Causation Cases Flashcards
P fell downstairs and a poorly lit stairwell at D’s apartment building. P died 4 months later.
Was the dimly lit stairwell a negligent cause for the decedent to fall and break her hip?
More likely than not, but P must prove that it’s more likely that her alleged theory of causation—that D’s breach was a cause of P’s injury—is more probable than other theories.
- negligence per se case: connecting violation of statute (not abiding by Minneapolis light ordinance) to the injury
- doesn’t mean P will win, but incumbent on D to introduce other evidence for the but-for cause
Muckler v. Buchl (1967)
P fell downstairs and D’s home and died, he wasn’t warned about the route to the bathroom.
Was P’s death the result of D’s negligence to warn P or take precautionary measures ?
No, there’s nothing to establish a causal link between alleged breaches of duty of care and the accident.
1) failure to warn social host. If you present enough evidence that a duty exists —> heating presumption = if you had made the warning, the warning would’ve made a difference and could get you to the jury.
- Rest 2d 342: Licensee: landowner has to make known any dangerous conditions that are not made safe and not warned of.
2) P had to prove but-for the stairs/lights then he wouldn’t have died. This embraces a formalistic view for actual causation.
Substantial Factor Test = was D’s breach an essential factor bringing about P’s injury?
- Some jurisdictions uses to replace “but for”
- Rest 3D rejects this test applies “but for”
Butts v. Weisz (2010)
D and Padzenksy were driving separate vehicles when they collided and struck pedestrian P
Does the accident from D and Penske’s interlocked cars dragging P underneath theirs constitute a concurrent negligence act ?
Yes. Both D1 and D2 are necessary but-for causes
- if the actors of two+ persons concur in contributing to and causing an accident, and for, but for such concurrence the accident would not have occurred, the injured P may sue the actors jointly or severally and recover against one or all
- there can be multiple “but for” necessary conditions
- a common intent, purpose, or design is not all essential
McDonald v. Robinson (1929)
P, D and second tortfeasor went quail hunting. Both D and second tortfeasor shot at Quail in the direction of P and he was struck. unknown whose pellet hit P.
Can two D’s who are not acting together, can each be held liable for all the damage?
Yes. Under alternate causation, both D and second tortfeasor may be held fully liable for the extent of P’s injuries and determine a fair proportion of damages among themselves.
Summers v. Tice (1948)
Pump manufactured by D caught fire at p’s workplace. After P and coworker put the fire out, P went to fix nitrogen purge valve by walking over an above ground pipe rack. P fell and was injured as they were returning from the job.
Was the pump manufacturer the proximate cause of P injuries, establishing a positive link?
No. Not a proximate cause.
D’s act or omission is not a proximate cause of P’s injury if:
1) the link between injury and conduct is to remote or to attenuated.
2) D’s fault was not a substantial factor and causing injury;
3) D’s conduct was a “mere condition” making P’s injury possible
4) forces generated by D’s carelessness had come to rest before in injury
Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton (1995)
Ryan and Polemis on fire foreseeability
Ryan (1866): natural and ordinary consequence
D owned railyard, engine sparked and ignited wooden shed —> fire spread to P’s house and house destroyed.
- not a natural ordinary consequence for fire to spread from its source beyond the first structured ignites (one leap rule)
- sometimes “proximate cause” is a way or dressing up arbitrary limits on liability or avoid suppressing useful activity by threat of mass liability
Polemis (1921): Directness
Furnessess leased steamship from Polemis and had to return it in the same condition (unless fire on board). Workers knocked a wooden plank off a flammable benzene leak into hole which destroyed the ship.
Fire was unforeseeable consequence of plank being dropped, but it followed directly (no intervening events) from workers’ carelessness —> proximate cause. Furnesses could not benefit from the “fire on board” exemption.
Wagon Mound 1 & 2
Wagon mound crew released oil into the harbor. Crew at nearby dock welding torches spoke with Wagon Mound and were reassured there was no risk of a fire. Welding debris re-ignited oil —> fire which destroyed Dock and nearby ship.
1: oil spill was not proximate cause of fire because ignition was not foreseeable
2: same spill and fire, suit now brought by nearby ship’s owner (vs. dock owner)
- fire damage now deemed foreseeable —> proximate cause
P’s rental car has defective trunk lap; when he got out of parked car to shut trunk, third party’s car negligently jerked forward an injured P
Is D’s defective trunk latch a proximate cause of the injury?
D’s misconduct was not a proximate cause because the circumstances giving rise to P’s injury were not foreseeable
- D is not liable for harms that were not within the scope of the risk created by his carelessness.
Ventricelli v. Kinney’s Sys Rent-A-Car (1978)
P stood on railroad platform waiting when two men ran to catch a separate train operated by D when they dropped a package full of explosives. P some distance away was injured with emotional shock
Was D negligent and not protecting P from getting injured by a man running to catch the train his suitcase with fireworks fell and exploded ?
(Cardozo) No, no duty owed to P, P was not a reasonably foreseeable victim. Railway worker did not breach duty with reference to P even if he breached duty to the holder of the package.
- Scope of D’s duties is only reasonably foreseeable harm
- P cannot “piggyback” on these carelessness towards a differently situation situated person
Minority (Andrew’s): everyone owes to the world at large at the duty of refraining from those acts that man reasonably threatened the safety of others
- This was proximate cause. the law arbitrarily declines traces series of events be on a certain point, which is not logic
Practical Takeaways:
Androzo I: Proximate cause case (Andrews) apply harm within the scope of the risk as a doctrinal test (Cardozo, Rest 3d)
Androzo II: duty case (Cardozo) but question of expedience/policy needs (Andrew’s) to be assessed to deciding duty all things considered approach
Palagraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (1928)
1993 World Trade Center bomb caused six deaths, many injuries and massive property damage. P is the owner of the World Trade Center is D a manufacturer of fertilizer that contains ammonium nitrate and urea used by the terrorist to make their bomb.
Is D liable for the creation of the bombs?
- Misfeasance: manufacturer carelessly damage my building
- nonfeasance: manufacturer failed to protect my building
No, the terrorist conduct was superseding caused, breaking the chain of causation —> alteration into bombs and World Trade Center bombing was not a natural probable or foreseeable consequence of any design defect in D’s fertilizer. No proximate and no duty for nonfeasance.
- unforeseeable alteration of a reasonably safe product constitutes superseding cause and exempts manufacturer from liability
Port Authority of NY & NJ v. Arcadian Corp (1999)
P was driving when hit by D’s car as she was not wearing glasses in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 509(3)
Was it negligence per se that D wasn’t wearing her contact lenses while driving and got into a collision given her license has a restriction requiring her to wear corrective lenses while driving and under the Vehicle and Traffic law a person cannot operate a car and violation of any restriction on their license?
Yes. Because 509(3) relates to the manner of operating a vehicle it set for the standard of care for such operation.
Dalal v. City of NY (1999)
P, employee of trucking company, was unloading delivery at D’s property when he fell and was injured.
Was it negligence per se to not have the guardrail for P and his trucking company to unload goods causing P to fall, when statute of Director of labor and industries had a regulation that requires guardrails?
Yes. Violation of the administrative safety regulation constitutes negligence per se as it is essential municipal ordinance, regulating safety (ergo conduct).
Bayne v. Todd Shipyards Corp (1977)
Dee was parked on the sidewalk in front of his home to show P a new compact disc player.
Did D’s parking in his car on the sidewalk to show P compact display constitute negligence per se when William collided into D’s car injuring P ?
No. Vehicle code statue was not designed to prevent the type of accident that caused P’s injury. It was meant to prevent obstructed pedestrian walkways, and pedestrians, walking into vehicles or being hit by moving vehicles previously parked on the sidewalk.
- P did not raise triable issue a fact that an ordinary prudent person would foreseen this risk
Victor v. Hedges (1999)
D blasted rocks onto the property of P and she suffered anxiety and feared for the safety of her herself and her child. no one was physically injured
Can P claim emotional distress from her anxiety suffered from the blasting rocks next to her property?
No. She cannot claim damages for mental suffering alone.
Emotional injury is not legally recognizable injury—cannot have an injury based on the psychological experience, need some more form of physical impact or claim, traditional impact rule.
Wyman v. Leavitt (1880)
P barely escaped death after her car is caught in a rut at D’s carelessly maintained railroad crossing. no physical contact, but lasting trauma with physical symptoms
May P recover for the physical consequences of fright caused by negligence of D being in immediate zone of physical danger created by negligence, although no contemporary bodily impact?
Yes. Physical injury approximately caused by fright due to negligence, recovery should be permitted. Rejects impact rule because it is over and under inclusive and is an arbitrary line controlling liability.
According to the zone of danger, if
1. D’s carelessness places P at risk of imminent physical harm.
2. P’s contemporaneous awareness causes her to fear for her own safety,
and
3. P’s fright produces physical consequences that would be elements of damage if a bodily injury had been suffered.
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. (1965)
