Parties to a Crime

Question 1

Introduction

Answer 1

Defendants do not always work alone. A conviction for a criminal offence may not necessarily require the accused to do the act that
forms the actus reus of the crime.
For example, Fred could break into Ahmed’s house and commit burglary. However Mary could
also be liable for the offence if she:
* Assisted Fred by driving him to Ahmed’s house or provided a hammer with which to break the
window to gain entry;
* Encouraged him to carry out the burglary;
* Procured the offence by suggesting Fred commit the burglary.

All these modes of participation could make Mary liable for the offence as an accessory.

Question 2

Joint enterprise.

Answer 2

Alternatively the parties might take part in a joint enterprise. Fred and Mary may break into Ahmed’s house together. Both enter the house, both intend to steal from the house, and both will be liable for burglary. If, in the course of the break-in, Fred confronts Ahmed and stabs him, killing him, Fred will probably be guilty of murder. Depending on her mens rea, Mary might also be guilty
of murder as an accessory.

Question 3

1.1 Principal offenders

It is necessary to distinguish between the principal offender and accessories, otherwise referred to
as secondary parties.

Answer 3

Principal: The principal (P) is the person who, with appropriate mens rea, commits the actus reus of the offence. It is always possible to have more than one principal: if Fred and Mary break into a house together and both have an intention to steal they will be joint principals for
the burglary.

Question 4

Innocent agents

Answer 4

In certain circumstances, a person may be guilty of an offence as a
principal, even if another person actually performs the actus reus. This occurs where the person acting can be described as an ‘innocent agent’.
Examples of this include where the person carrying out the actus reus is under the age of criminal liability or is deceived as to what they are doing.

Question 5

Key case: R v Michael (1840) 9 C & P 356

Answer 5

A woman gave a child a dose of poison and the child gave it to the victim. The woman was the principal offender.

Question 6

Key case: R v Stringer and Banks (1991) Crim LR 639

Answer 6

An employer told his employees to make accounting transactions which (unknown to those employees) resulted in fraudulent transfers. The employer was the principal and the employees were innocent agents.

Question 7

1.2 Secondary parties

Answer 7

Secondary parties: Section 8, Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 identifies the ways in which someone can be an accessory to a crime. It provides as follows: Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of any offence whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.

Question 8

R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8

Answer 8

The Supreme Court in R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 stated that the principles governing those who set
out on a joint enterprise are the same as for those who aid, abet, counsel or procure. There are
therefore five ways in which someone can be liable as an accessory:
* To aid
* To abet
* To counsel
* To procure
* To be a party to a joint enterprise
With the exception of procuring, these actions can be summarised as ‘assisting or encouraging the commission of the principal’s offence’. This was the term used in R v Jogee.

Question 9

2. Actus reus

Key case: Attorney General’s Reference(No 1 of 1975) 2 All ER 684

Answer 9

Lord Widgery stated: We approach s 8 of the 1861 Act on the basis that the words should be given their ordinary meaning, if possible. We approach the section on the basis also that if four words are employed here, ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’, the probability is that there is a difference between each of those four words and the other three, because, if there were no such
difference, then Parliament would be wasting time in using four words where two or three would do

Question 10

Lord Widgery’s

Answer 10

However, despite Lord Widgery’s implication that the words used in the Act are ordinary words, capable of being understood without explanation, some discussion of the terms, and particularly the differences between them, will be of assistance.

Question 11

2.1 Procuring

Key case: AG’s Ref(No 1 of 1975) 2 All ER 684

Answer 11

‘To procure means to produce by endeavour.’ In this case D added alcohol to P’s drink without his knowledge or consent. When P later got in his car and drove, his blood/alcohol concentration was higher than the prescribed limit. D had procured P to commit a drink-driving offence. There is no need for consensus. It is immaterial whether the procuring is relied on. In this case it was done without P’s knowledge or consent.

Question 12

Key case: Beatty v Gillibanks (1882) 9 QBD 308

Answer 12

Officers of the Salvation Army arranged a meeting in Weston-super-Mare which they knew was
likely to produce a violent reaction from the Skeleton Army. There was a violent reaction. However, it was held that the Salvation Army officers had not procured the violence. They were not endeavouring to cause the violence. There must be a causal link between D’s act and the commission of the offence.

Question 13

2.2 Aiding

Answer 13

This is perhaps the easiest term to understand. It requires the accessory to give help, support or
assistance to the principal offender in carrying out the principal offence.
Examples include:
* Supplying materials or tools to commit the offence (Thambiah v R [1966] AC 37)
* Giving information which helps the principal to commit a crime (AG v Able [1984] QB 795)
* Holding down a victim in assault (R v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344)

Question 14

Key case: R v Bryce [2004] 2 Cr App R 35

Answer 14

B drove P to a caravan close to V’s home. B argued that he was not liable as an accessory to P’s
subsequent murder of V because of a 12-hour delay between P’s arrival at the caravan and the murder, particularly as P had not fully made up his mind to kill when B drove him there. Despite this, the Court of Appeal held that B’s act could amount to aiding.

Question 15

No causation

Answer 15

There need be no causation in the sense that but for the assistance the crime would not have
happened. There need be no consensus, eg if D sees P committing a crime and comes to P’s assistance by, for example, talking to or restraining a police officer who would have prevented P from committing
the crime, D is guilty even if D’s assistance is unforeseen and unwanted by and unknown to P.
An accessory before the fact is one who helps before the crime. An accessory before the fact
would come under the category of ‘aiding’. An accessory after the fact has been abolished. Such a person would now be convicted of
assisting an offender under s 4 Criminal Law Act 1967.

Question 16

2.3 Counselling

Answer 16

This has been held to mean giving advice or encouragement before the commission of the
offence.

Key case: R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808
Held that ‘there is no implication that there should be any causal connection between the
counselling and the offence’. There need be no causal link eg but for the counselling, the crime would not be committed. However, there must be contact between the parties and a connection between the counselling
and the offence. The act done must be within the scope of the advice and the principal offender must know of the counselling, ie there must be consensus.

Question 17

Key case: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8

Answer 17

Once encouragement or assistance is proved to have been given the prosecution does not have to go so far as to prove that it had a positive effect on P’s conduct or on the outcome - R v Calhaem [1985] QB 808. In many cases that would be impossible to prove. There might, for
example, have been many supporters encouraging [P] so that the encouragement of a single one of them could not be shown to have made a difference. The
encouragement might have
been ignored, yet the counselled offence committed.

Question 18

2.4 Abetting

Answer 18

This is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ‘to incite, instigate or encourage’. Devlin J in NCB v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11 suggested that it means encouraging at the time the
offence is being committed. This is in contrast to counselling which is encouraging before the commission of the offence. As with counselling, there need be no causal link and there must be communication. The principal must know they are being abetted.

Question 19

Key case: R v Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1

Answer 19

Kennedy LJ considered what kind of encouragement might amount to abetting and concluded: Suppose somebody came up to G and said, “I am going to kill your wife”, if he played any part, either in encouragement, as little as patting him on the back, nodding, saying “Oh
goody”, that would be sufficient to involve him in the murder to make him guilty, because he is
encouraging the murder […]. Any involvement from mere encouragement upwards would
suffice.

Question 20

2.4.1 Mere presence at the scene of the crime

This is not necessarily enough to count as abetting.

Answer 20

Key case: R v Coney [1882] 8 QBD 534: Three spectators at an illegal prize-fight were charged with battery as accessories (the principals
being the two fighters). Although the Divisional Court accepted that the presence of the spectators could be seen as an encouragement, since the fighters would not be fighting if there
was no audience, the conviction of the defendants was quashed as the trial judge’s summing up may have lead the jury to conclude that mere presence at the scene would be sufficient to amount to the offence.

Question 21

Key case: Wilcox v Jeffrey [1951] 1 All ER 464

Answer 21

It is possible to abet by mere presence. H, an American jazz musician, played at a concert in London despite the fact that his permission to enter the UK prohibited him from working. W attended the concert and later wrote a favourable review in a magazine that he owned. It was held that W’s presence at the concert was an
encouragement to the offence.

Question 22

2.4.2 Failure to prevent an offence

Answer 22

Where D has the right or duty to control the actions of another and deliberately refrains from exercising it, D’s inactivity may be a positive encouragement to the other to perform an illegal act and would therefore be abetting

Question 23

Key case: R v Russell [1933] VLR 59

Answer 23

Parent: A husband who stood by and watched his wife drown their children was guilty of aiding and abetting the homicide. His deliberate abstention from action gave encouragement and
authority to his wife’s act.

Question 24

Key case: Tuck v Robson [1970] 1 WLR 741

Answer 24

Publican: If a licensee of a pub stands by and watches their customers drinking after hours, the licensee is guilty of aiding and abetting them in doing so.

Question 25

Key case: Du Cross v Lambourne [1907] 1 KB 40

Answer 25

Car owner: If D’s car was being driven at a dangerous speed by E in D’s presence, D could be convicted, for he was in control, could and ought to have prevented her from driving in a
dangerous manner

Question 26

Key case: R v J F Alford Transport Ltd [1997] 3 Cr App R 326

Answer 26

Employer: The company, together with the managing director and transport director, were convicted as accessories to offences of falsifying tachograph records, committed by 19 drivers employed by the company. They appealed, arguing that convictions required evidence of positive assistance or encouragement to commit the offence.

The Court of Appeal held that the company was in a position of control over the drivers and that passive acquiescence in such a circumstance was sufficient. It was not even necessary for the prosecution to prove that the appellants intended their acquiescence to encourage the drivers, just that they knew their silence would have this effect. This case also confirms that it is not
necessary for an inactive participator to be present at the scene of the crime.

Question 27

2.5 Joint enterprise

Answer 27

A joint enterprise is where two or more people are committing a crime together. Fred and Mary may break into Ahmed’s house together. Both enter the house, both intend to steal
from the house, and both will be liable for burglary. If, in the course of the break-in, Fred confronts Ahmed and stabs him, killing him, Fred will probably be guilty of murder. Depending on her mens rea, Mary might also be guilty of murder as an accessory.

Question 28

R v Gnango [2010] EWCA Crim 1691

Answer 28

Lord Philips described it in R v Gnango [2010] EWCA Crim 1691 as follows: D1 and D2 have a common intention to commit crime A. D1, as an incident of committing crime A, commits crime B. In a joint enterprise case, at the time of the accessorial offence, the accomplice was committing another offence with the principal. In a simple case of aiding, abetting etc, the accomplice is not committing an offence as a
principal.

Question 29

2.5.1 Key principles

Answer 29

To be liable under this principle there is no need to show that D2 aided or encouraged the offence. It is enough that D2 was a party to the joint enterprise and had the relevant mens rea for an accessory. An important requirement is that crime B must be committed in the course of or be incidental to crime A. If D1 and D2 got to a house to beat up a man and on the way home together D1 throws a brick through the window of a house, D2 cannot be liable for this criminal damage. A party cannot be liable for any offences committed before they join the enterprise.

Question 30

3. Mens rea

Answer 30

Key case: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8

This was stated by Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson in the Supreme Court as follows: The mental element in assisting or encouraging is an intention to assist or encourage the
commission of the crime and this requires knowledge of any existing facts necessary for it to be criminal […]. If the crime requires a particular intent, D2 must intend to assist or encourage D1 to act with such intent.

Question 31

Smith, Hogan and Ormerod into three parts:

Answer 31

This is broken down by Smith, Hogan and Ormerod into three parts:
* An intention to assist or encourage the principal’s conduct.
* If the crime requires a mens rea, an intention that the principal will do the actus reus with that
mens rea. (Procuring would appear to be an exception to this rule.)
* Knowledge of existing facts or circumstances necessary for the offence to be criminal.

Question 32

3.1 An intention to aid or encourage

Answer 32

This has two elements. D must intend:
* To do the act which aids or encourages; and
* It to aid or encourage the commission of the crime.
For example, if D supplies P with a gun which P uses to commit a murder, it must be proved that D
intended:
(a) To give it to P rather than accidently leaving it where P could pick it up; and
(b) P to use it to cause serious harm to someone.

Question 33

Key case: Lynch v DPP for Northern Ireland [1975] AC 653

Answer 33

Facts: In this case members of the IRA threatened to kill Lynch, a taxi driver, unless he drove them to the house of a police officer. Lynch knew that the men intended to murder the police officer. He therefore intended to assist them in this crime even though he was horrified by it.

Held: It was held that intention in this context does not mean desire, so there is no need for direct intent. It is enough that D had oblique intent

Question 34

Key case: R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8

Answer 34

The court said that D need not have a positive intent that the crime be committed (at paragraph
10). It gave the example of D who supplies a weapon where, at the time of supplying the weapon, D intends to give P the means to commit a crime, but it remains unclear what P might do. D would be liable even if they have no further interest in whether or not P commits the crime.

Question 35

Smith, Hogan and Ormerod

Answer 35

Smith, Hogan and Ormerod says this suggests that it is sufficient D intended their act might assist
in the crime, even if it cannot be said that it definitely will do so. Perhaps the test is as suggested by Herring for conditional intent – that the jury should convict if it decides that D would not mind if the crime were committed. This is suggested by the words ‘D would be liable even if they have no further interest in whether or not P commits the crime’.

Question 36

3.2 An intention that P will commit the crime with the necessary mens rea

Answer 36

We will consider two issues here:
* Conditional intention; and
* Crimes where the mens rea does not correspond to the actus reus.

Question 37

3.2.1 Conditional intention

Answer 37

It was accepted in Jogee that it is enough that D has a conditional intent that P will commit a crime with the necessary mens rea. For example, if D supplies P with a gun to use in a burglary and intends P to use it to cause serious harm only if disturbed in the burglary, then D intends P to
use the gun to cause serious harm

Question 38

Particularly helpful in cases of joint enterprise

Answer 38

This is particularly helpful in cases of joint enterprise. If D and P set out on a burglary and D intends that P will use a weapon to cause serious harm to someone if they are disturbed, D will be liable for the serious harm P causes when they are disturbed.

Question 39

Made clear in Jogee

Answer 39

It was made clear in Jogee that to establish conditional intent in such a case more was required than foresight that P might cause serious harm if the condition arose. On the other hand, it cannot be required that D must know P would definitely cause serious harm as per oblique intent. The court gave little guidance on when it is possible to find conditional intent based on foresight, merely saying that conditional intent could be inferred from foresight, but need not be.

Question 40

Best guidance for the Jury

Answer 40

Herring suggests that the best guidance for the jury would be to consider what D’s attitude would
be if P did commit the crime. If D is pleased or accepting of the fact that P acted that way, then the jury should find D has conditional intent the crime would be committed. If D is dismayed that P has committed the crime, then the jury cannot find conditional intention. In cases where P is dismayed, only oblique intention will suffice.

Question 41

3.2.2 Crimes where the mens rea does not correspond to the actus reus

Answer 41

It was stated in Jogee that if D1 intends D2 to do serious harm to the victim, D1 will be liable for murder when D2 injures the victim with intent to do serious harm and the victim dies as a result. This will be despite the fact that D1 could not be said to have intended murder to be committed. Presumably the same rule applies to s 47 and s 20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Question 42

3.3 Knowledge of the facts or circumstances

Answer 42

If the offence requires goods to be stolen, D needs to know that they are stolen. If the offence requires lack of consent, D must know that the victim does not consent.

Question 43

Key case: Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 KB 544

Answer 43

Facts: A builder committed an offence by selling a house for £250 more than the maximum permitted under a statutory regulation. The £250 was paid to him in advance by the purchaser. The builder then instructed a firm of solicitors to act for him in the sale. Two of the partners in the firm had no knowledge of the earlier payment, but they were convicted by the magistrates of aiding and abetting the builder’s offence.

Held: Their convictions were quashed by the Divisional Court because they had no knowledge of the facts which gave the transaction its criminal character. They therefore lacked the mens rea to be guilty as accessories.

Question 44

Wilful blindness

Answer 44

Knowledge here includes wilful blindness; a defendant who deliberately shuts their eyes to the
obvious will be deemed to have knowledge (R v J F Alford Transport).
D need not know the exact details of the crime which will be committed. D does not need to know the identity of the victim or the day on which the crime will be committed.

Question 45

Key case: R v Bainbridge [1960] 43 Cr App Rep 194

Answer 45

Lord Parker, quoting with approval from the direction given to the jury by the trial judge, said: The knowledge that is required to be proved in the mind of the appellant is not the knowledge of the precise crime. In other words it need not be proved that he knew that the Midland Bank, Stoke Newington branch was going to be broken and entered, and money stolen from that particular bank, but he must know the type of crime that was in fact committed. In this case it is a breaking and entering of premises and the stealing of property from those premises.
It is also enough to know that the principal may commit any one of a number of crimes including the crime which the principal does in fact commit (DPP for NI v Maxwell).

Question 46

3.3.1 Defendants with a lesser intent

Answer 46

Jogee: If a person is party to a violent attack on another, without an intent to assist in the causing of death or really serious harm, but the violence escalates and results in death, that person will be not guilty as an accessory to murder but can be guilty as a principal for the crime of manslaughter.

Question 47

Key case: DPP for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 3 All ER 1140

Answer 47

Maxwell was a member of the Ulster Volunteer Force and had driven the principals to the pub where they planted a bomb. The organisation had a history of violent acts with explosives and firearms. Therefore, it was held that even if Maxwell did not know which crime would be committed among a variety of offences such as shooting people at the pub, committing a robbery at the pub or planting a bomb, he knew that planting a bomb was amongst those crimes he could be assisting, so was liable. This case was approved in Jogee.

Question 48

4. Withdrawal

Answer 48

A secondary party may change their mind and want to withdraw their help or encouragement. The general rule is that it is not enough to just have a change of mind. Something must be done and, at the very least, the withdrawal must be communicated to the principal or a law enforcement agency. Further acts may be required depending on the circumstances of the case.

Question 49

Key case: R v O’Flaherty [2004] Cr App R 20

Mantell LJ stated:

Answer 49

[F]or there to be withdrawal, mere repentance does not suffice. To disengage from an incident
a person must do enough to demonstrate that he or she is withdrawing from the joint
enterprise. This is ultimately a question of fact and degree for the jury. Account will be taken
inter alia of the nature of the assistance and encouragement already given and how imminent
the infliction of the fatal injury or injuries is, as well as the nature of the action said to constitute withdrawal.

Question 50

Key case: R v Rook [1993] 2 AL ER 955

Answer 50

Facts: Rook and another were recruited by a man to kill his wife and paid money to do so. Rook recruited a fourth man to help. On the day of the killing, the husband drove his wife to the place where it was arranged she should be killed and the fourth man killed her. Rook never turned up and claimed he never intended to be involved in the killing, he just wanted the money.

Held: Lord Justice Lloyd held that the minimum which was required was unequivocal communication of his intention to withdraw. It may be that further steps would have been
necessary to neutralise his actions, but as the minimum was not there, the court did not consider what else would be required.

Question 51

Withdrawal takes place before assistance

Answer 51

For assistance, the relevant time for the mens rea is at the time of the act of assistance, not at the time when the principal commits the crime. Therefore, the withdrawal must take place, before the act of assistance. Where D has supplied the principal with the means of committing the crime and has given assistance, this will be less easily neutralised than where D has just given advice.

Question 52

Key case: R v Becerra (1975) 62 Cr App R 212

Answer 52

Facts: Becerra had broken into a house with C and G, intending to steal. B gave a knife to C to use on anyone interrupting them if necessary. The tenant of the upstairs flat came down to investigate the noise. B said, ‘come on, let’s go’ and got out through a window.

Held: The Court of Appeal held that something ‘vastly different and vastly more effective’ was required for a sufficient communication of withdrawal. Roskill LJ stated, obiter, that a point of time might be reached when the only way he could effectively withdraw so as to free himself from joint responsibility for any act C thereafter did in furtherance of the common design, would be physically to intervene so as to stop C attacking the victim, by interposing his own body between
them or somehow getting in between them.

Question 53

4.1 Withdrawal from spontaneous violence

Answer 53

Key case: R v Mitchell and King [1999] Crim LR 496

In this case it was suggested in that the test is less onerous for acts of spontaneous violence.
Facts: A fight broke out in a restaurant in which A, B and D assaulted two customers and
damaged the restaurant on their way out. They were followed out by the owner and his two sons.
The fight continued outside the restaurant, during which the victim was left on the ground. D
returned to beat the victim further and killed him.
Held: The Court of Appeal held that communication of withdrawal was required only in cases of
pre-planned violence, not a case like the one before them.

Question 54

Otton LJ:

Answer 54

Communication of withdrawal is a necessary condition for dissociation from pre-planned violence. It is not necessary when the violence is spontaneous. Although absent any
communication, it may, as a matter of evidence, be easier to persuade a jury that a defendant, who had previously participated, had not in fact withdrawn. Such considerations
are clearly relevant in such cases [ie of pre-planned violence], but less so when the violence has erupted spontaneously.

Question 55

R v Mitchell and King

Answer 55

has been strongly criticised on the grounds that if the principal, P, does not know that D has withdrawn, they may still be encouraged to commit the offence by (what they believe is) D’s support. Thus D will still be abetting.

Question 56

R v Mitchell and King

Answer 56

was confined to its facts by the Court of Appeal in R v Robinson [2000]
EWCA Crim 8, where it was pointed out that A, B and D had left the scene and that D’s return was in effect a new attack.

Question 57

Key case: R v O’Flaherty [2004] Cr App R 20

Answer 57

However the Court of Appeal, not having been referred to R v Robinson, said, obiter, that communication was not necessary for withdrawal from spontaneous violence.

Question 58

5 Conviction of secondary party and acquittal of principal

Answer 58

Conviction of a secondary party and acquittal of the principal is possible and could occur when the principal has been acquitted due to insufficient evidence or the principal could not be found. As long as it is clear that someone has committed the offence to which D was a secondary party,
D can be convicted. Another occasion when D can be convicted and the principal acquitted is where the principal has done the actus reus with the mens rea, but has a defence as in R v Bourne [1952] 36 Cr App R
125. Bourne procured his wife to do the actus reus with the mens rea of the offence, but she had the defence of marital coercion.

Question 59

General rule

Answer 59

The general rule is that if it cannot be proved which of two people committed the crime, both must
be acquitted. However, if it can be proved that the one who did not commit the crime as the principal was a secondary party to the crime, then both can be convicted.

Question 60

Key case: R v Russell and Russell [1987] 85 Crim App R 388

Answer 60

Both parents of a 16-month-old daughter were convicted of manslaughter after she died from a
massive dose of methadone. It did not matter that it could not be proven which parent had given
her the dose, as long as the other had been there when it happened, so abetted the offence. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that the jury had convicted on this basis.

Question 61

6. Interaction with attempt

Answer 61

It is not an offence to attempt to aid, abet, counsel or procure an offence (s 1(4)(b) Criminal Attempts Act 1861).
It is an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure an attempt to commit an offence (R v Hui ChiMing [1991] 3 All ER 897).

Question 62

7. Summary

Answer 62

Principal
* The principal (P) is the person who, with appropriate mens rea, commits the actus reus of the offence.

Question 63

Accessorial liability or secondary participation

Answer 63

Actus reus: any of the following five ways:
* To aid P in committing the offence: Giving help, support or assistance before or at the time of
the offence eg giving information, supplying tools or driving P.
* To abet P in committing the offence: Incite, instigate or encourage P at the time of the offence
which must be communicated to P. Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not necessarily
enough. If D has a right or duty to control the actions of another and refrains from doing so,
this can be abetting eg parent, employer.
* To counsel P in committing the offence: Giving P advice or encouragement before the offence
is committed. There must be contact and consensus between P and D along with a connection
between the advice and the crime. Causation isn’t needed.
* To procure P to commit the offence: To produce by endeavour. There must be a causal link
between D’s act and P’s commission of the offence.
* To be a party to a joint enterprise with P regarding one offence and during the enterprise P
commits a second, different offence eg P and D commit burglary as principals, P murders the
homeowner, D becomes an accessory to P’s murder.

Question 64

Mens rea:

Answer 64

• An intention to assist or encourage the principal’s conduct. D must intend:
• To do the act which aids or encourages; and
• It to aid or encourage the commission of the crime (oblique intent is sufficient, conditional
  intent may be sufficient).
• If the crime requires a mens rea, an intention that the principal will do the actus reus with
  that mens rea.
• Conditional intention is enough here.
• D can be liable for greater harm than intended for crimes where the MR does not
  correspond with the AR eg D might intend P do serious harm but if P does serious harm and
  V dies, D will be liable as an accessory to P’s murder.

Question 65

• Knowledge of existing facts or circumstances necessary for the offence to be criminal

Answer 65

eg if the offence requires lack of consent, D must know that the victim does not consent.
- A defendant who deliberately shuts their eyes to the obvious has knowledge.
- D need not know the exact details of the crime which will be committed eg V’s identity, the day of the crime or which of a number of crimes D knows P could commit.

Question 66

• Other key principles regarding accessorial liability covered in this section were:

Answer 66

• Withdrawal: Something must be done and in the case of pre-planned (but not necessarily spontaneous) violence, communicated to the principal or a law enforcement agency.
• Conviction of a secondary party and acquittal of the principal is possible.
• If it can be proved that the person who did not commit the crime as the principal was a secondary party to the crime, then both can be convicted.
• It is not an offence to attempt to aid, abet, counsel or procure an offence.
• It is an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure an attempt to commit an offence.