Philosophy substance Flashcards
Indivisibility Argument: Meditation 6
Makes use of Leibniz’s law: if two things share all the same properties, they must actually be one thing; but one has an any property that the other lacks, they must be distinct things. Since divisibility is a property of bodies which minds lack, minds must be different from bodies.
My mind is indivisible, as it does not extend in space. Our minds seem to have a unified nature. We do not experience the mind as anything but a singular consciousness. When I consider the mind – consider myself purely as a thinking thing – I can’t detect any parts within myself. Mind united to the whole body, but not by a uniting of parts to parts. If a foot or arm or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing is thereby taken away from the mind. Faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception, etc are not parts of the mind, as they are properties or powers of it.
Any corporeal thing can easily be divided into parts in my thoughts. Body is divisible
My mind is different to my body
Substance dualism is established
The mental is divisible: the sense that I have of being a singular consciousness may be an illusion.
When we introspect, it may not be an accurate representation of our selves. Physicalists argue: the brain is responsible for consciousness and sense of self, then cutting the brain up might involve dividing the mind. Severing the corpus callosum (main link between the left and right hemispheres of the brain) divides the brain. Two hemispheres of the brain pay different roles. Because it is dominant in language, when the left hemisphere sees the word “house” it verbally reports what it sees. When the right hemisphere was shown an image, the patient would report verbally that he could see nothing, and yet their left hand would still press the button, suggesting that the right hemisphere was aware of the image but the left was not. Dividing the brain appears to divide the mind into two distinct and mutually unaware centres of consciousness. Raises doubts about Descartes’ claim that the mind is indivisible.
Response: Our imagination finds it impossible to imagine what is not actually possible. Split-brain patients do seem to have two streams of consciousness operating in the same skull. I cannot imagine myself as having a divided consciousness doesn’t show that two streams of consciousness cannot simultaneously exist. I cannot imagine seeing the world from your point of view and from mine at the same time, but it doesn’t follow from this that you and I cannot have minds.
David Hume believed our concepts derive from experience (empiricist).
Descartes introspects to conclude that his mind as a unity, In Hume’s words Descartes’ claims “we are at every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self”. When Hume introspects, he finds he is conscious of no such thing. We do not have a mental and are only made of one property. Hume believes we are a bundle of experience. If the mind, as the dualist claim, immaterial and lacking extension, then it could not be a possible object of sense experience. Sense experience is necessarily of physical things which are extended in space. The idea of an immaterial mind as a thing, which is not a possible object of experience, must lack any meaning for Hume.
Not everything thought of as physical is divisible.
The fact that it does not make sense to talk about splitting the mind, does not show that is a special kind of indivisible stuff. This criticism focuses on the inference from the fact that it is difficult to make sense of the idea of dividing the mind or mental states to concluding they cannot be ultimately physical. For instance: the solubility of sugar is not something that makes sense to divide, but it would not follow that the solubility is an indivisible non-physical substance somehow connected to sugar.
Gilbert Ryle thinks we should pay careful consideration on how we use the word “mind”.
Ryle believes the mind is used to talk about behaviour. Since we cannot divide terms which describe our action and capacities such as running could mean it is senseless to talk about dividing the mind
Conceivability argument
If I can clearly and distinctly conceive of the essential natures of two things separately, it must be metaphysically possible to separate the.
I clearly and distinctly perceive myself (my mind) to be essentially a thinking and unextended thing
I clearly and distinctly perceive my body to be essentially an extended and unthinking thins
It must be metaphysically possible for mind and the body to be separated, meaning that they are distinct substances.
It is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body
Therefore, it is possible that the mind can exist without the body
Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances
Simple version: Descartes relies on his notion of clear and distinct ideas as logical possibilities to develop from the conceivable to the possible to reality. If I can tell a story where A exists and B doesn’t exist, it’s got to follow that A and B are not the same things.
Antoine Arnauld. What is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible.
Offers parallel argument. Pythagoras theorem, that the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angle triangle is equal to the squares of the other two sides (a2+b2=c2). It cannot follow that it is possible for a right-angle triangle to lack this property. Not even God could do this. Hence this property is not separable from a right-angle triangle even in principle, even if it is conceivable. Descartes may conceive the essence of his mind as distinct from his body does not guarantee that it is actually metaphysically possible to separate.
Response: It depends on Descartes thought of the nature of mind and body being “vivid and clear”. If he has an accurate and complete understanding of the essential natures of both, then he can conclude with confidence that they really are different things. Contemplating attributes of a triangle is different: their ignorance of the true nature of the triangle means their conception of it isn’t possible. Descartes’ conception of a mind is supposed to be complete, nothing is hidden from his view, so he can clearly see that extension is not a part of its nature. “I know… that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing; from this it follows that my essence consists soley in my being a thinking thing”
His response is only based on how those things appear to him. Appearances may be deceptive or incomplete. There could be aspects of himself that he is not directly aware of. Thought might still be the product of some material processes in the brain of which we are directly aware via introspection. So just because they appear to be two things here, wouldn’t necessarily mean that they are really two things. E.g., heat and motion – heat is reducible to motion
Masked man fallacy:
premise 1: I have an idea of my mind as a thinking thig.
Premise 2: I have an idea of my body as a non-thinking thing.
Conclusion: My mind and body are different.
Intentional context: involve the mind’s thinking about, or being aware of something (beliefs, hopes, and desires). Intentional states: directed at something in the world, or about something. Descartes’ argument involves the intentional states of being aware of his body and mind, and having an idea of their properties. He cannot apply Leibniz’s law. His awareness doesn’t reveal their true nature. Doesn’t guarantee that the two really do possess their properties in themselves.
My idea of Batman is a masked crusade
My idea of Bruce Wayne is not a masked crusader
Therefore, Batman is not Bruce Wayne.
Argument is fallacious. Bruce Wayne could be Batman if, on occasions and unbeknownst to me, he dresses up in a cape and mask to perform heroic deeds. Same way: mind could be the body, if unbeknownst to me the activities of some part of it, say my brain, are able to produce conscious experience. Just because I am unaware of my brain doing this doesn’t show that it doesn’t, so while my body and mind appear very different, in reality they could still be the same.
Response: Distorted Descartes’ intended argument. “I have a vivid and clear idea of myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended, and one of body as something that is extended and does not think”. Claim that his awareness reveals the true nature of each (“Clear and vivid”).
The true nature of my mind is a thinking and unextended thing
The true nature of my body is a non-thinking thing and extended thing
Therefore, my mind and body are different
Physicalist philosophers will deny the first premise.
They would claim the mind is extended (e.g., occupies the same space as the brain) Descartes’ is not aware if that mind and body have certain qualities – unaware of body being a thinking thing and the mind being an extended thing. His argument should follow as
I am aware of myself as a thinking thing/ I am aware of my body as an extended thing
I am not aware of my body as a thinking thing/ I am not aware of myself as an extended thing.
Therefore, my mind and body are different
Response: Not being aware of an aspect of something Is not the same as bring aware of the absence of that aspect. E.g.
I am aware my friend has blue eyes
I am not aware that the woman in the mask has blue eyes
Therefor the woman in the mask is not my friend
According to Leibniz’s law, the two terms “friend” and “woman in the man” cannot refer to the same person.
