Minerva Mills Flashcards
Minerva Mills
Year of Decision
Bench Strength
1980
5 Judges
Majority Opinion - Chandrachud + 3 ors
Separate Opinion - Bhagawati (common judgment to Waman Rao)
Minerva Mills
Scope of Challenge
- Validity of Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act
Section 4 amended Art. 31-C by changing the reference to Art. 39(b) and (c) therein to all or any of the principles of Part IV. The effect was that any law giving effect to policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles of Part IV of the Constitution could not be challenged on grounds of violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31.
Section 55 inserted Arts. 368 (4) and (5).
Art. 368(4) took constitutional amendments completely out of the purview of judicial review.
Art. 368(5) declared that there shall be no limitation on the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution.
Minerva Mills
What was the finding of the majority on the validity of Section 55 / Arts. 368 (4) and (5)?
Section 55/Arts.368 (4) & (5) was held to be invalid. The basis was as follows:
- The effect of Arts. 368(5) was to confer unlimited power of amending the constitution on Parliament. It even permitted distortion of the Constitution beyond recognition.
- The Constitution had conferred a limited amending power on Parliament. The Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited power enlarge that very power into an absolute power.
- A limited amending power is itself one of the basic features of the Constitution.
- Art. 368(5) deprives Courts of the power to pronounce upon the validity of laws. If courts are deprived of such powers, the fundamental rights conferred on people will become a mere adornment. A controlled constitution will become uncontrolled.
- Art. 368(4) leads to a total deprivation of the valuable mode of redress under Art. 32.
- Art. 368(4) is an appendage of Art. 368(5) and if the latter goes, the former must too.
Minerva Mills
What was the finding of the majority on the validity of Section 4 / Art. 31C?
- The scope of Art. 31-C stood largely expanded by the amendment. Previously only laws that sought to further the principles in Art. 39(b) and (c) stood immunized from challenges on grounds of violation of Art. 14, 19 and 31. Now, a law claiming to further any principle in Part IV would receive such immunity.
- The ameded Art. 31-C subordinates the rights under Art. 14 and 19 to the directive principles. Therefore, the validity of Arts. 31-C will necessarily depend on whether Arts.14 and 19 are essential features of the basic structure of the Constitution.
- India’s struggle for indpendence and the CAD show how personal liberties are deeply valued and are regarded an integral part of the Constitution.
- Parts III and Part IV represent competing constitutional interests, both of which are important in the constitutional scheme. The targeted “ends” of Part IV cannot be achieved through “means” that completely abrogate the importance of the rights in Part III. To destroy the guarantees given in Part III to purportedly achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert the constitution by destroying its basic structure.
- The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of balance between Parts III and IV. To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the constitution. The harmony and balance between FRs and DPSPs is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.
- By virtue of the amended Art. 31-C, Art. 14 and 19 stand abrogated at least in relation to the category of laws in Art.31-C. Though some laws that violate Arts. 14 and 19 may not be relatable to Art. 31-C, the large majority of laws will be. In respect of such a large area of laws, the operation of Arts. 14 and 19 will be completely withdrawn.
- A total deprivation of FRs, even in a limited area, can amount to abrogation of a FR, just a partial deprivation in every area can.
- Art. 31C cannot be saved by reading it down to mean that only laws that do not offend the basic structure will be immunized. The language of the Art. and its legislative history do not permit such reading down, since they evidence a a clear intention of Parliament to clothe itself with unlimited power. The principle of reading down cannot be invoked or applied in opposition to the clear intention of the legislature.
- There is a difference between Art. 31A and the amended Art. 31C. Art. 31A excludes challenge under Arts. 14 and 19 in regard to a specified category of laws. If by a constitutional amendment, Arts. 14 and 19 are withdraw from a “defined field of legislative activity” which is reasonably in public interest, the basic framework of the Constitution may remain unimpaired.
In contrast, the amended Art. 31-C does not deal with specific subjects. The DPSP are couched in broad and general terms.
- Principle of State Decisis cannot be the basis for perpertuating curtailment of human freedoms. Merely because Art. 31-A was upheld, it does not follow that Art. 31-C should also be upheld on the same logic.
- Striking down of Art. 31C will not in any way impair the ability of the State to make reasonable restrictions under Arts. 19(2)-(6). Restrictions under those provisions can only be in respect of the stated grounds, they must be reasonable, and above all the measures are subject to control by judicial review. In contrast, Art. 31-C completely excludes judicial review.
What did Section 4 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment provide?
Section 4 amended Art. 31-C by changing the reference to Art. 39(b) and (c) therein to “all or any of the principles of Part IV”. The effect was that any law giving effect to policy of the State towards securing the Directive Principles of Part IV of the Constitution could not be challenged on grounds of violation of Arts. 14, 19 and 31.
What did Section 55 of the 42 Constitutional Amendment provide?
Section 55 inserted Arts. 368 (4) and (5).
Art. 368(4) took constitutional amendments completely out of the purview of judicial review.
Art. 368(5) declared that there shall be no limitation on the Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution
What were the components of the basic structure identified in the Minerva Mills case?
A limited power of amenddment of the constitution.
The harmony and balance between FRs and DPSPs is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.
What were the principles regarding reading down of a statute that was laid down in the Minerva Mills Case?
The principle of reading down cannot be invoked or applied in opposition to the clear intention of the legislature.
Art. 31C cannot be saved by reading it down to mean that only laws that do not offend the basic structure will be immunized. The language of the Art. and its legislative history do not permit such reading down, since they evidence a a clear intention of Parliament to clothe itself with unlimited power. The same reasoning applies equally to arguments seeking to read down Arts. 368(4) and (5).
Why could the reasoning applied for upholding Art. 31A not apply to Art. 31C?
Principle of State Decisis cannot be the basis for perpertuating curtailment of human freedoms. Merely because Art. 31-A was upheld, it does not follow that Art. 31-C should also be upheld on the same logic.
There is a difference between Art. 31A and the amended Art. 31C. Art. 31A excludes challenge under Arts. 14 and 19 in regard to a specified category of laws. If by a constitutional amendment, Arts. 14 and 19 are withdraw from a “defined field of legislative activity” which is reasonably in public interest, the basic framework of the Constitution may remain unimpaired.
How did the Minerva Mills court deal with the argument that striking down Art. 31C would greatly impair the ability of the State to impose restrictions under Art. 19(2) – (6)?
Striking down of Art. 31C will not in any way impair the ability of the State to make reasonable restrictions under Arts. 19(2)-(6). Restrictions under those provisions can only be in respect of the stated grounds, they must be reasonable, and above all the measures are subject to control by judicial review. In contrast, Art. 31-C completely excludes judicial review.
Minerva Mills
Findings in Bhagawati J’s opinion
Contention regarding amended Art. 31C should not have been gone into because of Palkivala’s express concession that Art. 31A, 31B and unamended Art.31C stood valid, and the Nationalization Act did not need the shelter of the amended 31C for its validation, thereby rendering the challenge to Art. 31C academic.
But since time was spent on it, he answers the question anyway.
The observation by Khanna J. in keshavananda that each and every provision of the Constitution, including the FRs, could be amended but it could not be read to mean that fundamental rights were not part of the basic structure. The only limited conclusion reached by him was that the right to property could not be considered a part of the basic structure. The unconditional upholding of the 29th Constitutional amendment must be regarded as an incorrect application of the principle laid down by him that all amendments should be tested against the basic structure of the constitution. (Quoting Seervai)
In every case where the question arises as to whether a particular feature of the Constitution is part of its basic structure, it should be determined on a consideration of various factors such as: (i) the place of a particular feature in teh scheme of the Constitution; (ii) its object and purpose; (iii) the consequence of its denial on the integrity of the consitution. (follwing Chandrachud J. in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain)
For a particular feature to be a part of the basic structure of the constitution, it must be determined on the basis of specific provisions in the Constitution. It does not consist of any abstract ideals to be found outside the provisions of the constitution.
Art. 368(4) is a case of zeal overruning discretion. It would block challenges even to consitutional amendments on procedural grounds. It would also immunize amendments from basic structure challenges. It violates two essential features of the basic structure of the Constitution, namely: (i) limited amending power of Parliament; (ii) power of judicial review over ultra vires actions of constitutional authorities.
Constitution is controlled. Parliament is a creature of the constitution. Cannot in an exercise of limited amending power make that very same power unlimited. Under our Constitution, no authority, howsoever highly placed, can claim to be the sole judge of its power under the Constitution.
The judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and it falls upon it to uphold constitutional values and enforce constitutional limitations. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitution. A constitutional amendment seeking to take away judicial review will be invalid.
Minerva Mills
What were the observations of J. Bhagawati on the principle of stare decisis?
When constitutional problems arise for consideration by the SC, the decisions may bepend upon choice of competing values, and two views may be possible depending upon the value judgment mady the individual judge. If one view has been taken by the court after mature deliberation, the fact that another Bench is inclined to take another view would not justify the court in recondering the earlier devision and overruling it. “stare decisis et non quita movere” adhere to the decision and do not unsettle things which are established. Useful for certainty, continuity and uniformity in law. It should not however be a rigid and inflexible doctrine that is applied at the cost of justice. It is always a desideratum, never a command. It can be deviated from for substantial and compelling reasons. The review mjust be exercised with due care and caution and only for advancing the public well-being.
What were the observations of J. Bhagawati on Art. 31B and the Ninth Schedule for testing amendments after 24.4.1973?
It is possible that in a given case, even an abridgment of a fundamental right may involve violation of the basic structure. It would depend upon: (i) the nature of the fundamental right; (ii) the extent and depth of the infringement; (iii) the purpose for which the infringement is made; (iv) its impact on the basic values of the constitution.
