Philosophy of mind

Question 1

What are the five/six main ways of differentiating between the mind and the body?

Answer 1

• Mental states lack spatial features; they are not empirically verifiable or measurable.
• Mental states are private; they can only be accessed first personally, and cannot be accessed by third parties.
• Mental states are indubitable, Descartes said “I think therefore I am.” This refers to how mental states are accessed directly and infallibly by the person whose mental state it is. This means although you may doubt the truth or validity of your thought, you can never doubt what you are thinking.
• Mental states are subjective and qualitative; they have a personal quality to them. Two people experiencing the same phenomena will never experience it in the same way.
• Mental states are characterised by “intentionality”, this means that they are about something, and are directed upon something. For example by evaluating or desiring it.
• Mental states are anomalous, they are not bound by the physical laws of nature, not determined, and are non-reductive, they may not be reduced down to physical activity.

Question 2

What is Leibniz’ Law, and what does it suggest about the relationship of mind and body?

Answer 2

Leibniz’ law is a logical tool used for discriminating between two things, and deciding whether or not the two things are identical.
There are two main claims as to whether or not two things are equal.

The indiscernibility of identicals: if x is identical to y then x and y have all the same properties.
The identity of indiscernibles: if x and y have the same properties then x is identical to y.

It is used by non-reductionists such as Descartes, who used it to prove the mind and body are distinct, he claimed that one could not doubt the existence of the mind, but could doubt the existence of the body. Thus one possessed a property the other did not, and they must be different.

Question 3

What is The masked man fallacy?

Answer 3

What we believe to be true about things is not always the truth; we can be misguided or deprived of knowledge. Thus if we apply incorrect knowledge to Leibniz’ law we will arrive at an incorrect conclusion.

Question 4

What is an ontologically reductionist theory, in relation to the mind?

Answer 4

Ontology is the study of what exists. If a theory of the mind is ontologically reductive then it means it claims the minds existence can be totally rendered into the existence of something physical. An ontologically reductive theory claims that the mind is nothing more than … (eg the brain.)

Question 5

What is an analytically reductionist theory, in relation to the mind?

Answer 5

An analytically reductionist theory claims that a certain class of things can be rendered without loss of meaning into another class of things in a way that makes it clearer what is being asserted.

Question 6

What is a non-reductionist theory, in relation to the mind?

Answer 6

Non-reductionist theories of the mind claim that the mind’s existence cannot be totally rendered into the existence of something else. The mind is thus distinguishable from mere physical phenomena. Theories such as substance dualism are non-reductive.

Question 7

What is an eliminative theory, in relation to the mind?

Answer 7

An eliminative theory of the mind does not simply reduce mental phenomena; it displaces it entirely, removing it from philosophy of mind. Mental states are thus illusions derived from the way physical events seem to us. Eliminative materialism is an eliminative theory.

Question 8

What is monism, and how does it have a bearing on philosophy of mind?

Answer 8

A monist believes that there is only one type of substance in existence. It does not necessarily make you a materialist/physicalist; it is possible to be an idealist, who believes there is only non-physical substance in the world.

Question 9

What does ‘nomological’ mean, and how does it have a bearing on philosophy of mind?

Answer 9

Nomological means that something is law like and predictable. In philosophy of mind some theories claim that the mind is nomological, and some claim it is anomalous, which will in turn have an effect on whether or not free will really exists.

Question 10

What is a substance, and how does it have a bearing on philosophy of mind?

Answer 10

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Question 11

What is logical positivism, and how does it have a bearing on philosophy of mind?

Answer 11

Logical positivists are a group of people associated with members of the Vienna Circle. Logical positivists take an empirical route and were concerned with scientific proof. They created a verification principle, in which it was stated if a proposition is unverifiable then it should be deemed meaningless, and vice versa. This was then changed to the falsification principle; a statement was devoid of literal meaning unless it could in principle be falsified empirically.

Question 12

What is the mind/body problem, or the problem of interaction?

Answer 12

The problem of interaction is a problem that arises for non-reductionists, or dualists. It entails that two substances exist, a non physical substance, ie the mind, and a physical substance, ie the body. The problem of interaction is that how can a non physical and a physical substance interact, something inherit to a non physical substance is that it cannot be sensed or interact with any physical substance.

Question 13

In what way does the law of conservation of energy contribute to this debate?

Answer 13

For something that is non physical to interact physically there would be a creation of energy, which goes against our basic laws of physics, that energy cannot be neither destroyed or created. This idea is very counter intuitive and thus requires significant evidence to substantiate it.

Question 14

What is ‘interactionism’? Which theories of the mind are interactionist?

Answer 14

Interactionism is the theory in the philosophy of mind which holds that, matter and mind being distinct and independent, they exert causal effects on one another. As such, it is a type of dualism. Interactionist theories of the mind

Question 15

What are the advantages/disadvantages of this approach?

Answer 15

One advantage is that this approach is intuitive and a common-sense theory. It seems like we are surrounded by evidence that supports this theory. Everyday occurrences such as a child touching a hot stove, feeling pain and then screaming fit in with the idea that the physical can have an effect on the mental. However, it is almost impossible to establish its validity or correctedness, as it cannot be empirically proven.

Question 16

What is ‘epiphenomenalism’? Which theories of the mind are epiphenomenalist?

Answer 16

Epiphenomenalism is the theory that states mental phenomena are caused by physical processes in the brain. The impression that thoughts and feelings cause physical effects is an illusion. E.g. the mental event of deciding to pick up a rock is actually caused by the firing of specific neurons in the brain. Epiphenomenalism is a reductionist theory that eliminates mental causes, claiming that physical causes are reducible to fundamental physics.

Question 17

What approaches to the mind are non-interactionist and why?

Answer 17

Any theories which identify only one substance e.g. eliminative materialism, identity theory (type and token), biological naturalism.

Question 18

What is psycho-physical parallelism, and occasionalism? What do they contribute to the debate?

Answer 18

Psycho-physical parallelism is a theory that tries to avoid the problem of interaction. Leibniz claims that mental events and physical events run parallel to each other in synchronization. Psycho-physical parallelism uses the idea of God, who winds the kind and body clocks, making sure that the right kind of mental state occurs alongside the right kind of physical event. However, Leibniz does state that this God does not have to be constantly present to make sure this happens.
Occasionalism is associated with the philosopher Malebranche. Malebranche said that the mind (a non-physical soul) has no causal power on the material body, but when mental and physical events occur, God is present. God ensures that the appropriate correspondence between the mental and physical occur, so it appears as though one affects the other. This doctrine is also meant to escape the problem of interaction.

Question 19

Explain what substance dualism is.

Answer 19

Substance dualism is the view that the mind and the body are two ontologically distinct and independent substances, each having radically different essential natures. To a substance dualist the mind is an unextended thinking substance, and the body s an extended unthinking substance. Descartes is an example of a substance dualist.

Question 20

Explain what weak and strong property dualism is.

Answer 20

Property dualism recognizes the problems with substance dualism. Instead they say that humans are physical entities that have two distinct sets of properties – physical and mental, but only one kind of substance (matter). The brain has physical properties such as shape and weight, as well as mental properties. These mental properties are caused by processes in the brain – they do not exist independently. These mental properties emerge from certain processes in the brain when the brain reaches a certain level of complexity. Weak property dualism is when the properties can be seen as emergent in exactly the same way that the physical properties of colour or water are – they are merely complex physical emergent properties, and can be accounted for in a materialist framework. Strong property dualism is that the mental properties could also be interpreted as something non-physical, a set of metaphysically unique properties. These unique properties share many of the characteristics that Descartes attributed to the mental.

Question 21

Explain what type and token identity theory is.

Answer 21

Type identity theory makes the claim that all mental states of a particular kind (e.g. happiness) will be identical with a brain state of a particular type. All physical states of a particular type are also mental ones of a particular type. It is ontologically reductionist, because it claims that the existence of the mind can be reduced to purely physical brain states. Token identity theory makes the claim that all mental states of a particular type will be identical with a brain state of some type, however there may be a wide range of types of brain states that could be identical with that type of mental state. This allows for multiple realisability of mental states (some mental properties can be realized by different physical properties).

Question 22

Explain what eliminative materialism is.

Answer 22

Eliminative materialism is the theory that repudiates the ‘common sense’ view of life, where we use terms such as beliefs, desires etc to explain our mind. It rejects talk of mental states altogether. It states that nothing exists which corresponds to mental terms like ‘desire’ or ‘belief’. Eliminative materialism says that neuroscience will eventually be able to explain all of the brain processes.

Question 23

Explain what biological naturalism is.

Answer 23

John Searle argues that both dualists and materialists make a fundamental mistake. We assume that mental means non-physical, and physical implies non-mental. John Searle states that the world consists of entirely physical phenomena, and the dualists are right to think that it also contains irreducible mental phenomena. We just need to redefine mental and physical. Mental phenomena are a part of our natural biological history, just as growth and digestion are. All mental states are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain. Mental phenomena are higher-level features of the brain. A higher-level feature of a system is caused by the behavior of lower-level elements. Therefore, biological naturalism makes two key propositions. One is that brains cause minds. The second is that minds are higher-level features of brains. This is a non-reductionist, physicalist view.

Question 24

Explain what philosophical/metaphysical behaviourism is.

Answer 24

Beaviourism is an analytically reductionist, materialist, logical positivist theory of the mind. It states that all talk about mental states can be reduced and rendered, without loss of meaning, into talk about actual and possible patterns of behaviour. E.g. ‘being soluble’. To say that a sugar cube is soluble is not to say that the sugar cube has some sort of ghostly inner state. ‘X is water soluble’ is equivalent by definition to ‘if x were put in unsaturated water, x would dissolve’. This is operational definition. A similar analysis holds for mental states. When we describe someone as being in pain, this is not a description of that person’s mental experience. It is a description of that person’s public behaviour. Metaphysical behaviourism is the most radical version, and states that mental states are simply identified with behaviour. Philosophical behaviourism makes no claims about the nature of mental states, but states that if there were mental states, it was for all practical purposes inaccessible to scientific observation and therefore should be disregarded.

Question 25

Explain what machine and teleological functionalism is.

Answer 25

Machine functionalism is a computational theory of the mind which states that the nature of a mental state is the same as the nature of a computer. In computers, one state means that when given an input, such and such happens. Machine functionalism says that the mind works in the same way. So being in pain is the state which causes one to cry “ouch”.
Teleological functionalism ties the state of the brain and mind to the needs of the organism within the context of evolution. What a representation represents depends on the functions of the systems that produce or use the representation. Teleological functionalism says that we should understand functions to be what the thing the function was selected and intended for.

Question 26

What are strengths and weaknesses of Substance dualism?

Answer 26

Strengths:
Intuitive
• Seems as though mind and body have a different nature (e.g. spatial features etc)
• Conceivability– can imagine myself without a body
• Evidence to suggest people have had ‘out of body’ experiences
• Allows an afterlife
• Explains key questions like ‘what is consciousness?’

Weaknesses:
Not intuitive, actually over-complicates matters (Ockham’s Razor)
• Just because things can be distinguished in language, does not mean they are distinguishable in reality
• Scientific/evolutionary evidence suggests mind is totally dependent on brain
• Para-psychological phenomena have been widely discredited/explained away
• How does the mind react with the brain
• No empirical evidence for this mental substance – it is unobservable

Question 27

What are strengths and weaknesses of property dualism?

Answer 27

Strengths:
Intuitive – seems as though we have a mental life over and above our physical life
• Admits brain/mental states have a close relationship, and that the latter is dependent on the former – science supports this
• Does not have the problem that substance dualism faces of positing a substance that cannot be observed to exist
• Commitment to the science of the brain, whilst refusing to reduce mind down to an identity with neurones
• Explains how damage to brain can damage the mind

Weaknesses:
Not intuitive – Ockham’s Razor again
• Relationship leads to conclusion that mind is epiphenomenal to the brain, and that causal relationship is one-way (goes against our experience)
• Difficulty explaining what a mental property is – unobservable
• Impossible to reconcile this theory with idea that the mind could be causally active

Question 28

What are strengths and weaknesses of biological naturalism?

Answer 28

Strengths:
If it really can allow for minds to exist whilst explaining how they are naturally occurring in physical matter, then this could be perfect
• Theory is grounded in naturalism and the study of biological organisms. Fits in with evolution and the notion of animals having a consciousness
• Consciousness is simply a higher level feature of a collection of neurones, in the same way as liquidity is a higher level feature of a collection of water molecules. Analogy makes it seem simple

Weaknesses:
But Searle himself admits that the mind/body problem is not solved – his theory is more explanatory than others, but it is hard to see how. It seems extremely similar if not identical to property dualism, for example
• Other theorists of the mind can say the same for their own theories – but Searle himself admits that this analogy is imperfect. Liquidity is nothing like consciousness, for a start, it is observable
• Particular interpretation of ‘cause’ has to be use to successfully claim that brains cause minds. If minds are ‘higher level features’ of the brain, can we really say that the brain causes them? Are they not in some way interdependent?
• Is epiphenomenalism a consequence of Searle’s theory? If consciousness is merely a feature of the brain, can we see how it is able to causally affect the brain back? Or is it just a ‘brain shadow’?
• Searle claims he is not a reductionist. But then he says that consciousness is a higher level feature of the brain. Is that not reducing the mind to something else?

Question 29

What are strengths and weaknesses of Type Identity Theory?

Answer 29

Strengths:
• It gets rid of the problem of interaction that plagues dualists
It champions the physical states of the brain corresponding to mental states, something that a neuroscientist would be looking at.

Weaknesses:
• Thoughts are always “about” something, they have intentionality; whereas brain states do not seem to be about anything, and so it seems odd to say that they are analytically reducible.
It doesn’t seem that one certain mental state is universally analytically reducible to one certain brain state, as many brain states seem to be identical to one mental state of a particular type, e.g both dogs and humans can have the mental state of happiness, but their brain states that are reducible from it is different.

Question 30

What are strengths and weaknesses of Token Identity Theory?

Answer 30

Strengths:
• Allows for multiple realisability, not falling to the same criticisms that type Identity Theory falls to.
• Allows for animals or aliens to have mental states.
Same strengths as Type.

Weaknesses:
• Same brain states could be different thoughts. This makes the relationship between the brain states and mental states very mysterious, e,g two people could be physically identical, down to the same molecules, and yet they could be completely different mentally.

Question 31

What are strengths and weaknesses of behaviourism?

Answer 31

Strengths:
• Makes mind open to studying and therefore less mysterious
• Overcomes certain problems – e.g. the mind/body problem, as the mind is the body
• Could be considered intuitive
• Offers opportunity for us to be able to predict and control behaviour
• Simple

Weaknesses:
• Mind is actually made more mysterious – how do we explain random behaviour or lying, acting, paralysis etc
• Just because other theories cannot explain mind/behaviour interaction, does not mean we should make them the same thing
• Not more intuitive – feel as though we have a mind that dictates our behaviour, not the other way round
• Assumes that for something to exist, it has to be observable
• ‘Anaesthetising’ the mind – equivalent to a zombie

Question 32

What are strengths and weaknesses of functionalism?

Answer 32

Strengths:
Does not worry what the mind ‘is’ – focuses on what it does instead
• It is not chauvinistic, and thus is able to include aliens, computers and animals amongst beings capable of achieving ‘mind’
• It is pleasing because it allows us to keep an idea of the ‘mental’
• Grounds the idea of the ‘mental’ within the context of observable stimuli and behaviours

Weaknesses:
• Doesn’t say what the mind is
• Surely you need to know what a mind is – if functionalism is correct, then a mousetrap has a mind, which seems absurd
• This ‘mental’ is mysterious. Two people may have the same reaction to a stimulus and yet have very different mental process that got them there – this has not been explained
• The thing we really want to know about – the mind – remains elusive
• Cannot explain behaviour that require no thought (e.g. reflex actions)
• Just because a computer can follow a particular programme, it does not mean that it chooses to do so, or is even conscious of doing so – e.g. Chinese room example
• Computer could never have meaningful emotions, such as fear, because it does not have the necessary physiological features. E.g. an eyeless alien can never feel the pain of a blinding flash of light

Question 33

What are strengths and weaknesses of Eliminative Materialism?

Answer 33

Strengths:
• All other theories of the mind have in some way failed to explain what the mind is. Even reductive theories cannot explain what the mind is. It is simplest just to eliminate it
• Mind is not observable in any way – no thing to which the mind is is attributed. Thus it is a meaningless term (logical positivism)
• Often, in the past, we have explained phenomena such as rust or heat with crazy and incorrect theories. The mind is just another example.
• Maybe eliminative materialists are just doing the ‘brave’ thing – we bulk at the idea of not having a mind, but that is just an emotional response rather than a rational one

Weaknesses:
• Just because the other theories are not perfect does not mean we should completely do away with the mind. At least they are able to explain in some way why it seems as though I have a mind – eliminative materialists cannot explain this
• Logical positivism makes the huge assumption that meaningful statements have to correspond to something observable – they do not
• An examination of the past in no way provides certain conclusions about the future
• Self-contradictory – eliminative materialists ‘believe’ they have no minds – if they have no minds, how can they have a belief?
• Intuitively I cannot live my life as if I have no mind, so even if I do not have one I will continue my existence as if I do

Question 34

What is a philosophical zombie?

Answer 34

A philosophical zombie is a being that is indistinguishable from a human being in every way except that it lacks consciousness, qualia or experience.

Question 35

What is the hard problem of consciousness, and the really hard problem of consciousness?

Answer 35

The hard problem of consciousness is the question of how a completely physical system can be the subject of experience? When we think and perceive there is an aspect of subjectiveness, which is experience. Our experiences go along with our perceptions. So, if reductionist theories claim that there is no such thing as a non-physical mind, how can they explain this thing called ‘consciousness’ which is not part of our physical system.
The really hard problem of consciousness is why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? For example, when having the experience of deep blue, how we explain why there is something to experience this? Experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no explanation of why and how it arises.

Question 36

What is the argument from conceivability against the reduction of consciousness?

Answer 36

The conceivability argument attempts to show that consciousness must be non-physical by asking us to imagine two beings. These two beings are physically identical down to the last atom. However, one lacks consciousness. It is still perfectly conceivable that this being who lacks consciousness exists. Therefore, this simple thought experience proves that consciousness is not physical, because if it were, we would not be able to conceive of the existence of this being who does not have consciousness.

Question 37

How do qualia relate to the problem of consciousness?

Answer 37

Qualia relates to the problem of consciousness because when we experience objects, we are not only perceiving them – there is a subjective aspect too. For example when we experience red, we do not only see the colour. We get qualitative aspects too, such as the quality of redness, the experience of dark and light etc.

Question 38

What do the thought experiments of Nagel and Jackson contribute to the debate about qualia?

Answer 38

Nagel asked ‘what it is like to be a bat?’, saying that no matter how much we know about their brains, we cannot know what it is like to experience the world as they do. This is a non-reductionist standpoint, claiming that the mind has a separate existence which is why we will never be able to experience what the bat does.
Jackson offers a different thought experiment about Mary the colour scientist. Mary knows all the physical facts about colour, as well as physical facts about the experience of colour in other people. However, she has been confined to a black and white room for her whole life. When she finally leaves this room, it seems obvious to say that she learns something about the colour red when she first sees it – she learns what it is like to see that colour. This thought experiment claims that the brain and mind must be separate, because Mary cannot know everything about colour until her mind experiences it.

Question 39

How does intentionality relate to the problem of consciousness?

Answer 39

Mary cannot apply intentionality to the idea of colour red until she has experienced the colour red firsthand. This is the same for anything – we cannot fully know ‘about’ something until we have consciously experienced it. This suggests that there is something non-physical which is in charge of experiencing the subjectiveness of objects, and this thing is consciousness.

Question 40

What does Searle’s thought experiment contribute to the debate about intentionality?

Answer 40

The Chinese Room Experiment shows how a man, even though he seemingly is speaking Chinese, is fooling a collection of Chinese speakers by providing intellectual responses to their questions, actually has no intentionality with what he is doing and is simply assorting symbols according to a manual as they come to him. Searle argues that a machine does much the same thing, meaning that they lack both intentionality and a consciousness.

Question 41

What is the problem of other minds in general? Which theories of the mind are particularly susceptible to this problem and why?

Answer 41

The problem is that we have no way of detecting other minds; we can observe the choices they apparently makes, the movements and actions which they apparently control but we cannot actually have any way of empirically verifying the existence of other minds- we can only know about the existence of ours. This is a problem for non-reductionist theories as they create a clear distinction between the mind and the body, despite us only being able to prove the existence of one of these.

Question 42

What are the four key dimensions of the problem of other minds?

Answer 42

How do we know other people experience the world in the same way we do?

It is not possible to know for sure that what other people say they are feeling is what they actually are feeling.

It is not possible to know for sure that other people actually feel anything.

It is not possible to know for sure that I am not imagining the existence of these other people entirely.

Question 43

Outline the theories of the mind which have a ‘ready-made’ response to the problem of other minds and why.

Answer 43

Behaviourism argues that it is meaningless to talk about other minds as they are not directly demonstrable through behavior alone

Question 44

Do these responses to the problem of other minds from behaviourism work? Why? Why not?

Answer 44

The argument from analogy from Ayer works well in my opinion in solving the problem of other minds, in that it can show that as other people are analogous to me physically, then they must be analogous to me mentally as well and they must have mental states. This only accounts for 2 of the 4 problems though, we may not know if people are saying what they are actually feeling, or whether I have actually made up the world entirely or not. Behaviourism accounts for the former, saying that if other people do not show observable behavior, then any mental states they may claim to have are meaningless.

Question 45

Outline JS Mill’s response to the problem of other minds.

Answer 45

Mills provides a solution to the problem by using experience; he claims that other people have bodies, and he knows that his body is the ‘antecedent of feelings’, he continues to say that he sees actions, and knows that in his case are caused by feelings. Whilst he cannot identify the intermediate stage, he can use experience to see that it seems as regular as his and concludes that it must exist.

Question 46

Does this response from JS Mill in relation to the problem of other minds work? Why? Why not?

Answer 46

I believe that this is a sound response however it does raise several questions i.e. how can I know that others experience things in the same way that I do/at all, how do I know they feel what they say they feel or how do I know that they even exist at all? The overarching issue Is that Mill’s account is based on an assumption that others are like him, which he cannot prove.

Question 47

Outline Wittgenstein’s response to the problem of other minds (criteriological response/private language argument).

Answer 47

Wittgenstein says that we react to people as if they are minded as a part of human nature. He says that we can directly experience their mental states, e.g. seeing anger in their face; we are experiencing their mind directly in their bodily functions. He states that a certain behaviour acts as a symbol to indicate a certain mental state, and is vital in knowing about other minds and speaking meaningfully about them. The private language argument states that it is impossible to have a private language that refers to only our own mental states. Wittgenstein states that we need other language users to create a language, and this verifies the existence of other minds. Language cannot be attached to something that is publicly unverifiable, when we use language, we are not just talking about our own subjective experience, but rather everyone’s shared experience. If I were only referring to my own experience, then I could never share language with other people meaningfully. (Beetle in the box example).

Question 48

Does this response from Wittgenstein in relation to the problem of other minds work? Why? Why not?

Answer 48

These responses rule out solipsism, as a shared language presupposes the existence of other language users and other minds. From this, we know that people use behaviours like we do and the same language that we do to express similar mental states that we can also experience. However, it still does not solve the problem of people expressing things that they are not really feeling, e.g. displaying the behaviours of being in pain when they’re not.