Pre-War Nationalism

Question 1

Main types of nationalist movements

Answer 1

Ethnic religious

Question 2

Radicalised nationalist responses to direct rule

Answer 2

B: early politicisation of Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), split and form General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (radical, anti col front)

vs

M: indirect, Sultans kept, placid apolitical movements. Kaum Muda remained cultural religious, ethnically defined even till 1926 (vs GCBA/PKI), self improvement, promote educational & socioeconomic welfare of Malays

Question 3

Radicalised nationalist response to suppression

Answer 3

V: Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) (1927) radical assasination of French officials wrt limited pol reforms, inspired later movements (ICP 1930, continued underground after suppression)

I: suppression of SI after radicalisation (1919), PKI after uprisings (1927), PNI (1929) (arrested Sukarno), continued underground, PNI/PKI emerged after WW2

Question 4

Strengthening nationalism: colonial responsibility

Answer 4

Alienating political & economic policies provided fodder for continued momentum to agitate for pol concessions

Suppression highlighted injustice of col rule

Western education bred new generation of leaders more capable of mobilising masses toward a clear pol vision

Question 5

• Political agitation of masses

Answer 5

V: Continued harsh French control (limited reforms) after Phan Boi Chau/Phan Chu Trinh –> disappointment, rise of radical VNQDD (1920) & ICP (1930)

I: Continued Dutch control (crackdown, exile of radicals) after ISDV –> Rise of PKI & PNI (1920s)

B: British unwillingness to give independence (Burma not included in 1919 Government of India Act bc not ready, seen as poor excuse) led to continued pongyi agitation & rise of thakins in 1920s, University of Rangoon strike (1920)

Question 6

• Economic agitation of masses

Answer 6

V: Great Depression (1930), widespread rural uprising, temporary collapse of col authority –> ICP promised land redistribution

B: Great Depression (1930), rice prices less than half (1928-31), economic inequality between farmers and landowners, anti-Indian riots –> Saya San Rebellion (1932) (anti-col, ethnic-religious)

P: US + Filipino pol elite cronyism, econ inequality –> anti-Partido Nacionalista Sakdal Movement (1930s), National Society of Peasants (1930s)

Question 7

• Colonial suppression

Answer 7

V: Suppression of Phan Boi Chau in 1910s (failed to prevent rise of radical, popular Ho Chih Minh’s ICP in 1930)

B: Suppression of pongyis from 1900 (failed to prevent popularity of Aung San’s Dobama Asiayone)

I: Suppression of PKI in 1926 (failed to prevent mass support of Sukarno’s PNI)

Question 8

• Western education boosting nationalism

Answer 8

V: Ho Chih Minh travelled widely, strongly influenced by French pol ideals –> led ICP, highly organised under socialist ideals

B: Aung San + thakins under British education, exposed to Western ideals of democracy/bureaucracy –> led well-organised Dobama Asiayone

I: Sukarno & Hatta received Western education –> General Study Club of Bandung as common meeting ground for graduated students + Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) (student society) to discuss pol issues & spread pol ideas

Question 9

Strengthening nationalism: nationalists’ responsibility

Answer 9

Strong nationalist leadership capable of integrating and modifying Western ideologies with native concerns, hence able to mobilise and organise large groups toward pol cause (vs sporadic, reactive outbreaks)

Question 10

• Strong nationalist leadership

Answer 10

V: Ho able to adapt communist ideology to rural Vietnamese context, organised masses into soviets + addressed land concerns and uniting them under nationalist banner (vs Marxist working class focus)

B: Aung San addressed native needs (perceived anti-Burmese educational policy, high standards set for exams, 40% first year graduates failed) + nationhood aspirations (unite under common Burmese anthem & slogan) –> attract support of pongyis

Question 11

B: Dobama Asiayone (1935) slogan

Answer 11

“Burma is our country; Burmese literature is our literature; Burmese language is our language. Love our country, raise the standards of our literature, respect our language.”

Question 12

Strengthening nationalism: external ideology

Answer 12

(esp Communism) provide structure & order within nationalist parties, making them less easy to suppress/more formidable threats to the authority of col powers (at least in 1920s)

Question 13

• Ideological shaping of nationalism

Answer 13

V: ICP popular + able to mobilise masses, communist appeal sustained throughout through formation of Vietminh (1941) and post JO

I: PKI as the main threat to Dutch power in 1920s after ISDV was suppressed

Question 14

Weakening nationalism: colonial responsibility

Answer 14

Suppression removed influential leaders, deprived opportunity to gain further support & strength, weakening existing structures –> nationalists ceased to pose serious threats to col rule (esp 1930s despite strong leadership)

Col benevolence/concessions bred moderate collaborators, stirring up nationalist disunity with radicals, effectively weakening collective nationalism

Question 15

• Col suppression removal of nationalist leaders

Answer 15

V: French military campaigns (1931) on soviet insurrections forced Ho to flee –> rural soviets destroyed, ICP disintegrated

B: British raid on Thakin headquarters (1939) due to strikes protesting econ grievances –> Aung San fled in 1940, U Saw jailed/exiled Thakins

I: Sukarno’s exile (1929) –> only moderate groups/groups that did not pose serious threats remained

Question 16

• Col benevolence breeding collaborators

Answer 16

B: British constitutional concessions (allowing moderate General Council of Burmese Assoc (GCBA) members to assume pol positions) divided nationalist aims w/ anti-col radicals for fear of losing political gains

M: British-given special privileges to moderate Malay collaborators discouraged moderates from lending the radical KMM support –> Malay nationalism remained passive

P: US concessions encouraged collaboration of Partido Nationalist & Partido Federalista, creating self-serving politicians amidst radical peasant movements (Sakdal Movement)

Question 17

Weakening nationalism: nationalists’ responsibility

Answer 17

Lack of strong leadership + intra party divisions caused failure to unite nationalists to common aims & means –> failure to create united front

(deeper underlying problem): Geographical (rural vs urban) & ethnic divisions that made unified movements difficult to achieve –> fractiousness of nationalist movements

Elitist nature of movements drew focus to sectarian interests that failed to appeal to masses vs anti-col stance that addressed immediate anti-col grievances

Lack of an educated people alienated them from the philosophies of many movements, limiting accessibility of movements to masses –> lack of mass support

Question 18

• Lack of strong leadership causing disunity

Answer 18

B: GCBA branched out into Golden Valley faction, 21 Party & wunthanu athins, all had different aims about country’s independence. Wunthanu athins limited voter turnout to 7% –> disunity hindered indep efforts

V: Phan Boi Chau (anti-col radical, educated anti-col elements like the Renovation Society) VS Phan Chu Trinh (pro-monarchy moderate who believed in merging elements of French/Viet monarchies through negotiation)

M: Straits Chinese British Association wanted to protect Chinese business interests, while KMS fought for educational & econ opp for Malays

Question 19

• Geographical divisions hindered united front

Answer 19

B: radical pongyis lacked support of collaborationist Western-ed elites (1925 split inevitable), elites viewed as self-serving bureaucrats by the masses

I: Sukarno’s PNI focused on uniting mainland Javanese, lack of mode of transcendent communication caused failure to extend outreach to Outer Islands & Aceh

Question 20

• Ethnic divisions hindered united front

Answer 20

B: Dobama Asiayone predominantly Burman (neglected ethnic minorities (Karens, Shans, etc))

M: Malay elite collaborationists had self-preserving goals for racial community, vs Chinese & Indians

Question 21

• Intra party (similar faction) disunity

Answer 21

I: Serekat Islam (SI) and the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) failed to agree on religious & political direction of the party. PKI could not reconcile Madiun Uprising (1926) details –> uprising failed

V: ICP faced rivalry from Trotskyites (south) because of different views on liquidation of French Empire

Question 22

• Nationalists’ focus on sectarian interests

Answer 22

M: SCBA represented interests of business minority (Straits Chinese) vs Tung Meng Hui’s “pan-Chinese” focus was able to gain the support of both immigrant & straits Chinese

V: Phan Boi Chau vetoed interests of educated minority, Phan Chu Trinh represented believers of French benevolence

Question 23

• Masses’ inability to grasp nationalist philosophies

Answer 23

B: masses unable to understand constitutional process, democracy & significance of elections, thus easily influenced by wuthanu athins –> voter turnout restricted to 7% (1922)

Communist ideology not understood by masses –> unable to attract support (PKI, ISDV, ICP) (only when Ho united peasants under nationalistic banner and addressed their basic needs during Great Depression were they receptive to ICP)

Question 24

• Colonists as political agitators

Answer 24

V: Can Vuong Movement (“Loyalty to the King”) (1885) – revolt against French decentralisation of the monarchy

B: pongyis & Footwear Controversy (1916) – notion that colonists disrespect Burmese customs

Question 25

Reasons for difference in strength of nationalism

Answer 25

(STRENGTH AS DURABILITY)
Nature of col rule: colonists less willing to grant genuine concessions + more oppressive = stronger dissatisfaction + willpower of movements & masses (I/V vs P/M)

Quality of leadership: capability in using Western ideologies + addressing masses’ concerns = broad based support + maintain organisational discipline & unity = survive oppression (Sukarno vs Budi Utomo, Ho vs VNQDD)

(STRENGTH AS GETTING POL CONC)
Col response to nat: progressive col = empowered nat, repressive col = weakened nat (P/B: Govt of Burma Act 1937 vs I/V)

Question 26

Nat/Col patterns!

Answer 26

Colonial responses created nationalist weaknesses, while nationalist weaknesses made col response more effective (PNI suppression created fragmentation, US concessions bred disunity; disunity within ICP/PKI made them easily suppressed)

Nat/inherent factors explain factiousness of movements within a country, while col factors explain factiousness across countries (elite/mass divide vs P/B diff col policies)

Nat leadership strength ≠ nat success (strongest leaders V/I faced most oppression, vv)

Question 27

Evaluation of importance

Answer 27

Nat disunity > suppression (intangible) (easier suppression, disunity even without suppression) (M/P/B)

Suppression > nat disunity (tangible) (disunity overcome but col powers refused to grant concessions) (V/I/B)

Question 28

Time period patterns

Answer 28

Earlier dvpt: forming common platform as the biggest challenge (even w/o col suppression)

Late 1920s: nationhood awakening, politicisation of movements –> suppression the most relevant problem

Question 29

Effectiveness of col techniques

Answer 29

Neither is superior

Blanket suppression = radical backlash
No col power only granted concessions

Carrot-and-stick not relevant to all countries: concessions not viable to radicals demanding immediate independence; concessions not applicable to French/Dutch which regarded V/I as empirical territories