Participation Flashcards
Trinidad and Tobago Accessories and Abettors Act Chap 10:02
“Any person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of any indictable offense may be indicted, tried and punished as a principal offender”
A person may commit an offense through an innocent agent only if the offense is one that is so capable of being committed
WALTERS v LUNT
D’s were charged under the Larceny Act with receiving from a child, aged 7 years, certain articles knowing to them to have been stolen
- The Court held that according to statute the child could not be guilty of larceny as he was under the age of 8 years old and so doli incopax. Any property taken by the child could not be considered “stolen” and so Ds could not be guilty of receiving stolen property
Regardless of the role played in orchestrating the commission of a sexual offense, D cannot be regarded as the principal offender. However if D procuresP to commit the actus reus of that offense but P has a defence (such as a lack of mens rea), D’s mens rea can be added to P’s actus reus so as to make D liable for the offence which he could not himself commit
R v COGAN & LEAK
D2 after a night of drinking procured and persuaded D1 to rape his wife in order to punish her for past misconduct. In his intoxication, and along with the encouragement from D2, D1 thought she had consented
- D1’s conviction was quashed: the HOL held that he could not be convicted if he honestly, and not reasonably, believed V had consented
- Since D2 could not be convicted of rape, he appealed that he could not be held guilty of aiding and abetting D2 to the rape of his wife if D1 was acquitted of that offense. The Court held that the sexual intercourse without consent was the actus reus; and it was procured by D2 who had the appropriate mens rea used D1 to procure that criminal purpose
The criminal law permits the conviction of more than one person as a principal in the first degree
Where 2 or more persons act together to achieve a common unlawful purpose, a ‘joint enterprise’ exists. Even if the actus reus is caused by one, and it is not known which one, all are principals in its commission
QUEEN v SALMON
The 3 defendants, practicing firing with a rifle, lethal at 1 mile, fired shots at a target 100 yards away and inadvertently killed a boy in a tree almost 400 yards away
- albeit it was not proved which one fired the kill shot, the court held that they had not taking proper precautions to prevent injury to others, and so all 3 were found guilty of manslaughter
— the other 2 were joint actors with the shooter and so death resulted from the action of 3; therefore they were all liable
The criminal law permits the conviction of more than one person as a principal in the first degree
If it is clear that several persons contribute to the actus reus of a crime, each is aiding and abetting the other irrespective of whether there is a joint enterprise
MOHAN v R
Both defendants after quarreling chased, cornered and struck at V with cutlasses inflicting multiple wounds. V died but there was no certainty as to which appellants inflicted the fatal wound and due to that uncertainty Ds appealed their murder convictions claiming that it was necessary to prove that they were acting according to a prearranged plan
- The Court held that since the 2 appellants were attacking V at the same time with similar weapons and a common intention that he would suffer grievous bodily harm, the proof of a pre-arranged plan was unnecessary
— each was present and aiding and abetting each other and so were guilty as a principal offender
The criminal law permits the conviction of more than one person as a principal in the first degree
(2)
If it is clear that several persons contributed to the actus reus of a crime, each is aiding and abetting the other irrespective of whether there is a joint enterprise
R v RAYMOND; R v CHARLES
V was brutally rated by at least 4 men, including the 2 appellants. She ultimately died from a stab wound inflicted by one of them
- the court held that where 2 or more persons commit the felony of rape having agreed to use whatever force is necessary to overcome the resistance of their victim and death of the victim occurs from the use of that force by on of the assailants, both he and the other assailants are guilty of murder
The criminal law permits the conviction of more than one person as a principal in the first degree
(3)
Where it is not clear whether all accused contributed to the actus reus of the crime there must be evidence of a joint enterprise. If there is no such evidence both the accused must be acquitted
R v WILLIAMS et al
The 3 defendants picked up a hitchhiker. When D1, the driver asked him for gas money and V pulled out his wallet, D3 attempted to rob him. He became agitated and afraid, and so jumped out of the moving vehicle, hit his head and died from his injuries. D2 was acquitted of charges
- The Court held that there was no evidence of a ‘joint enterprise between the defendants to rob the deceased’, and the only real evidence of a joint venture bore against all 3 Ds including D2 who was acquitted
The person who assists the Principal Offender in committing the offense is known as the secondary party or accessory or accomplice or principal in the second degree
ROMERO and MACRADO v R
A bag of cannabis was found on the board of a ship of which D1 was the captain. D2, a member of the crew, ineffectually attempted to assist D1 with concealing the substance.
- Both defendants were charged together for the joint offense of the possession of a controlled drug and sentenced to 7 yrs imprisonment. There is a legal principle where if either before or during the commission of the crime a secondary party renders assistance to the PO the SO will be guilty of that crime with the necessary mens rea
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, mere presence at the scene of a crime is or knowledge that someone intends to commit a crime is not enough.
There must be an act along with an intention to assist or to encourage
R v CLARKSON AND CARROL
2 soldiers after a night of drinking heard a woman being raped by fellow soldiers and so entered into the room and stayed there for at least some of the time during which the rapes continued but only watched. They were charged with aiding and abetting
- the courts held that it is not enough that presence of the accused has given encouragement but it also must be proved that the accused intended to give intention
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, mere presence at the scene of a crime is or knowledge that someone intends to commit a crime is not enough.
(2)
There must be an act along with an intention to assist or to encourage
R v CONEY
Ds watched as an illegal prize fight took place in front of a large crowd but did not take any active part in the management of the fight, nor did they say or do anything. They were tried and convicted of assault as being principals in the second degree
-The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction holding that the jury was misdirected and affirmed that mere voluntary presence at a fight does not as a matter of law necessarily render persons so present guilty of aiding and abetting. It is only evidence from which the jury may infer in the absence if any evidence of a defense or rebuttal
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, mere presence at the scene of a crime or knowledge that someone intends to commit a crime is not enough.
There must be an act along with an intention to assist or to encourage
WILCOX v JEFFREY
D, aware that statute prohibited a certain musician from taking any employment while in the UK attended an arranged concert where the musician did in fact perform and then later wrote about it for his magazine. He was charged with aiding and abetting the musician in contravention of that statute
- The Court held that the D’s presence at the concert was not accidental and in the circumstances, it was open to the magistrate to find that his presence was an encouragement to the musician to commit the offense
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, there must be proof of mens rea
That is intention to assist as well as knowledge of the relevant circumstances (proof of a particular crime in view)
R v LOMAS
D returned a jemmy to his friend, a known criminal, who used it to commit a burglary. D was found guilty of being an accessory before the fact to the burglary since he had certain knowledge that the jemmy was wanted for an illegal purpose, and not specifically for this particular purpose
- The court held that mere knowledge that the principal intends to commit a crime does not constitute an accessory before the fact and so D’s conviction must be quashed; there must be some particular crime in view
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, there must be proof of mens rea
(2)
That is intention to assist as well as knowledge of the relevant circumstances
R v BULLOCK
D was charged with housebreaking and larceny as 2 different vehicles which he had ownership of were used for 2 separate robberies. He claimed that he had not lent the cars and their use for the purposes of robbery were entirely unknown to him
- The Court held that, here, where the jury are convinced that he had in fact lent the cars to someone and did know that an unlawful use was intended, a distinction between a general unlawful purpose and a particular unlawful purpose was not required as in LOMAS
In establishing the liability of a secondary offender, there must be proof of mens rea
That is intention to assist as well as knowledge of the relevant circumstances (no further knowledge needed)
R v BAINBRIDGE
Equipment used for breaking into a bank had been bought by D, on behalf of the thieves. He did so with full knowledge that it was going to be used in the commission of a crime for breaking and entering into premises. The specifics of the crime, however, he denied
- The court held that where D has knowledge that the type of crime committed was in fact intended it is unnecessary that knowledge of the date of particular premises be proven
Where 2 or more persons plan a crime and then participate in its execution - each becomes liable for the act of the other even where there are minor variations
Where one commits a further crime that is not the purpose of the JE, no other participant will be liable
R v ANDERSON and MORRIS
after a prior fight, D1 and D2 both went to look for V where another fight ensued between D1 and V while D2 stood aside, not taking any direct part in the fight. D1 then stabbed V to death. D2 denied knowing that D1 had a knife
- the court held that where 2 persons embark on a joint enterprise, each is liable criminally for acts done in pursuance of the JE; but if one of them goes beyond what was tacitly agreed as part of the JE, the other is not liable for the consequence of the unauthorized act. D2’s conviction of manslaughter was quashed
