Future Of War

Question 1

Martin van Creveld - central thesis

Answer 1

• Creveld argues that the future of war is fundamentally unknowable, no matter how advanced our prediction methods become
• This is because war is shaped by human irrationality, unpredictable events, emotional decision-making, and structural limitations of forecasting itself
• Modern science and models cannot overcome the inherent uncertainty and dynamic nature of conflict
• Instead of eliminating unpredictability, Creveld suggests we must accept and adapt to it, questioning the reliance on predictive tools in contemporary security discourse

Question 2

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 1: The limits of prediction make the future of war inherently uncertain

Content

Answer 2

Theoretical Perspective: Critique of Rationalism and Scientific Realism

• Creveld dismantles the idea that we can ever truly “know” the future of war
• No matter how sophisticated our tools become, prediction will always fall short, especially in conflict where irrationality and chaos dominate
• This strikes at the heart of liberal and realist beliefs in strategy, deterrence, and rational state behaviour
• This means policy built on prediction is inherently fragile - a powerful argument for uncertainty as a structural
  condition of global security
• We must stop expecting certainty from our models and instead build flexibility and resilience into security systems

Question 3

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 1: The limits of prediction make the future of war inherently uncertain

Examples

Answer 3

• “In any war, only one belligerent can emerge victorious…” - this implies at least half of all actors failed to foresee outcomes
• Reference to events like 9/11, reinforcing that critical turning points in warfare are usually unpredicted

Question 4

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 2: War games and strategic models offer limited insight into future conflicts

Content

Answer 4

Theoretical Perspective: Securitisation Theory + Constructivist Critique

• Creveld critiques the belief that models like war games can simulate or predict the future of war
• These simulations often assume ideal conditions and rational actors, yet real wars are shaped by fear, miscommunication, and irrationality
• The consequence is dangerous: war games may reinforce biased or narrow worldviews, giving false confidence to decision-makers
• These tools may not only fail to predict war but also distort how security threats are constructed and responded to

Question 5

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 2: War games and strategic models offer limited insight into future conflicts

Examples

Answer 5

• Prussian military pioneered war games in the 19th century to forecast campaigns, later spreading to other militaries and even business - but Creveld says they were better at training than predicting
• After WWII, war games were extended to politics and economics, but failed to produce accurate forecasts

Question 6

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 3: Attempts to fully know or eliminate uncertainty are futile and dehumanising

Content

Answer 6

• Perfect prediction would erase human agency
• If war could be precisely forecast, then leaders and societies would have no meaningful choices
• This challenges the foundations of individual freedom, tying into human security theories that value unpredictability as space for moral choice, freedom, and resistance
• If we strip war of uncertainty, we strip it of meaning, and risk building systems that are more about control than humanity
• It also cautions against tech-based determinism in warfare - AI, big data, or surveillance won’t remove unpredictability; they may intensify it

Question 7

Martin van Creveld

ARGUMENT 3: Attempts to fully know or eliminate uncertainty are futile and dehumanising

Example

Answer 7

Doomsday Clock is critiqued as a symbolic tool that never gives real dates or accuracy, illustrating the futility of symbolic forecasts

Question 8

Martin van Creveld

Relation Between the Future of War and the Question of Security

Answer 8

• Creveld argues that security and uncertainty are inseparable
• The future of war cannot be controlled, only approached with caution and adaptability
• Security strategies should not aim to predict and prevent every conflict but should be about managing uncertainty and being prepared for the unknown
• This marks a shift from traditional models of deterrence to more flexible, responsive frameworks in CSI

Question 9

Martin van Creveld

Best Conceptual Framework to Address the Future of War

Answer 9

Creveld rejects the idea of a single model or method. Instead, he leans toward a dialectical and historical approach, where war is understood as:

• Complex
• Human-driven
• Shaped by contradictions, and
• Resistant to mathematical reduction
• Rather than relying on liberal institutionalism, rational choice theory, or realist strategic modelling, Creveld calls for critical engagement, humility, and flexibility - a stance aligning with critical security studies and post-positivist IR theories

Question 10

Martin van Creveld

Strengths

Answer 10

1. Emphasis on Inherent Uncertainty
2. Critique of Strategic Modelling and War Games
3. Reframing Uncertainty as a Human and Political Necessity

Question 11

Martin van Creveld

Strength - Emphasis on Inherent Uncertainty

Answer 11

• One strength is Creveld’s insistence that the future of war is fundamentally unpredictable due to irrationality, emotional decision-making, and the limitations of forecasting tools
• This means that war cannot be reduced to models, trends, or rational behaviour, no matter how sophisticated the tools
• This is important because it reminds us that wars are shaped by unexpected, human, and chaotic factors that no prediction model can fully account for
• It provides insight into the fragility of contemporary security planning which theories like realism and liberalism often overlook by assuming rational state behaviour or predictable outcomes

Question 12

Martin van Creveld

Strength - Critique of Strategic Modelling and War Games

Answer 12

• Another strength is Creveld’s critique of war games as flawed tools that falsely promise foresight but ignore how real-world conflict deviates from scripted scenarios
• This means that while models may simulate conflict, they distort our understanding by assuming perfect information and rational actors
• It is relevant because war in practice is full of miscommunication, unpredictability, and irrational moves that can’t be gamed or modelled
• It offers a warning against positivism’s faith in data, showing that prediction itself can become a political act with dangerous consequences

Question 13

Martin van Creveld

Strength - Reframing Uncertainty as a Human and Political Necessity

Answer 13

• A third strength is Creveld’s argument that trying to eliminate uncertainty would remove human agency, political choice, and the moral dimension of war
• This means that unpredictability is a vital part of what makes war (and peace) meaningful
• This is relevant because it shifts focus from control to adaptability, reminding us that security should protect freedom and not just stability
• It provides a human security perspective, while realism and liberalism largely ignore the emotional, moral, and existential dimensions of war

Question 14

Martin van Creveld

Weaknesses

Answer 14

1. Overemphasis on Uncertainty Can Lead to Strategic Paralysis
2. Dismissal of Technological and Scientific Advancements

3.

Question 15

Martin van Creveld

Weakness - Overemphasis on Uncertainty Can Lead to Strategic Paralysis

Answer 15

• One weakness is Creveld’s overemphasis on unpredictability, which can imply that all future planning is futile
• This weakens our understanding by downplaying the value of contingency planning, and early warning systems in shaping outcomes
• Realists and liberals would argue that, while uncertainty exists, states must still act strategically based on perceived threats and rational interests - uncertainty does not mean inaction
• He overlooks how predictive frameworks can still inform policy and reduce risk, even if they’re imperfect - something liberal institutionalism tries to achieve through cooperation and norms
• It falls short by offering little guidance for how security actors should respond to uncertainty beyond accepting it, which can be disempowering in practical policy contexts

Question 16

Martin van Creveld

Weakness - Dismissal of Technological and Scientific Advancements

Answer 16

• Another weakness is Creveld’s skepticism toward all forms of predictive technology, including data analytics, AI, and complex modelling
• This is limiting because it disregards how emerging technologies (e.g., cyber surveillance, satellite intel) are actively shaping the prevention of modern warfare
• Positivist and liberal theorists would argue that while not perfect, technological forecasting enhances precision and reduces guesswork, especially in cyber or nuclear deterrence
• He overlooks that partial foresight can still yield strategic advantage, and scientific models don’t require perfection to be useful - a nuance explored more in realist and liberal strategies
• It falls short by rejecting incremental improvement in predictive capability, rather than asking how technology might complement, not replace, human judgment

Question 17

Martin van Creveld

Weakness - Neglect of Power Politics and State Behaviour

Answer 17

• A third weakness is that Creveld largely sidelines how power, interests, and state rivalry continue to structure war and security outcomes
• This matters because understanding the future of war requires engaging with why wars start, not just why they’re hard to predict - something Creveld underplays
• Realism would strongly critique this, arguing that war results from structural anarchy, security dilemmas, and competition - not just randomness or human irrationality
• He overlooks how war’s future is shaped by predictable patterns of power shifts, alliance-building, and strategic deterrence, which realism tracks closely
• It falls short by ignoring how many conflicts can be traced to rational state calculations, meaning unpredictability alone is an incomplete explanation for war’s future

Question 18

The Ministry of Defence - central thesis

Answer 18

• The future of war will be shaped by complex, intersecting global drivers - including climate change, technological advancement, economic transformation, and shifting geopolitical power
• The Ministry of Defence argues that conflict and insecurity will grow more multifaceted, involving a broader range of non-state actors, weapons, and domains (e.g. cyberspace and space)
• While the future remains uncertain, states must prepare for multiple, interconnected risks, requiring adaptive, forward-looking approaches to security rather than reliance on linear models or traditional state-centric assumptions

Question 19

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 1: The future of war will be shaped by six global drivers of change that are interconnected, unpredictable, and escalating

Content

Answer 19

Theoretical Perspective: Systems Thinking + Interpretivism + Elements of Securitisation

• The Ministry of Defence shows that war will not be shaped by one trend alone (e.g., military strength or state rivalry), but by the converging effects of systemic pressures
• This means any linear model of future conflict will fail; only those who can prepare for broad, intersecting shocks (like climate migration, resource wars, or cyber-triggered crises) will maintain security resilience
• Unlike realism, which focuses on state power, or liberalism, which assumes cooperation, this systems view highlights complexity and unpredictability as core features of future conflict

Question 20

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 1: The future of war will be shaped by six global drivers of change that are interconnected, unpredictable, and escalating

Examples

Answer 20

• Weapons of mass effect and cyberattacks are cited as growing risks influenced by these drivers
• For instance, technological change is expected to fuel both automated societies and instability, leading to more blurring between civilian and military tools

Question 21

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 1: The future of war will be shaped by six global drivers of change that are interconnected, unpredictable, and escalating

Relation to security

Answer 21

• The future of war and security are directly linked, as security threats are emerging across new domains (e.g., space, cyber, climate)
• Security can no longer be state-based alone but must anticipate disruptions in all six global systems.

Question 22

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 1: The future of war will be shaped by six global drivers of change that are interconnected, unpredictable, and escalating

Conceptual Framework

Answer 22

The best framework here is a systems-based approach - integrating environment, economy, society, and governance to understand how future wars may emerge and spread across domains

Question 23

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 2: The boundaries of warfare are expanding—conflict is no longer confined to traditional battlefields but extends into shared and digital spaces

Content

Answer 23

Theoretical Perspective: Securitisation Theory + Critical Security Studies

• By identifying shared and digital domains as key conflict arenas, The Ministry of Defence expands the scope of what must be “secured” beyond military assets or borders
• This means that security strategies must now anticipate invisible, deniable, and non-traditional threats
• Unlike realism, which assumes war is state-on-state, or liberalism, which focuses on global governance, this perspective shows that unregulated global commons are becoming the new frontlines of war

Question 24

The Ministry of Defence

ARGUMENT 2: The boundaries of warfare are expanding—conflict is no longer confined to traditional battlefields but extends into shared and digital spaces

Example

Answer 24

Commercial actors and PMCs (private military companies) may assume state-like roles in security provision, especially in failed states

Question 25

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 2: The boundaries of warfare are expanding—conflict is no longer confined to traditional battlefields but extends into shared and digital spaces Relation to Security

Answer 25

Security must now include control of these domains, regulation of commercial and state behaviour, and protection against non-traditional threats like cyberattacks, space weaponisation, and deep-sea sabotage

Question 26

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 2: The boundaries of warfare are expanding—conflict is no longer confined to traditional battlefields but extends into shared and digital spaces Conceptual Framework

Answer 26

The most relevant framework is securitisation theory, which shows how political actors define these new areas as threats to justify new forms of control, funding, and surveillance

Question 27

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 3: The future of war is defined by fragmentation of global governance and rise of alternative orders, leading to more diverse and unpredictable conflicts Content

Answer 27

Theoretical Perspective: Critical IR + Post-Structuralism - The Ministry of Defence shows that future conflict is shaped not just by weapons or technology, but by shifts in power structures, legitimacy, and governance - This means that future wars might not look like traditional wars at all - they may emerge as hybrid, slow-burning crises that outlast formal battle - Unlike positivist models that assume fixed variables or realist state-centric views, this argument reveals how the very concept of war is transforming, requiring new tools for analysis and response

Question 28

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 3: The future of war is defined by fragmentation of global governance and rise of alternative orders, leading to more diverse and unpredictable conflicts Examples

Answer 28

- Scenario 4 – Deglobalised World: Full deglobalisation following a conflict, with resource nationalism and proliferation of nuclear weapons - Scenario 5 – Networked Order: Failed states give way to governance by corporations and informal actors like PMCs and belief networks.

Question 29

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 3: The future of war is defined by fragmentation of global governance and rise of alternative orders, leading to more diverse and unpredictable conflicts Relation to security

Answer 29

As power decentralises and governance weakens, security becomes harder to define and enforce, particularly when traditional international institutions lose authority or legitimacy

Question 30

The Ministry of Defence ARGUMENT 3: The future of war is defined by fragmentation of global governance and rise of alternative orders, leading to more diverse and unpredictable conflicts Conceptual framework

Answer 30

This calls for a post-structuralist lens, recognising that the meanings of war and security themselves are changing, depending on who defines the threat and who controls the solution

Question 31

The Ministry of Defence Strengths

Answer 31

1. A systems-based approach exposes how the future of war is shaped by multiple intersecting global drivers, not isolated events 2. Recognises the expansion of warfare into shared and digital spaces, not just territorial battles 3. Anticipates fragmentation of global governance and power, showing how wars may emerge in non-linear and unexpected ways

Question 32

The Ministry of Defence Strength - A systems-based approach exposes how the future of war is shaped by multiple intersecting global drivers, not isolated events

Answer 32

- One strength is The Ministry of Defence‘s systems approach, which links war to six interconnected global drivers - climate, technology, demographics, inequality, economic transformation, and power competition - This means that conflict is no longer the result of one cause but emerges from compound crises, such as climate-induced migration triggering political instability or economic collapse fuelling violent extremism - It’s relevant because it helps security actors anticipate the cumulative roots of conflict, allowing for more nuanced and forward-looking policies - It provides insight into complex risk interdependencies, which realism and liberalism often ignore by treating causes of war as linear and mostly rational

Question 33

The Ministry of Defence Strength - Recognises the expansion of warfare into shared and digital spaces, not just territorial battles

Answer 33

- Another strength is the argument that future wars will increasingly be fought in non-traditional spaces - like cyberspace, space, and the oceans - by both state and non-state actors - This means war is no longer confined to land or military actors, but now includes invisible and transboundary operations (e.g. cyberattacks, satellite disruptions, maritime sabotage) - It’s relevant because it updates our understanding of what “security” means, showing that control over shared domains is now essential to national defence - It provides an expanded security lens and brings in concrete spatial and technological dimensions that realism (focused on states) and liberalism (focused on institutions) often overlook

Question 34

The Ministry of Defence Strength - Anticipates fragmentation of global governance and power, showing how wars may emerge in non-linear and unexpected ways

Answer 34

- A third strength is The Ministry of Defence‘s recognition that the future of war will be shaped by fragmentation of governance, erosion of multilateralism, and the rise of alternative global orders and actors - This means wars may arise from power vacuums, competing spheres of influence, or breakdowns in institutional legitimacy, rather than from direct state competition alone - It’s relevant because it explains how new forms of instability (from criminal networks to megacities or rogue corporations) can emerge as key players in future conflicts - It provides a post-structural and critical insight that challenges state-centric assumptions in realism, rational cooperation in liberalism, and even some securitisation logic by showing that the very architecture of security is evolving, not just its actors

Question 35

The Ministry of Defence Weaknesses

Answer 35

1. The breadth and complexity of the systems approach can make strategic priorities vague and impractical 2. Underplays enduring state power and overemphasises non-state and emerging actors 3. Lack of normative analysis about power, inequality, or who defines the security agenda

Question 36

The Ministry of Defence Weakness - The breadth and complexity of the systems approach can make strategic priorities vague and impractical

Answer 36

- One weakness is that by trying to account for six vast, interconnected global drivers, The Ministry of Defence‘s systems approach can become too broad and unfocused, making it difficult to prioritise action or allocate resources effectively - It weakens our understanding by creating a “paralysis by complexity”, where security planners know that everything is connected but are unclear where to start or which threats to prioritise - Realists would argue this is a weakness because it distracts from the core driver of war - power and state interest - which remains the most consistent and actionable framework for understanding conflict - It overlooks how narrower, interest-based frameworks can still offer clarity and predictive value, which realists argue are essential in a dangerous and anarchic world - It falls short by failing to translate systemic complexity into clear strategic doctrine, which limits its real-world utility in policy or defence planning

Question 37

The Ministry of Defence Weakness - Underplays enduring state power and overemphasises non-state and emerging actors

Answer 37

- Another weakness is that The Ministry of Defence may overstate the role of PMCs, belief networks, and megacities, while underplaying the enduring dominance of states as the primary war-making actors - It weakens understanding by suggesting that state-centric conflict is being replaced, when in fact many recent and ongoing wars (e.g. Ukraine, Gaza, Yemen) remain rooted in state-led military aggression or strategic rivalry - Realism would argue this is a flaw, as it dismisses the centrality of states in shaping international security, especially under conditions of geopolitical tension - It overlooks how state power adapts rather than disappears - even in fragmented global systems, states continue to exert force, form alliances using both traditional and hybrid tools - It falls short by not adequately explaining how states will respond to these non-state trends, making its predictions less grounded in current geopolitical dynamics.

Question 38

The Ministry of Defence Weakness - Lack of normative analysis about power, inequality, or who defines the security agenda

Answer 38

- A third weakness is that The Ministry of Defence largely describes trends without questioning who benefits from or drives them, offering limited critique of power structures, inequality, or elite interests shaping the future of war - It weakens understanding by treating global change as natural, rather than shaped by political choices, resource control, and ideological projects - Securitisation theory would argue this is a major flaw because it ignores how threats are constructed, who gets to define them, and who is marginalised in security discourse - It falls short by offering a technocratic outlook, assuming objective risk forecasting, rather than interrogating whose security is prioritised and at what cost