Module 3 - Moral Arguments Flashcards
David Hume
Scottish philosopher (1711-1776); noticed the Is-Ought Problem
Is-Ought
It is impossible for factual “Is” claims to generate moral “ought” claims. Impossible to derive moral “ought” claims from factual “is” claims
Factual “Is” claim examples
a fact is approved by someone, society, or God
Factual “Is” claims
may be true, but do not imply a moral “ought” claim
if and only if
link a moral “ought” and factual “is” claim together/they imply each other (always)
Bridge Statement
the claim that an act is right, if and only if the factual claim is true; Each ethical theory has a certain bridge to a certain “Is”
Moral Argument components
- Bridge Statement (moral standard/foundational value of ethical theory is linked to an act being right)
- Factual Claim
- Conclusion giving Moral Judgement of the Ethical Theory
Parts of Moral Arguments that can be criticized (2/3)/must be criticized if the moral judgement is criticized
- Bridge statement (bc theoretical link btwn is and ought claims) –> Theoretical Criticism of Moral Argument
- Factual claim (bc practical descriptive is claim) –> Practical Criticism of Moral Argument
Moral argument
type of argument which moral judgement cannot be false when both the bridge statement and factual claim are true
If you criticize the moral argument, you must
criticize the ethical theory too
moral universalism
maintains that we must always refer to moral principles to arrive at moral judgements
moral particularism
maintains that our moral thinking may not follow moral principles (especially when the case involves people and relationships)
Moral Judgement
(in some cases - moral reflection cases)
Descriptive claim(s) + moral considerations about the persons involved + moral considerations about the relationships involved
Psychological situationism
view that situational factors influence a persons’ behavior/thinking more than personality
The Big Five personality model
introvertness/extrovertness, neuroticism(stability), agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness