of the indigenous peoples
  • that by providing for an all encompassing definition of “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, the provisions violated the rights of private landowners.
  • it made customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands.

ISSUE: w/n IPRA is unconstitutional.

RULING:

No. As the votes of the Justices were equally divided, the petition was dismissed.

However In a separate opinion, judge Puno said that the provisions of the IPRA did not contravene the constitution, as ancestral domains and ancestral lands were the private property of indigenous peoples and did not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

Answer 28

Ignao vs. IAC 1991

• Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles private respondents Juan Ignao and Isidro Ignao were co-owners.
• In 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property against respondents before the CFI of Cavite because the area occupied by the two (2) houses built by respondents exceeded the 133.5 square meters previously alloted to them by the trial court in Civil Case No. N-1681.
• CFI ruled that since would be useless and unsuitable for Florencio to exercise the first option under Article 448 since this would render the entire houses of Juan and Isidro worthless, the trial court then applied the ruling in Grana vs. Court of Appeals, where the Supreme Court had advanced a more “workable solution”. Thus, it ordered Florencio to sell to Juan and Isidro those portions of his land respectively occupied by the latter.
• IAC affirmed

ISSUE:

1. w/n Article 448 should apply to a builder in good faith on a property held in common
2. w/n the ruling in Grana vs CA can be applied

RULING:

1. Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-ownership.

But when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the builder is in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply.

2. No. Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that “(t)he owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . .or to oblige the one who built . . . to pay the price of the land . . . .” The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts.

Question 29

Jariol vs CA 2011

Right of Way

1. Jariol vs CA, 117 SCRA 913
2. Dionisio v Ortiz, 204 SCRA 745
3. Costabella Corp. v CA, 198 SCRA 333
4. Encarnacion v. CA, 195 SCRA 74

Answer 29

FACTS:

1. Petitioner and private respondent are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco, Talisay, Batangas.
2. Petitioner owns the dominant estate. Private respondents co-own the servient estate. In other words, the servient estate stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
3. In 1984, petitioner was able to buy a jeep. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath and so he approached the servient estate owners and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2) meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down.
4. Petitioner then instituted an action before the RTC of Batangas to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way.
5. The RTC ruled for respodent on the ground of the existence of another exit to the highway, a dried river bed.
6. The CA affirmed the RTC on the ground that the petitioner can use the dried river bed to get to the highway.

ISSUE: w/n Petitioner is entitled to right of way on the servient estate

RULING:

Yes. While there is a dried river xxx, that access is grossly inadequate.

Generally, the right of way may be demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.

In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.

Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.

Answer 30

whether or not the private respondents have an easement of right of way over Howmart Road

RULING