Pre-Contractual Liability Flashcards

Question

Benedetti v Sawiris (2014)

Answer 1

Where market value of C's servces is different to their value to D, what is extent of D's enrichment? To protect D's freedom, he can show he would have paid less or even nothing for those services. C cannot show that D would have paid more however But note, if there is no wiider market for the services, and C and D agreed a [price fo rthose serices, that price may determine the extent of D's enrichment as it provides the only evidence of the obkective value of the services

Answer 2

If D promises to grant lease to C, then C, if reasonably relying on that promise by undertaking preparatory work, may have a claim in proprietary estoppel

Answer 3

Lord Walker "scholarly consensus" that PE is based on 3 main elements a representation/assurance made to C Reliance by C Detriment to C in consequence of reliance

Answer 4

Sometimes promises were made without intention to create legal obligation (necessary to create binding obligations) Several reasons why law might be reluctant to assume there was intention In this case, the promises was subject to unspoken and ill-defined qualifications. When D first made promise to say, dodnt know what might happen, may become inappropriate for C to get farm, but con must be performed come what may. Hence, C, has always accpeted what the promise could not have been intended to be a contract But none of this reasoning applies to equitable estoppel, because it does not loo frwoard and guess what might happen, looks backwards from momnet the prmise falls to be performed adn asks whether it would be unconscionable for promsie to not be kept

Answer 5

To establish PE, assurance must be clear enough. What = enough, depends on context Hoff in Walton put it well: "The promise must be unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously. Taken in its context, it must have been a promise which one might reasonably expect to be relied upon by the person to whom it was made.”

Answer 6

Estoppel bars the object of it from asserting some facts or some mixture of fact and law that stands in way of some right claimed by person entitled to benefit of estoppel The E becomes PE if the right is proprietary, usually over land, but in principle available to chattels or CIAs too But see Thorner v Major, successful PE claim based on D's promise that C will acquir right

Answer 7

Domestic/commercial distinction? Analysis of law in Cobbe was against very different facts Relationship was commercial, and C was experienced businessman Circumstances = parties could well have been expected to enter contract, but chose not to Here, relationship = familal and personal, and neither had commercial experience, or had even contemplated entering formal contract re farm

Answer 8

Newey J | “the Courts must beware of accepting proprietary estoppel claims too readily in commercial contexts.”;

Answer 9

Arden LJ For law in general to provide scope for claim re unsuccessful negotiations that do not result in enforceable contracts would liklely inhibit the efficient pursuit of commercial engotiation, which is part of proper entrepeneurial activity So really the same quote as before, jsut remember it in this context too lol

Answer 10

Wilson LJ Rejects D's suggesion that PE can only arise where C believes D made legally binding promise Equity intervenes to make promise unable to be revoked, not at time made but significantly later, namely in event that promisee acted to his detriment in relance and promisor sought unconscionably to withdraw from promise Equity does not require promisor to mis-state the law

Answer 11

No agreement whether the lad was to be transferred to C or, e.g., to a company set up by C No agreeent as to mechanism by which D would get security for overage position Lord Walker, "the matter which were not agreed (or even under negotiation) were far from trivial"

Answer 12

“there was total uncertainty as to the nature or terms of any benefit (property interest, contractual right, or money) and, if a property interest, as to the nature of that interest (freehold, leasehold or charge) to be accorded to [C].”

Answer 13

D's company needs mone to set up letter of credit so can buy rice from overseas supplier C willing to lend but needs security, D seds signed letter agreeing to give C charge over D's home - C provides money No contract as letter was not signed by both C and D But C acted in reliance on D's promise and would suffer detriment if D were wholly free to renege CA confirms that D is under duty to grant C the promised charge

Answer 14

Need in PE for the assurance to C to relate to property owned by D That = one of the main distinguishing features between the two EE varieties (prom and prop) Former must be based on pre-exisitng legal relationship Latter need not be based on exisitn legal relationship but must relate to identified prop owned or about to be owned by D It is this that has enabled PE to develop as a sword, not just a shield See Denning in Crabb v Arun

Answer 15

relied on his own judgment in Moorgate v Twitchings (1976), shortly to be overturned by HL, to support idea that the effect of estopel on true owner of prop may be that “his own title to the property, be it land or goods, has been held to be limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created therein.”

Answer 16

Referred to principle (now @ s21(1) SGA) that where S sells A's G to B, w/out A's auth, A may by his conduct be precluded from denying S's auth to sell

Answer 17

Compare to Dinning in Moorgate Says that such a case in fact involves S's exercise of ostensible authority, so that B acquires a "real title and noe merely a metaphorical title by estoppel"

Answer 18

EE allowed to assist C (prospective tenant) where D fails to proceed w a planned lease of C's land Brennan J: Unless the cases of PE are attributed to a different equity from that which explains PromE, the enforcement of promises to create new prop rights cannot be reconciled w limitation on enforcement of other promises. If it is unconscionable for an owner of prop to fail to fulfil non-con promises that he will convey an interest in prop to another, is there any reason in pricniple why it is not unconscionable for person to fail to fulfil a non-con promise to confer non-prop legal right? does not accord w pricniple to hold that equity, in seeking to avoid detriment occasioned by unconscionable conduct, can give relief in some cases but not others

Answer 19

proprietary estoppel claim permitted where D attempts to renege on promise to buy C’s land

Answer 20

C’s belief that its contract would be renewed arose solely from the long-standing nature of its arrangement with D and D had made no promise to acquire a particular quantity of garments from C, or to do so at a particular price

Answer 21

C's development of own land cannot support PE claim But note that: (i) C acted in reliance on belief that planning permission would be granted, now clear that a promise by planning authority cannot give rise to private law liability (R v East Sussex, ex p Reprotech (2003)) and (ii) C in any case did not rely on the assurance as its chairman in any case had an "absolute conviction" that it could use the land as it wished

Answer 22

Note that (i) it was still open for C to apply to court for maintenance, and the court could make any order it regarded as just, so its not clear that C's reliance caused any detriment (ii) promises of maintenance were generally understood as providing basis for an application for a consent order was not an act of reasonable reliance on D's promise (iii) C's delay meant that C was claiming 6 years of maintenance payments, so it may in any case not have been unconscionable for D to refuse to pay the whole sum: see per Denning LJ

Answer 23

Broad concept of unconscionability playing useful role in refining the doctrine as an objective value judgment on behaviour... unconscionability plays very important part in doctrine of EE, in uifiying and cofirming the other elements If the other elements appear to be present but the result does not shock the conscience of the court, the analysis needs to be looked at again