Oversight and Good Faith Oversight Flashcards
What are the two main kinds of functions that a board of directors performs?
The board makes decisions and oversees the corporation’s business
Chancellor Allen’s test for whether the Caremark directors breached their duty of care (by failing adequately to control Caremark’s employees) requires the shareholder plaintiffs to show that:
- the directors knew or should have known that violations of law were occurring
- the directors made no good faith efforts to prevent or remedy violations of law that they knew or should have known about
- the directors’ failure to prevent or remedy the employees’ violations proximately resulted in losses to the corporation
- all of the above
- 1 and 3 only
- all of the above
Under the Model Business Corporations Act, the standard of care for board of directors’ oversight of a corporation involves:
participatory performance over a period of time
A Caremark Claim is one in which shareholders allege:
that directors breached their fiduciary duty by allowing employees to violate the law and exposing the corporation to liability
With respect to board oversight, the key holding in Graham v. Allis-Chalmers is: absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to _________________.
install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists
Under Caremark, only a ______________________ will establish the lack of good faith necessary for liability
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such an utter failure to attempt to assure reasonable information systems exist
Which of the following things did the Francis v. United Jersey Bank court include in a director’s duty of care?
- be familiar with the fundamentals of the business
- keep informed about the activities of the corporation on an ongoing basis
- go to board meetings
- object if you find a problem
- all of the above
- all of the above
Big, Inc. borrows money from X and is unable to pay him back because the Big, Inc., board of directors has made some bad, but not negligent, business decisions. Big, Inc., has followed all of the requisite corporate formalities. When the loan becomes due, Big, Inc., does not pay X. Whom can X successfully sue?
- Big, Inc., only
- Big, Inc., and the members of its board of directors personally
- Big, Inc., and its shareholders personally
- Big., Inc., and the members of its board of directors personally and its shareholders personally
- Big, Inc., and the members of its board of directors who are also shareholders, personally
- Big, Inc., only
D is a board member of Washburn Industries, Inc. D never attends board meetings and never reads the corporate reports. As a result, D is unaware that the Washburn Industries, Inc., treasurer entered into a contract to sell one of Washburn Industries, Inc.’s, key technologies to a competitor. A Washburn Industries, Inc., shareholder who is upset about the transaction sues everyone on the board. D, who is sued for a breach of her duty of care relating to the transaction,
- Is not protected by the business judgment rule and would therefore not be liable
- is liable for a violation of her oversight duty of material benefit
- is not protected by the business judgement rule, but still may not be liable
- will not be liable unless the shareholder plaintiff can show criminal intent
- is protected by the business judgment rule
- is not protected by the business judgment rule, but still may not be liable
Under both Caremark and Stone, what is necessary to establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to liability on the part of directors?
a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight - such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists
What does a corporation’s “Section 102(b)(7)” do?
exculpates directors for breaches of their duty of care
When filing a derivative suit, shareholders must
have made a pre-suit demand on the board of directors or be prepared to show that such a demand would have been futile
How does the Stone v. Ritter court describe the interaction between, on one hand, the Delaware law conception of directors’ roles, and on the other hand, derivative actions?
the right of shareholders to pursue derivative actions is limited because they may impinge on the managerial freedom of the directors (a fundamental principle of corporations law)
According to Stone v. Ritter, when might directors be unable to exercise their business judgment in considering a pre-suit demand by shareholders contemplating a derivative action?
when directors face the possibility of personal liability as a result of the derivative
What is a “Caremark claim”?
a claim of directors’ liability for corporate loss based on their ignorance of liability-creating activities within the corporation