Civil Law Review 1 Cases

Question 1

Tanada v Tuvera Decision 1985

w/n publication is required for the effectivity of laws even they provides for their own effectivity dates

^{Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.}

Answer 1

FACTS:

1. In the 1980s, Lorenzo Tanada filed a petition for mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera as Executive Secretary to publish the presidential decrees.
2. Tuvera argued that publication is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their effectivity dates.

RULING:

Yes. The date of publication is material for determining its effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication.

Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law and is a requirement of due process.

presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

Note: the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees before publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact.

Question 2

Tanada v Tuvera Resolution 1986

w/n the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette

^{Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.}

Answer 2

FACTS:

1. Lorenzo Tanada filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those that are not; that publication means complete publication. The publication must be made in the Official Gazette.

RULING:

the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the publication requirement.

Publication is indispensable, but the legislature may, in its discretion, provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but “one year after such publication.” The general rule did not apply because it was “otherwise provided. “

All laws ^{_{(<em>including those of local application and private laws</em>)}} shall be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere, as a condition for their effectivity.

However, Letters of Instruction, Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature need not be published.

Publication must be in full, or it is no publication at all.

Question 3

Nagkakaisang v Military Shrine Services 2013

w/n subject lots were not alienable and disposable on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos which reclassified said lots was not included in the publication of the said law

^{Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.}

Answer 3

FACTS:

1. In 1999, Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems praying for the reclassification of the areas they occupied of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land under Proclamation No. 2476;
2. This began when President Marcos excluded and reserved a specific area of Fort Bonifacio for Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the administration of Military Shrine Services.
3. In 1986, he issued Proclamation No. 2476, which also excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village and declared it open for disposition. At the bottom, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:”P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan”
4. Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette without the addendum.

RULING:

Yes. The handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

Publication must be in full or no publication at all. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.

Question 4

Garcillano v. HOR 2008 “Hello Garci Scandal Published”

w/n the The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form is sufficient to satisfy the publication requirement

^{Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.}

Answer 4

FACTS:

1. In 2005, the Hello Garci tapes emerged and were played in the Chambers of the House of Representatives.
2. Comelec Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano filed a Petition for Prohibition, praying that the House Committees be restrained from using these tapes in their committee reports.
3. Without reaching its denouncement, the House debate on the “Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.
4. In 2007, the issue was revived in the Senate by Senator Ping Lacson. In her privilege speech, Senator Santiago recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the AFP and the PNP in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
5. Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, also filed another Petition for Prohibition.
6. Maj filed a motion for intervention. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the AFP who was summoned by the Senate to the scheduled legislative inquiry, alleging violation of his right to due process as he is summoned without being apprised of his rights through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure.
7. The SC dismissed the 1st petition for being moot and academic as the Hello Garci Tapes were already widely publicized but granted the 2nd petition.

RULING:

1. No. The publication of the Rules of Procedure on the website of the Senate or pamphlet form is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling, which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.

R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Question 5

People vs Siton 2009

w/n Article 202 (2)/vagrancy of the RPC in unconstitutional as it is vague or overbroad

^{Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.}

Answer 5

FACTS:

1. In 2003, Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy under Article 202 (2) of the RPC, which provides: “Any person found loitering about public without visible means of support.”
2. Respondents filed separate Motions to Quash because Article 202 is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
3. RTC held that Article 202 (2)/vagrancy of the RPC is unconstitutional because the “void for vagueness” doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Under Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court.
4. This case was elevated to the SC via certiorari.

RULING:

The SC, speaking through J Nachura, recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases.

However, the underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct finds no application here because ignorance of our legal system the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits exceptions.

Note: Unlike in Papachristou, there was probable cause in the arrest of the respondents in this case.

Answer 6

respondent argues that the Circular prohibited new acts not specified in Batas Pambansa Bilang 33, as amended. Respondent insists that since B.P. Blg. 33, as amended is a penal statute, it already criminalizes the specific acts involving petroleum products. Respondent invokes the “void for vagueness” doctrine.

A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void because general terms are used therein. The lawmakers have no positive constitutional or statutory duty to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended.5 Thus, respondent’s reliance on the “void for vagueness” doctrine is misplaced.

Question 7

PNB v Tejano. Jr. 2009

whether E.O. No. 80 has the effect of removing from the jurisdiction of the CSC pending appeal

^{Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.}

Answer 7

FACTS:

1. In 1994, Cayetano A. Tejano, then VP of PNB, was found guilty of misconduct by the PNB Management Hearing Committee.
2. He filed an appeal to the CSC.
3. Pending appeal, the PNB ceased being a GOCC and was converted into a private banking institution under EO 80.
4. PNB argued the case should be dismissed because of the privatization of PNB, which removed it from the jurisdiction of the CSC.
5. The CSC ruled for PNB. The CA ruled for Cayetano because the CSC had not lost jurisdiction despite the supervening privatization of PNB and remanded the case to the CSC.

RULING:

No. The SC, speaking through Justice Peralta, declared that, under Article 4 of the Civil Code, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.

This case does not fall under the exceptions.

Once jurisdiction is acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated.

CSC was able to acquire jurisdiction over the respondent’s appeal merely upon its filing, followed by the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From that point, the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC at once attached.

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction, its jurisdiction is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction in another tribunal.

There is no showing that Sec 80 expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another tribunal in cases already pending before it.

Question 8

Frivaldo v Comelec 1996 (not 1989)

w/n Frivaldo’s repatriation shall be given retroactive effect

^{Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.}

Answer 8

FACTS:

1. On March 23, 1995, Raul R. Lee filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo is disqualified from seeking or holding any public office on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines and that his Certificate of Candidacy is canceled.
2. The Comelec declared that Frivaldo is disqualified from running for Governor of Sorsogon because he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
3. Frivaldo filed a M.R., but such was not acted upon. So his candidacy continued.
4. Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. However, The Comelec proclaimed Lee as the winner. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was declared governor of Sorsogon.
5. On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the annulment of the proclamation of Lee and his proclamation on the ground that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after “his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 had been granted. As such, there was no more legal impediment to his proclamation as governor.
6. The Comelec ruled in favor of Frivaldo.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court, through Justice Panganiban, declared that It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.” But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

Because of the remedial or curative nature of the PD 725 granting him a new right to resume his political status, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application.

Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of governor’s office and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee.

Question 9

Bernabe v Alejo 2002

w/n Adrian’s an action for recognition is governed by Art. 285 of the Civil Code despite the express repeal by the Family Code

^{Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.}

Answer 9

FACTS:

1. In 1994, Carolina Alejo, on behalf of her son Adrian Bernabe, filed a complaint. She prayed that Adrian was declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of the late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe. As such, he should be given his share in the estate, which Ernestina Bernabe is now holding as the sole surviving heir.
2. It turns out Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe fathered a son with Carolina, his 23-year-old secretary.
3. The RTC ruled in favor of Ernestina because, under Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC, the putative father’s death, had barred Adrian’s action. However, the CA ruled in favor of Adrian. Adrian was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code.

RULING:

Yes. The SC, through justice Panganiban, declared that

Substantive law creates, defines, and regulates rights, while remedial law prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion.

Under Art 175 of the FC, an action for recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. Nonetheless, the Family Code provides that rights already vested before its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired.

Article 285 of the Civil Code is substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because that right had already been vested before its enactment.

A vested right is complete, unconditional, immediate, and perfect in itself and not dependent on contingency.

Question 10

w/n FF Cruz has waived its right to ask for joint measurement of completed works when it paid the progress billings

^{Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.}

Answer 10

FACTS:

1. In 2005, HRCC filed with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a Complaint against FFCI praying for the payment of an overdue obligation.
2. It turns out that under their subcontract agreement, the parties agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of DPWH and consultants to arrive at a joint valuation of completed works.
3. HRCC would submit its progress billings. However, FFCI would not pay the total amount stated because it still needs to evaluate it.
4. FFCI argued that HR Construction failed to comply with the condition of joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, FFCI justified it is not paying the amount stated in HRCC’s progress billings
5. both the CIAC and the CA ruled in favor of HRCC

RULING:

Yes. The SC, through Justice Reyes, declared that

A waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right

The joint measurement requirement is a mechanism that grants FFCI the opportunity to contest HRCC’s valuation of completed works before the HRCC submits its progress billings.

Accordingly, any issue which FFCCI may have about HRCC’s valuation should be raised during the said joint measurement, not after HRCC had submitted its progress billings.

Thus, having relinquished its right to ask for joint measurement, FFCCI had waived its right to dispute HRCC’s valuation.

Question 11

Lucero v Passig 2006

Whether or not the petitioners may claim a vested right to the market stalls they were occupying.

Answer 11

FACTS:

1. In 1995, the city government of Pasig filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners in the MTC on the ground that they failed to pay the required ₱10,000 performance bond and their rental fees since January 1994 as required by the municipal ordinance.

RULING:

No. The SC, through Justice Corona, declared that the lease (and occupation) of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances.

The operation of a market stall under a license is always subject to the police power of the city government.

Moreover, a public market is one dedicated to the service of the general public and operated under government control and supervision as a public utility.

Question 12

Guy vs CA 2006

whether the execution of Release and Waiver of Claim is a bar to a claim of successional rights

^{Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.}

^{Requisites of Valid Waiver}

1. The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver.
2. The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express. /intention to abandon the right
3. The right must exist.
4. It must comply with formalities of law.
5. The waiver must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy order (or public safety) or good customs
6. The waiver must not prejudice others with a right recog-nized by law.
7. The person waiving must be capacitated to make the waiver.
8. The waiver must be made clearly, but not necessarily express. /intention to abandon the right
9. The right must exist.
10. It must comply with formalities of law.
11. The waiver must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy order (or public safety) or good customs
12. The waiver must not prejudice others with a right recog-nized by law.

Answer 12

FACTS:

1. Respondent-minors, represented by their mother Remedios, filed a petition for letters of administration on the ground that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Rufino Guy
2. As a legitimate child, Petitioner Michael Guy prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that respondents’ claim had been waived by reason of Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner.

RULING:

No. the invocation of waiver must fail on the following grounds:

First, The Release and Waiver of Claim was not couched in clear terms xx

Second, such a waiver is ineffective without judicial approval. Under ART. 1044, Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.

Third, a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In the present case, Respondent-minors are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.

Question 13

SJS v Atienza 2008 (RESOLUTION)

w/n Ordinance No. 8119 Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027

Answer 13

1. In 2002, petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS) et al. filed a petition for mandamus against Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to compel him to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
2. It turns out that in 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027, reclassified the area from industrial to commercial, and directed the owners and operators of businesses to cease and desist from operating their businesses. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex, Petron, and Shell.
3. However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a contract with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”
4. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for six months starting July 25, 2002.

RULING:

No. Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027

There are two kinds of implied repeal. First, where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are contradictory, the latter act constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one to the extent of the conflict. Second, if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

The fact that a later enactment relates to the same subject matter as an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied repeal since the new law may merely be a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is legislative intent to repeal.

Moreover, a general law does not repeal a special law on the same subject absent legislative intent.

Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals with the Pandacan oil depot area. In contrast, Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.

The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be considered a legislative intent to repeal all prior laws since the official record of the discussions in the Sanggunian indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.

Question 14

Advocates vs Banko Sentral 2013

1 whether CB Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings repealed The Usury Law as regards usurious interest rates;

2 Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular No. 905.

^{Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.}

^{When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.}

^{Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)}

Answer 14

FACTS:

1. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (C.B.) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations within limits prescribed by the Usury Law.
2. P.D. No. 1684 amended The Usury Law ^{(<strong>Act 2655</strong>)}, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum interest rates for loans.
3. The CB-MB issued C.B. Circular No. 905, which removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans.
4. R.A. No. 7653 was enacted, establishing the BSP to replace the C.B. The repealing clause reads: Republic Act No. 265, as amended, or parts which may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

RULING:

1. No. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued C.B. Circular No. 905.

A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.

By lifting the interest ceiling, C.B. Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’ freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest under Article 1306 of the Civil Code.

2. Yes. R.A. No. 7653, merely supplemented the broader Usury Law.

Repeals by implication are not favored because it is presumed that the legislature has full knowledge of other existing laws in the passage of laws.

In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be deemed an implied repeal unless there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between the old law and the new law.

Here, there is no such conflict.

Question 15

Koalisyon vs Executive Secretary 2012

1. w/n EO 312 can validly transfer the power to allocate, use, and disburse coco-levy funds ^{<em>(which was vested to the PCA under PD232) </em>}to Coconut Trust Fund Commitee
2. w/n the separability clause will repeal the prior law

^{Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.}

Answer 15

FACTS:

1. In 2000, then-President Joseph Estrada issued EO 312, establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program, which sought immediate income supplement to coconut farmers. The Executive Order sought to establish a ₱1-billion fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of entities supported by those funds. A committee was created to manage the fund under this program.
2. President Estrada issued E.O. 313, which created an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust Fund). This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers. The shares of stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Fund’s initial capital. These shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of the outstanding capital stock of SMC. E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through its Trust Department, as the Trust Fund’s trustee bank. The Trust Fund Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the Trust Fund. The Committee would designate an external auditor to do an annual audit or as often as needed, but it may also request the Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.
3. To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 excluded the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil Case 0033, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., which was pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift the sequestration over those shares.
4. Petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present action to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. No. An executive order cannot repeal a presidential decree which has the same standing as a statute enacted by Congress.
2. The general rule is that where part of a statute is unconstitutional and another part is valid, the valid portion may be given effect if it can be separated from the invalid. However, when the parts of a statute are dependent and connected to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will invalidate the rest.

Since E.O.s 312 and 313 invalidly transferred powers over the funds to the two newly-created committees, the rest of their provisions became unconstitutional because President Estrada would not have created the new funding programs if they were to be managed by some other entity.

Question 16

Chavez vs NHA2007

Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the executed Agreements as to bar a writ of prohibition

Answer 16

FACTS:

1. petitioner, as taxpayer filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus to declare NULL AND VOID the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) between the National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc. and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project

RULING:

Yes. The “operative fact” doctrine provides that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.

RA 6957 was the prevailing law when the joint venture agreement was signed and allowed repayment to the private contractor of reclaimed lands.

The existence of such law and issuances is an “operative fact” to which legal consequences have attached.

The “operative fact” doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant of the writ of prohibition.

Answer 17

To justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, the case must be free from doubt, and the conflict with the constitution must be irreconcilable, because it is but a decent respect to the wisdom of the legislative body by which any law is passed to presume in favor of its validity until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

To doubt the constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of its validity.

Question 18

Kho vs CA 2002

Answer 18

It is well-settled that non-observance of the period for deciding cases or their incidents does not render such judgments ineffective or void.

Question 19

w/n the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received copy of the decision

Answer 19

1. .A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court. On 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal.
2. However, CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period.
3. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with the CA on the ground that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed. The petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received a copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 p.m. of 24 June 1977.

RULING

No. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code is similar but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that “Unless otherwise provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded.”

Question 20

Garvida vs. Sales 1997

Answer 20

1. private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy.
2. On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent’s votes of 76. 10 In accordance with the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.

RULING:

There is a distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election.

The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.

It means 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than 21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old,”

The day she registered as voter, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months, and 5 days old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials under the LGC.

Question 21

w/n brother Teoco can excercised the right of redemption

Answer 21

RULING:

Yes. A special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is generally not admissible in evidence as a public document in our courts ^{unless proved under Rule 132}.

As such, the assignment of the right of redemption is not admissible in evidence as a public document. However, this does not mean that such document has no probative value.

While it is true that the Civil Code requires certain transactions to appear in public documents, however, the necessity of a public document for contracts that transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property is only for convenience and is not essential for its validity. The only effect of noncompliance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code is that a party may be compelled to execute a public document.

Article 1625 requires presentation in a public document if it adversely affects 3rd persons.

Here, Metrobank would not be prejudiced by the assignment by the spouses Co of their right of redemption in favor of the brothers Teoco. As conceded by Metrobank, the assignees, the brothers Teoco, would merely step into the shoes of the assignors, the spouses Co.

^{Note: There are 3 reasons for the necessity of the presentation of public documents. First, public documents are prima facie evidence of the facts stated in them. Second, it dispenses with the need to prove a document’s due execution and authenticity. Third, the law may require that certain transactions appear in a public instrument.}

Question 22

BPI vs CA 1998

Damnum absque injuria

Answer 22

FACTS:

1. private respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner before the Regional Trial
2. Plaintiff, who is a lawyer by profession, was issued a Credit Card.
3. the defendant was demanding immediate payment of his outstanding account
4. Plaintiff issued a post-dated check received on November 23, 1989, by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the defendant, who in turn gave the said check to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee who handles the plaintiff’s account. The check remained in the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr Roberto Maniquiz, head of the collection department of the defendant, was formally informed of the post-dated check about a week later.
5. On November 28, 2989, the defendant served the plaintiff a letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion of his account number in their Caution List.

RULING:

For there to be an abuse of right under Article 19, the following elements must be present (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 10

The action of the petitioner belies the existence of bad faith.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm that results from the injury; damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.

Damnum absque Injuria is when the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages to an act that does not amount to a legal injury.

The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of duty, the imposition of liability for that breach, and the violation of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.

As the respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience, we find the award of damages is unjustified.

Question 23

Pantaleon vs. American Express International 2009

whether respondent, in connection with the aforementioned transactions, had committed a breach of its obligations to Pantaleon. In addition, Pantaleon submits that even assuming that respondent had not been in breach of its obligations, it still remained liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

Answer 23

1. The petitioner, a lawyer Polo Pantaleon and family, joined an escorted tour of Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October of 1991.
2. The following day, the last day of the tour, the group arrived at the Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam around 10 minutes before 9:00 a.m. Mrs Pantaleon also selected for purchase a pendant and a chain,3 all of which totalled the U.S. $13,826.00.
3. To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his American Express credit card.
4. Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon that his AmexCard had not yet been approved.
5. Coster decided to release the items even without the respondent’s approval of the purchase. The spouses Pantaleon returned to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of apology were met by their tourmates with stony silence.
6. Since the respondent refused to accede to Pantaleon’s demand for an apology, the aggrieved cardholder instituted an action for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
7. RTC rendered a decision13 in favour of Pantaleon, awarding him ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱300,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱100,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and ₱85,233.01 as expenses of litigation.
8. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision16 reversing the award of damages in favour of Pantaleon, holding that respondent had not breached its obligations to the petitioner.

RULING:

Petitioner is entitled to damages because the delay led to the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative.

The unusual attending circumstances gave rise to the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by the petitioner.

Question 24

Manaloto vs. Veloso III 2010

Art 19

Art 26

Answer 24

1. The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation, a protected right.

Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even though they are opposing parties.

Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent’s “dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind” under Article 26 of the Civil Code.

2. Under Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.

While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent.

Question 25

Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. vs. Clemente 2009

w/n a corporation is covered by Article 19,20 and 21

Answer 25

Yes. These provisions enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards one another.

A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends even to its shareholders or members.

The award of actual damages is of course warranted since Clemente has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagan’s wrongful violation of its own By-Laws.

Question 26

Equitable Banking vs. Calderon 2004

Answer 26

Enunciated BPI vs CA

In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.

Credit Card Agreement which is contract of Adhesion is “as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely

moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claim for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.

Question 27

Insular Investment n vs. Capital One 2012

Legal Interest

Answer 27

RULING:

Under Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, the rate of legal interest is 6% per annum. The interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicial. Also, When the judgment becomes final, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum. .

Because the obligation arose from a contract of sale and purchase of government securities, and not from a loan or forbearance of money, the applicable interest rate is 6% from June 10, 1994, when IITC received the demand letter from COEC.60 After the judgment becomes final and executory, the legal interest rate increases to 12% until the obligation is satisfied.

Question 28

Mitsubishi Motors Union vs. Mitsubishi Motors 2013

w/n the union can have double recovery under the collateral source rule

Answer 28

No. Under the collateral source rule, if an injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, it should not be deducted from the damages he would receive from the tortfeasor.

The rule does not apply to cases involving no-fault insurances in which the insured is indemnified for losses by insurance companies, regardless of who was at fault.

Here, it is clear that MMPC is a no-fault insurer.

Hence, it cannot be obliged to pay the hospitalization expenses of the dependents of its employees, which had already been paid by separate health insurance providers of said dependents.

To allow reimbursement of amounts paid under other insurance policies shall constitute double recovery which is not sanctioned by law.

^{Note: To constitute unjust enrichment, a party must be unjustly enriched in an unlawful manner.}

^{The CBA has lawfully provided for MMPC’s limited liability.}

Question 32

Filcar vs Espinas 2012

Question 35

Cancio vs. Isip 2002

1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases;

and 2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.

Answer 35

FACTS:

1. Petitioner filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three claims of Estafa against respondent for allegedly issuing checks without sufficient funds.
2. After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the estafa cases but reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases.
3. Petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money.
4. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the doctrine of res judicata bars petitioners action.
5. The trial court ruled for the respondent.
6. No. Under the present Rules, independent civil actions may be filed separately even without reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action.

Here, the cause of action is based on culpa contractual under Article 31, an independent civil action.

^{Note: An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities}

^{(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC (within criminal case)}

^{(2) independent civil liabilities}

^{(a) not arising from felony(Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code)}

^{(b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33, Civil Code].}

^{Under Article 2177, the offended party “cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission” or under both causes.}

^{Under the Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.}

2. One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.

Here, what is filed is an action based on culpa contractual that is separate and distinct from the criminal action based on culpa criminal.

Question 36

Heirs of Simon vs. Chan 2011

w/n an independent civil action can be filed.

Answer 36

No reservation for civil action

Question 39

Yuchengco vs manila chronicle 2009

whether or not moral damages can still be awarded although plaintiff premised their cause of action in Article 19 and 20

Answer 39

FACTS:

1. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents RTC of Makati City, under separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication against Neal H. Cruz and all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle(2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto

RULING:

Yes. Although the petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violation is one of the grounds for the recovery of moral damages under Article 2219.

^{Note: While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.}

kulang

Question 41

Pagasa Steel vs CA 2006

Answer 41

To ripen into a company practice, the employer should give the wage increase as an act of liberality, not because of legal or contractual obligation.

The company continuously granted a wage increase because the Wage Order or CBA mandated it. Therefore, the same would not automatically ripen into a company practice.

Question 42

Bayan vs Zamora 2000

Answer 43

The pending civil action did not pose a prejudicial question on the criminal action.

The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

There is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can proceed independently of each other.

In this case, the issue in the criminal cases for violation of BP 22 is whether the accused knowingly issued worthless checks.

In contrast, the issue in the civil action for specific performance, overpayment, and damages is whether complainant Sabandal overpaid his obligations to Philippines Today, Inc.

If, after trial in the civil case, petitioner is shown to have overpaid respondent, it does not follow that he cannot be held liable for the bouncing checks he issued, for the mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is itself an offense.

Also, Petitioner’s claim of overpayment to respondent may be raised as a defense during the trial of the cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 charged against him. The civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action.

Question 44

1200600

Answer 44

There is no prejudicial question.

The issue in the Pasig civil case for Injunctive Relief is whether respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother..

Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother, he is still liable for Estafa. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.

Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.

Question 45

Gaditano vs san miguel corporation 2013

Question 46

Dawson vs Register of Deeds 1998

Question 47

Continental steel 2009

182836 Oct 13, 2009

Question 48

Tecson vs Fernando Poe 2004

ISSUE: Whether or not Poe was a Filipino citizen

Answer 48

FACTS:

1. Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners.
2. COMELEC dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen.
3. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the COMELEC, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Question 49

Mercado vs Comelec 1999

ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the Philippines.

Answer 49

FACTS:

1. Mercado and Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
2. Manzano won. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Mercado on the ground that Manzano was a citizen of the United States. It appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.
3. COMELEC ruled that Respondent have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

RULING:

No. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.

Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; , effectively repudiated his American citizenship.

On the other hand, private respondent’s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

Question 50

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters.

Answer 50

FACTS: Petitioners are dual citizens by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225 - Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, allowing one to retain or re-acquire Phil. Citizenship who want to exercise their right to suffrage under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). The COMELEC denies on the ground that they fail to meet the qualification of 1-year residency required by the Constitution.

RULING:

Yes. With the passage of R.A. 9225, “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:

“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;

“Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;

^{Note: it also extends voting to derivative citizens.}

^{SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.}

Question 51

AAJS vs Datumanong 2007

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct.

Answer 51

FACTS:

1. Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop the respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225on the ground that it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

HELD:

No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance.

In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.

Congress was given the mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Mercado Case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.

Question 52

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC is correct.

Answer 52

FACTS: Petitioner Lopez, a dual citizen, was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City. He was eventually declared the winner. Respondent Villanueva filed a petition praying for the disqualification of Lopez because he was ineligible from running for any public office. Lopez argued that he is a Filipino-American, by virtue of the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. He said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. COMELEC issued the Resolution granting the petition for disqualification of Lopez from running as Barangay Chairman. COMELEC said, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, Lopez should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.

HELD: Yes.

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.

RA 9225 explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.”

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement.

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough to allow him to run for a public office.

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.

Question 53

Bengson v. HRET 2001

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Answer 53

FACTS:

1. The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
2. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
3. He was naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
4. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630
5. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
6. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
7. HRET ruled for Cruz

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING:

Yes. the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Under the Constitution, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens.

As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding, he is therefore a natural-born Filipino.

Question 54

whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- born Filipino citizen.

Answer 54

FACTS:

1. In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to day before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.
2. Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro,Iloilo and was legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SONORA POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974.
3. Grace Poe then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
4. On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his father’s deteriorating medical condition.
5. She finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
6. On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225.
7. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine Passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as appointes Chairperson of the MTRCB , she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using her American passport.
8. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a natural born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING.
9. The Comelec en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
10. No. Under Rule 25, Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

The Court ruled that The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

2. the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Question 55

Rommel Jalosjos v Comelec 2012

ISSUE: Whether or not the Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay

Answer 55

FACTS:

1. Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.
2. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship.
3. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
4. He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil.
5. A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name in the voter’s list was then filed by Erasmo, however it was denied by both MCTC and RTC. When Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province, Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.
6. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

Yes.

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

First, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good.

Second, a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.

Question 56

Imelda Marcos vs Butch 1995

Question 57

.

whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar stating that no Marriage License was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

Answer 57

FACTS:

1. Jaime O. Sevilla filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmelita N. Cardenas for their marriage on the ground of vitiated consent and that there was no marriage license.
2. The Civil registry could not located the marriage licensed.
3. The RTC ruled for nullity while the CA reversed.

RULING.

No. The absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License. It can also mean that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.

1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed.

Question 58

ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”

Answer 58

1. Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Danilo Bolos under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
2. Judgment was rendered by the RTC declaring the marriage as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
3. Danilo then filed with the CA a petition seeking to annul the orders of the RTC. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
4. The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicable in this case since the marriage of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.

RULING:

No. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis.

This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.

Question 59

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

Answer 59

FACTS:

1. On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
2. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.
3. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.
4. RTC and CA dismissed the petition.

HELD:

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.

Yes. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.

An exception is those marriages commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply here.

Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as determination of heirship, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage colleratally.

However, the person bringing the suit must still be a real party in interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. If this is true, he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano.

However, Leonila, Cresenciano’s surviving wife was not impleaded.

not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for their validity; thus it is important to determine whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.

Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her.

Question 60

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by Castro establishing nonissuance of marriage license sufficient enough to grant a decree of nullity of marriage.

Answer 60

FACTS:

1. Angelina M Castro and Edwin Cardenas had a civil wedding without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Hence, no parental advice was secured from the latter’s parents since it was a ‘secret marriage‘. But Cardenas was able to procure the requirements including the marriage license.
2. They did not live together immediately after the marriage but later on cohabited for four months and bore a child.
3. They parted and the child was adopted by Castro’s brother with the consent of Cardenas.
4. Castro filed a petition for judicial decree of nullity of marriage on the ground that no Marriage License was ever issued.

HELD:

Yes. The Civil Code provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.

However, the certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue a marriage license.

Question 61

ISSUE: Whether or not the Judge erred in solemnizing the marriage outside his jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license.

Answer 61

FACTS:

1. Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan, Camarines Sur, solemnized the marriage of Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
2. When Orobia died, RTC did not recognize the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast properties” of Orobia because the marriage was a null.

HELD:

Yes. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.

it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.

Question 62

whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple.

Answer 62

FACTS:

1. Syed Azhar Abbas filed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license.
2. Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan.
3. When they arrived in the Philippines, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
4. In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967 was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.

HELD:

No.

allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.”46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.

Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi

Answer 63

1. In 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
2. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry.
3. Luisa Delgado, sister of Josefa, filed a Petition on Letters of Administration of the estate of deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia. Such letter was opposed by Marciana Rustia, a sister of Guillermo, claiming that they should be the beneficiaries of the estate.
4. The trial court then allowed Guillerma Rustia, a legitimate child of Guillermo, to intervene in the case as she claimed that she possessed the status of an acknowledged legitimate natural child. Later, Luisa Delgado said that the spouses were living together without marriage. Luisa Delgado died and was substituted dela Rosa, petitioner in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Josefa and Guillermo contract marriage.

HELD: Yes, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.

Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony.

Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married.

Question 64

velasquez vs lacsamana 2015

Answer 64

FACTS:

1. Luis Uy filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca, and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza. In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy alleged that he and his wife acquired a residential land evidenced by a Deed of Sale from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers’ OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of “Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy.”
2. Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid marriage between Uy and Rosca.

HELD:

No, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place.

Question 65

Juliano-llave vs Republic 2011 2011

Answer 65

FACTS:

1. Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and, subsequently under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge.
2. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.
3. Private respondents, in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

Question 66

Catalan vs Catalan 2012

Answer 66

1. In 2005, the petitioner filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando.
2. Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with the petitioner.
3. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition.
4. The petitions were consolidated.
5. Both RTC and CA ruled for Louella

RULING:

Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality.

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven. Under Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.

Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish divorce.

Answer 67

FACTS:

1. Crasus married Fely and begot five children. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.”
2. Fely left the Philippines for the USA, leaving all of their five children to the care of respondent Crasus.
3. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child.
4. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA.
5. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage.
6. On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.

Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.

HELD:

No. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.

By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.

Answer 68

1. Herald Dacasin is an American, and Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin is a Filipino, were married. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995.
2. Sharon sought and obtained from Illinois court a divorce decree against Herald. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
3. Herald and Sharon executed in Manila an Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement.
4. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order “relinquishing” jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
5. Herald sued Sharon in the RTC to enforce the Agreement. Herald alleged that in violation of the Agreement, Sharon exercised sole custody over Stephanie.

ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

HELD:

No. The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.

However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody.

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction over the divorce.

Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody.

Question 69

Va

Answer 69

FACTS:

1. Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States.
2. They were married in Hongkong and established their residence in the Philippines.
3. They begot two children but the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States
4. the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
5. Private respondent filed a suit against petitioner, asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Yes, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces being contrary to public policy.

However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.

In this case, Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.

He would have no standing to sue in the case as he is estopped by his own divorce from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Question 70

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera 1989

Answer 70

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national at Federal Republic of Germany.
2. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
3. Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart.
4. On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila.
5. The decree of divorce was promulgated on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
6. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery alleging that while still married to Imelda, the latter had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife.

HELD:

No, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.

The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Answer 71

1. Manalo, a Filipino citizen, filed a case for divorce in Japan against her husband, a Japanese national. After due proceeding, a divorce decree was rendered by the Japanese court.
2. Thereafter, Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

ISSUE: Whether a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad.

HELD:

Yes. marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Question 74

suntay v suntay 2012

Answer 74

FACTS:

1. Petitioner, Federico, is opposing respondent’s Isabel, his granddaughter, for her petition for Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina, Federico’s wife, who died without leaving a will.
2. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
3. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by as “null and void.”
4. Federico anchors his opposition on the fact, that his son, Emilio had his marriage judicially declared null and void alleging that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabel’s parents was void.

HELD:

No.

Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.”

Question 75

Bangayan vs Bangayan Jr 2013

Answer 75

certification of non-issuance of marriage license enjoys probative value aka presumption of regularity

FACTS:

1. Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship. However, Sally’s father was against the relationship so Sally brought Benjamin to an office where they signed a purported marriage contract.
2. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
3. When Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
4. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license.

HELD:

Yes. We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.”

In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.

The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio.

Question 76

santos vs CA 1995

first case of psychological incapcity

Answer 76

“psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

Question 77

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA, Gina Lao Tsoi

Answer 77

one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Question 78

Republic vs Molina 1997

nagstricto

Question 79

relaxed

Question 82

latest on PI

Answer 83

FACTS:

1. In 1997, Marlyn and Akira, a Japanese national) got married, in Japan.
2. The document was registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division.
3. The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito.
4. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines.
5. Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines by filing a Petition for registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code.
6. Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by publication.

ISSUE: Whether, under the same provision [Art. 26], a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

HELD: Yes. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse, one of the consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after the divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.