Mind

Question 1

Substance dualism

Answer 1

Mind and body are ontologically distinct
There are two types of substance- physical and non-physical
The mind is non-physical- it does not consist of matter or exist in space
The mind does not depend on the body for its existence

Question 2

The conceivability argument

Answer 2

1) It is conceivable for the mind to exist without the body
2) It is possible for the mind to exist without the body
3) The mind is not dependent on the body for existence
4) Therefore the mind and body are distinct substances

Question 3

The divisibility argument

Answer 3

Leibniz’s law- if two things are numerically identical then they have the same properties

1) The body is divisible into parts
2) The mind is indivisible
3) The mind and the body are of distinct substances

Question 4

Issues with the divisibility argument

Answer 4

The mind is in some sense divisible
The argument assumes that the mind is a thing (or substance) capable of having properties at all
Not everything physical is divisible- eg. fundamental particles

Question 5

Issues with the conceivability argument

Answer 5

What is conceivible may not be possible- masked man example
What is logically possible may not be the case in reality
Mind without body is not conceivable

Question 6

Interactionist dualism

Answer 6

Mental events can cause physical events- there is a causal relationship between physical and non-physical substances

Question 7

Epiphenomenalist dualism

Answer 7

The view that the mind has no causal power over the body or the mind- all mental and physical events are caused by physical events.

Question 8

The problem from causal interaction

Answer 8

1) Physical things only move when a force is applied to them
2) Only extended things can apply forces
3) The mind has no extension
4) The mind cannot move the body
Interactionist dualists cannot account for how two distinct substances might have a causal relationship between eachother

Question 9

The causal redundancy of the mental

Answer 9

Objection to epiphenomenalism.
It is completely counter intuitive to argue that the mind is causally redundant- all my conscious actions occur as a result of my conscious will.

Question 10

The argument from introspection

Answer 10

If the mind causes nothing, it doesn’t even cause my introspective beliefs about it. This means my beliefs about my thoughts and feelings are independent of my actual thoughts and feelings- the process of introspection is flawed.

Question 11

The issue of free will

Answer 11

In order to be free, and have responsibility over my actions, my choices must control my actions
Choices are mental events
According to epiphenominalism, we do not have free will

Question 12

The problem of other minds

Answer 12

1) I cannot directly experience other minds, only their behaviour
2) Behaviour is expressed via a physical substance
3) According to dualism, mental and physical substances are distinct
4) Therefore I cannot infer with certainty that other people have minds
This leads to the threat of solipsism

Question 13

The argument from analogy

Answer 13

1) I have a mind
2) I know from experience that my mental states cause my behaviour
3) Other people behave similarly to me
4) By analogy, their behaviour must be caused by the same thing as my behaviour
5) Other people have minds

Question 14

Identity theory

Answer 14

The claim that mental states are synthetically identical to brain states and mental properties are just types of physical property
An ontological reduction

Question 15

Arguments for identity theory

Answer 15

It solves the causation problem

Rejecting the idea of a second substance satisfies Ockham’s razor

Question 16

Multiple realisability- identity theory

Answer 16

Putnam claims that the same mental property can relate to different physical properties and therefore the two are not identical
eg. the mental state of pain could be linked to different physical brain states in different species or individuals

Question 17

The location problem

Answer 17

1) If mental states = brain states then they must have identical properties
2) The brain has spatial location
3) The mind does not
4) Mental states are not identical with brain states

Question 18

Functionalism

Answer 18

Something is what something does
Mental states can be analysed purely in terms of their function as a causal role between sensory inputs and behavioural outputs
Mental states = functional states

Question 19

How functionalism differs from behaviourism

Answer 19

Specifically accounts for the causal role of other mental states as both inputs and outputs
Avoids objections from circularity and multiple realisability as a result