Paper 2: Metaphysics Of Mind Flashcards
What are mental states?
This refers to what goes on in our minds. There are different types such as -
- Sensations - Pain / aches.
- Emotions - Fear / jealousy.
- Perceptions - Seeing / hearing.
- Qualia.
What is qualia?
Qualia is the phenomenal quality of a conscious experience, ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’. What it is like to put on a pair of fleecy pyjamas or to bite into a piece of hot buttered toast.
What are intentional properties?
Some mental states have intentional properties. When we introspect (Look into our own minds) we recognise that our mental states - thoughts, hopes, desires are about something. They have a particular content that point to something. In a proposition - this intentionally is reflected in the use of “that”. I believe “that” it is raining outside. I wish “that” philosophy was an easier subject.
What are non-intentional (Qualia) properties?
Some mental states have phenomenal properties. This is our subjective experience of our mental states. The qualitative nature of phenomenal is referred to by some as qualia - what it is like to experience something. The intrinsic, ineffable, non-intentional qualitative experience of consciousness.
What is property dualism?
There are at least some mental properties (Qualia) that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.
What is Chalmers’ philosophical zombies argument?
1) Physicalism claims that consciousness is ultimately physical in nature.
2) It follows that any world which is physically identical to this world must contain consciousness.
3) But we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but in which there is no conscious experience (A zombie world).
4) Therefore a zombie world is metaphysically possible.
5) Therefore physicalism is false.
What is the response that a zombie world is not conceivable?
This objection focuses on the premise that we can conceive of a world which is physically identical to this one but in which there is no conscious experience (A zombie world). Dennett claims that it is a contradiction in claiming that we can conceive of a zombie world. Consciousness is integral to a physical being with the elements humans have.
Can we take ‘health’ away from the fully functioning, properly operating organs and processes? - NO.
Health supervenes on the state of the body. An exact replica of my body (Healthy) must all be healthy.
Can we take CONSCIOUSNESS away from a physical being functioning in the way ours do? No - as consciousness supervenes on the body.
Dennett claims that the fact that we can imagine a philosophical zombie is due to our lack of knowledge about how consciousness is created (Competing activity in parts of the brain).
What is the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world?
The objection runs as follows:
- It might be metaphysically possible to conceive of a world of philosophical zombies but in reality - what do we learn about our own world?
- Time travel might be metaphysically possible and chocolate trees are metaphysically possible too but worlds in which these might be possible would be so very different.
- Chocolate trees would be so unlike our trees - could we even call them trees?
- In the same way - a philosophical zombie would be so unlike us and our world that the concept becomes so far removed from our own that we have to question the relevance.
What is the response that what is conceivable might not be metaphysically possible?
1) We might think we can conceive of things being metaphysically possible.
Eg. That water NOT HAVING the chemical composition of H2O.
Eg. That we can have physical replicas without consciousness.
2) In reality, water does have the chemical composition of H2O + Physical replicas may well need to be conscious.
C) Therefore conceivability isn’t same to possibility.
What is Jackson’s Mary Argument?
1) Mary knows everything about the physical processes involved in colour vision.
2) But she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself (She comes to knowledge).
3) Therefore, there is more to know about colour vision that what is given in a complete physical account of it.
4) So physicalism is false + property dualism with it’s claims of the irreducibility of mental states is true.
What is the response that Mary gains no new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge?
This response claims that Mary doesn’t learn any new facts. Mary does acquire acquaintance knowledge - knowledge of.
If we just look at knowledge in the propositional sense (As philosophers tend to) then Mary doesn’t actually acquire any new knowledge.
Therefore PHYSICALISM is not threatened as NO NEW knowledge is gained by Mary.
Facts are not changed by seeing colour so the Physicalism still covers all we need to know of the mind.
What is the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge?
1) Knowledge is generally thought to be propositional.
2) Mary might be seen to acquire ABILITY knowledge - knowledge HOW to identify colours.
3) Mary does not gain any new facts.
C) Therefore Physicalism remains a complete explanation of the mind.
What is the response that Mary gains new propositional knowledge?
This objection points out that new knowledge is gained by Mary but this doesn’t lead to the idea that there are particular non-physical facts.
They do this by saying that Mary gains the same old facts but in a different and new way.
Mary only knew about colour from the third person, then she confirmed her knowledge from a first person perspective.
This is the idea that Mary comes to new knowledge of old facts. Therefore, Mary might come to knowledge but this phenomenal experience does not add to her facts about the world.
Physicalism and the claim that is accounts for all of Mary’s knowledge and she doesn’t learn anything new.
What is the problem of other minds?
P1) I have privileged access to my own mind through introspection.
P2) My mind is private.
P3) I cannot introspect into others’ minds.
C1) I can only infer that others have minds through their behaviour.
C2) I cannot be certain that others have minds at all.
What is the response of the argument from analogy?
The analogous argument works on the basis that if two things are similar in some respects then they are probably similar in other respects. Some philosophers accept that while one can never be certain that another person is thinking or feeling something, it is possible to justifiably believe that they are thinking or feeling something through analogy. Mill concludes that other human beings have feelings like him because of two factors:
1) They have bodies like him.
2) They exhibit the acts caused by feelings.
