Nuclear Proliferation Flashcards
1
Q
Can proliferation be positive?
A
Yes - universal deterrence
No:
Every conflict has the potential to lead to nuclear use and can lead to miscalculation
2
Q
Efforts to stifle vertical nuclear proliferation
A
Arms control agreements : placing limits on the development, production, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons
Multilateral agreements (EG 1963 partial test ban treaty)
Bilateral agreements (EG 1974 threshold test ban treaty)
Commitments to disarm (EG Obama and ‘nuclear zero’)
3
Q
The first nuclear age
A
1945 - 1991
- Bipolar world - Cold War between US and USSR
- Other states align into blocs
- Arms build up under conditions of distrust
- Constant fear of “general nuclear war”
4
Q
The second nuclear age
A
1991 - 2010s?
- threat reduction efforts, progress on arms control
- main goals become non-proliferation to EG Iran, North Korea etc.
5
Q
A third nuclear age?
A
- Characterised by multipolarity, new nuclear states and a dissolving/shifting global nuclear order
- Circular Error Probability (CEP) shrinking - weapons more accurate
- Can hit target directly more often, so lower yield weapons
- Extreme accuracy, penetration and survivability from emerging technology
6
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Key arguments
A
- National security and state motivations
- Diversified conceptual models
- The second nuclear age
- Nuclear latency and its implications
7
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Argument - National security and state motivations
A
- States build nuclear weapons primarily as a means of ensuring national security
- States facing external threats view nuclear capabilities as essential deterrents against political aggression
- Historical examples - USA developed the atomic bomb to decisively end WW2 and deter future threats
= the Soviet Union pursued nuclear weapons out of a sense of vulnerability in relation to the USA - This conventional wisdom does not consider how motivations extend beyond security concerns
- This challenges the oversimplification of nuclear proliferation as merely a reaction to external security threats, suggesting that each state’s context and internal dynamics shape its nuclear policies
8
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Argument - diversified and conceptual models
A
- The security model: aligns with realist traditions
- suggesting that states’ nuclear ambitions are primarily spurred by perceived threats to their sovereignty - Domestic politics model
- nuclear weapons policies are influenced by domestic political factors, internal bureaucratic interest and public opinion, rather than solely external security considerations - Liberalism model
- specific political parties may push for nuclear programmes to gain influence or electoral support
9
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Technological determinism
A
Advancements in nuclear technology can push states toward developing nuclear weapons independent of their security landscape - this raises questions, as, many states capable of acquiring nuclear weapons choose not to, thus countering the narrative that possession of technology inevitably leads to proliferation
10
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Horizontal and Vertical proliferation
A
Horizontal - spread of nuclear weapons to NEW states, which raises concerns regarding global stability
Vertical - existing nuclear powers EXPANDING their arsenals
These are interconnected as the actions of established nuclear states can influence the decision of non-nuclear states
11
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Argument - the second nuclear age
A
- marked by the emergence of new nuclear actors and shifting geopolitical landscapes
- debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists about whether the spread of nuclear weapons contributes to stability or chaos
- optimists (EG Waltz) argue that a multipolar nuclear landscape can enhance stability through deterrence
- critics like Scott Sagan believe that the introduction of new nuclear states leads to increased unpredictability and the risk of conflict
12
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Argument - nuclear latency and its implications
A
Nuclear latency - certain states possess the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons but choose not to
- This brings challenges to international security particularly concerning states like Japan and South Korea, who are capable of transitioning into a nuclear weapons programme
- Nuclear latency suggests that the ability to build weapons does not equate to the decision to do so, yet the presence of latent capabilities can influence the international bargaining dynamics
- Countries may leverage their potential for nuclear weapons development as a diplomatic tool, enhancing their negotiating power without explicitly crossing the nuclear threshold
13
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
“Nuclear weapons are…political objects of…”
A
“…considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles”
14
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
“Decisions to go or not to go nuclear result not from…”
A
“…the international structure, but rather from individual hearts”
15
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
“The spread of nuclear weapons…”
A
“…to more actors presents a new set of global challenges”
16
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Strengths
A
- Integrating multiple theoretical perspectives
- Recognition of domestic factors
- Relevance to contemporary security challenges
17
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Strength - integrating multiple theoretical perspectives
A
- the use of diverse models allows for a comprehensive understanding of why states may purse nuclear weapons
- this framework recognises that states operate within a complex web of internal and external influences, providing a multifaceted view that enhances analysis of state behaviour
18
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Strength - recognition of domestic factors
A
- By acknowledging that internal political environments, interest groups and bureaucratic motives can shape nuclear policies, the complexities of state behaviour are explored
- this highlights the importance of internal legitimacy and political stability, particularly for the regimes that might use nuclear ambitions to bolster their power or distract from domestic issues
19
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Strength - relevance to contemporary security challenges
A
- The discussion of the “second nuclear age” contextualises nuclear proliferation within the current global security landscape
- this is relevant as it reflects contemporary challenges posed by emerging nuclear states and non state actors
- Highlights changes in the nature of security threatens, emphasising that traditional deterrence models may need adaptation in light of new actors and technological developments
20
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Weaknesses
A
- Neglecting the role of non-state actors
- Overemphasis on horizontal vs vertical proliferation
- Misleading arguments around proliferation about nuclear deterrence
- Generalisations of motivations
21
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Weakness - neglecting the role of non-state actors
A
- the arguments primarily concentrate on state actors
- While states are primary actors, the influence of EG nuclear terrorism and black market proliferation introduces additional complexities that challenge traditional state focused narratives
22
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Weakness - overemphasis on horizontal vs vertical proliferation
A
- The strict dichotomy between horizontal and vertical proliferation oversimplifies the nuances of nuclear weapons dynamics and may overlook the interconnectedness between both
23
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Weakness - misleading optimism or pessimism about nuclear deterrence
A
- the arguments around proliferation optimists and pessimists may present binary viewpoints that overlook scenarios where nuclear weapons can both stabilise and destabilise IR
- fails to account for broader socio-political contexts
- EG the Cold War exemplifies the paradox of nuclear deterrence - while MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) arguably prevented large-scale conflict, it resulted in proxy wars and crises (EG in Cuba and Vietnam) which caused significant human suffering
24
Q
“The Politics of Nuclear Weapons” - Andrew Futter
Weakness - generalisations of motivations
A
- The arguments that categorise motivations for states acquiring nuclear weapons (like security, domestic politics, cultural norms) can oversimplify complex realities. Not all states fit neatly into these models
- Constructivist perspectives emphasise that state behaviours are deeply tied to their unique historical contexts, identities, and perceptions
- Each state’s rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons can be unique and influenced by specific cultural or historical narratives.
- Example: Pakistan’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was influenced by its national identity formed in the context of historical conflicts with India. The motivation was less about direct security and more tied to the national narrative of sovereignty and recognition as a sovereign state
25
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Key arguments
1. Historical context of WMD
2. Definition and scope of WMD
3. Categories of WMD
4. Impact on international politics
5. Ethics and responsibility
6. Recent developments and considerations
26
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Argument - historical context of WMD
- Nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
- The atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed approximately 68,000 and injured around 76,000
27
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Argument - definition and scope of WMD
- UN initiatives: the UN played a vital role in addressing WMD, starting with calls for their elimination throughout 1946 and subsequent years
- 1950s definition:
1. Atomic explosive weapons
2. Radioactive material weapons
3. Chemical weapons
4. Biological weapons
28
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Argument - categories of WMD
1. Nuclear weapons
- Destructive capacity: most destructive, with a few kg of fissile material they can yield an explosive power equivalent to thousands of tonnes of TNT
2. Chemical weapons:
- Nerve agents (EG Sarin, VX): designed to incapacitate or kill through their impact on the nervous system
- Blister agents (EG mustard gas): causes severe burns and used extensively in WW1
- Choking agents (EG chlorine gas): causes suffocation and damage to the respiratory system
3. Biological weapons:
- Bacteria - weaponised to infect populations
- Viruses (EG smallpox): highly lethal and contagious
- Toxins (EG Botulinum toxin) - can cause paralysis and death at extremely low doses
29
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Argument - impact on international politics
- Deterrence strategies
- Arms control treaties:
- Efforts such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are attempts to regulate and prevent the spread of WMD
= balancing national interests with global humanitarian concerns
30
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Strengths
1. Complex definitions and implications for coercion
2. Ethical considerations connecting to modern warfare
3. Relevance to the third nuclear age
4. Implications for non-proliferation efforts
31
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Strength - complex definitions and implications for coercion
- By articulating the complexities in defining WMD, Martin prompts policymakers to consider how different classifications affect strategies of coercion
- EG nuclear weapons’ categorisation versus chemical and biological agents alters the international community’s response to each threat
= this is crucial in understanding how states may leverage the threat of specific types of WMD for coercive diplomacy
- Recognising this can help formulate responsive strategies that account for the unique implications of each weapon type, thereby enhancing deterrence
32
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Strength - ethical considerations connecting to modern warfare
- Her focus on the ethical implications enriches contemporary debates on the morality of coercive strategies that involve nuclear capabilities
- As discussion on preemptive strikes, deterrence, and the ethical use of force become more relevant, Martin’s arguments offer a framework for addressing the morality dilemmas associated with using nuclear weapons
- By questioning the ethical boundaries of coercion in statecraft, her analysis can guide modern military and diplomatic policies that navigate the fine line between deterrent threatens and irresponsible escalation
33
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Strength - relevance to third nuclear age
- As we enter what some analysts refer to as the 3rd nuclear age, martin’s arguments help contextualise the evolving nature of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability
- her insights into asymmetric warfare and the behaviour of non-state actors highlight the importance of re-evaluating traditional deterrence models that were effective during previous nuclear eras
34
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Strength - implications for non-proliferation efforts
- Martin’s comparative analysis of the varying types of WMD highlights the need for tailored non-proliferation strategies that consider the unique characteristics of nuclear vs chemical and biological threats
- Her arguments highlight that a one size fits all approach to non-proliferation might be ineffective
- a deeper understanding of how states perceive threats and coercive capacities can lead to more effective agreements and policies
35
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Weaknesses
1. Limited consideration of non-state actors
2. Insufficient engagement with constructivist perspectives
3. Neglect of domestic influences on proliferation
4. Simplistic approach to ethical concerns
36
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Weakness - limited consideration of non-state actors
- Her analysis tends to focus on state actors and traditional military dynamics, neglecting the growing influence of non-state actors in the realm of WMD
- Groups such as terrorist organisations may not adhere to the rational actor model typically employed in IR theories
- their motivations and operational methods could diverge significantly from state-based interaction regarding WMD, leaving traditional deterrence strategies less effective
- failing to account for this shift diminishes the applicability of her arguments to contemporary security challenges
37
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Weakness - insufficient engagement with constructivist perspectives
- Her arguments primarily reflect realist paradigms that emphasise state security, power dynamics and deterrence
- they may overlook constructivist insights regarding the role of identity, norms and perceptions in shaping state behaviour regarding nuclear weapons
- the way states view their status, security, and legitimacy can influence their proliferation decisions and responses to coercion
38
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Weakness - neglect of domestic influences on proliferation
- Insufficient emphasis on domestic political factors that influence nuclear proliferation decisions
- EG public opinion, interest groups and political leadership play a crucial role in shaping a state’s nuclear policy
- By focusing predominantly on external factors such as historical context and international pressures, Martin’s arguments inadequately explore how domestic dynamics can stimulate or deter nuclear ambitions
- Understanding these internal influences is essential for comprehensively addressing the complexities of proliferation i the 21st century
39
“Weapons of mass destruction” - Susan Martin
Weakness - simplistic approach to ethical concerns
- While Martin raises important ethical questions regarding WMD, her treatment may be somewhat simplistic, failing to adequately engage with the moral ambiguities and competing ethical frameworks encountered in practical scenarios
- EG, the moral imperatives of deterrence strategies versus humanitarian concerns may not lend themselves to clear resolutions
- Moreover, applying ethical arguments to justify or critique coercive strategies can lead to contentious debates that require more sophisticated normative frameworks
- Without addressing these complexities, her analyses may lack the depth necessary to inform policymakers grappling with ethical dilemmas in contemporary security.
