POLI 244 Flashcards

Question

What is the structure of the international system made of in terms of Material vs. Social structures? (Neorealist vs. Constructivism)

Answer 1

1. Neorealism —> material capabilities. - Realism and liberalism assume that material capabilities are the main structure of the international system. - It is what varies state to state: relates to the relative power each state has and distinguishes them. International structure is a result of the distribution of material capabilities among states. 2. Constructivism —> social relations. - The social structures generate social relationships between states —> relationships are not material in nature.

Answer 2

1. Shared understandings/expectations. - Shared ideas/beliefs of states, which determine the nature of their relationships. A change in the constitutive rules of the institution affects the nature of the actors and a change of constitutive norms (e.g. slavery) —> changes power relations. - Affects the security dilemma and the security community. 2. Material resources. - Material resources matter, but only acquire meaning fo human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded (e.g. acquisition of war ships in terms of security dilemma or security community). - Material resources are the same, but the meaning of acquisition is different. 3. Practises. - Social structures exist in social practises. If the practises stop, the value is lost (e.g. foreign money).

Answer 3

Social structures are not subjective, but intersubjective. Structures cannot be reproduced or destroyed by individual subjects, they are a collective phenomena. Structures are constructed through interactions of the individuals that make the collective —> the individual alone has no power to change it alone, transformation of social structures needs to be collective.

Answer 4

—> Constructivist critique: 1. Norms. - not all behavioural is rational, some is driven by norms that are internalized by the state. 2. Pre social nature of preferences. - realists and liberals take state interest as given. But, state interest is not given or fixed, state interests and preferences are a product of practises between states —> can be changed through practise. 3. Practises are the key element that constructs social structures —> constitutive state with constitutive rules that make up their own actors with their own identities and interests. —> Realist. - Social structures are in a self-help structure = positional identities. - Results in competitive interests —> leads to rational choices. - Interactions that result from rational choices will constitute international politics as power politics. - State interactions reproduce self-help structure, which reproduces the social structure/interests.

Answer 5

1. Stimulus requiring action. 2. State A’s definition of the situation. - Based on A’s identities and interests. 3. State A’s action. - Intersubjective understandings and expectations possessed by and constitutive of A and B. 4. State B’s interpretation of state A’s action and B’s own definition of the situation. - It has to understand the meaning of state A’s action before reacting, through its identities and interests. 5. State B’s action. - B reacts to the action through intersubjective understandings and expectations, which are constitutive of the identities and interests of state A and B. —> Constructivist POV: Interactions can reproduce the social structures that they are a result of, but they can also transform the social structures. There is room for deviating behaviour (e.g. security dilemma —> security community).

Answer 6

1. The external cost of deviance: the harsher the environment is on deviant behaviour, the more difficult it will be to transform the system —> resistance to change . - Once constituted, any social system confront each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain practises and discourages others. 2. The internal cost of cognition: tendency to confirm existing beliefs about the social world. Questioning the nature of the word generates anxiety, it is not easy. - The major practises that need to be changed in order to change the system are typically interlocked with other associated practises as well as associated actors who have vested interests in those practises.

Answer 7

Constructivistes argue that some norms (collective understandings/beliefs) might relax the rigidity of self-help systems —> sovereignty is one such norm (if sovereign states stopped the practises that made them sovereign states, in terms of authority, their identity as a sovereign would disappear). Sovereignty is the mutual recognition of one another’s rights to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits. It is the mutual recognition that states have territorial property rights. Community of sovereign states —> community of states acting in accord with the norm of sovereignty. - States can rely on the institutional fabric of international security, and less on the individual. Do not need to be constantly preoccupied about being attacked by another state.

Answer 8

1. Hobbesian anarchy. - Described by realism where states have competitive interests. 2. Locke an anarchy. - Assumed by néolibéral institutionnalise where states have individualistic interests which allow for many levels of cooperation between states. - States have reconstructed their identities and interests (individualistic rather than competitive). Common interests become abundant, more opportunities and desire for cooperation. 3. Kantian anarchy. - Individualistic interests are replaced with collective interests. - According to constructivists, a sustained practise of cooperation may lead to the construction of collective identities rather than self-interested identities.

Answer 9

1. Incremental, slow, and usually unintended process of policies pursued for other reasons rather than the intentional effort to transcend existing institutions. 2. Path dependent process. - Presupposes that some evolution in this direction has already happened. - Presupposes that states don’t identify negatively with one another, being concerned with relative losses and define their own welfare as opposed to the welfare of others. - States can’t jump from a Hobbesian state of nature to a Kantian security community —> they have to go through the Lockean culture of anarchy.

Answer 10

1. Breakdown of consensus. - Collective knowledge shared by the actors is called into question. 2. Denaturalization of existing identities/interests. 3. Change in one’s practises. - Replacement of old practises (generative of old identities) with new practises (generative of new identities). The goal is to change the nature of social interactions between actors in a state —> acquire new identities and interests. 4. Change in collective practises. - Reciprocity of revolutionary practises by other states —> encouragement of this practise by others (rewarded by others). - True transformation of social relationships between states —> moves toward a community of states with collective identity as opposed to being trapped in a security dilemma or self-help system.

Answer 11

Standards of behaviour for actors with a given identity in a given social context. They attach meaning to certain behaviours and define what actions are right or appropriate under particular circumstances. A norm tells you what the right thing is to do given who you are and given the social context. The more internalized norms are, the more powerful they are in shaping our behaviour, ans the less we are aware of them. Norms can also define who is a legitimate actor and who is not (e.g. sovereign statehood).

Answer 12

1. The logic of consequences (rationalism). - The actor makes a choice as to how to behave because there are certain interests/preferences that the actor has, and given certain pieces of information, the actor can anticipate the consequences of the different courses of actions that they face. - Given the preferences/interests, the actors ranks all the consequences and identifies the preferred one —> they choose the behaviour associated with the expected consequences. 2. The logic of appropriateness. - The social actor needs to make a behavioural decision with a certain social identity of who they are and they find themselves in a social context. - Given the social identity and the social context —> they will asses the different course of action then identify different levels of appropriateness —> the right thing to do given who they are and the social context they find themselves in.

Answer 13

Appropriateness: - It is through social construction and the process of socialization associated with the social construction of facts that the social actors acquire a given social identity. - The norms we have internalized give meaning to a certain context we interpret. - Norms help evaluate the appropriateness of the different courses of actions available. Consequences: - The interests we associate with the rational actor are the result of the process of social construction/socialization —> formation of preferences. - The actor has these preferences because they have been socialized into internalizing certain norms (but not others) —> determines a set of preferences.

Answer 14

1. The logic of appropriateness imbedded within the logic of consequences. - Start with a set of preferences, then assess the different types of consequences that will follow from different courses of action you may take. Then, you rank order your preferred expected consequences based on your initial goal. - The logic of consequence/expected utility takes precedents, then the logic of appropriateness makes the final decisional move of the actor (e.g. soldiers). 2. The logic of consequences is embedded within the other. - Start with a given norm that you have internalized, this determines your interest. - When it comes to taking action, we assess the expected consequences of the expected course of action we can take in this context. 3. The two logics operating independently, rather than one being embedded in the other. - A behavioural choice made through the logic of consequences, another by the logic of appropriateness. - If they both point in the same behavioural direction: we make a choice because the expected utility mandated that we should do it ans because appropriateness appropriated that we should do it. If they don’t point in the same behavioural direction: what you end up doing depends on which of the two logics is going to prevail in a specific scenario.

Answer 15

Stage 1: Norm emergence. - Norm entrepreneurs: individuals/groups with strong beliefs about desirable behaviour and want other to adopt it. - Sell their normative beliefs through framing (comprehensible to audience or tying the new norm to already established norms). Stage 2: Norm cascade. - Behavioural conformity: coercion and/or socialization (universal standard). - Transnational pressure: The boomerang model (pressure on the norm by calling out the violation of the norm, affects international reputation —> NGOs). Stage 3: Norm internalization. - Behavioural conformity: automatic. - The norm is taken for granted, unquestioned (widely accepted in the international community). - Redefinition of state interests. —> Norm’s transformation of death (contested and reshaped by social actors) and normative backslides (goes back to a previous stage or norms polarization).

Answer 16

A body of rules that creates rights and obligations for states (and other actors). It is a consent-based system of law. - International law represents a system of contracts between different legal subjects with their consent.

Answer 17

1. Treaties —> explicit consent. - Negotiation by states —> signature (political leaders)—> ratification by the state’s government (the state becomes bound by the provision of the Treaty, it gave it s consent). - Advantages: - Explicit consent —> no issues. - More precision about rules/expectations —> it is written. 2. International customs —> inferred consent. - International customs are unwritten. A rule becomes an international custom when two conditions are met: - Regularity/pattern of custom. - Opinion ours: presumption that there exists a rule of international law that forces me to act in that particular way —> presumption of an obligation. - Issue: validity of consent. - Codification: turning a customary rule into a a rule of treaty, incorporations in written form of rules customary international law.

Answer 18

1. The interpretation problem of international law —> interpretive authority. - There is no one to turn to to understand the interpretation of the treaty (with exceptions). 2. The enforcement problem of international law —> self-help. - There is no one to enforce the treat or coerce whoever violates it to go back into compliance. - anarchic system —> self help. —> both these issues refer to anarchy as the main source of the problem.

Answer 19

1. Reciprocity: violation legitimizes reciprocal violations. - States comply with a treaty they ratified because they expect that if they violate the treaty, then the other parties will violate it as well. - Others violating it harms your interests —> best not to violate it yourself. 2. Retaliation: violation legitimizes retaliatory measures. - The party retaliates if you violate the treaty by harming your interests in another way, interests outside the treaty. 3. Reputation: reputation all costs/benefits (“rogue state”). - Will undermine your ability to enter cooperative agreements with other states in the future. Reputation is built from behaviour —> violating treaties builds a bad reputation —> no cooperative gains.

Answer 20

1. Domestic/transnational compliance constituencies. - Societal actors that benefit directly from the treaty pressure their government against violation of the treaty in when it decides to violate it (e.g. feminist). The societal groups can face direct or indirect harm. 2. Legitimacy costs/benefits (discursive entrapment). - Legitimacy in the act of violating or complying with a treaty —> it can harm your prestige. 3. Socialization and the internalization of international law. - Many rules of international law are said to be complied with because states internalize them —> psychological or political sense.

Answer 21

Maintain international peace and security (e.g. prevent a next world war). —> Articles: - General ban on the use of force between states (illegal declaration of war). - Right to use force in self-Defense. - Right to use force under the authorization of the UN Security Council. It has six primary organs.

Answer 22

- All members of the UN have a seat in this organ. - Primary focus on the discussion of global issues: most conflicts emerge from misinformation/miscommunication, they can be solved through communication. Annual meeting with a broad agenda —> all topics of international politics are covered. - Issues non-binding resolution —> sovereign equality. - Issues are not legally binding —> not a source of law. They do not generate obligations to the state. - They are made in response to the principle of sovereign equality —> every member is given one cote, no privileges. - Codification and development of international law.

Answer 23

- Political organ made up of 15 members (5 permanent with institutional privileges/veto and 10 non-permanent, rotation every 2 years). - Primary purpose: maintain international peace and security. - Creation of peacekeeping missions (by practise, not UN charter). - Peace enforcement powers —> authorization of military measures against an aggressor wen necessary. - Issues legally binding resolutions: - Great power unanimity —> permanent member’s’ veto.

Answer 24

- Headquarters: Netherlands. Composed of 15 judges. - Function: Interstate dispute resolution between states based on international law. - Disputes about how to interpret a given treaty or if one country finds that another has violated an international agreement/custom. - All parties must give their consent to jurisdiction of the court. - Issus legally binding decisions and advisory opinions: - There are legal obligations derived from these decisions. - Advisory opinions —> not legally binding, more abstract statements as to how international law needs to be interpreted. - Limited jurisdiction.

Answer 25

1. State obligations vis-a-vis individuals (and groups). - Not obligations between states, but to their own individuals. 2. The problem of reciprocity as a driver of compliance. - It does not work —> the main condition for reciprocity to work are missing. If a state harms its individuals, t does not harm itself. 3. Huge asymmetry between the right-holder (individuals) and the duty-bearer (government). - the capacity to retaliate the right-holder (the ones whose interests are damaged by the violation of the treaty), their capacity is very limited due to asymmetry. 4. Admits a national “margin of appreciation.” - Ongoing debate between universalism vs. Cultural realism when it comes to universal or international human rights standards. - Should human rights be the same for all countries/societies or should they be sent I’ve to the diversity and culture in the international system? - Can create opportunities for violation of human rights.

Answer 26

1. The primacy of societal actors. - The actors have have an impact on national interest, the state is perceived as an organization of actors, not an individual actor. - National interests depend on the interactions that take place within a given state (different actors, individuals, social groups) and affects the preference of the state. 2. Domestic State preference formation. - The state is not an actor but a biased representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by coalitions of social actors. - The domestic formation of state preference, different interactions by different actor might result in different pressures at the state, different foreign policy agendas. Aggregation of different societal interests.

Answer 27

R+NL: states and their interests are a given. C: the states are a given, but not interests. It tries to understand how interests are formed by looking at inter-state interactions at the international level. Interactions between social actors rather than within state. NL: Tries to understand the formation of interests through domestic processes —> different kinds of actors with diverging interests that pressure the government. The different interests within a state forms preferences which can explain interactions with other states (e.g. influence of a transnational anti-vaccination movement).

Answer 28

1. Formation of state preference. - New Liberal factors. - Looking at different politics and identifying different societal actors and their institutional context with ideational preferences/beliefs/interests —> set of preferences assigned to the state. 2. International area —> interactions within state. - Realist and institutionalist factors. - Strategic interactions (assumed by all paradigms) —> once state preferences are explained, the way the state will behave internationally given the preference 9strategic interactions) determines the systemic outcome. —> NLI + R + C = assumed/given preferences. —> NL = explain preferences.

Answer 29

New Liberals theories focus on the 2nd level of analysis (domestic politics, domestic institutions, domestic societal actors and their interactions within and between states). 1. Domestic causes explain international causes. 2. International causes explain domestic effects. - Reversed image. 3. Domestic interactions. - Two level game. - Looking at both domestic factors and international factors as explanatory actors of both outcomes. - Domestic actors/processes have an impact on international outcomes. International interactions also have an impact on domestic politics.

Answer 30

People’s tendency to become more supportive of their government when they experience dramatic international event or crisis. It may have strategic value for political leaders. Th really effect is short lived and the following effects are less impactful.

Answer 31

- The bargaining range shrinks when there is an incentive to go to war from the rally effect, war is more likely to happen. The status quo is outside the bargaining range because it has shrunk. The status quo become very unstable —> incentive to go to war.

Answer 32

1. There are scope conditions that apply to to the rally effect —> only significant in the context of a domestic crisis of legitimacy. - If there is no crisis, the rally effect would not have that much of an impact on the size of the bargaining range. . 2. Even when there is a crisis, the incentive is limited because usually the immediate political benefits of war are outweighed by the long-term political costs. - The rally effect is short lived and fatigued over time. - As time goes on, the costs of the war will take over and outweigh all the benefits that the leader obtained by the rally effect.

Answer 33

1. Group that enjoys the benefits of the war and pay few costs = hawks: - Leaders, ministry or military (war means a larger budget they enjoy, personal promotion in military careers). - Interest groups (e.g. arms manufacturers), national interest groups (opportunity to assert their sense of national superiority). - General public —> nationalism moves them towards fear. 2. Group that enjoys few benefit and pays most of the costs of war = doves: - Leaders (never ending war, loss of popularity, political cost of war). - Government bureaucracies (meant to find peaceful solutions). - Interest groups (interruption of national trade). - Tax payers.

Answer 34

1. The political influence of specialized bureaucracies. - Military influence (government, threat, dependency, expertise, manipulation). 2. Domestic actors and collective action problems. —> for economic and societal actors, their capacity to influence the government depends on the CAPs that they will face and their biliary to overcome these problems —> free-riding problem. - Size (small vs. Big incentives). - Organization (monitoring behaviour). - Resources (economic and political —> more resources = more influence).

Answer 35

1. State is dominated by dovish interests. - Bargaining range is huge, the costs of war are perceived to be very big because the perception is shaped by the influence of doves on the government. - the chances of both states finding a peaceful solution are larger —> the likelihood of war goes down. 2. State is dominated by hawkish interests. - Bargaining range is very small, the costs of war are perceived to be very small. They focus on the benefit of war. - The likelihood of war increases.

Answer 36

1. Civil war: - A type of armed conflict. - Distinguished by nature of participants: non-state armed groups. 2. Terrorism: - A strategy using violence. - Distinguished by nature of its targets: civilians. Not distinguished by actors involved. - Not necessarily an armed conflict —> it is a strategy. - Triangular logic.

Answer 37

1. Violence used for political goals. 2. Non-state actors: CAP. - How do they avoid free-riding? 3. Asymmetric warfare. - Relatively weak actors fighting powerful states.

Answer 38

1. Grievances. - Mistreatment of minority groups by the government, systematic discrimination or exploitation —> get together to fight against discriminatory status. - Self determination: separatism or irredentism. 2. Greed. - Control over natural resources (diamonds, oil) —> access to lucrative resources controlled by the government. - Control of the state (access to power, money).

Answer 39

1. Group-level explanation. - strong beliefs/motivations (grievances or greed). 2. Country-level explanation. 3. International factors.

Answer 40

1. Strong beliefs, strong motivation (related to greed and grievances). 2. Strong dissatisfaction, strong motivation. 3. Strong solidarity/collective identity (identity element that unites the group, undermines free-riding). 4. Mechanisms of group governance (good leadership). 5. Strong leadership (manipulation —> promoting a sense of identity, monitoring the group).

Answer 41

1. Political institutions. - Unites the group for it to be heard by the government and being partially resolved —> less costly change compared to violence. 2. Political culture. - Some support violence, some don’t. Impacts the ability to act cohesively as a group. 3. An effective apparatus of repression. - Weak apparatus (government) = more incentive to contribute. 4. Wealth. - Cost and resources + wealth reward. 5. Highest risk: wealthy “anocracies”. - Political regimes where there is no effective apparatus of repression, the government is weak —> civil war is not costly/hard —> lots of possible gains —> increases incentives for war to breakout.

Answer 42

1. Aid from outsiders (solidarity, self-interest). | 2. Proxy wars.

Answer 43

—> there is a bargaining range where gov + rebel groups can find a peaceful option, but go to war. 1. Incomplete information. - Yet civil war tends to be long. - Rebel groups have more info about the government —> war reveals information. 2. Commitment problems. - Shifts in balance of power (no promise that the government will not take advantage of rebel group after disarming). - Economic cycles, rebel disarmament (taking advantage of rebel groups during economic upturn). - Rebel group commitment problem —> unpredictability of members. 3. Indivisible goods. - non-negotiable goods, zero-sum approach, no feasible bargaining range.

Answer 44

1. State-sponsored terrorism. - Triangular logic present. - 4th actor —> outside aid (territory, funds/weapons). 2. State terrorism. - The state is the terrorism organization, it carries out terrorist attacks —> typically look for concessions from some militarized group to get something out of it, rather than the government. 3. Transnational terrorism. - Instead of the interactions between actors happen within a state, it happens across national borders.

Answer 45

We may think of terrorism as irrational acts, but the terrorist organization as a whole is a rational actor that responds to the circumstances around them and pick strategies to get what they want. 1. Terrorists are strategic. 2. Terrorists have goals. 3. Terrorists are weak. - They have goals and strategies that they choose to maximize their ability to get those goals in the context of huge constraints they face due to the asymmetry of power—> they are rational actors.

Answer 46

1. Coercion: - Induce policy change by imposing costs on the government due to an attack or a threat of an attack —> fear of civilian population as pressure. - Show credibility —> shows destructive capability —> government can prevent future attacks by giving into demands. 2. Provocation: - Terrorists may take action to provoke a response from the target government. - The overreaction can cause sympathetic audiences t increase support for terrorists —> increases political power and support. 3. Spoiling: - Sabotage or spoil potential peace between target audience and the leadership from their home society —> peace is not credible. 4. Outbidding: - Two or more terrorist go ups compete for support —> can demonstrate its superior leadership through violence —> greater response from target government.

Answer 47

Violence and the threat of violence is used to raise costs for the other bargaining side —> violence is a result of failed bargaining. 1. Incomplete information: - Private and missing information —> may end to strategic mistakes from the government’s side. - Exaggeration of terrorist strength and damage —> threats are not credible (weak). - Revealing information is prohibited. 2. Commitment problems: - Terrorists can demonstrate credibility (disarming, denounce terror, join political process) —> no incentive for the government to keep the compromise. - Unpredictable members —> deals cannot be credible. 3. Indivisibility: - zero-sum game, no compromise. - Indivisibility may be a bargaining strategy.

Answer 48

1. Deterrence (need for credible threat of retaliation —> lack of info). 2. Preemptive offense: stopping terrorist before they strike (selective capturing). - Problem: collateral damage, resentment due to civilian casualties. - Torturing terrorist for info —> backfire: sympathy for terrorists. 3. Defense: measures against terrorists (wall, airport security —> expensive and inconvenient). 4. Criminalization: law enforcement approach. - Difficult for transnational terrorists —> requires cooperation from other countries. 5. Negotiation and compromise: indivisibility issue, signal to other extremist group to use violence.

Answer 49

Significant shifts in the balance of power in the system. It is a materialist conception.

Answer 50

It is not a change in the polarity of a system, but a change in the international order due to a redistribution of material power, the change goes beyond a redistribution of power. 1. International systems are made of settled or routine practises sustained by norms. - Systemic change = change in the norms that sustain these practises. 2. Transformation in or of the international system in terms of its: - Regulative norms (norms that regulate interstate interactions). - Constitutive norms (norms that define the main actor and their capacities) —> mostly associated with systemic change.

Answer 51

1. The CW was the result of a bipolar distribution of power and would continue as long as bipolarity continued. - The CW ended before bipolarity ended. 2. The system could change only through hegemonic war or the emergence of another superpower. - No war occurred during the CW. 3. If the USSR “lost” the CW, the US would eliminate the Soviet threat by asserting its dominance. - USSR and US cooperated. 4. If the USSR imploded, other states (Germany, France) would arm up and form an alliance against the US. - Did not happen lol.

Answer 52

The CW ended because of domestic revolutions in Eastern Europe (and USSR) and Moscow’s reaction to them. CW was made of two Bloc parties: Western bloc (led by US, old style) and Eastern bloc (formal - Soviet empire and informal empire - Eastern European states). Soviet empire took control of domestic political processes, suppressed domestic civil society (maintain communist party rules), Brezhnev doctrine. West responded with “containment” and acceptance of the “iron curtain,” (acceptance of the division of Europe, legitimized Soviet enforcement). Legitimacy deficit in the Eastern Bloc (anti-totalitarian movements created, non violent domestic revolutions). Gorbachev: end of Brezhnev Doctrine. Contagion effect: from the informal empire to the formal empire (different national identities rose and implosion and dismemberment USSR).

Answer 53

Political theory that stresses the role of government on civil society. Useful to understand the state behaviour. 1. States interacts with each other as if they were each unit. 2. The state controls what happens within a territory and across territorial borders. 3. The state has the capacity to extract resources through taxes and allocate those resources in internationally relèvent ways.

Answer 54

1. First image: Individual. - Individual decision makers and their chacretristcis that help us explain a certain outcome. They have different tendencies, personality traits, physical and mental health, etc. 2. Second image: State. - Comparative politics, distinctions between political regimes of a type of government (e.g. Authoritarian vs. Democratic), different world views and beliefs of state —> different outcomes about IR. 3. Third image: International system. - Theories of the international system try to explain patterns of state behaviour or other international phenoemnon by looking at the structure of the international system, not the unit or individuals that make the state —> the way authorities are organized within the international system.

Answer 55

- War and the preparation of war (offensive and defensive) was the key factor that explains why different political units adapted and shaped themselves into sovereign states. Concentration of power = efficient political organization —> they found efficient ways to extract resources (men, arms, supplies, money). There were three types of competition states in Europe: Capital intensive state form (mostly capital, private military), Coercion intensive state form (coercion by the state, little capital accumulation), Capital-coercive state form. —> The predominance (selection) of the sovereign state, sovereign states are more likely to win wars due to more resources and better armies. Evolutionary explanation through competition. War waging advantages —> more efficient at fighting wars.

Answer 56

- Emergence of the sovereign state before the military revolution, before war was important —> war did no create the states. Happened due to economic interests (burghers). They could not become to economically powerful, their ressources had to be pulled in the hands of a centralized power. 3 institutional outcomes: - Sovereign states: need a centralized power for economic growth. - City states: capitalist class was wealthy —> no need for pooling resources. - City leagues: weak enforcement of pooling resources. —> Insittutional makeup of sovereign states, ability for the state to create standardized rules and enforce them. - Selection of sovereign state: law-enforcement and transaction costs reduction (economic growth), inter unit relations: lower commitment problems.

Answer 57

The line on a bargaining graph that makes up all the best choice combinations. The benefits of cooperation have been maximized, but the division between two states is different. At any point below the Pareto frontier, is a suboptimal deal, the pie is not as large as it could be.

Answer 58

Theories: refers to a more abstract phenomenon that we are trying to explain. Does no tréfler to a specific event (e.g. the theory of war). Explanations: can relate to a specific phenomenon. explanations may be derived from the same theory. Paradigm: the set of fundamental assumptions that a theory relies on and is built on.

Answer 59

1. Anarchy: formal absence of government. 2. Predominant actors: sovereign states, the main actor is the state. - National interest is survival and security (self-help system).Powerful states = increased chances of survival. - States are unitary actors —> military power distinguishes states. 3. States act rationally —> strategic actors that make decisions based on the goal of maximizing their security. Egoistic state.

Answer 60

1. Internal strategy: economic development, military buildup. - Becoming wealthier —> buy military power —> more security. 2. External strategy: alliance, war (very limited cooperation). - Alliance: states can help each other, rationalists don’t rely on alliances. - War: neutralizing potential threats to your survival by attacking other states.

Answer 61

1. Anarchy: puts states under a system that makes war a constant consideration —> states act in response to the possibility of war. 2. Power: states need power in the self-help system to protect themselves and enhance their level of survival. 3. Power politics: every interaction has to do with increasing their power relative to other states, they will never do something that will make them weaker. 4. International politics are explained by the polarity of the system. - polarity is important to realists because it will determine the dynamic of the system: which alliances will occur, which wars will occur.

Answer 62

You can never rely on your neighbours, never sure how they will use their power. To protect yourself from the possibility of a future attack, you increase your power so that you are not at a power disadvantage —> other states do the same. You end up less safe since everyone is arming up.

Answer 63

1. Defensive (neo)realism: focus on the maximization of security. - Increasing power to protect themselves. - More power does not mean more security —> there is a threshold. Other states may form alliances against you if you get too powerful —> too powerful is a threat. - If you pass that threshold, you are undermining your security. 2. Offensive (neo)realism: strict focus on power. - Security depends on power, but the more power you have , the more security you have. More power is always better. - There is no threshold and the optimal level is infinity. 3. Global hegemony: - It is very unsafe to amass a certain amount of power between the threshold and erode the curve, which will undermine security. - If you are able to pass that stage, you get so much power compared to the rest and become the hegemony. - Greater amount of security, but it is risky to get there.

Answer 64

1. Anarchy: main characteristic of the international system for both. - Realists: anarchy makes cooperation unfeasible. - NLI: anarchy allows for cooperation in major areas, but not minor or short term. 2. State-centrism. - NLI also focus on the state rather than other types of actors is important and a useful strategy. 3. Self-interest. - NLI assume that security and power are not the only interests that need to be pursued, but it it obviously trumps and controls the behaviour of the state. 4. Rationality: shared assumption. - Acting rationally and making strategic choices.

Answer 65

The idea that the fate of the state, especially the economic fate and the development of the state, depends on each other, an interdependence exists between states. Interdependence creates common interests ad give rise to opportunities for cooperation. States may face problems with cooperation, but can come up with strategies to overcome these problems.

Answer 66

Also referred to as international institutions/rules. These institutions facilitate cooperate between states and help states. the level interstate cooperation in the world would be much lower without international regimes that facilitate cooperation according to neoliberalists. This is a big difference from realism.

Answer 67

Realists: the interactions between states is always a zero-sum game because interests are contradictory. - Power trumps everything, gaining power in relation to a state means that the other state lost power. - they are opponents, there is no benefit or opportunity for advantage. Neoliberals: there are interactions that result in a zero-sum game, but many are non-zero sum game. - Brings states together that share common interest. It implies that two states can win at the same time, they can be partners and not opponents. - Creates opportunities for cooperation in the anarchic world.

Answer 68

Positional: only relative gains matter. - Value of their gains out of a given interaction in light of the loss of another state. Focus on relative gains and losses. - Realists assume that states are positional actors. Atomistic state: only absolute gains matter. - States that don’t care about their partner’s gains or losses, they care about their absolute gains. - Neoliberals assume that states are atomistic actors —> can be positional in times of international crisis.

Answer 69

Realists say that there are absolute gains to be obtained from cooperation, but the concern for relative gains trumps this and makes those absolute gains unattainable. By going after the absolute gains, states risk their survival. So, it is very rare for states to engage in inter-state cooperation.

Answer 70

Offensive realists: inevitability of conflict. - Zero-sum game, there is always a winner and a loser —> cooperation is unlikely. Defensive realists: limited feasibility of cooperation. - Once states achieve a certain level of military power, they can relax their obsession with power and security. - they consider cooperation that refer to absolute gains if it does not come with relative losses —> they can afford some absolute gain while losing a little relative to their partner. - Only happens when a certain level of security is reached —> never for offensive realists. Neoliberals: international institutions. - Focus on pointing out the many common interests between states and that states can be more atomistic than positional . - International institutions are facilitators of interstate cooperation whenever they face cooperation problems.

Answer 71

—> challenges many assumptions that both realism and neoliberalism share. 1. Idealism vs. materialism. - R and NL missed the social nature of international politics. - States are social actors and their interactions are social. - Material factors are interpreted by ideas/beliefs —> critique of material basis of the other paradigms. 2. Norms: the social construction of international politics. - The belief of how a state is supposed to behave given their political organization and their norms. 3. International anarchy and international change. - Agree that the international system is anarchic. - Not necessarily a self-help system, there are social instituions that prevent this.

Answer 72

Explaining international politics as the outcome of individual goal-seeking decision. - Explanations proceed in terms of identifying the relevant rational actors, the goals they seek, and their ability to achieve their goals through rational calculations (maximization of the actors utility).

Answer 73

1. Any actor’s choices can be modelled as rational choices. - Does not need to refer to a specific actor. 2. Behaviour can be oriented to any goals. 3. Goal-seeking can be constrained by obstacles internal or external to the rational actor. - Choices need to be coordinated to achieve the preferred outcome —> if the other actro does not behave rationally, it may affect the outcome if the actor behaves rationally. - Another obstacle is missing information —> preferred outcome is not achieved.

Answer 74

1. Needs to make more substantive commitments. - Choice about the relevant actors/rational decision makers in the theory (states, political leader, non-government, etc.). - Specific goals. 2. What is rational about the choice is not the goal it seeks but the relationship between goal and choice. - A goal is never rational; an action is rational (in light of a given goal). - Rational Choice explains behaviour (endogenous), not goals (exogenous).

Answer 75

1. The actor will consider the possible strategies/courses of action/paths that can be taken. 2. The actor with determine the outcome of each path. 3. The actor will rank-order the outcomes for the highest utility. What are the preferred outcomes? - Based on the actor’s interests and preferences. —> Only true information can take the actor to their more preferred outcome.

Answer 76

1. The rational actor: real of ideal? - They need to act as if they were rational, whether they truly are or not. 2. Unfalsified theories - plagued with ad hoc adjustments made to the theory. - Creating a model that will predict the behaviours you observe. 3. Rationalism cannot be tested as an approach to the study of politics. - Does not make any substantive commitments in terms of their actors and goals —> very flexible and can be filled by different theories. 4. Testing rationalism against its rivals. - Compatible with other theories. 5. Impossibility of rational calculations. - Perfect rational calculations requires receiving all information relevant to the choice —> impossible.

Answer 77

1. Cognitive short-cuts used to process heavy information and quickly —> create distortions of the conclusions (e.g. analogies). 2. Cognitive dissonance: staying within the psychological comfort zone. - Tendency to discount evidence inconsistent with the individual’s prior beliefs and focusing on evidence that is consistent. - Wrong interpretation of facts —> making wrong decisions that are consistent with prior beliefs. 3. Attribution. - Thinking everyone’s actions are towards them —> increased conflict. 4. Prospect theory: distinguishing the objective value of expected utility and subjective value of some action’s utility.

Answer 78

Distinguishing the objective value of expected utility and subjective psychological value of some action’s tilts. Investors value gains and losses differently, placing more weight on perceived gains versus perceived losses. - The rational actor’s utility function: unbiased perception of the value of an income. - Not neutral about risks: less willingness to take risks when things are good (risk aversion) and more risks when things are bad (risk acceptance) - different subjective values. - We place a greater value on avoiding losses due to the associated negative impact.

Answer 79

Dominant strategy: a startegy that is the best response to whatever the other player does. Nash equilibrium: a combination of strategies (one from each player), each of which is the best response to each other. Pareto-optimal outcome: a combination of strategies (one from each player), such that not combination strategies would make at least one player better off without making anyone worse off. Expected outcome: the cohabitation of strategies (one from each player) determined by each player’s maximization of their expected payoff.

Answer 80

1. Territory. - Natural resources, mineral, farm land (all good for the economy). - Strategic geographic location (military advantage) or entice/religious values. 2. National policy. - Trying to force other states to give up a policy (e.g. nuclear weapons). - Contrary to a state’s national interest. 3. Regime type. - Cannot stop a state from doing something, but need to get the leaders out of the regime and change the political regime to prevent future invasions. - Human rights violations. 4. Ethnic or religious divisions.

Answer 81

Reversion outcome: outcome that results when no bargaining is reached —> process fails to produce a new agreement. Bargaining power: power resources that each player comes with when they sit at the negotiation table. Depend on the relative satisfaction with the reversion outcome. - Satisfied = willing to reject a deal. - If they are not satisfied = need a deal = weakness (desperate). Crisis bargaining: bargaining under a threat of war. - Reversion outcome has changed —> it is now war.

Answer 82

1. Capabilities: - refers to the ability to win a war, military capabilities. Determines the positioning of P (state A’s capabilities relative to state B’s - a weaker state will have their ideal point further away). 2. Resolve: - The willingness of a state to fight over the good they are bargaining over - how much does the state value the good. - If a state is more willing to fight for something, they will put their capabilities to greater use. - Also determines P.

Answer 83

1. Yielding too little. - A state isn’t willing to give anything, which results in war. - Not enough deals are happening. 2. Demanding too much. - May be pushing for a deal, but the other state will be willing to go to war - the state should have demanded less. - If they had known the real bargaining range, they would have asked for less.

Answer 84

1. Exaggerate their own strengths and hide their weakness. - They want to present themselves as having lots of capabilities and resolve to help them get a better deal. - It will move the opponent’s perception of the bargaining range closer to the state’s ideal to get out of the negotiation with a better deal. 2. The risk-return trade-off. - Trade-pff between the state’s willingness to get the best deal possible and the willingness to avoid war. - Both states will be pushing in opposite directions of the bargaining range —> risky, it can lead to bargaining failure.

Answer 85

1. Tying hands: making a public statement/commitment about not taking a deal. - Adds credibility to the promise —> reputation. - The other state has an incentive to believe that you will through with the war threat. 2. Paying for power: notorious military buildup. - Shows other states that you are prepping for war, public preparation. - Shows that the war threat is not a bluff due to investment costs and energy while preparing for war. 3. Brinkmanship: approaching the slippery slope. - Taking actions that would make the risk of accidental war very high, any move can result in war. - Getting very close to war to send a credible threat to the other state that you’ve are serious about the war threat.

Answer 86

1. Incomplete information. 2. Commitment problems. - First-strike advantage: preemptive war. - Future bargaining advantage: preventive war. 3. Indivisible goods.

Answer 87

—> the more divisible the good, the more likely the deal will fall within the bargaining range. Certain goods cannot be divided —> peace is unlikely. 1. Indivisibility can be socially constructed: - States frame a good as indivisible - cannot conceive the good to be divisible because it would lose value (e.g. a painting). - Divisibility can be can be socially constructed - if states engage in negotiation that includes rethinking the good and retain its value - might overcome the obstacle of Indivisibility. 2. Claims of indivisibility might be strategic: - States will present a good as being indivisible in the eyes of their rival, hoping they will get the entire good - getting out of the deal with a better outcome. 3. Allegedly “indivisible” goods can be divisible. - States may need to engage in ways to find the divisibility of the good.

Answer 88

1. Raise the costs of war. - Acquiring nuclear weapons or integrated economies lead to interdependence (more costly in terms of disruption of international trade). 2. Increase transparency. - Solves the issue of lack of information and wrong perception - the perception gap gets smaller and overlap in the bargaining range. - Monitoring technologies, international organizations (inspectors for nuclear weapons). 3. Outside enforcement. - Commitment that evolves a third party, making it difficult to back down —> credible commitment not to exploit a state’s weakness. - UN peacemakers to prevent states from sudden wars. 4. Divide indivisible goods. - Bargaining over a package of different goods instead of one - the package can be divided.

Answer 89

A situation in which power is distributed equally among the great powers in the international system in terms of material and military power. Balance of power theory: a systemic tendency toward equilibrium in the system. Focuses on the mechanisms that are going to restore the balance that was upset.

Answer 90

Realist states seek security. Power is needed for security. These can be reached by maintaining a balanced distribution of power - preventing a state from becoming too powerful, too threatening —> security is reached this way. Power-gap minimizers and power-gap maximizers.

Answer 91

Minimizers: they wants to intentionally maintain a balanced distribution of power (intended outcome). - Defensive realists. - Balancing strategies/foreign policies. Maximizers: they try to reach an unbalanced distribution of power tilted in their favour to ensure security. - Offensive realists. - Unintended outcome: when a maximizer tries to gain power, other states will too. - From the POV of offensive realists, everyone wants to be the global hegemon. —> both seek a balanced distribution of power.

Answer 92

Balancing: foreign policy aimed at preventing a rising power from being too hegemonic —> power-gap minimizers. 1. Internal balancing: militarizing - increase military power. - To restore the balance of power when a state has gotten too powerful, a state will increase their military power to match the rival state, bringing back the balance. - Economic development - money can be converted to power. 2. External balancing: making alliances with other states, with the goal of restoring/maintaining the balance of power. - Defensive in nature: forming an alliance neutralizes the military power of a growing state. They are not more powerful than all states together. - Can be offensive: not to defend each other, but to go to war together against the same enemy.

Answer 93

Bandwagoning is the opposite of balancing, especially with external balancing. It is allying with the dominant power, as opposed to allying against the most powerful state. - Appeasement (defence): protecting yourself from becoming the next target. - Ambition (offense): sharing the rewards of war with the dominant state. Balancing is more common. There is an uncertainty of intentions - bandwagoning implies that you are an ally with a more powerful states, but you will help the powerful state become more powerful —> they might come after you the next day if it is in their interests.

Answer 94

Bandwagoners: - Threatening, agressive states are rewarded by these actions. Bandwagoners are going to jump on your bandwagon if you can prove to be most aggressive. - Demonstrating aggressiveness is the best strategy since others will join you instead of going against you. Balancers: - Threatening, aggressive states provokes resistance - upsets the balance of powers and the balancer want to bring it back. - Demonstrating self-restraint is the best strategy. Present yourself to be respectful of others - the state has its own power capabilities but won’t use it against others - needs to be credible.

Answer 95

The use of Soviet military force when necessary to maintain the rule of the Communist Party in East European countries.

Answer 96

Instead of applying the Brezhnev Doctrine (sending troops to suppress revolts), he decided to give way of a reformed version of socialism —> allowing civil societies to express themselves and create their own form of communism, they can have their own domestic politics but foreign policy must be aligned with that of the Soviet Union’s. This failed: when they were given more freedom to express and organize themselves, anti-communist regimes came to power. Led to the contagion effect. Narrower definition of the national interest of USSR: - less concerned with the universalist projection of communism and more with trying to maintain stability within the states, trying to maintain control of its civil society.

Answer 97

- The US would not threaten the USSR and take advantage of it while it was going through its domestic crisis or encourage greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. - Invitation of Gorbachev to join the community of nations by the US —> reintegration of the reformed Soviet Union into the rest of the international system. - Us-Soviet cooperation in the UN Security Council.

Answer 98

1. From domestic revolution to systemic change. - Change began with Eastern revolutions, then the USSR itself. - It is the domestic politics rather than international anarchy and the dynamics of power in the international system that brought about the end of the CW (systemic change). - More in line with constructivist and new liberalism POV, not neoliberal. 2. Balance of power practises were replaced by the practise of multilateralism. - More collaboration in global government institutions. - Participation of US and Russia in many multilateral institutions. - Replaced balance of power practises. 3. The distribution of material power capabilities changes (bipolar to unipolar) after CW.

Answer 99

1. Hegemony = domination = unipolarity (or unbalanced multipolarity). - Rules and obligations imposed by the dominant state on everyone else —> concentration of power sustains the hegemonic order. 2. Gilpin’s “prestige”. - Prestige = a state’s reputation for power (hard power, material capabilities, military capabilities). 3. Implications for the stability of hegemonic orders. - The hegemony constantly uses its power in order to impose the international order on others. - When the hegemony declines —> the hegemonic order declines. - The stability of the hegemonic order depends on the stability of the hegemony as the dominant power in the system.

Answer 100

1. Hegemony = legitimate domination. - A relation of domination in the international order —> implies rules, obligations. 2. The roles of power and legitimacy. - Actors diffuse an ideology and have others internalize it = socialization (convinced themselves of the goodness of the ideology or beneficial to them). - Does not spread automatically —> power is important in the distribution (soft or hard). 3. Implications for the stability of hegemonic orders. - Does not depend of the stability of a particular hegemony as the dominant state. It has legitimacy rather than being imposed by a powerful state —> the order will survive changes in the distribution of pwoer.

Answer 101

1. Coercion: the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers (realism). - The asymmetry that exists between the dominant and subordinate state has to do with physical capacity (i.e. hard power). 2. Self-interest: the actor sees the rules as in its own self-interest (liberalism). - Given distribution of incentives and bargaining leverage. - The states that have more bargaining power over others are the ones that will have more ability to shape the international order and to influence the way others behave. 3. Legitimacy: the actor feels the rules are legitimate and should be obeyed (constructivism). - Compliance is normatively driven, results of having internalized norms that establish the legitimacy of the order to begin with. - Soft power is key.

Answer 102

The practise of respecting state’s borders and the internal autonomy of these states is sustained by material deterrence. Sovereignty as a shared belief does not matter —> what matters is the label for the pattern that emerges from the material pressures that exist when there is an uncertainty of power. Problem: many international borders are largely undefended and indefensible by one side because of the overwhelming force on the other side (anticipated consequences of an attack). Today’s system of sovereign states cannot be primarily a product of material deterrence or the coercion model of social control.

Answer 103

Wars have become obsolete because conquering territory is not as profitable as it used to be. - Economic interdependence encourages peace between self-interested states. - Liberal democratic rulers may be constrained by their voters to respect the sovereignty rights of other liberal democracies —> democratic peace theory. - Sovereignty is respected to build a reputation for cooperation. Problem: we do not always see the process of constantly recalculating the costs and benefits of violating sovereignty but then decide not to do it —> always in the state’s mind. We see that borders are taken for granted. There is a heavy bias for the status quo. The absence of thinking about the international system as a sovereignty is evidence that there has to be legitimacy.

Answer 104

The compliance with sovereignty results from the internalization of the sovereignty norms by states —> their acceptance of the norm as legitimate. Respecting sovereignty is the appropriate thing to do, so they do it.

Answer 105

Anarchy: absence of the structure of authority. Authority: legitimized power, most compliance is unproblematic and only occasional deviance needs to be policed. When an actor internalizes a rule because it perceives the rule to be legitimate, that rules takes on the quality of authority over the actors —> partly determines its behaviour. Power needs to be understood in the sense of authority and legitimized power, not coercion. The international system can be thought of as a system of decentralized authority governed by rules and norms that actors conform to our of an internal sense of rightness, out of the fact that they see these results as legitimate and authoritative.

Answer 106

1. The internalization of social reality as the natural state of the world (norms). - Includes the internalization of social norms that make up that specific social reality. 2. The adoption of role-identities therein. - That belongs in the specific social reality —> identities of sovereign state, great power, rogue state, etc.

Answer 107

The generation of shared beliefs in the acceptability of legitimacy of a given international order. - Hegemonic socialization is the socialization of states into a given hegemonic order. - Socialization does not need to be strategic. Socialization is not frequently controlled or strategically steered by any actors, but takes a course of its own.

Answer 108

1. Normative persuasion: - Normative persuasion —> norm change —> policy change. - Subordinate states are first socialized and then follow conformity with the hegemonic order by the adoption of policies which are in conformity with the rules that constitute the order. 2. External inducement. - External inducement —> policy change (cooperation through coercion/self-interest) —> norm change. - Compliance occurs through coercion and the inducement of positive incentives to comply —> hegemony uses economic and military incentives to induce the subordinate state to change its policies into conformity with the hegemonic state. 3. Internal reconstruction: - Internal reconstruction —> policy change (through imposition) —> norm change. - The hegemon directly intervenes in the subordinate states and transforms its domestic political institutions.

Answer 109

- Goal: replace old diplomatic practises between the great powers with a system of collective security and free trade (multilateralism institutions put in place). —> Elites in France and Britain were unpersuaded: 1. No domestic political crisis. - crisis = window of opportunity for normative persuasion. 2. No economic or military incentives —> no “hegemon” - Lack of external inducement —> US was not ready to act as a hegemon, could not economically or militarily persuade the countries.

Answer 110

Goal: replace old diplomatic practises between the great powers with a system of collective security and free trade (multilateralism institutions put in place). 1. US exerted external inducement on Britain and France. - Marshall Plan: Europe’s economic renewal and political integration. - Massive flow of money, and economic success over time. 2. Germany and Japan’s internal reconstruction following the occupation. - Germany: federalization and democratization and trade liberalization. - Japan: constitutionalization. —> Well integrated in the Pax Americana, came together with other countries as key pillars of the international order led by the US.

Answer 111

1. Balance of power theory. 2. Counter-hegemonic balancing. - Regional rivalries / regional balancing (balancing against other rivals = unintended rise of power). 3. The lazy hegemon. - Different incentives (rise in power of revisionist states and stability in hegemon). 4. The overburdened hegemon. - Hegemon pays mosts costs to support hegemonic order, challengers grows faster in power and power gap becomes smaller).

Answer 112

1. The unipolar threshold —> too powerful to be balanced. - Free-riding and defection on counter hegemonic cooperation. - Internal balancing as self-defeating (cannot protect yourself from the hegemon because it is so powerful —> bandwagoning and alliances for protection, no counter-hegemon). - Regional versus global imperatives (offshore hegemon, balancing happens mostly regionally, hegemon can be an ally). 2. Nuclear balancing. - Having nuclear weapons makes the power preponderance of the hegemon more tolerable for states. - Hegemonic war is too costly when nuclear weapons are involved.

Answer 113

Engaging = stability. 1. Reliance on the hegemon for security alliances —> protection from regional threats by conventional and nuclear US weapons. - No security alliance = arms race = unintentional rise in power of subordinate states. 2. Selective intervention. - Engagement as a bully —> undermines stability. - Engagement by alliances —> maintains stability.

Answer 114

Powerful, but not threatening. Depends on the reputation they have built, how they are using their power. Foreign policy (the way it exercises power) will make the difference between a benign hegemon or a hegemon that should be feared. Bullying and threatening or imposing power on others creates a benign hegemon.

Answer 115

1. Security co-binding. - Security interdependence between states that further consolidates the commitment towards this particular order. 2. Penetrated reciprocal hegemony. - Transparency and permeability of US government. - many access points for decision making, input of interests —> influences American decision making 3. Semi-sovereign and partial great powers. - Internal reconstruction of revisionist states (the internal reconstruction as a general rule constitute of the western, liberal international order) —> self impose limitations in constitutions. - Great powers have limited power capabilities. 4. Economic openness. 5. Civic identity. - Collective identity that gives cohesiveness and solidarity to the international order

Answer 116

1. Limited/indirect warfare. 2. Balancing soft power. - Soft “culture war.” - Competition over attention and credibility. - Anti-hegemonic ideologies.

Answer 117

Yes and no lol

Answer 118

A form of soft balancing. Refers to the institutional resources to force the hegemon to retrain itself or break the rules of its own hegemonic order. - Source of stability and instability.

Answer 119

1. Concerts resolve security dilemmas —> states can cooperate. - offense/defence balance. - satisfaction with status quo —> defensive attitude (no preventive or preemptive war). - defensive attitude is dominant. 2. Payoff matrix is changed —> mutual defection (war) is costly. Incentive for mutual cooperation. Greater transparency, 3. Self-enforcing settlement —> threat against changes in the system is credible.

Answer 120

Unilateral measures: - security dilemma resolved, distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. - publicize your commitment, reduces the gains from defection. - problem: risk of exploitation. - Issue-linkage (conditional play): looking at different games as if they were linked. - Transparency: reduction of private information.

Answer 121

—> future cooperation depends on current cooperation, different gains in future cooperation. - Reputation: reputation for cooperation enhances future cooperation and obtain gains. - Issue-linkage (conditional play): link between present behaviour and future cooperation, state’s strategy depends on another state’s behaviour (e.g. tit for tat). - Strategies of reciprocity conditional play). - Problem of recognition. - Problem of control.

Answer 122

- More players = less cooperation: (less common interests, more coordination is required, less transparency in terms of defection). —> states can cooperate regionally instead of globally.

Answer 123

The endowment effect: valuing what you own more than what you don’t have. Losing something that you have represents a greater loss than gaining something you did not have. Framing something as a potential loss or a potential gain can lead to a different decision. Relates to prospect theory.

Answer 124

Reactive devaluation: dismissing or discounting some value from a deal offered by the deal. The deal would have more value if it came from the individual and not a different party/rival —> psychological bias - leads to different outcomes and negotiations. Prospect theory.