Planning Law

Question 1

Welch v. Swasey; 214 U.S. 91 (1909)

Answer 1

14th Amendment, police power, equal protection, due process

Established right of municipalities to regulate building height
1905 act in MA enabled limitation of building heights
Court held that height limitation is based on reasonable grounds
Exercise of police power of the state
Does not violate equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th amendment

Question 2

Eubank v. City of Richmond; U.S. Supreme Court (1912)

Answer 2

Zoning, 14th amendment, police power

VA had statute authorizing cities and towns to establish building lines
Ordinance allowed owners of ⅔ of land abutting any street to request a building line
Court struck down ordinance, opposed to delegation of authority to establish building lines to private citizens
Court ruled that establishment of building lines was valid exercise of police power

Question 3

Hadacheck v. Sebastian; U.S. Supreme Court (1915)

Answer 3

Zoning, 14th amendment, due process, equal protection

Court approved regulation of location of land uses
Zoning ordinance in Los Angeles prohibiting production of bricks in an area of LA
Ordinance not a violation of 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses

Question 4

Village of Euclid, OH v. Ambler Realty Co.; U.S. Supreme Court (1926)

Answer 4

Zoning, nuisance, 14th Amendment, due process, equal protection

As long as a community believes there is a threat of a nuisance, zoning ordinance should be upheld
Question whether Euclid’s zoning ordinance violated Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of 14th Amendment
Upheld modern zoning as a proper use of police power
Alfred Bettman argued before the supreme court in favor of Euclid’s zoning, went on to be the first president of American Society of Planning Officials

Question 5

Nectow v. City of Cambridge; U.S. Supreme Court (1928)

Answer 5

Zoning, 14th Amendment, due process

Court used rational basis test to strike down zoning ordinance
Found that ordinance had no valid public purpose (e.g. to promote the health, safety , morals, or welfare of the public)
Ruled it a violation of due process clause of the 14th Amendment

Question 6

Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo; New York State Court of Appeals (1972)

Answer 6

Growth Managment, 5th amendment, takings
1971 land-use planning case in New York that established growth management planning as a valid exercise of the police power in the United States.
Adequate public facilities ordinance did not prevent future development, did not constitute a taking
Upheld growth management system that awarded points to development proposals based on availability of public utilities, drainage facilities, parks, road access, and firehouses
Proposals only being approved upon reaching a certain point level
Developers can increase point total by providing facilities themselves
Golden v. Ramapo and Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. The City of Petaluma, California are the basis for the use of development impact fees to finance public infrastructure throughout the United States

Question 7

Construction Industry of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma; U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit (1975)

Answer 7

Growth Management
Court upheld quotas on annual number of building permits issued
The Petaluma Plan had three general purposes: (1) to moderate soaring growth rate; (2) to geographically balance the growth; (3) to retain and protect small town character of the city
holding: city has the right to limit and control the numerical extent, aesthetic quality, and geographical direction of its own growth
falls within the broad parameters of legitimate governmental interests, permitting exercise of the city’s public welfare zoning powers
Golden v. Ramapo and Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. The City of Petaluma, California are the basis for the use of development impact fees to finance public infrastructure throughout the United States

Question 8

Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay v. City of Livermore; California Supreme Court (1976)

Answer 8

Growth Management
Court upheld temporary moratoriums on building permits
municipal land use ordinance that prohibited the issuance of new residential building permits until the sewage disposal, water supply, and local education facilities were in compliance with the specified standards.
City of Livermore enacted a municipal ordinance to promote the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens
If a municipal land use ordinance is reasonably related to the public welfare, then the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police powers.

Question 9

Brandt Revocable Trust v United States (2013)

Answer 9

challenges to federal acts
Court found that 1875 General Railroad Right-of-Way Act grants easement for the railroad’s land
When railroad company abandons land, should be settled as an easement, and if the easement is abandoned, easement disappears and the land reverts to the previous owner

Question 10

Massachusetts v. EPA, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 10

challenges to federal acts
EPA must provide reasonable justification for why it would not regulate greenhouse gases

Question 11

Rapanos v. United States; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 11

challenges to federal acts
Army Corp of Engineers must determine whether there is a significant nexus between a wetland and a navigable waterway
as long as wetlands are “adjacent” to tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and share a “significant nexus” with such waters, the wetlands qualify as “waters of the United States” for purposes of the CWA.

Question 12

SD Warren v. Maine Board of Environmental Protection; U.S. Supreme Court (2006)

Answer 12

Under Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, companies must obtain state approval of “any activity” “which may result in any discharge into the [Nation’s] navigable waters.”
Hydroelectric dams result in “discharge” under the meaning of Section 401 of the federal Clean Water Act, and mandates state approval

Question 13

Texas Dept. of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015)

Answer 13

Question whether disparate impact is the appropriate standard with which to evaluate the impact of the Fair Housing Act
ICP claimed Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs disprop. Granted tax credits to developments in minority neighborhoods, denied credits to developments in white neighborhoods
Ruled that disparate impact is the appropriate standard to apply to the Fair Housing Act
Policies that inadvertently relegate minorities to poor areas violate Fair Housing Act

Question 14

Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (1976)

Answer 14

First Amendment Case (free speech), fourteenth amendment (due process)
Upheld zoning scheme that decentralized sex-oriented business in Detroit
Detroit’s 1972 ordinances to regulate location of adult movie theaters did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The ordinance did not qualify as a restriction on free speech

Question 15

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego; U.S. Supreme Court (1981)

Answer 15

First Amendment Case (free speech), fourteenth amendment (equal protection)
Court found that commercial and noncommercial speech cannot be treated differently
Overruled an ordinance that banned all off-premises signs because it effectively banned noncommercial signs
City ban on “offsite” outdoor advertising signs violates First and Fourteenth Amendment provisions for free speech
Established a high standard for aesthetic regulation of billboards by providing First Amendment protection to commercial firms that advertise goods or services not available at the location of the sign.

Question 16

Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent; U.S. Supreme Court (1984)

Answer 16

First Amendment
Court upheld Los Angeles ordinance that banned attaching signs to utility poles
Regulation of signs valid for aesthetic reasons as long as not regulating content of the sign
If regulation based on sign content, must be justified by compelling govt. Interest
Aesthetics does advance a legitimate state interest

Question 17

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (1986)

Answer 17

First Amendment (free speech), Fourteenth amendment (equal protection)
Upheld zoning ordinance that limited sex-oriented business to a single zoning district
Placing restrictions on time, place, and manner of adult entertainment is acceptable
Ordinance dealt with secondary effects (such as traffic and crime), not type of business
City does not have to guarantee that there is land available at a reasonable price for this use
City cannot entirely prohibit adult entertainment

Question 18

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

Answer 18

Followed ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores (church denied permit to expand because it was located in a historic district; upheld and found RFRA unconstitutional, therefore not violation of 14th amendment equal protection)
No government may implement land use regulation in a manner that imposes substantial burden on religion assembly or institution unless govt demonstrates that it is furthering governmental interest and is least restrictive means of doing so
Act has been challenged in severa legal cases, e.g.
Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. the City of Chicago
Court found changes City made to zoning ordinance brought ordinance into compliance with RLUIPA
Cutter v. Wilkinson, U.S. Supreme Court (2005)
RLUIPA is a constitutional religious accomodation under 1st Amendment’s Establishment Clause

Question 19

Reed et al. v Town of Gilbert Arizona (2014)

Answer 19

1st amendment (free speech); 14th amendment (equal protection)
Town advised church that it had violated sign code via placement of temporary signs
Sign ordinance restricted size, number, duration, location of temporary signs
Church sued claiming sign code violated free speech clause in 1st Amendment, equal protection clause in 14th amendment
Court found that the city cannot impose a more stringent restriction on signs directing the public to a meeting than on signs conveying other messages
Ruled that sign ordinance was not content-neutral

Question 20

United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Company; U.S. Supreme Court (1896)

Answer 20

5th Amendment (takings clause)
Acquisition of a national battlefield at Gettysburg served a valid public purpose
First significant legal case dealing with historic preservation

Question 21

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon; U.S. Supreme Court (1922)

Answer 21

5th Amendment (takings clause)
If a regulation goes too far it will be considered a taking
First takings ruling, defined a taking under 5th amendment

Question 22

Berman v. Parker; U.S. Supreme Court (1954)

Answer 22

5th Amendment (takings clause)
Congress formed District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency in 1945 for urban renewal of blighted areas of DC
Congress granted Agency power of eminent domain
Berman owned department store and objected to eminent domain taking for purpose of beautification and redevelopment
Fifth Amendment does not limit Congress’ power to seize private property with just compensation to any specific purpose.
Aesthetics is a valid public purpose
Urban renewal is a valid public purpose

Question 23

Fred French Investing Co. v. City of New York; New York Court of Appeals (1976)

Answer 23

5th Amendment (takings clause)
Regulation that required placement of public park on private property
No economically viable use of the property
Court invalidated the regulation, but not ruled as a taking that should receive compensation

Question 24

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. The City of New York; U.S. Supreme Court (1978)

Answer 24

5th Amendment (takings clause)
NYC Landmark Preservation Law as applied to Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a taking
Penn Central argued taking based on extent of diminution of value, interference of investment-backed expectations, and character of the govt. Action
Court weighed economic impact of the regulation on investment-backed expectations, character of regulation
Determined on this basis that it did not deprive Penn Central of property rights
Introduced a means-end balancing test for regulatory takings and validated historic preservation controls.

Question 25

Agins v. City of Tiburon; U.S. Supreme Court (1980)

Answer 25

5th amendment (takings clause)
Appellants had 5 acres of unimproved land for residential development
Zoning ordinance placed property in zone with density restrictions (one single-family residence per acre)
Brought suit against city in state court, saying city had taken property without just compensation in violation of 5th and 14th amendments
Court upheld city’s right to zone property at low-density, determined it was not a taking

Question 26

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court (1982)

Answer 26

5th amendment (takings), 14th amendment (police power)
Cable company installed cables on building to serve tenants of building and other bldgs.
Property owner brought class action suit claiming allowing cable company to occupy land was a taking
Court found that govt. Authorized permanent physical occupation of private property, therefore constituted a taking requiring just compensation
Manhattan Teleprompter’s minor but permanent physical occupation of Loretto’s property constituted a regulatory taking of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution

Question 27

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 27

5th Amendment (just compensation)
Church owned campground site that was impacted by ordinance prohibiting construction on sites impacted by flood one year earlier
If property is unusable for a period of time, ordinance can be set aside, and property owner can subject govt. To pay for damages
County could either purchase property outright or revoke ordinance and pay church for losses during time of the trial
because the church was unable to use its property during this time, a “taking” of the property had occurred. Thus, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment required the government to exercise one of a number of “options” such as amending the regulation or fair payment for the use of the property in order to protect the Church’s constitutional rights.

Question 28

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 28

5th amendment (takings)
Pennsylvania’s Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act prohibits coal mining that causes subsidence damage to pre-existing public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries
Act requires that 50% of coal beneath four protected structures be kept in place to provide surface support
Coal Assoc. Alleged that this constituted a taking
Enactment of the regulation did not constitute a taking, justified by public interests protected by the Act
valid public purpose behind the present Act and determined the Act would not make it impossible for the miners to profitably conduct business. Therefore the decision in Pennsylvania Coal did not apply.

Question 29

FCC v. Florida Power Corporation; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 29

5th Amendment (takings)
Public utilities challenged a federal statute that authorized FCC to regulate rents charged by utilities to to cable TV operators for use of utility poles
Court found that a taking had not occurred
The court first concluded that the Act authorized a permanent physical occupation of property, constituting a per se taking for which compensation must be paid under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419.
The court then struck down the Act under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that its authorization to the FCC to make initial rate determinations under prescribed standards usurped an exclusively judicial function; voluntary leasing is not the same as a government taking

Question 30

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission; U.S. Supreme Court (1987)

Answer 30

California Coastal Commission required owners of beachfront property seeking building permit to maintain public beachfront access
Court agreed that legitimate interest is served in maintaining “continuous strip of publicly accessible beach along the coast”, but considered a property taking in violation of 5th and 14th Amendments
Ruled that California must provide just compensation to beachfront property owners for the use of their land
Created “essential nexus” takings test for conditioning development approvals on dedications and exactions. There must be a strong relationship between the problem created by proposed development and the proposed exaction (or mitigation), or else compensation may be required.

Question 31

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council; U.S. Supreme Court (1992)

Answer 31

There is a taking requiring just compensation if there is a total reduction in value (no viable economic use) after regulation is in place (except where derived from the state’s law of property and nuisance).
Court ruled that Lucas purchased land prior to development regulations being put in place, and regulation constituted a taking

Question 32

Dolan v. Tigard; U.S. Supreme Court (1994)

Answer 32

Court overturned exaction that required dedication of a portion of floodplain (to create greenway and bicycle path) by commercial business that wanted to expand
Court found that there was not enough of a connection betw. Exaction requirement and development
Conditions that require the deeding of portions of a property to the government can be justified, but there has to be a clear relationship betw. The nature and extent of the proposed development
Created “rough proportionality” test: “an exaction is legitimate only if the public benefit from the exaction is roughly proportional to the burden imposed on the public by allowing the proposed land use”
Established a higher standard for takings by extending Nollan’s “essential nexus” test to require “rough proportionality” between development impact and conditions.

Question 33

Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; U.S. Supreme Court (1997)

Answer 33

Question of whether an owner must attempt to sell their development rights before claiming a regulatory taking of property without just compensation
Petitioner owned undeveloped lot near Lake Tahoe
Tahoe Regional Planning agency found that the lot could not be developed under agencies’ regulations, but that appellant could sell development rights under Transfer of Development Rights program
Suitum did not have to attempt to sell developmental rights before filing a regulatory taking suit

Question 34

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd.; U.S. Supreme Court (1999)

Answer 34

Supreme Court upheld a jury award of $1.45 million in favor of development based on city’s repeated denials of a development permit for a 190-unit residential complex on oceanfront property
Development was in conformance with city’s comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance
Court ruled that the repeated denials of permits deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land (constituted a taking)

Question 35

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island; U.S. Supreme Court (2001)

Answer 35

Question whether a property owner who acquired title to property after regulations were in place could still bring a takings claim under the 5th amendment
Property owner claimed inverse condemnation against Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council bc landowner was denied permit to fill 18 acres of wetlands to construct a beach club
Supreme Court found that acquisition of title after effective date of regulations does not bar regulatory takings claims

Question 36

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. et al. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al.; U.S. Supreme Court (2002)

Answer 36

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency imposed two moratoria on development in Lake Tahoe Basin while agency formulated comp plan for the area
Group of property owners sued, claiming a taking
Court found that the moratoria did not constitute a taking requiring compensation
Recognizes that partial, temporary deprivations of property may constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment, but must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the regulatory taking framework of Penn Central.

Question 37

Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc.; U.S. Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 37

Court overturned portion of Agins v. Tiburon declaring regulation of property does effect a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests (more appropriate for due process cases)
Court found that Takings clause challenges had to be based on the severity of the burden that the regulation imposed, not the effectiveness of the regulation in furthering the governmental interest
Recognizing that regulatory takings claims that do not deprive an owner of all economically viable use of land or property must be evaluated under the factors set forth in Penn Central.

Question 38

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams; U.S. Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 38

Court ruled that a licensed radio operator that was denied a conditional use permit for an antenna could not seek damages because it would distort the congressional intent of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

Question 39

Kelo v. City of New London; US Supreme Court (2005)

Answer 39

Kelo was homeowner in area of non-blighted single family homes identified for private redevelopment for biotech company offices
Court ruled that economic development, even if it involves taking land for private development, is a valid use of eminent domain
Reasoned that it is not in a position to determine the amount or character of land needed for a particular project
Satisfied 5th amendment public use requirement
the government “may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation,” while it may “transfer from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking,”
Kelo’s house eventually relocated to another area, but biotech campus was never built
Upheld the use of eminent domain for economic development purposes.

Question 40

Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2009)

Answer 40

SC ruled that submerged lands that would be filled by the state for beach reclamation did not constitute a taking of property without just compensation (in violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments)
Recognizes that states may fill submerged land without constituting a taking on the rights of littoral property owners.

Question 41

Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Management (2012)

Answer 41

Appellant requested permit from St. John’s River Water Managment to develop additional land beyond what was allowed under the original permit
Agreed to issue development permit on condition that Koontz deed rest of property into a conservation area and complete additional mitigation work; he refused and was denied application
Question whether govt. Is liable for attacking when it denies a permit until a landowner agrees to dedicate land for public use
SC sided with Koontz, noting that there was no specific regulation requiring dedication and mitigation work, ruled a taking had occurred
Recognized that monetary exactions are subject to the per se takings test of Nollan and Dolan.

Question 42

Munn v. Illinois; U.S. Supreme Court (1876)

Answer 42

Court found that a state law regulating pricing did not constitute a violation of due process
Court established principle of public regulation of private businesses in the public interest
Court found that the regulation of private property does not violate due process when regulation becomes necessary for public good

Question 43

Mugler v. Kansas; US Supreme Court (1887)

Answer 43

Court found that a state law prohibiting liquor sales did not constitute a taking and violation of due process
“A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking.”

Question 44

Village of Belle Terre v. Boaraas; US Supreme Court (1974)

Answer 44

Court upheld regulation that prohibited more than 2 unrelated individuals from living together as a single-family
Court found that a community has the power to control lifestyle and values
Court extended the concept of zoning under police power to include a community’s desire for certain types of lifestyles

Question 45

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation; US Supreme Court (1977)

Answer 45

Court reviewed zoning case that denied a rezoning of a property from single-family to multi-family
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp (MHDC) contracted to purchase tract within Arlington Heights to build racially integrated low and moderate income housing
Contract contingent on securing rezoning as well as federal housing assistance
MHDC applied to the Village for necessary rezoning from single family to multi-family
Village denied rezoning request, respondents sued for racial discrimination and violated Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment and FHA
District court held that Village’s rezoning denial was motivated not by racial discrimination but desire to protect property values and maintain village’s zoning plan
Court of appeals approved those conclusions, but reversed finding, stating that the “ultimate effect” of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory, would disproportionately affect Black people, as the area was already segregated
SC found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the Village acted in a racially discriminatory manner and overturned the findings of the previous two courts
Established that discriminatory intent is required to invalidate zoning actions with racially disproportionate impacts.

Question 46

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel; New Jersey Supreme Court (1975)

Answer 46

Court found that Mount Laurel had exclusionary zoning that prohibited multi-family, mobile home, or low-to-moderate income housing
Court required town to open its doors to all income levels

Question 47

City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores; U.S. Supreme Court (1997)

Question 48

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel [Mount Laurel I] (1975)

Answer 48

NJ Supreme court
Zoning ordinance in 1964; 70% residential zoning, residential zones permitted only one detached, single-family dwelling per lot, with large minimums for lot size and building floor area.
Nonprofit wanted to build multifamily affordable housing, but effectively impossible due to zoning ordinance
NAACP argued that zoning ordinance discriminated against low income families
Court agreed that Mt. Laurel, by a system of land use regulation, made it physically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the municipality
“no municipality may exclude or limit categories of housing” for fiscal purposes.
Formalized concept of “fair share” affordable housing burden
The NJ Supreme Court established a doctrine in the NJ Constitution requiring that municipalities’ land-use regulations had to provide a realistic opportunity for lower-income housing.

Question 49

Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel [Mount Laurel II] (1983)

Answer 49

The New Jersey Supreme Court felt that the township had continued its exclusionary housing policies after Mt. Laurel I
every municipality’s land use regulations should provide a realistic opportunity for decent housing for at least part of its resident poor who now occupy dilapidated housing.
Beyond elimination of obstacles to affordable housing, municipalities should use affirmative policies such as density bonuses and mandatory set-asides.
6. “Builder’s remedies” may allow developers, given judicial approval, to circumvent local zoning decisions and build affordable housing units if a need has been established.
Created the model fair housing remedy for exclusionary zoning.
A municipality’s land-use regulations must provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of the municipality’s fair share of the regional lower-income housing need.

Question 50

City of Edmonds v. Oxford House; US Supreme Court (1995)

Answer 50

Edmonds enacted zoning ordinance that single family dwellings could only be inhabited by families with “an individual or two or more persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer persons, who are not related by genetics, adoption or marriage”
Oxford House-Edmonds, located in a single-family neighborhood and subject to the family definition, operated a group home for 10-12 persons recovering from alcohol and drug addiction, was cited because residents did not fit ordinance definition of family
Requested exemption under FHA, but FHA only offers exemption based on number of residents, not composition of family
The court distinguished between ordinances capping the number of individuals who may occupy a dwelling and ordinances limiting who may occupy a dwelling.
Recognizes that definitions of “family” contained in zoning ordinances that limit who may occupy a dwelling are subject to the requirements of the FHA.

Question 51

Murr v. Wisconsin (2017)

Answer 51

Where a landowner owns adjacent tracts of land, the tracts constitute one parcel for purposes of the Takings Clause if the owner’s reasonable expectations about property ownership would lead him to expect that his holdings would be treated as one parcel.
SC ruled no regulatory taking occurred