Daniel Latifi Flashcards
“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Year of Decision
Bench Strength”
“2001
5 Judge bench
Rajendra babu”
“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Issues involved”
“Social issue: Liability of Muslim husbands to pay maintenance to divorced wives beyond iddat period
Legal Issue: Constitutional Validity and interpretation of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986”
“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Background”
“In 1985, the SC pronounced judgment in Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, holding that in case a divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried is unable to maintain herself, then her husband is required to pay her maintenance even after the iddat period under Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. The holding was on 3 points mainly:
- The provisions of S.125 Cr. P.C. are part of the criminal laws of the Country. Unlike civil laws that are specialised to different communities, criminal law has uniform applicability across all religions. If there is a conflict between criminal law and personal law of a community, it is the criminal law that will prevail.
- There is in reality no conflict between the Muslim law on maintenance, and the requirement under Sec. 125 Cr. P.C. The Muslim personal law principle that the husband’s liability to pay maintenance to his divorced wife is limited to the iddat period, applies when the wife is capable of maintaining herself. As such, the principle does not extend to a situation where the wife is unable to maintain herself. In such a situation, even Muslim personal law requires the husband to make provision for the divorced wife after the iddat period. The object of S.125 Cr. P.C is to prevent vagrancy and destitution and provides for maintenance in the limited circumstance where the wife is unable to maintain herself. As such, there is no conflict.
- Section 127(3)(b) of the Cr. P.C. envisages that an order requiring payment of maintenance passed under S.125 may be revoked where the wife is subsequently divorced and it is shown that the sums that are due to be paid to her ““on divorce”” under the customary laws of the community have been paid. The court held that a mahr payment at the time of triple talaq divorce will not be a payment of a sum due ““on divorce””. This is because mahr is more linked with marriage rather than divorce. The payment is a mark of respect for the wife - only part of its payment is deferred to a future date, which is often conveniently fixed as the date of dissolution of the marriage.
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“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986”
“Section 3(1) placed the following obligations on a Muslim husband towards his divorced wife:
(i) ensure that a fair and reasonable provision be made and maintenance be paid within the iddat period.
(ii) in case the women is maintaining childred, then provision made and maintenance paid for a period of 2 years after the birth of the child.
(iii) payment of sums agreed as mahr or dower at the time of marriage.
(iv) delivery of property given as gifts during the marriage.
In case the husband failed to arrange for the above, the woman could approach court for relief.
Under Section 4, it was provided that where the woman is unable to maintain herself after the iddat period, she could approach court for relief, and the court could order payment of maintenance by those of her relatives who would inherit from her on her death, or the wakf board in the absence of any such relative.
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“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Crux of Challenge”
“1. Section 125 Cr. P.C. is a criminal law seeking to prevent vagrancy. It further social justice and Art. 21. It cannot be derogated from the selectively for the women of a certain community alone, in a manner to their detriment.
- If Act is read as requiring Muslim husbands as needing only to pay maintenance for the iddat period and not thereafter, it violates Muslim women’s rights under Arts. 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
- Less beneficial remedy
- will lead to vagrancy
- defeats the right to live with dignity. - The Act is un-Islamic and unconstitution and undermines the secular feature of the constitution.
- Personal law is not a legitimate basis for classification in the criminal law domain.”
“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Crux of Defense”
“1. Personal law can be a legitimate basis of classification
- If Sec. 125 can be extended by leg. Policy to muslims, it may be withdrawn as well.
- Enactment was to overcome Shah Bano.
- Purpose of S.125 still achieved, you go after the family members.”
“Daniel Latifi v. Union of India
Findings”
“1. It is universally recognized that a woman should be compensated in terms of money for her livelihood if divorced. This partakes the character of a basic human right, and it is difficult to perceive that Muslim law provides for a different kind of responsibility.
- S.3(1)(a) requires that: (i) reasonable and fair provision be made; and (i) maintenance be paid, ““within”” the iddat period. There is a difference between ““provision”” and ““maintenance”” - maintenance itself refers to iddat period but provision is wider. The word ““within”” must be read as ““during””, rather it should be read as ““on or before””. The implication is that the provision that is to be made ensure the future livelihood of the wife even beyond the idda period. It is only that the provision itself is to be made within the iddat period, i.e., by payment of a lump sum in advance.
- Emphasis is not on the duration of the obligation, but the point of time at which the obligation must be complied with.
- When viewed this way, the Act provides for an equally effective or more beneficial remedy for a Muslim wife, so its constitutionality is preserved. At the same time, there is no intereference in the personal law.”
