Misrepresentation Flashcards
Misrepresentation component : an inaccurate statement of fact. Includes mistakes as to law opinion.
Brennan v Bolt Burdon: a misrepresentation as to the law can also count as misrep.
Cannot be a mere puff authority
Dimmock v Hallett: selling land and claiming it was ‘fertile and improveable’ was just a mere puff.
The misrepresentation must be as to a material fact
Museprime Properties
What is the authority for the proposition that a misrepresentation can be made by conduct?
Spice Girls v Aprilia: where the spice girls posed for photos in their full group, this gave the misleading impression that they would be staying together in a group. However, this was not the case and aprilia sued them.
What are the key authorities when you are considering whether there is a statement as to fact or opinion?
(1) If the statement is as to an opinion, it may still be a misrepresentation as to the fact of whatever opinion he holds (Edgington v Fitzmaurice);
(2) It can suggest the opinion is based on a fact: IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs/Smith v Land and House Property (describing a tenant as ‘most desirable’);
(3) Bisset v Wilkinson: saying that the land could accomodate x number of sheep was pure speculation as it had never been used for that purpose (‘his idea’). Note, that whether a misrepresentation as to an opinion suggests a fact hinges on: (a) relative knowledge/expertise; (b) skill; (c) External and Exclusive information.
(4) if the defendant has special professional knowledge this might lead to them being bound: Nottingham Patent Brick & Tile Co (lawyer by saying there was no restrictive covenant suggested he had looked at the deeds).
What is an example of a misrepresentation which was held to be an opinion suggesting a fact? Also, the same authority suggesting that the terms were unfair.
Avora Fine Arts Investment Lrd v Christie, Manson & Woods: a statement of opinion about the origin of the painting could only allow recision.
A misrepresentation had been made: it was clear that C not only warranted that Odalisque was by K but represented that that was its opinion; as C was giving its opinion as well as a warranty, it had impliedly represented that it had reasonable grounds for holding that opinion.
Is it possible to warrant against making a statement of fact?
IFE Fund SA v Goldman Sachs: YES: here, a bank was not liable because they had assured the purchaser they were not vouching for the veracity of the advice.
What happens if the statement is substantially correct?
Avon Insurance Plc v Swire Fraser: must be such that the difference in the correctness and reality would not be enough to induce the reasonable person to enter into the contracts.
Do the parties communicated also need to be the parties to the contract?
Etridge, yes, or the third party becoming involved must have involved itself with notice of the misrepresentation.
For deceit, will the misrepresentor be liable for third parties?
Andrews v Mockford: the representor in a deceit action must have intended the information to get passed on to B and for B to rely detrimentally.
For negligence, will the misrepresentor be liable for third parties?
Smith v Bush: for a negligent misstatement it is enough for it to be reasonably foreseeable.
How are misrepresentations assessed?
EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan: unclear if this is ‘fly on the wall’ objectivity or ‘in the shoes’ objectivity.
Does the misrepresentation need to be material?
Yes, the misrepresentation needs to be material to the degree that it induced the party into entering the contract.
Spice Girls v Aprilia: materiality and the argument by the representee of reliance has the effect of producing a presumption in his favour.
Aquitaine: it can also be met by inducement into entering a contract at less favourable terms.
To what extent must the representee have been induced to enter the contract?
Aquitaine v Laporte: it need not be the sole inducement in the decision to enter or the decision to accept certain terms.
Eddington v Firzmaurice: it is enough that the misrep was one of the factors leading him to enter the contract.
Is there a duty on the representee to check to see if the information is correct for himself? What happens if he does check?
Redgrave v Hurd: the representation is actionable even though the representee might have checked the info for himself. Even if the Re did make a cursory investigation, this might not stop the materiality of the misrepresentation mislead him. If a material misrep, he is taken to have relied upon it.
Peekay: in this case a sophisticated and experienced investor did his own investigation, preferring not to take heed of a casual misrepresentation, and thus had not relied on it.
What are the authorities for the concealment cases and is there any resolution on them?
Gordon v Selico:
The misrepresentor sold a defective house to Re, even though Re hired a surveyor he was not held to have relied as the defect had been concealed. Thus, Re could sue on deceit.
Horsfall v Thomas:
However, when the Mo sold a defective gun to Re, Re was taken not to have relied upon the sale on the basis it would have been obvious on a reasonable inspection.
It seems to square these cases it depends on how obvious the defect in the working condition of the products is.
What happens if Ro corrects Re?
Assicurazioni Generali SpA v Arab Insurance: must actually come to the representee’s notice.
Peekay: Ro can get Re to sign a declaration he has read and understood a correction
When the statement is fraudulent, does Re need to prove prove reliance?
Reeves v Metropolitan police: no, reliance is presumed.
What happens if the statement becomes false after it has been made?
With v O’Flanagan: it seems if the Ro has notice of this development then he is under a duty to update Re.
Foodco v Boot: knowledge is the standard.
IFE v Goldman Sachs: it might be that there is a continuing representation that the party continues to believe the statement.
S2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act imposes a duty on Ro to review the veracity of his statements (stops after formation), otherwise he will lack vaid grounds in the belief.
Unclear if knowledge of reasonable knowledge are the standards.
How do we tell if a representation is a contractual warrantee or a representation?
There is a multi-factoral approach which will hinge on severa different features (Business Environment Bow Lane: the test is strict)
(1) Objective appearance: Yam Seng Pte Ltd: was the Re entitled reasonable to assume it was a contractually binding statement.
(2) Importance to Re (a ‘deal breaker’). Bannerman v White: the court will consider whether the matter is crucial to Re.
(3) Obvious Importance: City & Westminster Properties v Mudd: the landlord had assured a prospective tenant that he would be free to sleep in a business premises, when in reality he couldn’t. This was an objective dealbreaker.
(4) Relative skill: dirk bentley and oscar chess, regarding relative abilities of the parties. In the former a car dealer’s statement to mileage was treated as a term. In the latter, the seller was a private vendor and the buyer was an expert in vintage cars.
Cf Oscar: ““5. When the seller states a fact which is or should be within his own knowledge and of which the buyer is ignorant, intending that the buyer should act on it and he does so, it is easy to infer a warranty. So also if the seller makes a promise about something which is or should be within his own control. If, however, the seller, when he states a fact, makes it clear that he has no knowledge of his own but has got his information elsewhere, and is merely passing it on, it is not so easy to imply a warranty.””
What happens, when ascertaining whether something is a collateral warrantee, if both parties are equally experienced?
Drake v Thos: When they are equally experienced. If there is patent doubt on behalf of the Re, it is unlikely to form part of the contractual warrantee. Here, significant doubts as to the validity of a painting meant that the bueyr was unable to claim it was a term (he was gambling, or at least his agent was).
One tool to avoid these is to put an ‘entire agreement’ clause in.
Is independent verification relavant for the warranty test?
Ecay v Godfrey: yes, if a party is aked to independently verify something then it is unlikely the representation is a warranty.
BUT
Schawel v Reade: if Ro asked Re not to verify the matter, this is equally relevant.
Regarding the warrantee test, are statements as to future facts more likely to be mispreresentations?
Business Environment Bow Lane: No - if the statement is to a fact, it is more likely than assurances as to future forecasts or future facts to be a warrantee.
Esso Petroleum: Here the expertise of the party meant the statement concerning future forecast of business in a filling station was a collateral warranty. Unusually this related to the warrantee they had taken sufficient care in making the statement, not of the veracity of the fact.
What role does the interval between making the statement and concluding the contract make?
Business Environment Bow Lane: the logner the period the more likely it will be a mere representation.
What happens, when working out if there is a warranty, when subsequent negotiations occur?
Business Environment Bow Lane: if subsequent negotiations occur, such as a written contract, it is very difficult to overcome the presumption the written document contains all the terms.
What is a good authority for collateral contracts?
Shanklin Pier v Detel Product: where A enters into contract C, this can provide the consideration for entering into contract B. A warranted to B about the quality of A’s paint, and B was held to have a collateral contract with A despite the fact it was X, a third party, who bought from A.
What is the basic authority for negligent misstatements?
Hedley Byrne v Heller
What are the components of the tort of deceit?
The tort of deceit is met whenever A makes a false statement knowingly, intending B to rely on it, or recklessly. Further, it also covers situations of ‘couldn’t care less’ becasue A needs to have a positive belief in the veracity of the statement (Derry v Peek).
What is the measure of damages for deceit?
Smith v New Court: the defendant is liable for all damage directly flowing from the transaction: ie, capital loss,although it need not be foreseeable, it must have been directly caused.
This also differs from the contractual measure as the claimant cannot claim what the position would be had the representation been true.