Estoppel Cases Flashcards
What are the requirements (and authority) for passive acquiescence estoppel?
Ramsden v Dyson: the defendant must allow the plaintiff to build on the defendant’s land under the mistaken belief that P owns the land, and must know P is labouring under this belief.
Mees: not easy to rationalise under the other headings of estoppel and it seems more to be an instance of where the equitable unfairness has arisen from a different source.
What are the judiciary’s attitude towards estoppel?
Hoyl Group Ltd v Cromer Town Council: Lewison LJ is of the opinion that the boundaries of estoppel are open and it resists being pinned down too tightly.
Do you look at each requirement of estoppel individually or do you take them all together ‘in the round’?
Gillet v Holt: you take them all in the round (they often overlap), and ask whether there is unconscionability throughout.
What are the four requirements of estoppel?
Assurance; Reliance; Detriment; Unconscionability (Gillet v Holt)
The assurance must be clear, but how strict is this test?
Walton v Walton: it must be clear, unambiguous, and seriously intended. But also note the difference between estoppel and contract: in the latter the obligation arises at formation, in the former it arises when the obligation is enforced. This will give the court the benefit of hindsight looking at subsequent acts - if there is detriment, a lack of clarity will not usually be fatal provided in the context it was clear enough (Thorner v Major)
What if there are a series of individually insufficient representations?
Thorner v Major: if, taken together, they amount to a clear representiation/promise then this is enough for the assurance limb.
What form must the promise take?
No particular form: Ives v High. This can be a promise to give ownership, or some property, in a piece of land now or in the future (Thorner v Major)
What are some examples of assurances?
Thorner v Major: possible to be implicit, but a high burden;
Flowermix: it can be a failed written agreement;
Gillett: can take the form of a unilateral or a mutual promise
Is it possible to have a pre-contractual estoppel arising?
Crabb v District council: where A and B were negotiating over a piece of land, A suggested to B that B would get a right of way when he sold the land. Even if more negotiation was required, the steps A had taken (ie a gate) led B to suffering detriment, selling the land, but inadvertently landlocking his own land when A backed out.
Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row: in commercial settings it is much more likely that B will know he is not getting property rights (subject to contract), whereas in domestic (thorner) B is much more likely to assume he is getting an unqualified right. Crabb is different in that B was misled by the gate being put in, whereas B in Cobbe knew at all times he wasn’t getting a proprietary right.
How is the law applied to domestic circumstances differently to commercial ones?
In domestic cases (LN) it is more likely that the courts will find assurances as it is unreal to suggest they should have made a contract. In commercial cases this is less of a concern and the interests of certainty require B to be misled as to the granting of a proprietary right (ie, in Crabb) with no more negotiation (gate), rather than just the hope of a future proprietary right.
How is the estoppel assessed?
Thorner v Major: Objectively
Does it need to be for a specific property right, aka a lease?
Thorner v Major: no it doesn’t, however in Cobbe v Yeoman’s row there was no assurance as to B getting a property right as it was only ‘subject to contract’, binding in honour, and B knew he would have to negotiate the contract first.
What are the requirements of certainty?
Thorner v Major: the right has to be certain enough to indentify the land at least. Here, the farm ‘as existing from time to time’ was enough.
What are the requirements of ‘reliance’?
The claimant must alter his or her behaviour in response to the assurance of the defendant. If there is detriment then reliance is presumed (Greasley v Cooke).
What if C would have acted as they did even if the promise had not been made?
Wayling v Jones: the test was altered here because C had suffered considerable detriment in reliance on the promise. The test they applied was: ‘would C have worked there even if D had told him he was breaking his promise’. This is a bit different and brings in some other considerations (like trust).
Cooke: odd test as not equivalent, cf Coombes v Smith where a wife said she would have moved in with D even if there had been no promise. McFarlane thinks it only applies to domestic cases.
Does the reliance need to occur as a sole result of the promise?
No, mixed motives are okay (Ottey v Grundy; Chun v Ho); if the detriment predates the assurance then there might be difficulties unless it can be shown that the assurance dates back before in implied form.
How must the detriment be connected to reliance?
It does not need to be connected, detriment is enough provided that but for the operation of the proprietary estoppel P would suffer a loss.
Gillet v Holt: examples of detriment include not seeking a new job; carrying out existing duties; taking no steps to secure future income.
What if the claimant has also received benefits in return?
Henry v Henry: the question is whether the benefits outweigh the prejudice. Here, the fact that the claimant was the only one to take up his mother’s offer to work the farm and get a share in it suggested this. Also, the claimant had worked the land for 30 years, and even if he got profits from the sale and rent it didn’t matter.
Does the detriment have to be above a de minimus level?
Clibbery v Century: yes, recording tapes of horse-racing is not enough.
What are five examples of detriment which is valid?
Emotional and physical support (Campbell v Griffin: nursing care); Giving up an opportunity (Dugdale); Better prospects (Gillett); A career (Ottey); Other accommodation (Parker v Parker).
