Part 2 Nuclear Weapons Class

Question 1

About How many nuclear weapons does China Have?

Answer 1

410

Question 2

How many nuclear weapons is China likely to have by 2035

Answer 2

1500 (Triple what they have now)

Question 3

If China stores its nuclear warheads on top of its missiles, as opposed to storing them apart, how does that affect China’s ability to launch their nuclear weapons

Answer 3

Reduced Launch Time which makes the nuclear arsenal more capable of quick retaliation, enhancing its deterrent posture

Question 4

What new qualities will China’s new Missile carrying submarines have?

Answer 4

Quieter and harder to track and destroy. Longer operational ranges 1st strike capability threat to US

Question 5

How many long range (strategic) nuclear weapons does Russia have?

Answer 5

6000

Question 6

Because Russia exited the new START treaty, will they remain constrained to that number?

Answer 6

There is a concern that they will develop more now that they have left the treaty

Question 7

Why are US defense planners concerned about the long-range nuclear - armed Russian torpedo

Answer 7

1.Poseidon can travel vast distances underwater evading traditional missile defenses. 2.Has the potential to cause widespread radioactive contamination if detonated near coastal cities or naval bases. 3. Its stealth and unpredictability increases the complexity of defense planning and deterrence strategies

Question 8

How have Russian military setbacks in the Ukraine war shifted Russian attitudes on non-strategic weapons?

Answer 8

President Putin’s commitment to winning the war, combined with significant losses and ongoing instability, increases the likelihood of considering non-strategic nuclear weapons to compensate for substantial conventional military shortcomings, including severe depletion of personnel and equipment, Non-strategic nuclear weapons maintain a credible deterrent against NATO involvement and to secure political and military leverage to force a favorable resolution.

Question 9

Why is Putin unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the Ukraine War, despite his public nuclear threats?

Answer 9

International Backlash, Escalation Risks, Lack of military advantage - Exposes troops to damage and can destroy the prize intended for capture, can be achieved with conventional weapons, Deterrence and Control - primary aim of nuclear threats to deter Western intervention

Question 10

What is the argument and evidence that there is a taboo against the use of nuclear weapons?

Answer 10

Historical non-use since WW2, Public Opinion via surveys and studies - widespread moral opposition, Treaties, UN resolutions, International agreements underscore global desire to prevent their use, Military doctrines of nuclear armed states emphasize use as a last resort, Elite Opinion - recognizes catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences, strengthening the taboo

Question 11

For the survey experiment in the Sagan and Valentino article, describe the scenario for which the subjects were asked whether or not they would approve the use of nuclear weapons. Against what country would nuclear weapons be used? How many civilians would be killed? If nuclear weapons are not used, how many American soldiers would die in the ground war?

Answer 11

Iran attacked a US carrier: 2,400 military casualties, US airstrikes destroy nuclear infrastructure and air defenses
Iran refusal to surrender
US Ground invasion: 20,000 US military casualties; using nuclear weapons would result in the deaths of approximately 2 million Iranian civilians. * If nuclear weapons were not used, the scenario indicated that a ground war with Iran would result in the deaths of 20,000 American soldiers

Question 12

Are women more, less, or equally likely to support the use of nuclear weapons?

Answer 12

Women were not less likely than men

Question 12

What are the results from the Iran survey experiment?

Answer 12

The survey results challenge the strength of the nuclear taboo, showing that a considerable number of Americans(60%) might support the use of nuclear weapons in scenarios where it could save American military lives, even at the cost of massive civilian casualties(100 forgeign:1Ameriecan).

Question 12

What are the results if the survey respondents are given the chance to accept Iranian surrender, but keeping the Ayatollah Khamenei in place as spiritual leader. Do a substantial number of Americans still prefer using nuclear weapons rather than accepting such a surrender?

Answer 12

A substantial number of Americans still preferred using nuclear weapons. Strong inclination towards complete military victory and regime change, rather than accepting a surrender that leaves the existing leadership in power. Suggests a deep-seated distrust and hostility towards the Iranian regime

Question 13

(1) Describe the Security model of why states acquire nuclear weapons.

Answer 13

Focused on the country and its interests. States are the actors. The fundamental reason states acquire nuclear weapons is a threat to security. Nuclear weapons provide a powerful deterrent that can prevent aggression from adversaries. States protect their national interests . States are suspicious of each other – there is no protection or consequence if they lie. Cant rely on international law for protection. This model is grounded in the realist theory of international relations, which emphasizes the anarchic nature of the international system and the consequent need for self-help to ensure survival.

Question 14

(2) Describe the Domestic Politics model of why states acquire nuclear weapons. What kinds of substate actors sometimes support their government acquiring nuclear weapons?

Answer 14

Foreign policy decisions are affected by domestic politics and are made by a variety of people and interests within the country / government. To understand why countries make foreign policy decisions think about individuals and their motivations and that individuals job. Military organizations, political leaders, scientific communities, special and corporate interests, political interests and defense industries, may support nuclear weapons development for their own institutional or personal interests.

Question 15

(3) Describe the Norms model of why states acquire nuclear weapons.

Answer 15

Explains nuclear proliferation in terms of identity, norms, and symbolic functions. International relations is a society not the interest of states or individuals. This model suggests that states build nuclear weapons to symbolize their modernity, technological advancement, and status in the international community. Acquiring nuclear weapons can be seen as a way to gain prestige and assert a nation’s identity as a major power.

Question 16

1. What are Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCAs)?

Answer 16

Formal agreements between countries that facilitate the exchange of nuclear technology, in the peaceful use of nuclear energy such as energy production, medical applications and scientific research while preventing nuclear proliferation. These agreements typically include provisions to ensure that the transferred materials and technology are not used for the development of nuclear weapons.

Question 17

(2) Why might countries receiving peaceful nuclear assistance be more likely to
start a nuclear weapons program or acquire nuclear weapons? How do external
security threats interact with these relationships?

Answer 17

The technology and expertise obtained through peaceful cooperation can also be applied to developing nuclear weapons. It increases the means and even the motives. Once you have the knowledge and technology it creates the motive. It’s a Reduced Cost. The presence of external threats can amplify the risk that a country receiving peaceful nuclear assistance will pursue a nuclear weapons program.

Question 18

In the statistical tests, what are the two dependent variables? What is the
temporal range? What are the main independent variables? What is the sample
of cases that is analyzed?

Answer 18

Dependent Variables:
1.The initiation of a nuclear weapons program / Start a nuclear program in a specific year
2.The acquisition of nuclear weapons. / Get nuclear weapons in a specific year
Temporal Range: The study covers the period from 1950 to 2000
Main independent variables:
1.Civilian nuclear assistance (measured through nuclear cooperation
agreements)
2.Security threats (measured by militarized disputes)
Sample of Cases analyzed: Countries with the potential for nuclear weapons development during the study period.

Question 19

(4) Main findings of the statistical analysis:

Answer 19

• There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between nuclear
  cooperation agreements and nuclear weapons program initiation
• The relationship between peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear weapons
  pursuit becomes stronger as countries experience a greater number of militarized
  disputes with other states[
• All types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks of proliferation, not just
  sensitive technologies

Question 20

(5) What does the NPT require of nuclear weapons state signatories? What does it require of non-nuclear weapons state signatories? What benefits do non-nuclear weapons states receive for signing the NPT?

Answer 20

For nuclear weapons state signatories:
- Agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to
non-nuclear weapon states
- Commit to pursuing negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear
disarmament
For non-nuclear weapons state signatories:
- Agree not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
- Accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities
Benefits for non-nuclear weapons states:
- Right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under appropriate
safeguards
- Access to peaceful nuclear technology and cooperation

Question 21

What is the IAEA? What happens if the IAEA suspects a signatory state of being non-compliant?

Answer 21

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization
that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibits its use for military
purposes. Its main functions include:
- Establishing and adopting safety standards for nuclear activities
- Verifying compliance with safeguards agreements through inspections
If the IAEA suspects a signatory state of being non-compliant:
- The IAEA reports its concerns to its Board of Governors
- If non-compliance is confirmed, the Board reports to the UN Security Council
and General Assembly
- The UN Security Council may then decide on further actions, including
sanctions or other measures to bring the state into compliance
it does not have enforcement powers itself. The ultimate responsibility for
addressing non-compliance lies with the UN Security Council.

Question 22

1. According to Waltz, what is “The Military Logic of Self-Help Systems”?

Answer 22

You have to rely on yourself. Deterrence is the way you ensure your survival. Deterence by punishment and deterrence by denial. In an anarchic international system where no central authority exists to enforce rules, states must rely on self-help to ensure their survival. This leads to a continuous cycle of arms build-up and balancing against potential threats. Each state must assume responsibility for its own defense, leading to a security dilemma where the actions of one state to secure itself can make others feel insecure, prompting them to also increase their military capabilities.

Question 23

According to Waltz, how do nuclear weapons decrease the chances of war?

Answer 23

nuclear weapons decrease the chance of war by creating high costs and reducing uncertainty about outcomes, which discourages conflict.
1. High Stakes: The prospect of nuclear war raises the stakes so high that states are unlikely to engage in conflicts over low-value issues. Historical examples like the Berlin and Cuban missile crises show that states are cautious when nuclear escalation is a risk.
2. High Costs: The potential for devastating consequences from nuclear conflict discourages risky behavior. This is evident in the careful conduct of nuclear powers like the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and in the current restraint of Russia with NATO members.
3. Territory and Security: Nuclear weapons diminish the need for territorial expansion as a means of security. For example, the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal allowed it to forego control over Eastern Europe for security.
4. Credibility of Threats: The determination of a country to defend itself with nuclear weapons strengthens its position against attackers. The will of the defending nation to retain its territory can be more potent than the attacker’s will.
5. Certainty About Strength: Nuclear weapons provide clarity about the relative strengths of adversaries, making conflicts less likely. The knowledge that a conflict could lead to mutual destruction, as seen with the stability/instability paradox, makes aggressive actions less appealing.

Question 24

According to Sagan, why does the problem of preventive war make nuclear proliferation dangerous?

Answer 24

States may be tempted to strike preemptively before a rival state can develop a secure second-strike capability. The fear of a future nuclear threat can push a state to take military action while it still holds a conventional advantage. This increases the likelihood of conflict during the early stages of nuclear proliferation.

Question 25

What is Waltz’s reply to Sagan’s critique that preventive war makes nuclear proliferation more dangerous?

Answer 25

The inherent risks and potential for escalation make preventive war unlikely. States would prefer to avoid the high costs and uncertainties associated with initiating conflict and instead focus on maintaining deterrence.
1. Those kinds of attacks are relatively rare and many Obtained weapons without their nuclear programs being destroyed
2. Such attacks are dangerous after a state has acquired its first nuclear weapon
3. Even after a successful preventative attack state might seek nuclear weapons again

Question 26

According to Sagan, why might new nuclear states not build survivable nuclear forces?

Answer 26

Reasons countries may not want to build survivable 2nd strike forces: lack of resources, technological expertise, or strategic culture.
1. Submarines too expensive (Ohio class submarines 2Billion dollars / submarine)
2. Not consistent with organizational culture Branches of military may not want to do it. US Navy didn’t want to build nuclear submarines. They’re not very quiet and not as effective operationally
3. Militaries like to plan for war, not deterrence
4. Standard operating procedures might undermine survivability
5. Organizations don’t learn except from failures – this is a problem because you can’t afford failure

Question 27

What is Waltz’ reply to Sagan’s critique that new nuclear states might not build survivable nuclear forces

Answer 27

The logic of deterrence will compel new nuclear states to prioritize the survivability of their nuclear forces. He argues that even with limited resources, states will find ways to ensure that their nuclear capabilities are secure enough to provide a credible deterrent.

Question 28

(5) What are Sagan’s views about the likelihood of nuclear accidents, and the implications of accident risk on deterrence?

Answer 28

Sagan is concerned about the likelihood of nuclear accidents, arguing that the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons undermines the stability of deterrence. He highlights issues such as human error, technical malfunctions, and organizational flaws that can lead to unintentional nuclear detonations. Sagan believes that the risk of accidents increases with the spread of nuclear weapons, potentially leading to catastrophicc consequences.

Question 29

What are Waltz’s views about the likelihood of nuclear accidents, and the implications of accident risk on deterrence?

Answer 29

downplays the risk of nuclear accidents, arguing that states have strong incentives to maintain strict control over their nuclear arsenals. He believes that the high stakes associated with nuclear weapons will drive states to implement robust safety and security measures. Waltz asserts that while the risk of accidents cannot be entirely eliminated, the likelihood is low enough not to undermine the overall stability provided by nuclear deterrence. The knowledge of mutual vulnerability will drive states to adopt measures that protect their nuclear arsenals. There are strong reasons to maintain tight control. Its not happened ever in 80yrs of the nuclear age we haven’t had accidental detonation nuclear war or terrorist event.

Question 30

What is a nuclear posture?

Answer 30

Refers to a state’s strategy and stance regarding the use, deployment, and potential employment of its nuclear arsenal. It encompasses how a state plans to use its nuclear weapons to deter adversaries, defend itself, and achieve its security objectives.

Question 31

What is a catalytic posture?

Answer 31

A catalytic posture is one in which a state uses its nuclear capabilities as a tool to encourage intervention by a major power, typically a superpower, in the event of a conflict. The idea is that the state’s nuclear capabilities will prompt a more powerful ally to come to its aid, thus increasing the likelihood of external intervention and support. you’re using them as a way to frighten one of your allies to get them to come to your rescue if you’re in trouble.

Question 32

What is an assured retaliation posture?

Answer 32

Structure your nuclear arsenal to be able to inflict destruction. . Conduct a test and people get involved. Need a few weapons that can assure destruction. Need moderate sized arsenal
maintaining a nuclear capability that ensures a credible and devastating retaliation against an adversary if attacked.

Question 33

What is an asymmetric escalation posture?

Answer 33

A strategy where a state threatens to escalate a conventional conflict to a nuclear level if it is being threatened or attacked. This posture aims to use the threat of nuclear escalation to deter adversaries from engaging in aggressive actions, knowing that the conflict could rapidly escalate to nuclear use.

Question 34

What are the deterrence effects of catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation postures on different kinds of conflict?

Answer 34

Catalytic Posture: Do not deter high level attacks This posture primarily aims to deter conventional conflicts by leveraging the threat of intervention from a major power. It is less about deterring nuclear conflict directly and more about ensuring that a powerful ally will come to the state’s aid.

Assured Retaliation Posture: Deter both nuclear and conventional attacks by guaranteeing a devastating retaliatory strike. Might suffer stability / instability issue –Nuclear weapons are good at high intensity attacks but not lower level attacks which becomes a limitation of the assured retaliation posture

Asymmetric Escalation Posture: Has greater possibility of deterring high and low level attacks however it is very risky. Jervis explosion model of escapation. All kinds or reasons a limited war wont stay limited. This posture is intended to deter conventional aggression by threatening nuclear escalation if attacked. It seeks to prevent conventional conflicts from escalating to a nuclear level by making the potential for nuclear retaliation a significant deterrent.

Question 35

What nuclear posture did Israel have up through 1991? Did Israeli nuclear weapons successfully deter in the 1967 Six Day War, 1973 Yom Kippur War, or 1991 Gulf War?

Answer 35

• Up through 1991, Israel maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity, where it neither confirmed nor denied possessing nuclear weapons. This posture was intended to deter adversaries by keeping them uncertain about the extent of Israel’s nuclear capabilities.

Question 36

Did Israeli nuclear weapons successfully deter in the 1967 Six Day War?

Answer 36

1967 Six Day War: Crisis between Israel against Egypt and Syria. Egypt orders peacekeepers out. closes off the straight. Deep panic within Israeli society and government. Israel decides to conduct a test as a strategic means.Israeli nuclear weapons did not successfully deter the 1967 Six-Day War. At the time, Israel’s nuclear capability was secret and not publicly known, so it did not factor into the conflict’s deterrence. Despite suspicions among Arab states about Israel’s nuclear capabilities, they proceeded with provocative actions, leading to the war. Narang considers this a failure of deterrence because the potential threat of Israeli nuclear weapons did not prevent the Arab states from initiating conflict.

Question 37

Did Israeli nuclear weapons successfully deter in the 1973 Yom Kippur War?

Answer 37

During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli nuclear weapons were not used or publicly acknowledged. Although Israel’s nuclear capability was recognized, it did not directly influence the war’s outcome. Instead, Israel relied on conventional military aid and signals to third parties, particularly the U.S., to sustain their defense. The nuclear arsenal’s role was more about signaling than deterring or affecting the immediate conflict.

Question 38

Did Israeli nuclear weapons successfully deter the 1991 Gulf War?

Answer 38

No, nuclear weapons did not help deter the 1991 Gulf War. By that time, Israel’s nuclear posture was known, but the war was primarily influenced by the global coalition against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Israel’s deterrence was more about strategic ambiguity and broader geopolitical factors. The threat of nuclear weapons did not prevent Iraq from launching missile attacks against Israeli cities.

Conflict Background: Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, invaded Kuwait in August 1990, aiming to control oil resources and address economic issues. This invasion prompted a strong international response, with the U.S., Soviet Union, China, and other nations uniting to counter Iraq’s aggression.

Iraq’s Strategy: To shift the focus from a global coalition against Iraq to an Arab-Israeli conflict, Iraq launched long-range missile attacks on Israeli cities. Saddam Hussein hoped this would provoke Israeli retaliation, thereby fracturing the coalition and garnering support from other Arab states.

Israel’s Response: Despite the missile attacks, Israel did not retaliate. The U.S. pressured Israel to restrain itself to maintain coalition unity, as retaliatory actions could have jeopardized international support. No Israeli casualties resulted from the attacks.

Nuclear Deterrence: Israel’s nuclear arsenal was known but was not a decisive factor in the conflict. The deterrence was more about strategic ambiguity—keeping nuclear capabilities vague to prevent escalation—rather than directly affecting the immediate war dynamics. The presence of nuclear weapons did not prevent Iraq from launching attacks.

Question 39

What is the “existential bias” in deterrence theory?

Answer 39

Refers to a tendency to prioritize the most extreme scenarios where a state’s primary concern is its own survival. This bias affects how deterrence strategies are formulated and can lead to an overemphasis on nuclear deterrence and existential threats, sometimes neglecting more immediate or conventional security concerns.

Question 40

(1) What are the arguments that nuclear weapons have stabilized the India-Pakistan conflict?

Answer 40

MAD has created a strong deterrent effect leading to a more stable strategic balance Large-scale wars and major conflicts have not taken place since nuclearization. The high stakes involved have encouraged both sides to manage their disputes through diplomatic or limited means rather than full scale military confrontations. Border clashes have not escalated.

Question 41

(1) What are the arguments that nuclear weapons have destabilized the India-Pakistan conflict?

Answer 41

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has 1. heightened the risk of accidental escalation if actions or intentions are miscalculated. 2. It also emboldens both sides to engage in more frequent or aggressive conventional conflicts like the Kargil war, under the assumption that nuclear weapons will prevent escalation to full scale war. 3. Pre-emptive strikes could be the result vs deterrence with the logic of deterrence not always working out perfectly.

Question 42

What was the Kargil War?

Answer 42

The Kargil War (May-July 1999) was a conflict between India and Pakistan over the line of control in the Kashmir region. Pakistani forces, disguised as militants, infiltrated Indian territory in the high-altitude Kargil district, with the aim of altering the Line of Control (LoC) and gaining strategic advantage. India detected the infiltration and launched Operation Vijay to drive the intruders out. The war involved intense fighting in difficult mountainous terrain, with both sides suffering casualties. India successfully recaptured most of the territory, and Pakistan eventually withdrew its forces. The war ended with a return to the status quo along the LoC.

Question 43

What are the arguments that the Kargil War shows that nuclear weapons are not stabilizing,

Answer 43

Escalation Despite Nuclear Deterrence: The Kargil War occurred despite the presence of nuclear weapons, suggesting that nuclear deterrence might not fully prevent conflicts. The fact that the war escalated to a significant conventional conflict indicates that nuclear weapons did not effectively stabilize the situation. Plus Pakistan was emboldened as an aggressor due to the stability / instability paradox. Risk of escalation - with having nuclear-armed neighbors in a high-stakes conflict

Question 44

Arguments that the Kargil War shows that nuclear weapons are stabilizing?

Answer 44

1. Limited Conflict: Despite the intensity of the Kargil War, it remained a limited conflict and did not escalate into a full-scale war or involve nuclear weapons. This limited nature of the conflict could be seen as evidence that nuclear deterrence worked in preventing a broader and potentially more devastating war.
2. Prevented Wider War: The Kargil War did not lead to a major regional conflict or nuclear exchange, suggesting that the presence of nuclear weapons acted as a stabilizing force by preventing the conflict from escalating further. The limited engagement might reflect the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in constraining the scope of military operations.

Question 45

(1) What are some reasons it will be harder to verify the denuclearization of North Korea as compared with Iran?

Answer 45

1.Secrecy and Concealment: North Korea’s regime is known for its secrecy and has a history of hiding nuclear activities. This makes it difficult for international inspectors to verify the full extent of its nuclear program.
2.Complex Infrastructure: North Korea has a more extensive and potentially hidden nuclear infrastructure compared to Iran, with facilities that may not be disclosed or accessible to international inspectors.
3.Technical Challenges: The verification process requires advanced technical methods to detect and dismantle nuclear facilities, which are more challenging in North Korea due to its rugged terrain and the potential for underground facilities.
4.Political Obstacles: North Korea’s diplomatic interactions are less transparent and more volatile compared to Iran, which can further complicate verification efforts. Negotiations are also hindered by North Korea’s resistance to external scrutiny.

Question 46

(2) How might North Korean nuclear weapons undermine confidence in the American nuclear commitment to South Korea and Japan?

Answer 46

Credibility of Extended Deterrence is compromised if N Korea has nuclear capabilities that directly challenge the ability of the US to provide protection.
Potential for escalation with the threat of nuclear strikes can lead them to seek their own nuclear capabilities or alternative security arrangements.
Increased risk of miscalculations or accidents which could undermine the stability of extended deterrence guarantees.

Question 47

(3) How might North Korean nuclear weapons make the occurrence and escalation of low level conflict more likely?

Answer 47

Once N Korea has nuclear weapons it strengthens the stability instability paradox
Nuclear Blackmail: North Korea might use its nuclear arsenal to intimidate or coerce other countries into concessions, increasing the likelihood of low-level conflicts as it leverages its nuclear threat for strategic gains.
Escalation Dynamics: The presence of nuclear weapons could embolden North Korea in regional conflicts, knowing that nuclear threats might deter stronger responses. This could escalate minor skirmishes or provocations into larger conflicts.
Regional Instability: The existence of North Korean nuclear weapons could lead to increased military tensions and arms races in the region, prompting more frequent and intense low-level conflicts among neighboring states.

Question 48

Why is a war between the US and North Korea unlikely?

Answer 48

Historically unlikely. No pre-emptive wars since 1815, Since 1953 there have been many severe crisis involving N Korea. There are some clear redlines that US and N. Korea wont cross Both sides seem to understand where the red lines are.
High costs and high risks make large scale conflict unlikely
Deterrence and MAD The fear of nuclear escalation discourages both sides from initiating large-scale hostilities.
Diplomatic and Economic Pressures: Diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions are more likely to be used to manage tensions, rather than resorting to outright war. The strategic and economic costs of war provide strong incentives for both sides to avoid escalation.
Fear of consequences to S Korea and use of Nuclear weapons

Question 49

What is the argument in favor of a deal with North Korea by which North Korea keeps its nuclear arsenal, but gives up its nuclear infrastructure? (see the O’Hanlon reading)

Answer 49

1.Minimized Immediate Threat: The argument suggests that if North Korea retains its nuclear weapons but dismantles its nuclear infrastructure, the immediate threat of producing additional weapons is reduced. This could lower the risk of nuclear proliferation and potential new nuclear tests.
2.Focused Negotiation: Such a deal would focus on dismantling the production and deployment capabilities, which are critical for preventing further nuclear escalation. It allows for a more manageable and verifiable agreement.
3. Pragmatic Approach: It represents a pragmatic compromise where both sides can achieve some of their goals—North Korea retains its arsenal for deterrence, while the international community gains control over its nuclear production capabilities.

Question 50

What missile tests did North Korea undertake in 2024? What is the significance of those tests?

Answer 50

Hypersonic Intermediate-Range Missile: In April 2024, North Korea tested a new hypersonic intermediate-range missile that uses solid propellants. This advancement is significant because:
Enhanced Capability: Hypersonic missiles are faster and more maneuverable, making them harder to intercept and increasing their effectiveness.
Strategic Impact: The development of such missiles enhances North Korea’s strike capability and potentially undermines regional missile defense systems, escalating the threat to neighboring countries and complicating U.S. defense strategies.
Technological Progress: The test demonstrates North Korea’s progress in missile technology, indicating its ability to advance its military capabilities despite international sanctions and pressure.

Question 51

(1) What effects did economic sanctions and the threat of force have on Libya from 1981-1988?

Answer 51

While sanctions created economic difficulties for Libya, they did not significantly alter the regime’s behavior in the short term. The sanctions contributed to economic hardship and the threat of force to increased tensions with the West but were not sufficient to compel a strategic shift.
Mismatch between ends and the means. US demanding Gadafi to step down from power. Limited means. Theres no European cooperation. They could still sell oil to Italy. Air strikes strengthened Gadafi. Rally around me I can protect you. The US tried to get me but they cant

Question 52

(2) What effects did economic sanctions and the threat of force have on Libya from 1989-1998?

Answer 52

From 1989 to 1998, Libya experienced significant impacts due to economic sanctions and the threat of force. Imposed by the UN in 1992, these sanctions targeted key sectors like oil and arms, causing economic hardship and international isolation. Despite continued efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, Libya began to reduce its involvement in terrorism, influenced by the mounting pressure. Diplomatic negotiations, particularly regarding the Lockerbie bombing, led to Libya’s willingness to address international concerns in exchange for relief from sanctions. The US shifted its focus from regime change to demanding specific policy changes, aiming to resolve issues without destabilizing the Libyan government. The UN General Assembly’s resolutions, though influential, lacked binding power, highlighting the limitations of international bodies in enforcing sanctions.
Combination of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and the threat of further international action contributed to a shift in Libya’s policies, particularly in reducing its involvement in terrorism and engaging in negotiations over the Lockerbie incident.

Question 53

What effects did economic sanctions and the threat of force have on Libya from 1999-2003?

Answer 53

The period from 1999 to 2003 saw Libya shift its policies significantly due to a combination of economic pressure, diplomatic engagement, and the gradual easing of sanctions, ultimately leading to improved relations and reintegration into the global community. agreed to dismantle its longer-range missiles and chemical weapons programs, and to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. This compliance was facilitated by the easing of sanctions and the shift to demanding specific policy changes rather than regime change. compensating victims of the Lockerbie bombing diplomatic engagement and economic rewards played a central role in Libya’s decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs and improve its international standing.

Question 54

What are the main elements of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iranian uranium enrichment, plutonium production, and inspection of Iranian nuclear facilities?

Answer 54

Uranium Enrichment: Limits Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 3.67% for 15 years, a level suitable for civilian nuclear reactors but far below the 90% needed for weapons.
Plutonium Production: Requires Iran to redesign its heavy-water reactor to prevent plutonium production, which could be used in nuclear weapons.
Inspection of Facilities: Grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) extensive access to Iranian nuclear sites to monitor compliance and verify that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons

Question 55

Who are the JCPOA signatories?

Answer 55

o Iran
o United States
o United Kingdom
o France
o Russia
o China
o Germany

Question 56

According to most observers, was Iran complying with the JCPOA before the US exited the treaty? In what year did the US exit the treaty?

Answer 56

Before the U.S. exited the JCPOA in 2018, most observers believed that Iran was generally complying with the agreement, as verified by IAEA reports. However, following the U.S. withdrawal and re-imposition of sanctions, Iran began to breach some of the deal’s limits.

Question 57

What condition has Iran demanded as a prerequisite for restarting JCPOA negotiations?

Answer 57

Iran has demanded that the U.S. lift all sanctions imposed after its exit from the JCPOA as a condition for restarting negotiations.

Question 58

What are the main arguments that the US cannot return to the original terms of the JCPOA?

Answer 58

oChanges in Iran’s nuclear program and regional dynamics since the U.S. withdrawal.
oIncreased complexity in diplomatic and political landscapes.
oThe need to address additional issues beyond the original scope of the JCPOA, such as Iran’s missile program and regional activities.

Question 59

What are the main critiques of the JCPOA? (see Oren reading, in particular)

Answer 59

insufficient constraints on Iran’s nuclear program, which they believe allows for eventual nuclear weapons development. They contend that the deal’s focus is too short-term, with key restrictions set to expire, and does not address Iran’s destabilizing regional activities or provide robust verification and compliance mechanisms. Additionally, some view the JCPOA as a diplomatic and strategic misstep, suggesting that the concessions made were too significant and that a more effective agreement could have been achieved with a firmer negotiating stance.

Question 60

What are the three factors affecting a state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons? How do these three factors interrelate?

Answer 60

Security Concerns: A state’s perception of external threats can drive it to seek nuclear weapons for deterrence or protection.
Power and Prestige: Nuclear weapons are often sought to enhance a state’s international status and influence.
Alliances and Security Guarantees: The presence or absence of strong alliances and security guarantees from other nuclear-armed states can influence a state’s decision to pursue nuclear capabilities.
These factors are interconnected. A state feeling insecure due to external threats might seek nuclear weapons to enhance its security. If it lacks strong alliances or security guarantees, this insecurity is amplified. Simultaneously, the desire for increased power and prestige can drive a state to pursue nuclear weapons, even in the face of potential security guarantees from allies.

Question 61

What is the abandonment/entrapment tradeoff? How does it relate to extended deterrence?

Answer 61

Abandonment: Refers to the fear that allies might not honor their security commitments, leaving a state vulnerable.

Entrapment: Refers to the concern that a state might be dragged into conflicts due to its security commitments to allies.
Relation to Extended Deterrence: The tradeoff involves balancing the risks of abandonment (which may lead a state to seek nuclear weapons) against the risks of entrapment (which might deter a state from seeking nuclear weapons if it fears getting involved in unwanted conflicts).

Question 62

How might military deployments or foreign deployed nuclear weapons dissuade a state from acquiring nuclear weapons?

Answer 62

Such deployments can dissuade a state from acquiring nuclear weapons by enhancing the perceived security of the state. The presence of foreign nuclear weapons or military forces can reduce a state’s perceived need to develop its own nuclear arsenal by providing a security umbrella and credible deterrence against potential threats.

Question 63

What is the temporal range of the quantitative analysis? What is the dependent variable? What are the three main independent variables?

Answer 63

Temporal Range: The analysis covers the period from 1945 to 2000.
Dependent Variable: The dependent variable is the state’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
Three Main Independent Variables:
Security Threats: Perceived external threats to the state.
Alliances and Security Guarantees: The strength and credibility of alliances and security commitments from other states.
Nuclear Deployment: Presence of foreign nuclear weapons or military deployments in the region.

Question 64

How do entrapment fears negate the relationship between offered nuclear weapons deployments and the acquisition of nuclear weapons?

Answer 64

Entrapment fears can negate the effectiveness of offering nuclear weapons deployments as a deterrent because states may worry about being drawn into conflicts due to their allies’ actions. This concern can lead them to seek their own nuclear weapons as a more reliable means of security rather than relying on external guarantees that might lead to unwanted entanglements.

Question 65

What are the results of the quantitative analysis? (Security Commitments)

Answer 65

The analysis finds that security threats and the perceived inadequacy of alliances and security guarantees are significant factors driving states to acquire nuclear weapons. The presence of foreign nuclear deployments can reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation, but fears of entrapment may counteract the deterrent effect of these deployments. The results emphasize the complex interplay between security concerns, international alliances, and the role of nuclear deployments in shaping proliferation decisions.

Question 66

According to the National Security Strategy (aka the Bush Doctrine), how are post-Cold War threats facing the United States different from Cold War threats?

Answer 66

Unlike the Cold War era, where the primary threat was from a state actor with a large nuclear arsenal (the Soviet Union), post-Cold War threats are characterized by the emergence of rogue states and non-state actors who may possess or seek weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). These new threats include states like Iraq and North Korea, which could use WMDs not just for deterrence but for aggressive purposes. The strategy emphasizes that the spread of these weapons to such actors poses a more immediate and unpredictable threat than the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War era.

Question 67

According to the National Security Strategy, why is deterrence outmoded in the twenty-first century? What military policies should the US rely on in place of deterrence?

Answer 67

The National Security Strategy argues that deterrence is outmoded because it is based on the assumption that threats are rational and that adversaries will be deterred by the prospect of massive retaliation. However, in the twenty-first century, the emergence of rogue states and non-state actors who may not adhere to these rational calculations makes traditional deterrence less effective. Instead of relying on deterrence, the strategy advocates for a proactive approach that includes preemption and preventive strikes to address imminent threats before they fully materialize. This shift reflects a move towards more aggressive and proactive measures to counter threats from WMDs and other advanced capabilities.

Question 68

According to Pollack, could Saddam Hussein have been deterred if he had not been overthrown in 2003? Why or why not?

Answer 68

Kenneth M. Pollack argues that Saddam Hussein could not have been effectively deterred. He suggests that Saddam’s regime was characterized by a mix of paranoia, opportunism, and a willingness to use WMDs aggressively rather than defensively. Pollack points out that Saddam’s behavior was driven by a need for internal legitimacy and regional influence, making him less susceptible to traditional deterrent threats. The regime’s unpredictability and willingness to engage in risky behavior with WMDs rendered deterrence an insufficient strategy. The lack of a clear, rational deterrent effect and Saddam’s calculated risks meant that he could not be reliably deterred by conventional means.

Question 69

What is the empirical record of preventive attacks against WMD programs according to Dan Reiter?

Answer 69

Dan Reiter, in his chapter in Hitting First, reviews the empirical record of preventive attacks against WMD programs and finds that such actions are highly controversial and yield mixed results. While preventive attacks can sometimes delay or disrupt WMD programs, they do not guarantee long-term success and often come with significant risks and costs. Reiter notes that preventive attacks can lead to unintended consequences, including increased regional instability, retaliation, and the potential for the target state to accelerate its WMD efforts. The historical record suggests that while preventive attacks may achieve short-term objectives, their overall effectiveness and strategic value are often debated and can be problematic.

Question 70

What are three types of nuclear terrorist attacks?

Answer 70

Detonating a Nuclear Device: This involves a terrorist group successfully acquiring and detonating an actual nuclear weapon, which could cause widespread destruction and loss of life.

Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs): These are crude devices that could be constructed from stolen nuclear material. They are less sophisticated than standard nuclear weapons but could still cause significant damage.

Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs): Often referred to as “dirty bombs,” these devices use conventional explosives to spread radioactive material over a wide area. While not as deadly as a nuclear explosion, they can cause panic, economic disruption, and health risks.

Question 71

What is the most likely means by which a terrorist group would be able to detonate a nuclear device?

Answer 71

The most likely means by which a terrorist group would be able to detonate a nuclear device is through acquiring a ready-made weapon from a state or illicit market, as stated by Bunn, Roth, and Tobey. The complexity and technical expertise required to build a functional nuclear device from scratch make it less probable for most terrorist groups compared to acquiring an existing weapon or a significant amount of fissile material.

Question 72

Why are apocalyptic groups more likely to engage in nuclear terrorism? What is the Aum Shinrikyo group, what did they do in 1995?

Answer 72

Apocalyptic groups are more likely to engage in nuclear terrorism because their ideologies often involve catastrophic visions of the end of the world or divine retribution, which aligns with their willingness to use extreme methods to achieve their goals. The goal of causing mass destruction fits with their worldview of bringing about a major upheaval or end-times scenario.

Aum Shinrikyo was a Japanese doomsday cult led by Shoko Asahara. In 1995, they carried out a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, which resulted in the deaths of 13 people and injuries to over 50 others. The group had previously attempted to acquire nuclear weapons and had a known interest in chemical and biological warfare, demonstrating their willingness to engage in high-impact attacks to further their apocalyptic beliefs.

Question 73

Why might groups with immense political ambitions be more likely to engage in nuclear terrorism? Why might al Qaeda fit into this category?

Answer 73

Groups with immense political ambitions might be more likely to engage in nuclear terrorism because they seek to achieve their objectives through dramatic and high-impact actions that can capture global attention and achieve substantial leverage. The use of nuclear weapons or dirty bombs could be seen as a means to influence international politics, create fear, or disrupt major powers’ activities.

Al Qaeda fits into this category due to its extremist goals and historical use of terrorism as a tool to achieve political ends. The group’s leaders have expressed interest in acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction to further their agenda of challenging Western powers and creating a global Islamic state