POLI 244 Flashcards

1
Q

The stability of an international system is determined by the relationship between: (Gilpin’s theory)

A
  1. The distribution of material power.
  2. The distribution of prestige: hierarchy of prestige, equivalent of authority in domestic politics —> less powerful states obey the commands of dominant states. Based on reputation of power.
  3. The rights and rules that set parameters of behaviour:

—> hegemonic war determines the hierarchy of prestige by reflecting the true redistribution of power and thereby determines which state will govern the international system. Hegemonic wars restore equilibrium when power is mal distributed.

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2
Q

Explain Robert Gilpin’s theory of systemic change (hegemonic war):

A
  1. System is state of equilibrium (consolidated hegemony), satisfaction with the current international order.
    —> Differential growth of power.
  2. Redistribution of power in the system (declining hegemony).
    —> Rise of challenger.
  3. Disequilibrium of the system.
    —> Bipolarization.
  4. Resolution of systemic crisis (hegemonic war). - Challenger initiates war to bring a change in the system or the declining hegemony launches a preemptive war. Equilibrium is reset.
    —> Peace settlement.

Cycle restarts.

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3
Q

Explain status quo vs. Revisionist states:

A

Revisionist states: states that are dissatisfied with the current international order and are willing to pay some cost to bring change.
—> more power = less satisfaction = more revisionist. The state gains power, but the perception of power does not change = dissatisfaction = more incentives to bring change in the international order.

Status quo states: states that are generally satisfied - not going to try to use their power to bring change in the system.

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4
Q

Why would the dominant state’s power decline in terms of uneven growth in power?

A

Exogenous factors: factors that are not explained by Gilpin’s theory itself and that may be taken as a given.

  1. Technical innovations - increases international trade and the wealth generated by it.
  2. Political organization.
  3. Good (regional) leadership.

Endogenous factors: factors that are explained by the theory, by the dynamics elaborated in the theory itself.
1. Uneven environmental pressures in terms of security.
—> security concerns are less pressing for the dominant state due to power advantage.

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5
Q

Explain achieving cooperation under anarchy.

A

International and domestic characteristics, state interests (preferences over outcomes), and external characteristics determine the strategic setting.

Their behaviour and strategic choices align to produce cooperative outcomes. Based on expectations about other and preferences over strategies.

If there is no cooperation problem, states can gain from cooperation.

If states end up in a mutual defection outcome, it is Pareto inferior to mutual cooperation. They will need to coordinate their actions through strategies cooperation or international institutions.

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6
Q

What are strategies to cooperation under anarchy?

A
  1. Altering the payoff structure.
  2. Lengthening the shadow of the future (iterated games).
  3. Reducing the number of players.
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7
Q

Explain international stability without cooperation under anarchy:

A
  1. Hegemonic systems.
  2. Balance of power systems.
    - states are stuck in a Pareto0suboptimal equilibrium of mutual-defection. Underlying instability.
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8
Q

Explain international stability with cooperation under anarchy.

A
  1. Concert systems.
    - great powers can achieve cooperation in their security relations through multilateral mechanisms and self-restraint. The Concert of Europe consisted of a series of regular international conferences where concerns and solutions were discussed between leading powers. Happened after the defeat of Napoleon.
  2. Collective-security systems.
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9
Q

Explain the Concert of Europe.

A

—> Concerts occur after a major war against a potential threat. Fear of the threat against old power, alliance between other powers —> concert. War is too costly.

  • The Great Powers govern Europe (Russia, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, UK, France).
  • Strategic territorial divisions create spheres of influence without regard for history, nationality, etc.
  • Distribution of power reflected bargaining power of each Great power.
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10
Q

What is collective security?

A

A state’s act of agression against another state is met with a collective (diplomatic/condominium/military) response. Moves away from a self-help system towards a collective security system. The individual response to aggression is replaced with a collective response.

The action should not depend upon who the aggressor is —> immediate response. Goal to enforce a norm of non-aggression.

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11
Q

What are the goals of collective security?

A
  1. Deter agression:
    - Prevent aggression from happening in the future.
    - Payoff matrix is altered —> aggressor thinks twice.
    - When collective security works, we don’t see it work.
  2. Neutralize aggression and eliminate its benefits:
    - It can minimize/neutralize an act of agression if collective security fails.
    - Reenforces the idea that agression does not pay —> benefits are eliminated.
  3. Mitigate the need of military buildup:
    - Solution to security dilemma —> no longer a self-help system.
    - You don’t need to arm up, reliance on the security of the collective.
    - No longer pays to build up individual military, investment in other things —> eases the arms race.
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12
Q

Compare forms of managing security in terms of deployable power to meet aggression and the flexibility to respond or not against an act of aggression:

A
  1. Internal balancing.
    P: minimum, individual power/military capabilities.
    F: maximum, individual decision.
  2. External balancing (alliance)
    P: higher than individual, pooling resources from members of alliance.
    F: lower than individual response, joint decision.
  3. Concerts.
    P: high, great powers have greater resources.
    F: compromised, agreement from all great powers.
  4. Collective security.
    P: maximum, collective response by the entire international community.
    F: minimum, automatic response, non-negotiated.
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13
Q

Why do realists reject collective security systems?

A
  1. The system can only work when it is not needed (the aggressor is not a great power threat) —> only works when small states commit an act of agression.
    —> False: unless the aggressor is too powerful (hegemony). Selective responses —> the collective consider power capabilities before responding to an act of agression.
  2. A security system geared towards an abstract threat (no identified enemy) limits strategic strategic preparation to effectively deter/face the aggressor.
    —> Partially true: there are expectations of the next aggressor + overwhelming force compensante next act of agression.
  3. The animating motive for constructing a collective security system (no more war) reflects abhorrence of war, but the system requires going to war where immediate self-interest might not.
    —> False: the goal is no more aggression, not no more war.
  4. Rigidly conservative, as it requires honouring the status quo ante irrespective of its merits.
    —> False: presumes war is the only path to change (peaceful path).
  5. It makes the world more unstable, because it discourages the formation of a balance of power to prevent unipolarity.
    —> Partially true: assumes that unipolarity is unstable and ignores internal balancing.
  6. It makes the world more unstable, because it exacerbates revisionists.
    —> Partially true: assumes exacerbated revisionists cannot be stopped/deterred by the community.
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14
Q

What are the challenges to collective security systems?

A
  1. Joint decision-making problems.
    - Coordination action is needed.
    - Calculation in terms of self-interest: do they contribute? How much? How will their security be affected?
    - Self défense and who is the aggressor?
  2. Collective action problems.
    - Collective security is a public good —> free riding (non-excludable and non-rivalrous). Collective response is too weak if there is free-riding.
    - The hegemony solution: they provide public goods and distribute and can monitor other states. They can punish free-riders because of their overwhelming power.
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15
Q

What is power? How do we measure power?

A

The ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants. Making others do something that they would not have done without the influence of a powerful state.

  1. Power resources: military capabilities, economic power, status.
  2. Behavioural outcome: the outcome that the particular actor was able to bring about their actions.
    - Always getting what you want = very powerful.
    - Problem: we cannot measure power until it is put in place.

—> important to create causal links between power and behavioural outcomes, they are not indépendant.

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16
Q

What are the 3 dimensions of power in terms of relational power?

A
  1. Command power.
    - Power exercise through a command (simple and visible) —> coercion.
    - Associated with hard power and resources.
  2. Framing and agenda-setting power.
    - Creating a structure/environment that will prioritize some actors over others (less subtle and visible).
    - Focuses on power to frame social interactions and to set the agenda in which they take place.
    - Depending on the content, can be hard or soft power, or a mix.
  3. Preference formation.
    - Altering the preference that others have through influence.
    - Soft power, cheaper to enforce.
    - Co-option, invisibility.
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17
Q

What are the 4 strategic functions of military force?

A
  1. Defense.
  2. Deterrence.
  3. Compellence.
  4. Swaggering.
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18
Q

Explain Defense as a strategic function of military force.

A
  1. Purpose:
    - Dissuade an adversary from attacking.
    - Minimizing damage if attacked and failed to prevent it.
  2. Means: adversary’s victory is made less likely and more costly.
  3. Employment: Passive (no violence, often military technology) or Active.
    —> Active:
    • Repellent (second) strikes: counterattack to adversary’s attack.
    • Offensive (first) strikes: preemptive (attacking first when it is known that the adversary will soon attack) or preventive (unknown when they will attack, but buildngup resources and material power).
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19
Q

Explain Deterrence as a strategic function of military force.

A
  1. Purpose: dissuade an adversary from starting an attack.
  2. Means:
    - Credible threat of retaliation with unacceptable damage (nuclear weapons or mass destruction —> worse off attacking).
    - Adversary’s victory is made less attractive.
  3. Employment:
    - Passive, necessary when dissuasion by defensive forces is weak.
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20
Q

Explain Compellence as a strategic function of military force. How is it different from deterrence?

A
  1. Purpose: persuade an adversary to change their behaviour.
    - Command of power —> coercion by military resources.
  2. Employment: active.

—> Deterrence keeps things unchanged and preventing a military attack. Compellence uses military force to make a behavioural change for the adversary. Changes the status quo.

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21
Q

Explain Swaggering as a strategic function of military force.

A
  1. Purpose: increase prestige, reputation for power, showing others how powerful you are.
  2. Means: visible displays of military might and/or technology.
  3. Employment: passive. Hard or soft power.
    Hard: what is behind the threat is known.
    Soft: success story, other states look up to the state for military strategies.
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22
Q

Explain vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. What is the nuclear non-profile ration treaty?

A

Vertical: increase of nuclear weapons within a state overtime (acquiring more).
Horizontal: more states acquire nuclear weapon overtime.

For states that have nuclear weapons, they have an obligation to not help other states get some. States that don’t have any have the obligation to to acquire them. Regime of nuclear inspectors that check compliance with regulations. States can build nuclear plants if they are used for peaceful purposes.

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23
Q

What is the difference between brute facts and social/institutional facts? What is defined as an action?

A

Brute facts: exist regardless of shared ideas (e.g. a rock).
- Behaviour is a brute fact.

Social facts: can only exist in virtue of collectively shared knowledge (e.g. 20$ bill). Politics is about social facts.
- Action is a social fact.

Action = behaviour + meaning. Collectively shared meanings distinguish behaviour (brute fact) from action (social fact) —> e.g. eye wink vs. Eye twitch, behaviour is the same, meaning is different. We need to understand the meaning (and collectively shared meaning) to deconstruct behaviour and their meanings attacked.

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24
Q

Explain Regulative vs. Constitutive rules. What about norms?

A

Regulative: rules that regulate an activity that exists independently of those rules These rules can be broken (e.g. driving of RHS of a road, but driving existed before the rule).
- Norms: norms that regulate interstate interactions.

Constitutive: creates the possibility of a certain activity (e.g. rules of chess create the game of chess).
- Norms: norms that define the main actors and their capacities. Changes in constitutive norms are mostly associated with systemic change.

—> Social/institutional facts can only exist within systems of constitutive rules. The meaning that makes something material or immaterial becomes a social fact, operate as a constructive rule (e.g. belief of a state).

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25
Q

What is the structure of the international system made of in terms of Material vs. Social structures? (Neorealist vs. Constructivism)

A
  1. Neorealism —> material capabilities.
    - Realism and liberalism assume that material capabilities are the main structure of the international system.
    - It is what varies state to state: relates to the relative power each state has and distinguishes them. International structure is a result of the distribution of material capabilities among states.
  2. Constructivism —> social relations.
    - The social structures generate social relationships between states —> relationships are not material in nature.
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26
Q

What are the 3 elements to the nature of social structures?

A
  1. Shared understandings/expectations.
    - Shared ideas/beliefs of states, which determine the nature of their relationships. A change in the constitutive rules of the institution affects the nature of the actors and a change of constitutive norms (e.g. slavery) —> changes power relations.
    - Affects the security dilemma and the security community.
  2. Material resources.
    - Material resources matter, but only acquire meaning fo human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded (e.g. acquisition of war ships in terms of security dilemma or security community).
    - Material resources are the same, but the meaning of acquisition is different.
  3. Practises.
    - Social structures exist in social practises. If the practises stop, the value is lost (e.g. foreign money).
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27
Q

Explain the social construction of reality in terms of subjective and intersubjective construction.

A

Social structures are not subjective, but intersubjective. Structures cannot be reproduced or destroyed by individual subjects, they are a collective phenomena.

Structures are constructed through interactions of the individuals that make the collective —> the individual alone has no power to change it alone, transformation of social structures needs to be collective.

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28
Q

Explain acting in and onto the international system in the world of constructivism and realism.

A

—> Constructivist critique:

  1. Norms.
    - not all behavioural is rational, some is driven by norms that are internalized by the state.
  2. Pre social nature of preferences.
    - realists and liberals take state interest as given. But, state interest is not given or fixed, state interests and preferences are a product of practises between states —> can be changed through practise.
  3. Practises are the key element that constructs social structures —> constitutive state with constitutive rules that make up their own actors with their own identities and interests.

—> Realist.

  • Social structures are in a self-help structure = positional identities.
  • Results in competitive interests —> leads to rational choices.
  • Interactions that result from rational choices will constitute international politics as power politics.
  • State interactions reproduce self-help structure, which reproduces the social structure/interests.
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29
Q

What are the processes in the social construction of world politics and its codetermination with institutions?

A
  1. Stimulus requiring action.
  2. State A’s definition of the situation.
    - Based on A’s identities and interests.
  3. State A’s action.
    - Intersubjective understandings and expectations possessed by and constitutive of A and B.
  4. State B’s interpretation of state A’s action and B’s own definition of the situation.
    - It has to understand the meaning of state A’s action before reacting, through its identities and interests.
  5. State B’s action.
    - B reacts to the action through intersubjective understandings and expectations, which are constitutive of the identities and interests of state A and B.

—> Constructivist POV: Interactions can reproduce the social structures that they are a result of, but they can also transform the social structures. There is room for deviating behaviour (e.g. security dilemma —> security community).

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30
Q

Explain why a world of power politics can be resistant to change according to constructivistes despite being socially constructed?

A
  1. The external cost of deviance: the harsher the environment is on deviant behaviour, the more difficult it will be to transform the system —> resistance to change .
    - Once constituted, any social system confront each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain practises and discourages others.
  2. The internal cost of cognition: tendency to confirm existing beliefs about the social world. Questioning the nature of the word generates anxiety, it is not easy.
    - The major practises that need to be changed in order to change the system are typically interlocked with other associated practises as well as associated actors who have vested interests in those practises.
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31
Q

How can sovereignty be a mitigator of self-help systems?

A

Constructivistes argue that some norms (collective understandings/beliefs) might relax the rigidity of self-help systems —> sovereignty is one such norm (if sovereign states stopped the practises that made them sovereign states, in terms of authority, their identity as a sovereign would disappear).

Sovereignty is the mutual recognition of one another’s rights to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits. It is the mutual recognition that states have territorial property rights.

Community of sovereign states —> community of states acting in accord with the norm of sovereignty.
- States can rely on the institutional fabric of international security, and less on the individual. Do not need to be constantly preoccupied about being attacked by another state.

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32
Q

What are the 3 different cultures of anarchy?

A
  1. Hobbesian anarchy.
    - Described by realism where states have competitive interests.
  2. Locke an anarchy.
    - Assumed by néolibéral institutionnalise where states have individualistic interests which allow for many levels of cooperation between states.
    - States have reconstructed their identities and interests (individualistic rather than competitive). Common interests become abundant, more opportunities and desire for cooperation.
  3. Kantian anarchy.
    - Individualistic interests are replaced with collective interests.
    - According to constructivists, a sustained practise of cooperation may lead to the construction of collective identities rather than self-interested identities.
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33
Q

What are the two major constraints to the Kantian development of identities and the evolution of cooperation?

A
  1. Incremental, slow, and usually unintended process of policies pursued for other reasons rather than the intentional effort to transcend existing institutions.
  2. Path dependent process.
    - Presupposes that some evolution in this direction has already happened.
    - Presupposes that states don’t identify negatively with one another, being concerned with relative losses and define their own welfare as opposed to the welfare of others.
    - States can’t jump from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Kantian security community —> they have to go through the Lockean culture of anarchy.
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34
Q

What are the 4 stages to the intentional transformation of social structure?

A
  1. Breakdown of consensus.
    - Collective knowledge shared by the actors is called into question.
  2. Denaturalization of existing identities/interests.
  3. Change in one’s practises.
    - Replacement of old practises (generative of old identities) with new practises (generative of new identities). The goal is to change the nature of social interactions between actors in a state —> acquire new identities and interests.
  4. Change in collective practises.
    - Reciprocity of revolutionary practises by other states —> encouragement of this practise by others (rewarded by others).
    - True transformation of social relationships between states —> moves toward a community of states with collective identity as opposed to being trapped in a security dilemma or self-help system.
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35
Q

What are norms?

A

Standards of behaviour for actors with a given identity in a given social context. They attach meaning to certain behaviours and define what actions are right or appropriate under particular circumstances.

A norm tells you what the right thing is to do given who you are and given the social context. The more internalized norms are, the more powerful they are in shaping our behaviour, ans the less we are aware of them.

Norms can also define who is a legitimate actor and who is not (e.g. sovereign statehood).

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36
Q

What are the 2 different logic of actions that explain state behaviour in the social world?

A
  1. The logic of consequences (rationalism).
    - The actor makes a choice as to how to behave because there are certain interests/preferences that the actor has, and given certain pieces of information, the actor can anticipate the consequences of the different courses of actions that they face.
    - Given the preferences/interests, the actors ranks all the consequences and identifies the preferred one —> they choose the behaviour associated with the expected consequences.
  2. The logic of appropriateness.
    - The social actor needs to make a behavioural decision with a certain social identity of who they are and they find themselves in a social context.
    - Given the social identity and the social context —> they will asses the different course of action then identify different levels of appropriateness —> the right thing to do given who they are and the social context they find themselves in.
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37
Q

Why are norms important for the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences?

A

Appropriateness:

  • It is through social construction and the process of socialization associated with the social construction of facts that the social actors acquire a given social identity.
  • The norms we have internalized give meaning to a certain context we interpret.
  • Norms help evaluate the appropriateness of the different courses of actions available.

Consequences:

  • The interests we associate with the rational actor are the result of the process of social construction/socialization —> formation of preferences.
  • The actor has these preferences because they have been socialized into internalizing certain norms (but not others) —> determines a set of preferences.
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38
Q

What are the 3 most prominent ways that the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences can be combined?

A
  1. The logic of appropriateness imbedded within the logic of consequences.
    - Start with a set of preferences, then assess the different types of consequences that will follow from different courses of action you may take. Then, you rank order your preferred expected consequences based on your initial goal.
    - The logic of consequence/expected utility takes precedents, then the logic of appropriateness makes the final decisional move of the actor (e.g. soldiers).
  2. The logic of consequences is embedded within the other.
    - Start with a given norm that you have internalized, this determines your interest.
    - When it comes to taking action, we assess the expected consequences of the expected course of action we can take in this context.
  3. The two logics operating independently, rather than one being embedded in the other.
    - A behavioural choice made through the logic of consequences, another by the logic of appropriateness.
    - If they both point in the same behavioural direction: we make a choice because the expected utility mandated that we should do it ans because appropriateness appropriated that we should do it.
    If they don’t point in the same behavioural direction: what you end up doing depends on which of the two logics is going to prevail in a specific scenario.
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39
Q

What are the 3 stages of the norm’s life cycle? It explains how norms diffuse in the international system and how they achieve a taken for granted status.

Explain a norm’s transformation of death and normative backslides.

A

Stage 1: Norm emergence.

  • Norm entrepreneurs: individuals/groups with strong beliefs about desirable behaviour and want other to adopt it.
  • Sell their normative beliefs through framing (comprehensible to audience or tying the new norm to already established norms).

Stage 2: Norm cascade.

  • Behavioural conformity: coercion and/or socialization (universal standard).
  • Transnational pressure: The boomerang model (pressure on the norm by calling out the violation of the norm, affects international reputation —> NGOs).

Stage 3: Norm internalization.

  • Behavioural conformity: automatic.
  • The norm is taken for granted, unquestioned (widely accepted in the international community).
  • Redefinition of state interests.

—> Norm’s transformation of death (contested and reshaped by social actors) and normative backslides (goes back to a previous stage or norms polarization).

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40
Q

What is international law?

A

A body of rules that creates rights and obligations for states (and other actors).

It is a consent-based system of law.
- International law represents a system of contracts between different legal subjects with their consent.

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41
Q

What are the two sources of international law?

A
  1. Treaties —> explicit consent.
    - Negotiation by states —> signature (political leaders)—> ratification by the state’s government (the state becomes bound by the provision of the Treaty, it gave it s consent).
    - Advantages:
    • Explicit consent —> no issues.
    • More precision about rules/expectations —> it is written.
  2. International customs —> inferred consent.
    - International customs are unwritten. A rule becomes an international custom when two conditions are met:
    • Regularity/pattern of custom.
    • Opinion ours: presumption that there exists a rule of international law that forces me to act in that particular way —> presumption of an obligation.
      - Issue: validity of consent.
      - Codification: turning a customary rule into a a rule of treaty, incorporations in written form of rules customary international law.
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42
Q

What is the relationship of international law and state behaviour in terms of anarchy and sovereignty? In other words, what are the two problems in this relationship?

A
  1. The interpretation problem of international law —> interpretive authority.
    - There is no one to turn to to understand the interpretation of the treaty (with exceptions).
  2. The enforcement problem of international law —> self-help.
    - There is no one to enforce the treat or coerce whoever violates it to go back into compliance.
    - anarchic system —> self help.

—> both these issues refer to anarchy as the main source of the problem.

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43
Q

Why should we obey international law (3Rs)?

A
  1. Reciprocity: violation legitimizes reciprocal violations.
    - States comply with a treaty they ratified because they expect that if they violate the treaty, then the other parties will violate it as well.
    - Others violating it harms your interests —> best not to violate it yourself.
  2. Retaliation: violation legitimizes retaliatory measures.
    - The party retaliates if you violate the treaty by harming your interests in another way, interests outside the treaty.
  3. Reputation: reputation all costs/benefits (“rogue state”).
    - Will undermine your ability to enter cooperative agreements with other states in the future. Reputation is built from behaviour —> violating treaties builds a bad reputation —> no cooperative gains.
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44
Q

Why should we obey international law (NOT 3Rs)?

A
  1. Domestic/transnational compliance constituencies.
    - Societal actors that benefit directly from the treaty pressure their government against violation of the treaty in when it decides to violate it (e.g. feminist). The societal groups can face direct or indirect harm.
  2. Legitimacy costs/benefits (discursive entrapment).
    - Legitimacy in the act of violating or complying with a treaty —> it can harm your prestige.
  3. Socialization and the internalization of international law.
    - Many rules of international law are said to be complied with because states internalize them —> psychological or political sense.
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45
Q

What is the primary purpose of the United Nations Organization?

A

Maintain international peace and security (e.g. prevent a next world war).

—> Articles:

  • General ban on the use of force between states (illegal declaration of war).
  • Right to use force in self-Defense.
  • Right to use force under the authorization of the UN Security Council.

It has six primary organs.

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46
Q

Explain the UN General Assembly.

A
  • All members of the UN have a seat in this organ.
  • Primary focus on the discussion of global issues: most conflicts emerge from misinformation/miscommunication, they can be solved through communication. Annual meeting with a broad agenda —> all topics of international politics are covered.
  • Issues non-binding resolution —> sovereign equality.
    • Issues are not legally binding —> not a source of law. They do not generate obligations to the state.
    • They are made in response to the principle of sovereign equality —> every member is given one cote, no privileges.
  • Codification and development of international law.
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47
Q

Explain the UN Security Council.

A
  • Political organ made up of 15 members (5 permanent with institutional privileges/veto and 10 non-permanent, rotation every 2 years).
  • Primary purpose: maintain international peace and security.
    • Creation of peacekeeping missions (by practise, not UN charter).
    • Peace enforcement powers —> authorization of military measures against an aggressor wen necessary.
  • Issues legally binding resolutions:
    • Great power unanimity —> permanent member’s’ veto.
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48
Q

Explain the Intenational Court of Justice.

A
  • Headquarters: Netherlands. Composed of 15 judges.
  • Function: Interstate dispute resolution between states based on international law.
    • Disputes about how to interpret a given treaty or if one country finds that another has violated an international agreement/custom.
    • All parties must give their consent to jurisdiction of the court.
  • Issus legally binding decisions and advisory opinions:
    • There are legal obligations derived from these decisions.
    • Advisory opinions —> not legally binding, more abstract statements as to how international law needs to be interpreted.
  • Limited jurisdiction.
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49
Q

Explain the characteristics of international human rights law with the state (4).

A
  1. State obligations vis-a-vis individuals (and groups).
    - Not obligations between states, but to their own individuals.
  2. The problem of reciprocity as a driver of compliance.
    - It does not work —> the main condition for reciprocity to work are missing. If a state harms its individuals, t does not harm itself.
  3. Huge asymmetry between the right-holder (individuals) and the duty-bearer (government).
    - the capacity to retaliate the right-holder (the ones whose interests are damaged by the violation of the treaty), their capacity is very limited due to asymmetry.
  4. Admits a national “margin of appreciation.”
    - Ongoing debate between universalism vs. Cultural realism when it comes to universal or international human rights standards.
    - Should human rights be the same for all countries/societies or should they be sent I’ve to the diversity and culture in the international system?
    - Can create opportunities for violation of human rights.
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50
Q

What are the core assumptions of Liberal Theory?

A
  1. The primacy of societal actors.
    - The actors have have an impact on national interest, the state is perceived as an organization of actors, not an individual actor.
    - National interests depend on the interactions that take place within a given state (different actors, individuals, social groups) and affects the preference of the state.
  2. Domestic State preference formation.
    - The state is not an actor but a biased representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by coalitions of social actors.
    - The domestic formation of state preference, different interactions by different actor might result in different pressures at the state, different foreign policy agendas. Aggregation of different societal interests.
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51
Q

What is the difference between Realists + Neoliberalism vs. Constructivists + New Liberalists. What about C vs. NL?

A

R+NL: states and their interests are a given.

C: the states are a given, but not interests. It tries to understand how interests are formed by looking at inter-state interactions at the international level. Interactions between social actors rather than within state.

NL: Tries to understand the formation of interests through domestic processes —> different kinds of actors with diverging interests that pressure the government. The different interests within a state forms preferences which can explain interactions with other states (e.g. influence of a transnational anti-vaccination movement).

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52
Q

Describe the 2 stage model of state behaviour.

A
  1. Formation of state preference.
    - New Liberal factors.
    - Looking at different politics and identifying different societal actors and their institutional context with ideational preferences/beliefs/interests —> set of preferences assigned to the state.
  2. International area —> interactions within state.
    - Realist and institutionalist factors.
    - Strategic interactions (assumed by all paradigms) —> once state preferences are explained, the way the state will behave internationally given the preference 9strategic interactions) determines the systemic outcome.

—> NLI + R + C = assumed/given preferences.
—> NL = explain preferences.

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53
Q

Explain the revision of the different levels of analysis in IR in terms of New Liberal beliefs.

A

New Liberals theories focus on the 2nd level of analysis (domestic politics, domestic institutions, domestic societal actors and their interactions within and between states).

  1. Domestic causes explain international causes.
  2. International causes explain domestic effects.
    - Reversed image.
  3. Domestic interactions.
    - Two level game.
    - Looking at both domestic factors and international factors as explanatory actors of both outcomes.
    - Domestic actors/processes have an impact on international outcomes. International interactions also have an impact on domestic politics.
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54
Q

What is the rally effect?

A

People’s tendency to become more supportive of their government when they experience dramatic international event or crisis. It may have strategic value for political leaders. Th really effect is short lived and the following effects are less impactful.

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55
Q

How does the “rally round the flag” effect alter the bargaining range and thus the likelihood of war?

A
  • The bargaining range shrinks when there is an incentive to go to war from the rally effect, war is more likely to happen. The status quo is outside the bargaining range because it has shrunk. The status quo become very unstable —> incentive to go to war.
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56
Q

What are the 2 limiting factors to the usefulness of the rally effect?

A
  1. There are scope conditions that apply to to the rally effect —> only significant in the context of a domestic crisis of legitimacy.
    - If there is no crisis, the rally effect would not have that much of an impact on the size of the bargaining range. .
  2. Even when there is a crisis, the incentive is limited because usually the immediate political benefits of war are outweighed by the long-term political costs.
    - The rally effect is short lived and fatigued over time.
    - As time goes on, the costs of the war will take over and outweigh all the benefits that the leader obtained by the rally effect.
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57
Q

Who are the other domestic actors that might enjoy the costs/benefits of war? What are they called?

A
  1. Group that enjoys the benefits of the war and pay few costs = hawks:
    - Leaders, ministry or military (war means a larger budget they enjoy, personal promotion in military careers).
    - Interest groups (e.g. arms manufacturers), national interest groups (opportunity to assert their sense of national superiority).
    - General public —> nationalism moves them towards fear.
  2. Group that enjoys few benefit and pays most of the costs of war = doves:
    - Leaders (never ending war, loss of popularity, political cost of war).
    - Government bureaucracies (meant to find peaceful solutions).
    - Interest groups (interruption of national trade).
    - Tax payers.
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58
Q

Who determines foreign policy in terms of domestic politics?

A
  1. The political influence of specialized bureaucracies.
    - Military influence (government, threat, dependency, expertise, manipulation).
  2. Domestic actors and collective action problems.
    —> for economic and societal actors, their capacity to influence the government depends on the CAPs that they will face and their biliary to overcome these problems —> free-riding problem.
    - Size (small vs. Big incentives).
    - Organization (monitoring behaviour).
    - Resources (economic and political —> more resources = more influence).
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59
Q

Explain hawkish and dovish interest and the influence they have on the government in terms of the likeliness of war.

A
  1. State is dominated by dovish interests.
    - Bargaining range is huge, the costs of war are perceived to be very big because the perception is shaped by the influence of doves on the government.
    - the chances of both states finding a peaceful solution are larger —> the likelihood of war goes down.
  2. State is dominated by hawkish interests.
    - Bargaining range is very small, the costs of war are perceived to be very small. They focus on the benefit of war.
    - The likelihood of war increases.
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60
Q

What are the differences between civil war and terrorism?

A
  1. Civil war:
    - A type of armed conflict.
    - Distinguished by nature of participants: non-state armed groups.
  2. Terrorism:
    - A strategy using violence.
    - Distinguished by nature of its targets: civilians. Not distinguished by actors involved.
    - Not necessarily an armed conflict —> it is a strategy.
    - Triangular logic.
61
Q

What are the similarities of civil wars and terrorism?

A
  1. Violence used for political goals.
  2. Non-state actors: CAP.
    - How do they avoid free-riding?
  3. Asymmetric warfare.
    - Relatively weak actors fighting powerful states.
62
Q

Why do rebel groups fight civil wars?

A
  1. Grievances.
    - Mistreatment of minority groups by the government, systematic discrimination or exploitation —> get together to fight against discriminatory status.
    - Self determination: separatism or irredentism.
  2. Greed.
    - Control over natural resources (diamonds, oil) —> access to lucrative resources controlled by the government.
    - Control of the state (access to power, money).
63
Q

What are the 3 factor that can help rebel groups overcome CAPs?

A
  1. Group-level explanation.
    - strong beliefs/motivations (grievances or greed).
  2. Country-level explanation.
  3. International factors.
64
Q

Explain the ‘Group-level explanation’ factor that can help rebel groups overcome CAPs.

A
  1. Strong beliefs, strong motivation (related to greed and grievances).
  2. Strong dissatisfaction, strong motivation.
  3. Strong solidarity/collective identity (identity element that unites the group, undermines free-riding).
  4. Mechanisms of group governance (good leadership).
  5. Strong leadership (manipulation —> promoting a sense of identity, monitoring the group).
65
Q

Explain the ‘Country-level explanation’ factor that can help rebel groups overcome CAPs.

A
  1. Political institutions.
    - Unites the group for it to be heard by the government and being partially resolved —> less costly change compared to violence.
  2. Political culture.
    - Some support violence, some don’t. Impacts the ability to act cohesively as a group.
  3. An effective apparatus of repression.
    - Weak apparatus (government) = more incentive to contribute.
  4. Wealth.
    - Cost and resources + wealth reward.
  5. Highest risk: wealthy “anocracies”.
    - Political regimes where there is no effective apparatus of repression, the government is weak —> civil war is not costly/hard —> lots of possible gains —> increases incentives for war to breakout.
66
Q

Explain the ‘Institutional’ factor that can help rebel groups overcome CAPs.

A
  1. Aid from outsiders (solidarity, self-interest).

2. Proxy wars.

67
Q

Explain the Civil war in terms of a bargaining failure.

A

—> there is a bargaining range where gov + rebel groups can find a peaceful option, but go to war.

  1. Incomplete information.
    - Yet civil war tends to be long.
    - Rebel groups have more info about the government —> war reveals information.
  2. Commitment problems.
    - Shifts in balance of power (no promise that the government will not take advantage of rebel group after disarming).
    - Economic cycles, rebel disarmament (taking advantage of rebel groups during economic upturn).
    - Rebel group commitment problem —> unpredictability of members.
  3. Indivisible goods.
    - non-negotiable goods, zero-sum approach, no feasible bargaining range.
68
Q

What are the 3 types of terrorism?

A
  1. State-sponsored terrorism.
    - Triangular logic present.
    - 4th actor —> outside aid (territory, funds/weapons).
  2. State terrorism.
    - The state is the terrorism organization, it carries out terrorist attacks —> typically look for concessions from some militarized group to get something out of it, rather than the government.
  3. Transnational terrorism.
    - Instead of the interactions between actors happen within a state, it happens across national borders.
69
Q

Are terrorists rational actors?

A

We may think of terrorism as irrational acts, but the terrorist organization as a whole is a rational actor that responds to the circumstances around them and pick strategies to get what they want.

  1. Terrorists are strategic.
  2. Terrorists have goals.
  3. Terrorists are weak.
    - They have goals and strategies that they choose to maximize their ability to get those goals in the context of huge constraints they face due to the asymmetry of power—> they are rational actors.
70
Q

What are the strategies terrorist groups use to achieve their goals?

A
  1. Coercion:
    - Induce policy change by imposing costs on the government due to an attack or a threat of an attack —> fear of civilian population as pressure.
    - Show credibility —> shows destructive capability —> government can prevent future attacks by giving into demands.
  2. Provocation:
    - Terrorists may take action to provoke a response from the target government.
    - The overreaction can cause sympathetic audiences t increase support for terrorists —> increases political power and support.
  3. Spoiling:
    - Sabotage or spoil potential peace between target audience and the leadership from their home society —> peace is not credible.
  4. Outbidding:
    - Two or more terrorist go ups compete for support —> can demonstrate its superior leadership through violence —> greater response from target government.
71
Q

Explain terrorism as a bargaining failure.

A

Violence and the threat of violence is used to raise costs for the other bargaining side —> violence is a result of failed bargaining.

  1. Incomplete information:
    - Private and missing information —> may end to strategic mistakes from the government’s side.
    - Exaggeration of terrorist strength and damage —> threats are not credible (weak).
    - Revealing information is prohibited.
  2. Commitment problems:
    - Terrorists can demonstrate credibility (disarming, denounce terror, join political process) —> no incentive for the government to keep the compromise.
    - Unpredictable members —> deals cannot be credible.
  3. Indivisibility:
    - zero-sum game, no compromise.
    - Indivisibility may be a bargaining strategy.
72
Q

What are counter-terrorism strategies taken by governments to fight/control terrorism?

A
  1. Deterrence (need for credible threat of retaliation —> lack of info).
  2. Preemptive offense: stopping terrorist before they strike (selective capturing).
    - Problem: collateral damage, resentment due to civilian casualties.
    - Torturing terrorist for info —> backfire: sympathy for terrorists.
  3. Defense: measures against terrorists (wall, airport security —> expensive and inconvenient).
  4. Criminalization: law enforcement approach.
    - Difficult for transnational terrorists —> requires cooperation from other countries.
  5. Negotiation and compromise: indivisibility issue, signal to other extremist group to use violence.
73
Q

What is systemic change?

A

Significant shifts in the balance of power in the system. It is a materialist conception.

74
Q

Explain systemic change beyond the materialist conception (Constructivist POV).

A

It is not a change in the polarity of a system, but a change in the international order due to a redistribution of material power, the change goes beyond a redistribution of power.

  1. International systems are made of settled or routine practises sustained by norms.
    - Systemic change = change in the norms that sustain these practises.
  2. Transformation in or of the international system in terms of its:
    - Regulative norms (norms that regulate interstate interactions).
    - Constitutive norms (norms that define the main actor and their capacities) —> mostly associated with systemic change.
75
Q

What were neorealism’s false predictions about the Cold War?

A
  1. The CW was the result of a bipolar distribution of power and would continue as long as bipolarity continued.
    - The CW ended before bipolarity ended.
  2. The system could change only through hegemonic war or the emergence of another superpower.
    - No war occurred during the CW.
  3. If the USSR “lost” the CW, the US would eliminate the Soviet threat by asserting its dominance.
    - USSR and US cooperated.
  4. If the USSR imploded, other states (Germany, France) would arm up and form an alliance against the US.
    - Did not happen lol.
76
Q

How did the CW actually end?

A

The CW ended because of domestic revolutions in Eastern Europe (and USSR) and Moscow’s reaction to them.

CW was made of two Bloc parties: Western bloc (led by US, old style) and Eastern bloc (formal - Soviet empire and informal empire - Eastern European states).

Soviet empire took control of domestic political processes, suppressed domestic civil society (maintain communist party rules), Brezhnev doctrine.

West responded with “containment” and acceptance of the “iron curtain,” (acceptance of the division of Europe, legitimized Soviet enforcement).

Legitimacy deficit in the Eastern Bloc (anti-totalitarian movements created, non violent domestic revolutions).

Gorbachev: end of Brezhnev Doctrine.

Contagion effect: from the informal empire to the formal empire (different national identities rose and implosion and dismemberment USSR).

77
Q

What is a state-centric state? What are its characteristics?

A

Political theory that stresses the role of government on civil society. Useful to understand the state behaviour.

  1. States interacts with each other as if they were each unit.
  2. The state controls what happens within a territory and across territorial borders.
  3. The state has the capacity to extract resources through taxes and allocate those resources in internationally relèvent ways.
78
Q

What are the three levels of analysis in international politics?

A
  1. First image: Individual.
    - Individual decision makers and their chacretristcis that help us explain a certain outcome. They have different tendencies, personality traits, physical and mental health, etc.
  2. Second image: State.
    - Comparative politics, distinctions between political regimes of a type of government (e.g. Authoritarian vs. Democratic), different world views and beliefs of state —> different outcomes about IR.
  3. Third image: International system.
    - Theories of the international system try to explain patterns of state behaviour or other international phenoemnon by looking at the structure of the international system, not the unit or individuals that make the state —> the way authorities are organized within the international system.
79
Q

What is Charles Tilly’s account of the evolution of the international system?

A
  • War and the preparation of war (offensive and defensive) was the key factor that explains why different political units adapted and shaped themselves into sovereign states. Concentration of power = efficient political organization —> they found efficient ways to extract resources (men, arms, supplies, money).

There were three types of competition states in Europe: Capital intensive state form (mostly capital, private military), Coercion intensive state form (coercion by the state, little capital accumulation), Capital-coercive state form.

—> The predominance (selection) of the sovereign state, sovereign states are more likely to win wars due to more resources and better armies. Evolutionary explanation through competition. War waging advantages —> more efficient at fighting wars.

80
Q

What is Hendrik Spruyt’s account of the evolution of the international system?

A
  • Emergence of the sovereign state before the military revolution, before war was important —> war did no create the states. Happened due to economic interests (burghers). They could not become to economically powerful, their ressources had to be pulled in the hands of a centralized power.

3 institutional outcomes:

  • Sovereign states: need a centralized power for economic growth.
  • City states: capitalist class was wealthy —> no need for pooling resources.
  • City leagues: weak enforcement of pooling resources.

—> Insittutional makeup of sovereign states, ability for the state to create standardized rules and enforce them.

  • Selection of sovereign state: law-enforcement and transaction costs reduction (economic growth), inter unit relations: lower commitment problems.
81
Q

What is the Pareto frontier?

A

The line on a bargaining graph that makes up all the best choice combinations. The benefits of cooperation have been maximized, but the division between two states is different. At any point below the Pareto frontier, is a suboptimal deal, the pie is not as large as it could be.

82
Q

What is the difference between theories, explanations, and paradigms?

A

Theories: refers to a more abstract phenomenon that we are trying to explain. Does no tréfler to a specific event (e.g. the theory of war).

Explanations: can relate to a specific phenomenon. explanations may be derived from the same theory.

Paradigm: the set of fundamental assumptions that a theory relies on and is built on.

83
Q

What are characteristic of a realist worldview?

A
  1. Anarchy: formal absence of government.
  2. Predominant actors: sovereign states, the main actor is the state.
    - National interest is survival and security (self-help system).Powerful states = increased chances of survival.
    - States are unitary actors —> military power distinguishes states.
  3. States act rationally —> strategic actors that make decisions based on the goal of maximizing their security. Egoistic state.
84
Q

What do anarchic/rational states do to maximize their security (power)?

A
  1. Internal strategy: economic development, military buildup.
    - Becoming wealthier —> buy military power —> more security.
  2. External strategy: alliance, war (very limited cooperation).
    - Alliance: states can help each other, rationalists don’t rely on alliances.
    - War: neutralizing potential threats to your survival by attacking other states.
85
Q

What are the characteristics of neorealism (structural realism)?

A
  1. Anarchy: puts states under a system that makes war a constant consideration —> states act in response to the possibility of war.
  2. Power: states need power in the self-help system to protect themselves and enhance their level of survival.
  3. Power politics: every interaction has to do with increasing their power relative to other states, they will never do something that will make them weaker.
  4. International politics are explained by the polarity of the system.
    - polarity is important to realists because it will determine the dynamic of the system: which alliances will occur, which wars will occur.
86
Q

Explain anarchy and the security dilemma.

A

You can never rely on your neighbours, never sure how they will use their power. To protect yourself from the possibility of a future attack, you increase your power so that you are not at a power disadvantage —> other states do the same. You end up less safe since everyone is arming up.

87
Q

What is the difference between defensive néoréalistes and offensive néoréalistes. What about a global hegemony?

A
  1. Defensive (neo)realism: focus on the maximization of security.
    - Increasing power to protect themselves.
    - More power does not mean more security —> there is a threshold. Other states may form alliances against you if you get too powerful —> too powerful is a threat.
    - If you pass that threshold, you are undermining your security.
  2. Offensive (neo)realism: strict focus on power.
    - Security depends on power, but the more power you have , the more security you have. More power is always better.
    - There is no threshold and the optimal level is infinity.
  3. Global hegemony:
    - It is very unsafe to amass a certain amount of power between the threshold and erode the curve, which will undermine security.
    - If you are able to pass that stage, you get so much power compared to the rest and become the hegemony.
    - Greater amount of security, but it is risky to get there.
88
Q

What are some assumptions that neoliberal institutionalist and néoréalistes shared and disagree about?

A
  1. Anarchy: main characteristic of the international system for both.
    - Realists: anarchy makes cooperation unfeasible.
    - NLI: anarchy allows for cooperation in major areas, but not minor or short term.
  2. State-centrism.
    - NLI also focus on the state rather than other types of actors is important and a useful strategy.
  3. Self-interest.
    - NLI assume that security and power are not the only interests that need to be pursued, but it it obviously trumps and controls the behaviour of the state.
  4. Rationality: shared assumption.
    - Acting rationally and making strategic choices.
89
Q

Explain interdependence in terms of the neoliberal POV.

A

The idea that the fate of the state, especially the economic fate and the development of the state, depends on each other, an interdependence exists between states. Interdependence creates common interests ad give rise to opportunities for cooperation. States may face problems with cooperation, but can come up with strategies to overcome these problems.

90
Q

How can international regimes help overcome cooperation problems in the neoliberal perspective?

A

Also referred to as international institutions/rules.

These institutions facilitate cooperate between states and help states. the level interstate cooperation in the world would be much lower without international regimes that facilitate cooperation according to neoliberalists.

This is a big difference from realism.

91
Q

What is the difference between neoliberal institutionalist and realists in terms of cooperation?

A

Realists: the interactions between states is always a zero-sum game because interests are contradictory.

  • Power trumps everything, gaining power in relation to a state means that the other state lost power.
  • they are opponents, there is no benefit or opportunity for advantage.

Neoliberals: there are interactions that result in a zero-sum game, but many are non-zero sum game.

  • Brings states together that share common interest. It implies that two states can win at the same time, they can be partners and not opponents.
  • Creates opportunities for cooperation in the anarchic world.
92
Q

What is a positional state? What is an atomistic state?

A

Positional: only relative gains matter.

  • Value of their gains out of a given interaction in light of the loss of another state. Focus on relative gains and losses.
  • Realists assume that states are positional actors.

Atomistic state: only absolute gains matter.

  • States that don’t care about their partner’s gains or losses, they care about their absolute gains.
  • Neoliberals assume that states are atomistic actors —> can be positional in times of international crisis.
93
Q

Even if inter-state cooperation makes sense due to common interests, why do realists not cooperate?

A

Realists say that there are absolute gains to be obtained from cooperation, but the concern for relative gains trumps this and makes those absolute gains unattainable.

By going after the absolute gains, states risk their survival. So, it is very rare for states to engage in inter-state cooperation.

94
Q

Explain the difference between offensive realists, defensive realists, and neoliberals in terms of cooperation.

A

Offensive realists: inevitability of conflict.
- Zero-sum game, there is always a winner and a loser —> cooperation is unlikely.

Defensive realists: limited feasibility of cooperation.

  • Once states achieve a certain level of military power, they can relax their obsession with power and security.
  • they consider cooperation that refer to absolute gains if it does not come with relative losses —> they can afford some absolute gain while losing a little relative to their partner.
  • Only happens when a certain level of security is reached —> never for offensive realists.

Neoliberals: international institutions.

  • Focus on pointing out the many common interests between states and that states can be more atomistic than positional .
  • International institutions are facilitators of interstate cooperation whenever they face cooperation problems.
95
Q

Explain the characteristics of constructivism.

A

—> challenges many assumptions that both realism and neoliberalism share.

  1. Idealism vs. materialism.
    - R and NL missed the social nature of international politics.
    - States are social actors and their interactions are social.
    - Material factors are interpreted by ideas/beliefs —> critique of material basis of the other paradigms.
  2. Norms: the social construction of international politics.
    - The belief of how a state is supposed to behave given their political organization and their norms.
  3. International anarchy and international change.
    - Agree that the international system is anarchic.
    - Not necessarily a self-help system, there are social instituions that prevent this.
96
Q

What is the Rational Choice approach?

A

Explaining international politics as the outcome of individual goal-seeking decision.
- Explanations proceed in terms of identifying the relevant rational actors, the goals they seek, and their ability to achieve their goals through rational calculations (maximization of the actors utility).

97
Q

Explain why the Rational Choice approach has only very substantive commitments.

A
  1. Any actor’s choices can be modelled as rational choices.
    - Does not need to refer to a specific actor.
  2. Behaviour can be oriented to any goals.
  3. Goal-seeking can be constrained by obstacles internal or external to the rational actor.
    - Choices need to be coordinated to achieve the preferred outcome —> if the other actro does not behave rationally, it may affect the outcome if the actor behaves rationally.
    - Another obstacle is missing information —> preferred outcome is not achieved.
98
Q

What are the characteristics of Rational Choice Theory?

A
  1. Needs to make more substantive commitments.
    - Choice about the relevant actors/rational decision makers in the theory (states, political leader, non-government, etc.).
    - Specific goals.
  2. What is rational about the choice is not the goal it seeks but the relationship between goal and choice.
    - A goal is never rational; an action is rational (in light of a given goal).
    - Rational Choice explains behaviour (endogenous), not goals (exogenous).
99
Q

How does Rational Choice work?

A
  1. The actor will consider the possible strategies/courses of action/paths that can be taken.
  2. The actor with determine the outcome of each path.
  3. The actor will rank-order the outcomes for the highest utility. What are the preferred outcomes?
    - Based on the actor’s interests and preferences.

—> Only true information can take the actor to their more preferred outcome.

100
Q

What are the disconnects with rationalism?

A
  1. The rational actor: real of ideal?
    - They need to act as if they were rational, whether they truly are or not.
  2. Unfalsified theories - plagued with ad hoc adjustments made to the theory.
    - Creating a model that will predict the behaviours you observe.
  3. Rationalism cannot be tested as an approach to the study of politics.
    - Does not make any substantive commitments in terms of their actors and goals —> very flexible and can be filled by different theories.
  4. Testing rationalism against its rivals.
    - Compatible with other theories.
  5. Impossibility of rational calculations.
    - Perfect rational calculations requires receiving all information relevant to the choice —> impossible.
101
Q

What are the cognitive limits of rationality?

A
  1. Cognitive short-cuts used to process heavy information and quickly —> create distortions of the conclusions (e.g. analogies).
  2. Cognitive dissonance: staying within the psychological comfort zone.
    - Tendency to discount evidence inconsistent with the individual’s prior beliefs and focusing on evidence that is consistent.
    - Wrong interpretation of facts —> making wrong decisions that are consistent with prior beliefs.
  3. Attribution.
    - Thinking everyone’s actions are towards them —> increased conflict.
  4. Prospect theory: distinguishing the objective value of expected utility and subjective value of some action’s utility.
102
Q

Explain the Prospect theory.

A

Distinguishing the objective value of expected utility and subjective psychological value of some action’s tilts. Investors value gains and losses differently, placing more weight on perceived gains versus perceived losses.

  • The rational actor’s utility function: unbiased perception of the value of an income.
  • Not neutral about risks: less willingness to take risks when things are good (risk aversion) and more risks when things are bad (risk acceptance) - different subjective values.
  • We place a greater value on avoiding losses due to the associated negative impact.
103
Q

Define the following: dominant startegy, nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimal outcome, expected outcome.

A

Dominant strategy: a startegy that is the best response to whatever the other player does.

Nash equilibrium: a combination of strategies (one from each player), each of which is the best response to each other.

Pareto-optimal outcome: a combination of strategies (one from each player), such that not combination strategies would make at least one player better off without making anyone worse off.

Expected outcome: the cohabitation of strategies (one from each player) determined by each player’s maximization of their expected payoff.

104
Q

What do states fight over during war?

A
  1. Territory.
    - Natural resources, mineral, farm land (all good for the economy).
    - Strategic geographic location (military advantage) or entice/religious values.
  2. National policy.
    - Trying to force other states to give up a policy (e.g. nuclear weapons).
    - Contrary to a state’s national interest.
  3. Regime type.
    - Cannot stop a state from doing something, but need to get the leaders out of the regime and change the political regime to prevent future invasions.
    - Human rights violations.
  4. Ethnic or religious divisions.
105
Q

Define the following in terms of cooperation and bargaining: reversion outcome, bargaining power, crisis bargaining.

A

Reversion outcome: outcome that results when no bargaining is reached —> process fails to produce a new agreement.

Bargaining power: power resources that each player comes with when they sit at the negotiation table. Depend on the relative satisfaction with the reversion outcome.

  • Satisfied = willing to reject a deal.
  • If they are not satisfied = need a deal = weakness (desperate).

Crisis bargaining: bargaining under a threat of war.
- Reversion outcome has changed —> it is now war.

106
Q

What are the two types of information used during the bargaining process?

A
  1. Capabilities:
    - refers to the ability to win a war, military capabilities. Determines the positioning of P (state A’s capabilities relative to state B’s - a weaker state will have their ideal point further away).
  2. Resolve:
    - The willingness of a state to fight over the good they are bargaining over - how much does the state value the good.
    - If a state is more willing to fight for something, they will put their capabilities to greater use.
    - Also determines P.
107
Q

What are the two bargaining mistakes that private information (capabilities and resolve) may lead to?

A
  1. Yielding too little.
    - A state isn’t willing to give anything, which results in war.
    - Not enough deals are happening.
  2. Demanding too much.
    - May be pushing for a deal, but the other state will be willing to go to war - the state should have demanded less.
    - If they had known the real bargaining range, they would have asked for less.
108
Q

In what ways can states can show their incentive to misrepresent?

A
  1. Exaggerate their own strengths and hide their weakness.
    - They want to present themselves as having lots of capabilities and resolve to help them get a better deal.
    - It will move the opponent’s perception of the bargaining range closer to the state’s ideal to get out of the negotiation with a better deal.
  2. The risk-return trade-off.
    - Trade-pff between the state’s willingness to get the best deal possible and the willingness to avoid war.
    - Both states will be pushing in opposite directions of the bargaining range —> risky, it can lead to bargaining failure.
109
Q

How can lack of information be resolved by communicate in a credible manner to avoid bargaining failure?

A
  1. Tying hands: making a public statement/commitment about not taking a deal.
    - Adds credibility to the promise —> reputation.
    - The other state has an incentive to believe that you will through with the war threat.
  2. Paying for power: notorious military buildup.
    - Shows other states that you are prepping for war, public preparation.
    - Shows that the war threat is not a bluff due to investment costs and energy while preparing for war.
  3. Brinkmanship: approaching the slippery slope.
    - Taking actions that would make the risk of accidental war very high, any move can result in war.
    - Getting very close to war to send a credible threat to the other state that you’ve are serious about the war threat.
110
Q

What are the strategic problems in terms of war as a bargaining failure?

A
  1. Incomplete information.
  2. Commitment problems.
    - First-strike advantage: preemptive war.
    - Future bargaining advantage: preventive war.
  3. Indivisible goods.
111
Q

Explain war as a bargaining failure in terms of indivisible goods:

A

—> the more divisible the good, the more likely the deal will fall within the bargaining range. Certain goods cannot be divided —> peace is unlikely.

  1. Indivisibility can be socially constructed:
    - States frame a good as indivisible - cannot conceive the good to be divisible because it would lose value (e.g. a painting).
    - Divisibility can be can be socially constructed - if states engage in negotiation that includes rethinking the good and retain its value - might overcome the obstacle of Indivisibility.
  2. Claims of indivisibility might be strategic:
    - States will present a good as being indivisible in the eyes of their rival, hoping they will get the entire good - getting out of the deal with a better outcome.
  3. Allegedly “indivisible” goods can be divisible.
    - States may need to engage in ways to find the divisibility of the good.
112
Q

How can we make war less likely?

A
  1. Raise the costs of war.
    - Acquiring nuclear weapons or integrated economies lead to interdependence (more costly in terms of disruption of international trade).
  2. Increase transparency.
    - Solves the issue of lack of information and wrong perception - the perception gap gets smaller and overlap in the bargaining range.
    - Monitoring technologies, international organizations (inspectors for nuclear weapons).
  3. Outside enforcement.
    - Commitment that evolves a third party, making it difficult to back down —> credible commitment not to exploit a state’s weakness.
    - UN peacemakers to prevent states from sudden wars.
  4. Divide indivisible goods.
    - Bargaining over a package of different goods instead of one - the package can be divided.
113
Q

What is the balance of power?

What is the realist’s balance of power theory?

A

A situation in which power is distributed equally among the great powers in the international system in terms of material and military power.

Balance of power theory: a systemic tendency toward equilibrium in the system. Focuses on the mechanisms that are going to restore the balance that was upset.

114
Q

Why do systems tend to a balance of power? What are the two types of actors?

A

Realist states seek security. Power is needed for security. These can be reached by maintaining a balanced distribution of power - preventing a state from becoming too powerful, too threatening —> security is reached this way.

Power-gap minimizers and power-gap maximizers.

115
Q

Explain the difference between power-gap minimizers and maximizers in a balance of power system.

A

Minimizers: they wants to intentionally maintain a balanced distribution of power (intended outcome).

  • Defensive realists.
  • Balancing strategies/foreign policies.

Maximizers: they try to reach an unbalanced distribution of power tilted in their favour to ensure security.

  • Offensive realists.
  • Unintended outcome: when a maximizer tries to gain power, other states will too.
  • From the POV of offensive realists, everyone wants to be the global hegemon.

—> both seek a balanced distribution of power.

116
Q

What are the two types of balancing?

A

Balancing: foreign policy aimed at preventing a rising power from being too hegemonic —> power-gap minimizers.

  1. Internal balancing: militarizing - increase military power.
    - To restore the balance of power when a state has gotten too powerful, a state will increase their military power to match the rival state, bringing back the balance.
    - Economic development - money can be converted to power.
  2. External balancing: making alliances with other states, with the goal of restoring/maintaining the balance of power.
    - Defensive in nature: forming an alliance neutralizes the military power of a growing state. They are not more powerful than all states together.
    - Can be offensive: not to defend each other, but to go to war together against the same enemy.
117
Q

What is bandwagoning? Why do states bandwagon? Why is it less common than balancing?

A

Bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing, especially with external balancing. It is allying with the dominant power, as opposed to allying against the most powerful state.

  • Appeasement (defence): protecting yourself from becoming the next target.
  • Ambition (offense): sharing the rewards of war with the dominant state.

Balancing is more common. There is an uncertainty of intentions - bandwagoning implies that you are an ally with a more powerful states, but you will help the powerful state become more powerful —> they might come after you the next day if it is in their interests.

118
Q

How should states act if they are in a world of bandwagoners? What about a world of balancers?

A

Bandwagoners:

  • Threatening, agressive states are rewarded by these actions. Bandwagoners are going to jump on your bandwagon if you can prove to be most aggressive.
  • Demonstrating aggressiveness is the best strategy since others will join you instead of going against you.

Balancers:

  • Threatening, aggressive states provokes resistance - upsets the balance of powers and the balancer want to bring it back.
  • Demonstrating self-restraint is the best strategy. Present yourself to be respectful of others - the state has its own power capabilities but won’t use it against others - needs to be credible.
119
Q

What is the Brezhnev Doctrine?

A

The use of Soviet military force when necessary to maintain the rule of the Communist Party in East European countries.

120
Q

How did Gorbachev end the Brezhnev Doctrine?

A

Instead of applying the Brezhnev Doctrine (sending troops to suppress revolts), he decided to give way of a reformed version of socialism —> allowing civil societies to express themselves and create their own form of communism, they can have their own domestic politics but foreign policy must be aligned with that of the Soviet Union’s.

This failed: when they were given more freedom to express and organize themselves, anti-communist regimes came to power. Led to the contagion effect.

Narrower definition of the national interest of USSR:
- less concerned with the universalist projection of communism and more with trying to maintain stability within the states, trying to maintain control of its civil society.

121
Q

Explain US and USSR cooperation after the CW.

A
  • The US would not threaten the USSR and take advantage of it while it was going through its domestic crisis or encourage greater autonomy in Eastern Europe.
  • Invitation of Gorbachev to join the community of nations by the US —> reintegration of the reformed Soviet Union into the rest of the international system.
  • Us-Soviet cooperation in the UN Security Council.
122
Q

Analyze the end of the CW.

A
  1. From domestic revolution to systemic change.
    - Change began with Eastern revolutions, then the USSR itself.
    - It is the domestic politics rather than international anarchy and the dynamics of power in the international system that brought about the end of the CW (systemic change).
    - More in line with constructivist and new liberalism POV, not neoliberal.
  2. Balance of power practises were replaced by the practise of multilateralism.
    - More collaboration in global government institutions.
    - Participation of US and Russia in many multilateral institutions.
    - Replaced balance of power practises.
  3. The distribution of material power capabilities changes (bipolar to unipolar) after CW.
123
Q

Define hegemony in the realist POV.

A
  1. Hegemony = domination = unipolarity (or unbalanced multipolarity).
    - Rules and obligations imposed by the dominant state on everyone else —> concentration of power sustains the hegemonic order.
  2. Gilpin’s “prestige”.
    - Prestige = a state’s reputation for power (hard power, material capabilities, military capabilities).
  3. Implications for the stability of hegemonic orders.
    - The hegemony constantly uses its power in order to impose the international order on others.
    - When the hegemony declines —> the hegemonic order declines.
    - The stability of the hegemonic order depends on the stability of the hegemony as the dominant power in the system.
124
Q

Explain hegemony from a constructivist POV.

A
  1. Hegemony = legitimate domination.
    - A relation of domination in the international order —> implies rules, obligations.
  2. The roles of power and legitimacy.
    - Actors diffuse an ideology and have others internalize it = socialization (convinced themselves of the goodness of the ideology or beneficial to them).
    - Does not spread automatically —> power is important in the distribution (soft or hard).
  3. Implications for the stability of hegemonic orders.
    - Does not depend of the stability of a particular hegemony as the dominant state. It has legitimacy rather than being imposed by a powerful state —> the order will survive changes in the distribution of pwoer.
125
Q

What are the three modes of social control (sources of obedience) in the international order?

A
  1. Coercion: the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers (realism).
    - The asymmetry that exists between the dominant and subordinate state has to do with physical capacity (i.e. hard power).
  2. Self-interest: the actor sees the rules as in its own self-interest (liberalism).
    - Given distribution of incentives and bargaining leverage.
    - The states that have more bargaining power over others are the ones that will have more ability to shape the international order and to influence the way others behave.
  3. Legitimacy: the actor feels the rules are legitimate and should be obeyed (constructivism).
    - Compliance is normatively driven, results of having internalized norms that establish the legitimacy of the order to begin with.
    - Soft power is key.
126
Q

Explain the realist’s compliance with sovereignty and its problems.

A

The practise of respecting state’s borders and the internal autonomy of these states is sustained by material deterrence. Sovereignty as a shared belief does not matter —> what matters is the label for the pattern that emerges from the material pressures that exist when there is an uncertainty of power.

Problem: many international borders are largely undefended and indefensible by one side because of the overwhelming force on the other side (anticipated consequences of an attack). Today’s system of sovereign states cannot be primarily a product of material deterrence or the coercion model of social control.

127
Q

Explain the liberalist’s compliance with sovereignty and its problems.

A

Wars have become obsolete because conquering territory is not as profitable as it used to be.

  • Economic interdependence encourages peace between self-interested states.
  • Liberal democratic rulers may be constrained by their voters to respect the sovereignty rights of other liberal democracies —> democratic peace theory.
  • Sovereignty is respected to build a reputation for cooperation.

Problem: we do not always see the process of constantly recalculating the costs and benefits of violating sovereignty but then decide not to do it —> always in the state’s mind. We see that borders are taken for granted. There is a heavy bias for the status quo. The absence of thinking about the international system as a sovereignty is evidence that there has to be legitimacy.

128
Q

Explain the constructivist’s compliance with sovereignty and its problems.

A

The compliance with sovereignty results from the internalization of the sovereignty norms by states —> their acceptance of the norm as legitimate. Respecting sovereignty is the appropriate thing to do, so they do it.

129
Q

Explain the relationship between legitimacy, authority, and anarchy.

A

Anarchy: absence of the structure of authority.

Authority: legitimized power, most compliance is unproblematic and only occasional deviance needs to be policed.

When an actor internalizes a rule because it perceives the rule to be legitimate, that rules takes on the quality of authority over the actors —> partly determines its behaviour. Power needs to be understood in the sense of authority and legitimized power, not coercion.

The international system can be thought of as a system of decentralized authority governed by rules and norms that actors conform to our of an internal sense of rightness, out of the fact that they see these results as legitimate and authoritative.

130
Q

Socialization is the inducement of what 2 things?

A
  1. The internalization of social reality as the natural state of the world (norms).
    - Includes the internalization of social norms that make up that specific social reality.
  2. The adoption of role-identities therein.
    - That belongs in the specific social reality —> identities of sovereign state, great power, rogue state, etc.
131
Q

What is hegemonic socialization?

A

The generation of shared beliefs in the acceptability of legitimacy of a given international order.

  • Hegemonic socialization is the socialization of states into a given hegemonic order.
  • Socialization does not need to be strategic. Socialization is not frequently controlled or strategically steered by any actors, but takes a course of its own.
132
Q

What are the 3 main mechanisms of hegemonic socialization?

A
  1. Normative persuasion:
    - Normative persuasion —> norm change —> policy change.
    - Subordinate states are first socialized and then follow conformity with the hegemonic order by the adoption of policies which are in conformity with the rules that constitute the order.
  2. External inducement.
    - External inducement —> policy change (cooperation through coercion/self-interest) —> norm change.
    - Compliance occurs through coercion and the inducement of positive incentives to comply —> hegemony uses economic and military incentives to induce the subordinate state to change its policies into conformity with the hegemonic state.
  3. Internal reconstruction:
    - Internal reconstruction —> policy change (through imposition) —> norm change.
    - The hegemon directly intervenes in the subordinate states and transforms its domestic political institutions.
133
Q

Explain the failed attempt of the Pax Americana.

A
  • Goal: replace old diplomatic practises between the great powers with a system of collective security and free trade (multilateralism institutions put in place).

—> Elites in France and Britain were unpersuaded:

  1. No domestic political crisis.
    - crisis = window of opportunity for normative persuasion.
  2. No economic or military incentives —> no “hegemon”
    - Lack of external inducement —> US was not ready to act as a hegemon, could not economically or militarily persuade the countries.
134
Q

Explain the successful attempt of the Pax Americana after WW2.

A

Goal: replace old diplomatic practises between the great powers with a system of collective security and free trade (multilateralism institutions put in place).

  1. US exerted external inducement on Britain and France.
    - Marshall Plan: Europe’s economic renewal and political integration.
    - Massive flow of money, and economic success over time.
  2. Germany and Japan’s internal reconstruction following the occupation.
    - Germany: federalization and democratization and trade liberalization.
    - Japan: constitutionalization.
    —> Well integrated in the Pax Americana, came together with other countries as key pillars of the international order led by the US.
135
Q

What are the sources of instability in unipolarity?

A
  1. Balance of power theory.
  2. Counter-hegemonic balancing.
    - Regional rivalries / regional balancing (balancing against other rivals = unintended rise of power).
  3. The lazy hegemon.
    - Different incentives (rise in power of revisionist states and stability in hegemon).
  4. The overburdened hegemon.
    - Hegemon pays mosts costs to support hegemonic order, challengers grows faster in power and power gap becomes smaller).
136
Q

What are the sources of stability in unipolarity?

A
  1. The unipolar threshold —> too powerful to be balanced.
    - Free-riding and defection on counter hegemonic cooperation.
    - Internal balancing as self-defeating (cannot protect yourself from the hegemon because it is so powerful —> bandwagoning and alliances for protection, no counter-hegemon).
    - Regional versus global imperatives (offshore hegemon, balancing happens mostly regionally, hegemon can be an ally).
  2. Nuclear balancing.
    - Having nuclear weapons makes the power preponderance of the hegemon more tolerable for states.
    - Hegemonic war is too costly when nuclear weapons are involved.
137
Q

Should the hegemon engage with other states or isolate itself in international affairs?

A

Engaging = stability.

  1. Reliance on the hegemon for security alliances —> protection from regional threats by conventional and nuclear US weapons.
    - No security alliance = arms race = unintentional rise in power of subordinate states.
  2. Selective intervention.
    - Engagement as a bully —> undermines stability.
    - Engagement by alliances —> maintains stability.
138
Q

What is a benign hegemon?

A

Powerful, but not threatening. Depends on the reputation they have built, how they are using their power. Foreign policy (the way it exercises power) will make the difference between a benign hegemon or a hegemon that should be feared.

Bullying and threatening or imposing power on others creates a benign hegemon.

139
Q

What are the 5 core elements of the Western liberal order that render itself sustaining and resistant to power shifts?

A
  1. Security co-binding.
    - Security interdependence between states that further consolidates the commitment towards this particular order.
  2. Penetrated reciprocal hegemony.
    - Transparency and permeability of US government.
    - many access points for decision making, input of interests —> influences American decision making
  3. Semi-sovereign and partial great powers.
    - Internal reconstruction of revisionist states (the internal reconstruction as a general rule constitute of the western, liberal international order) —> self impose limitations in constitutions.
    - Great powers have limited power capabilities.
  4. Economic openness.
  5. Civic identity.
    - Collective identity that gives cohesiveness and solidarity to the international order
140
Q

How do we balance the soft power of the US?

A
  1. Limited/indirect warfare.
  2. Balancing soft power.
    - Soft “culture war.”
    - Competition over attention and credibility.
    - Anti-hegemonic ideologies.
141
Q

Is China really a revisionist state?

A

Yes and no lol

142
Q

What is institutional balancing?

A

A form of soft balancing. Refers to the institutional resources to force the hegemon to retrain itself or break the rules of its own hegemonic order.
- Source of stability and instability.

143
Q

Explain war as a mechanism of systemic change in terms of revolutionary vs. Incremental changes.

A

Lol

144
Q

What was the outcome of the Concert of Europe?

A
  1. Concerts resolve security dilemmas —> states can cooperate.
    - offense/defence balance.
    - satisfaction with status quo —> defensive attitude (no preventive or preemptive war).
    - defensive attitude is dominant.
  2. Payoff matrix is changed —> mutual defection (war) is costly. Incentive for mutual cooperation. Greater transparency,
  3. Self-enforcing settlement —> threat against changes in the system is credible.
145
Q

Explain the strategy of cooperation in terms of altering the payoff structure.

A

Unilateral measures:

- security dilemma resolved, distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. 
- publicize your commitment, reduces the gains from defection. 
- problem: risk of exploitation.  - Issue-linkage (conditional play): looking at different games as if they were linked.  - Transparency: reduction of private information.
146
Q

Explain the strategy of cooperation in terms of lengthening the shadow of cooperation.

A

—> future cooperation depends on current cooperation, different gains in future cooperation.

  • Reputation: reputation for cooperation enhances future cooperation and obtain gains.
  • Issue-linkage (conditional play): link between present behaviour and future cooperation, state’s strategy depends on another state’s behaviour (e.g. tit for tat).
  • Strategies of reciprocity conditional play).
    • Problem of recognition.
    • Problem of control.
147
Q

Explain the strategy of cooperation in terms of a reduced number of players.

A
  • More players = less cooperation: (less common interests, more coordination is required, less transparency in terms of defection).
    —> states can cooperate regionally instead of globally.
148
Q

What is the endowment effect? What theory does this relate to?

A

The endowment effect: valuing what you own more than what you don’t have. Losing something that you have represents a greater loss than gaining something you did not have. Framing something as a potential loss or a potential gain can lead to a different decision.

Relates to prospect theory.

149
Q

What is reactive devaluation? What theory does it relate to?

A

Reactive devaluation: dismissing or discounting some value from a deal offered by the deal. The deal would have more value if it came from the individual and not a different party/rival —> psychological bias - leads to different outcomes and negotiations.

Prospect theory.