Negligence Cases Flashcards
English Cases
No Duty v. Duty
No Duty
- Winterbottom v. Wright (1842): privity rule carriage manufacturer was not liable to a third-party contracted driver for his injury. There is liability only if there’s privity (relationship) between the parties.
Duty
- Heaven v. Pender (1883): a rope supplied by a contractor of a ship was defective, and the painter on board was injured. An unqualified duty to take responsible care not to cause physical harm is owed to another person wherever a person’s careless conduct would create danger of injury to the person or property of the other, reasonable foreseeability
NY Cases
No Duty v. Duty
No Duty
- Loop v. Litchfield (1870): manufacturer of cast-iron wheel not liable to third-party buyer who is fatally injured when the wheel burst at the point of a Patch from the original seller
- Loser v. Clute (1873): A steam boil manufacturer wasn’t liable to the adjacent property when its steam boiler exploded in a papermill. Winterbottom supported that manufacturer has no control over boiler upon installation court ruled was not owed to property owners next-door.
Duty
- Thomas v. Winchester (1852): Thomas Suda company that mislabeled a bottle of poison as medicine, causing her to be accidentally poisoned. If danger is foreseen, there is duty to avoid injury.
- Delvin v. Smith (1882): painter was killed from scaffolding, Court of appeals
invoked Thomas saying that poorly constructed scaffold was imminently dangerous to human life and D owed duty of care to third parties using the scaffolding.
- Torgensen v. Schultz (1908): carbonated water on ice exploded and took out D’s eye. court said that a bottle of aerated water is inherently dangerous instrument.
Car manufacturer sold car to retail dealer who sold to P. While driving, one of the wheels’ spokes crumbled due to being made of defective wood and P was injured
Did D (manufacturer) owe a duty of care to anyone with the immediate purchaser of their car?
Options for the court:
1. Apply Winterbottom and treat the “inherently dangerous” exception narrowly to not cover cars (D wins—dissenting)
2. Recognize a special, broader duty rule for “inherently dangerous products” and include cars (P wins; Thomas)
3. Induce a still-broader, foresight-oriented duty rule from earlier decisions (P wins; Heaven)
Yes. It was foreseeable that once an automobile was sold to the retailer it would be purchased by someone else. D owed P a duty of care to ensure the safety of the automobile and is liable.
Macpherson repealed the Privity Rule
A manufacturer of articles that are not inherently dangerous that may become dangerous if improperly constructed owes a duty to anyone beyond the purchaser who might foreseeably use the articles if it is reasonable to expect no further tests will be performed
- Read Broadly: Owes duty to anyone who might foreseeably be injured by carelessly made product
- Read Narrowly: if a product when carelessly made is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril and if the manufacturer knows the product will be used by non-purchasers and not inspected for safety after sale —> Owes duty to protect only users.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916)
D paramour has an STI. Has sex with P doctor’s wife and P doctor gets the STI. D paramour knew but didn’t inform P doctor’s wife. P doctor sues paramour.
Does paramour D owe the P doctor a duty of care by informing him about the STI?
Yes. Since the spouse P is a foreseeable sexual partner of the paramour.
- (1) who knows or should know that he has an STD and (2) who is having sex with a married person (i.e. whom he knows or should know is married) —> owes the married person’s spouse of duty to take care against infecting the spouse
- But only until the married person knows or should know that she is infected (then duty discharged)
Parallels to MacPherson
- D’s STD, like Buick’s car, poses a risk of physical harm (a thing of danger)
- no “privity” between P and D
- inspection by another unlikely
A person with a sexually transmitted disease owes a duty of care toward his or her lovers foreseeable sexual partner.
- general rule = foreseeability
Mussivand v. David (1989)
Did D owe a duty of care to the decedent when renting him a canoe and hearing him upon drowning?
No. He could’ve protected himself, and D did not violate any legal duty in renting a canoe to him in his intoxicated condition.
- If you haven’t done anything to expose this to risk -> nonfeasance -> no duty of care unless an established special relationship.
Osterland v. Hill
P fell in Taco Bell disputed whether Taco Bell employees assisted him, but he gained consciousness fell forward again, was knocked unconscious, which led to injuries.
Does Taco Bell have a duty to assist a customer who falls on the floor and lose his consciousness when the customers fall was not Taco Bell’s fault?
Yes, a possessor of land who holds the land open to public as in rest 3128 special relations, giving rise to a duty or a to protect, has a duty to members of the public who enter the land to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm and to give them first aid when they’re ill or injured
-Ayres says they have a duty to assist a customer only if the injury resulted from the use of an instrumentality under the control of a defendant
-They should know that invitee needs assistance, take reasonable steps, even if they didn’t create the need
Baker v. Fenneman & Brown Properties, LLC (2003)
P was residing in the Quarter Inn and after night of drinking, went out onto the rooftop through the door labeled “not an exit” and fell 20 feet to the ground. The roof was not leased by owners of the end.
Is P going out onto the roof considered trespassing and are the owners responsible for his injuries?
It is trespassing, and the owners of the are not responsible. The owner did not breach of duty to P as a trespasser
- trespasser is only owed duty not to willfully or wantonly injure
Leffler v. Sharp (2004)
Podar killed P’s daughter. Podar told his therapist at UC Berkeley of this plan. psychologist had Poddar detained by the police and then released but did not warn P’s family.
Does the school’s therapist and police’s knowledge of Poddar’s plan to kill P’s daughter subject them to a duty of care to (1) detain Poddar and (2) warn P’s family against his actions?
Yes, the court creates a new special relationship duty to take reasonable steps to warn an identifiable victim. The school is liable because P was reasonably foreseeable & identifiable victim.
- Controversial because of the burden, this must involve a threat to readily known victim, only no duty to the public at large (general murder accusations)
Policy analysis: CA Supreme Court’s ‘balancing’ on duty
Favoring Duty
- Protection of would-be victims
- Manageable for MDs (only a duty to take steps to warn
- Less liberty-infringing for patients than confinement
Against Duty
- Patients’ interests in confidentiality
- Society’s interest in not discouraging therapy
- Ineffectual or generative of too many warnings (amicus curae)
Tarasoff v. Regents (1976)
D’s haystack caught on fire and lit P’s cottages for damages of 500 pounds. Even though D was warned of risk didn’t remove the stacks and said “I’ll chance it”.
Is the defendant liable for damages from refraining to act on his stack of hay that led to a fire?
Yes. Failing to exercise the level of care that would be exercised by a reasonable person is grounds for liability.
- the standard doesn’t budge even with someone of lower IQ
- prevents excuses
Vaughan v. Menlove (1837)
The five-year-old was riding his bike and hit P leading to her fractured hip
Is the five-year-old liable for a bicycle accident through (1) negligence and (2) the parents not taking preventative measures?
No. The tender years doctrine prevents kids under the age of 7 to be capable of negligence to sue. The parents must show:
- Parents were aware of prior instances of this conduct
- parents had an opportunity to control kid at the time of the accident
Applehans v. McFall (2002)
D, a professional truck driver, hit a pedestrian car
Is D held to superior knowledge rule or professional or trade principal?
Yes, the standard of care remains reasonable standard of care, but an actor’s extra skills ought to be considered
Dakter v. Cavallino (2015)
P’s decedent injured when moved by D’s nurses from her wheelchair to bed using the Hoyer lift
Was the trial court OK in ruling on the professional negligence instruction for ordinary standard of care ?
No, professional care standard would require expert testimony but this was not needed since the functions of a nurse not require more than a high school degree to understand/execute
- P wanting a higher standard of care work against her because D has better/clearer experts to testify (as a hospital)
- D in malpractice cases can employ experts from the hospital and P is going to be systematically disadvantage to hire an expert
Myers v. Heritage Enters, Inc (2004)
P said he was injured on a PAT bus when it stopped suddenly, but D said this never happened
Does P’s alleged injury, fall under the common carriers heightened duty of care that D owed to P?
Yes, lower court did not clearly explain that the common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care
A common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care in operating and maintaining their vehicles
- Rest 3d rejects this and uses the ordinary standard, no strict liability
Jones v. Port Authority of Allegheny County (1990)
P of 12 y/o goes across the bridge swinging a wire of 8 feet long which catches onto D bridge company’s wire. D’s trolley wire was strung and P is shocked and burned when wires cross
Does D owe P a duty of care ?
No, a person who has taken reasonable precautions against forseeable dangers, may not be held liable and negligence for injuries caused by extraordinary circumstances
- Cardozo champion of the jury as a matter of law no reasonable jury could find breach because there was no duty
- judges are in effective and creating railroad laws because rules don’t provide individualized laws for each case—negligence/breach should be treated case-by-case
- bridge was lawful—no special danger or need for special precaution, no professional or industrial standard violated
-if we made the bridge company liable, then we make them the insurer which would be strict liability - wire system was lawful, no special danger or need for special precaution, no professional or industrial standard violated, nothing similar had happened prior
A person who had take reasonable precautions against foreseeable dangers may not be held liable in negligence for injuries caused by extraordinary circumstances
- P can’t get to a jury in breach without evidence/instruction from a judge—jurors do not have discretion to define breach how they choose
Adams v. Bullock (1919)
Tugboat release line of barges on a pier on the Hudson River. One of the barges, Anna C. which held government flour struck a tanker which punched a hole in Anna C. pushing it in between two piers and sinking it.
Does Connor Marine Coast failure to have a bargee on board when it sank during the midst of a bar removal for a barge on the adjacent pier constitute negligence?
Yes, Connors is contributorily negligent for its failure to take safety precautions by having an employee aboard the barge during the daylight hours. Burden was low, compared to the risk of injury and likelihood of a current given daylight working hours, wartime
Hand Formula = Liability depends on whether the burden (B) is less than the injury (L) times probability of occurrence (P)
- Gives jury tangible factors to frame the factors that we care most about (reasonableness) for the jury to decide.
- Serve as guardrails for how evidence gets presented, informs the jury, and the legal standard for evaluating breach
- Grounded in evidence, more precise— focused on the event and its foreseeability less so the victims. Ability is more intuitive/moral understanding.
- Measure the dollar cost of precautions against the dollar value of expected harm
- Moisan v. Loftus the factors’ precision is illusory. B, P and L just center attention on relevant considerations, but not applicable to reaching behaviors.
- monetizing burden —> rational actors to take efficient precautions (cost internalization; precautions where societal gain outweighs societal costs)
- Rest. 3d; foreseeability should not be the legal test but it’s still relevant
Admiralty laws pro rata used the dividend damages rule which apportioned liability equally among all legally responsible parties
US v. Carroll Towing Co (1947)
