Mens rea Flashcards
The outdated test of intention where it was equated with foresight
HYAM v DPP
D in order to frighten Mrs. Booth (her rival for the affections of X) out blazing newspaper through Mrs. Booth’s letter box and the resulting fire caused the death of 2 of her children
- The judge directed the jury that D was guilty if she knew that it was ‘highly probable’ that her act would cause at least serious bodily harm. D was found guilty
The ‘likelihood’ of a consequence is too broad a concept to infer intention
R v MALONEY
After a night of heavy drinking and during a shooting contest, D shot and killed his stepfather whom he loved
- His convection of murder was quashed because the court misdirected the jury that D intended the serious bodily harm if he foresaw that it would ‘probably’ happen. The appeal Judge insisted on the need for a probability that it a little short of overwhelming and an act that ‘will lead to a certain event unless something unexpected happens to supervenes or prevent it’.
In summing up he used the term ‘natural consequence’ to mean one that is virtually certain to ensue
— a term which caused confusion in subsequent cases
In order to infer intention a consequence must be a natural consequence of D’s act. That does not equate to a direct consequence but an overwhelming probability
R v HANCOCK AND SHANKLAND
2 shrinking miners pushed concrete blocks from a bridge which struck and killed a taxi driver. They only intended to block the road or frighten and not to kill or do serious bodily harm to anyone. The Judge followed closely with the principles of MALONEY without explaining that a natural consequence did not simply mean a causally connected one
- the CAP quashed the conviction since they held that the trial judge directed the jury on defective guidelines. The court stressed that the consequence being a natural consequence is not in itself intention but evidence from which intention can be inferred by the jury
— the greater the probability if the consequence occurring, the more likely that it was foreseen and therefore the more likely that it was intended
Only where the consequence created by D’s act is a VIRTUAL CERTAINTY can intention be inferred
R v NEDRICK
A child had burned to death in a house where D had without warning put a petrol bomb through the letter box. D was convicted of murder after the court once again directed the jury in terms of equating foresight with intent
- The CAP, seeking to resolve the confusion resulting from earlier cases overturned murder and substituted a conviction of manslaughter. The held that the jury must ask themselves how probable was the consequence that resulted and whether or not D foresaw that consequence - essentially linking foresight and certainty
— only if the jury are satisfied that D recognized that GBH or death was virtually certain (sure to happen barring some intervention) to result from his act can they find it easy to infer intention
(2) Only where the consequence created by D’s act is VIRTUALLY CERTAIN can intention be inferred
R v WOOLLIN
D lost his temper and threw down his 3 month old son unto a hard surface, killing him. He had not intended to kill the child. The trial judge directed the jury using the phrases ‘virtually certain’ and ‘substantial risk’ and so D was convicted of murder
- As established in NEDRICK, the HOL held that in inferring intention the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to do so, unless they felt sure that death or GBH was a virtually certain result of D’s act. The use of ‘Substantial risk’ had enlarged the scope of murder and so it was swapped for a conviction of manslaughter
“Recklessness” as used in Statute
In CALDWELL and LAWRENCE the HOL posited that when used in statute ‘recklessness’ can only be proven where D does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk and when he does this act he:
- has not given any thought to the possibility of there being such a risk (inadvertent recklessness) or
- has recognized that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it (adverting recklessness)
Under both limits it must be proved that the risk taken was an OBVIOUS & SERIOUS one
Subjective recklessness
Requires proof of D’s awareness of the risk taken
R v CUNNINGHAM
D broke a gas meter to steal money in it with the result that gas escaped into the next-door house. The occupant became ill and her life was endangered and so D was charged according to statute with ‘maliciously administering a noxious thing so as to endanger life’
- The CAP held that for D to have acted ‘maliciously’ there had to be proof that he intended to cause the consequence or that he was aware of the risk that his actions might cause the prohibited consequence
Objective Recklessness
Requires only that the risk be obvious to the reasonable man (satisfied by advertent and inadvertent recklessness)
MPC v CALDWELL
After being fired from his job at a hotel, D got drunk and returned at night to set the hotel on fire. The fire was discovered and extinguished before any serious damage or injury had occurred. D claimed that the thought that he was endangering lives never crossed his drunken mind. The judge directed the jury that drunkenness was no defense to the charge of ‘damaging property with intent to endanger life or being reckless as to whether it be done’ and so he was convicted
- The HOL reaffirmed Cunningham Recklessness but was introduced a new subjective form based on D’s failure to advert risks obvious to the reasonable person. Recklessness in statute meant ‘carelessness, regardless of the possible harmful consequences of ones act’
— encompasses the decision to ignore the risk as well as the failure to give any thought to it
(2) Objective Recklessness
Requires only that the risk be obvious to the reasonable man
R v LAWRENCE
D, a motor cyclist, had collided with and killed a pedestrian. He was charged with causing death by reckless driving
- The HOL, in dismissing his appeal reaffirmed that the test of recklessness stood - as the men’s rea of the offense was driving in such a manner without giving any thought to the risk or recognizing the risk and taking it anyway. They posited that it is for the jury to decide whether the risk created was both obvious and serious
Proof of recklessness must be accompanied by a CRIMINALLY CULPABLE state of mind
R v G
A mistake of youth where preteens (11 & 12) started a fire that destroyed $1m worth of property and were found guilty of arson - being reckless whether such property would be damaged - in accordance with CALDWELL recklessness
- the court overruled the objective test of recklessness holding that it is a principle of the criminal law that conviction of serious crimes should depend on proof that D’s conduct was accompanied by a criminally culpable state of mind
The doctrine of Transferred Malice says that a defendant will be liable for an offense if he has the necessary mens rea and commits the actus reus even if the victims is not the one intended
R v LATIMER
D had a quarrel with X and anime a blow at X which instead struck V, wounding her severely
- it was held that D could be convicted of maliciously wounding V because he had an intent to injure and it was irrelevant that he did not intend to injure V
With the doctrine of Transferred Malice; if the defendant has the mens rea for a different offense from that which he commits the intent cannot be transferred
R v PEMBLITON
D, who had been fighting with persons in the street threw a stone at them, which missed but went through the window of a nearby public house
- his conviction of maliciously damaging the window was quashed because he acted with the intent to injure persons and not with the intent to injure property
