Contractual Interpretation Flashcards
The Didymi
Found EA, rather than A2A
Interpreting clause to avoid rule and give effect to parties’ intention
What are the 10 rules?
1: Objective Intention
2: If in writing, that is primary source of intention
3: Read as a whole
4: Read in context of BG facts
5: Almost always give words ordinary meaning in their context
6: If words ambiguous, give meaning parties most likely to have intended
7: If ordinary meaning of words cannot have been intended, give them the meaning the parties objectively must have intended
8: Words impied into contract if parties must objectively have intended them
9: If contract doesn’t reflect common intention at time made, can be amended
10: If parties dealt on basis of common understanding of meaning or effect of contract, will be bound by that if it woud be unjust to go back on it
Why objective intention?
More pragmatic (difficult to determine subjective intention)
More certain
Protects third parties
What counts as part of the contract?
Not just one piece of paper, can be broader emails and letters between them deciding terms
This makes for a very time-consuming process of determining what counts as part of the contract
What are Entire Agreement Clauses?
Stipulate that this one document contains the entire contract, avoids problem of contract being over many documents.
Longmore LJ in Northe Easter Properties v Coleman (2010): “if the parties agree that the written contract is to be the entire contract, it is no business of the courts to tell them that they do not mean what they have said”
Can you have no variation clauses as well as EACs to be conclusive of what happens in future
This would slow down commerical process
But would also put a handle on the change
FOC would allow you to bind yourself
But would also mean you can’t be prevented from agreeing in future
Like ParSov
So doesn’t do anything, just promotes good conduct
Re Sigma Finance
E.g. of usual effect of Rule 3: Words expressed generally are limited by reference to rest of contract
Provision of trust deed not expressly limited, but implieddly limited by reference to rest of con.
Reading of whole contract show parties did not inted broad literal inrepretation of clause as it would conflict w scheme of con as a whole
Belmont Park Investments v BNY Corporate Trustee Services
Court sometimes refuses to read clause as part of the whole contract, particularly when interpreting a clause they disapprove of
Not good for coherency and certainty of the law…
Thorney Park Golf v Myers Catering
Clause 4: For the contract to be reasonable, initial term of 3 yeas must be agreed
Clause 6: Can terminate w/out given reason w 4 months notice
CA: Clause 4 is more powerful, must read 6 in light of it
4 says must have 3 years to be reasonable, ergo 4 months notice in first 3 years = unreasonable
Lord Hoffman, in ICS v West Bromowich Building Society, on what = relevant BG facts
“absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man”
But don’t look at prior negotiations
So quite a narrow period where you can consider context
Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes
Prior negotiations are excluded
Except as evidence that another fact was known to the parties that can be relevant BG
Lord Hoffman
Bank of Scotland v Dunedin Property Investment Co
Used the exception to prior negotiation exclusion that Hoff mentioned in Chartbrook
Helped establish parties’ knowledge of cricumstances w reference to which they used words in the contract (that the company was aware the bank would borrow money to subcribe for the loan stock and inetended to hedge the transaction and if the loan stock wa rdeemed early there would be uncertain cost associated w the hedge)
Raises Q of wheher parties might use contract itself to expressly limit thte types of background info available in interpretation process
ICS v West Bromowich (1998), Lord Hoffman at 912:
Principels of interpretation may be summarised as follows:
(1) Interpretation = ascertainment of emaning the doc would coveey to reasonable person having all the background knowledge reasonably availbale to parties at time of contracting
(2) BG famously referred to by Lord WF as the “matrix of fact”. An understated description of what BG may include. Subject to reasonable availbility to parties, and exception next, includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way the language would be understood by reasonable man
(3) Law excludes previous negotiations and declarations of subjective intent from BG. Admissible only in action for rectification. Law makes this distinciton for practical policy, and in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the wat we would interpret ordinary utternaces. Boundaries of this exception unclear
BG facts that are excluded as available evidence:
Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes, Hoff @ 42:
Prior negotiation cannot be used to draw inferences about what the con meant, but can be used to establish fact known to both parties
Schuler v Wickman Mchine Tools Sales (1974)
Subsequent conduct = excluded
William Hare v Shepherd Construction (2010)
Dispute about whether person was insolvent
Clause defined insolvency to include “the making of an administration order”, but didn’t prima facie include going into admin by filing doc w court
Parties cannot have intended that admin only count as insolvency if made admin order, would make no commercail sense
Nonetheless CA decided def should be given natural meaning
The Aragon (1977)
“East of Panama Canal” means can’t go through Panama Canal to Western Seaboard, does not exclude US Gulf even though technically West of the meridian of longitude on which PC stands
Giving the words their natural meaning in context, which parties would understand
Fitzhugh v Fitzhugh (2012)
“Licensor” must exclude Anthony bc he was the Licensee?
One party looking at perfectly clear words, the other saying it can’t mean that in context of agreement, would make no commercial sense, would be absurd result.
1st Instance finds for Harry, CA for Anthony 2-1
Could have gone either way, encapsulates recurring problem of what words say vs what they must reasonably mean
Canons of construciton
Contra proferentum (ambiguous terms should be interpreted aganst arty that propsed/drafted the contract/term) Eiusdem generis (the specific rule over-rides the general rule)
Rainy Sky v Kokmin Bank (2011)
Recent example of how ambiguity dealt with
Words were ambiguous and both interpretations of what bank is libale to provide were arguable
Court favoured bbuyer onbasis of “considerations of commercial common sense”
Arguably emphasised commercial common sense too much, not overall structure of contract enough
Shows that ambiguities need to eb resolved and resolution depends on trying to esblish what parties must objectively have intended
Y.E.S. v Soup (2015)
Agreement that Soup sublease to YES was to survive as long as Soup’s lease was not terminated
The specific lease that existed at time of sub-lease (which had ended) or the lease which Soup had from time to time of the unit?
YES wins
Context of the contract makes the seemingly unambiguous text of the contract seem questionable. Would lead to an absurd result, so must consider that it’s not so unambiguous
Can’t use context to rewrite contract or ignore plain wording, but can presume parties would not have intended absurd result, and thus infer a more reasonable interpretation as more likely
Napier Park v Harbourmaster (2014)
Had the Class A1 notes been downgraded, considering they had gone back up?
1st instance says they had, CA says they hadn’t
1st instance goes w natural meaning of words
CA goes w the more commercially reasonable result
ICS v West Brom Building Society
How was the contract rewritten?
“any claim (whether sounding for recission in undue influence or otherwise)” = “any claim sounding for recission (whether for undue influence or otherwise)”
Barclays Bank v HHY Luxembourg [2010]
CA interpreted reference to “disposal of all of the shares in the capital of an Obligor” as if it had referred to a disposal of the shares of a subsidiary of an Obligor
Lord Mustill in Charter Re v Fagan (1997)
I would hesitate long before giving words any meaning other than their ordinary meaning in the ocntext of their document just bc the result would be extraordinary
Lord Reid saying that a construciton leading to a very unreasonable result must be a relevant consideration regfeclts a metod of constructing contracts and the common experince of how language is understood
But the ppractical rule of thumb ahs limits, and the court should remind itself that the task is to discover what the parties meant from what they said, not to substitute fro the bargain actually made one which the court believes could better have been amde